Sommers Island: photo, internal structure. How to get there? Landing on Sommers Island. Mysterious Sommers Island Little Sommers Island

(text by authors photo rep)
and here is what fits in the psto:

Here they are the rocks in the northeastern tip, on which the paratroopers tried to land in a three-point wave.

The stones in the surf are all ideally run in by storms, polished by ice. They are covered with a thin, almost imperceptible layer of blue-green algae, which live in a dry state, waiting for storm waves to bring them life-giving moisture. But as soon as water gets on them, that's it, amba - the legs part. It is almost impossible not to walk, not to get out of the water without outside help during excitement.

Slippery coastal stones played their evil role in the landing on the rocky southeastern coast. It becomes clear why most of the Maxim heavy machine guns were drowned during the landing. And all the paratroopers were loaded with weapons and ammunition. In addition, they were fired from mortars, cannons and machine guns by the entire Finnish garrison of the island in 93 people from land, and Finnish gunboats from the sea.

On the granite rocks, traces of shell explosions are still visible.

On that day, there were waves with a force of three points - this is a wave height of up to 0.75 m. With masks and flippers, Zhenya and Sasha examine the underwater coastal part of the landing site. We are looking for items related to the landing, in order to find out the landing site and clarify the history of the events that took place here.

Aleksey compares our and Finnish data on losses in people and weapons. How many Finns captured Maxim machine guns. Like two. This means that the remaining eight were drowned during the landing. And no wonder. Maxim's weight as an assembly is 70 kg, even if the body of the machine gun is removed from the machine, then individually, each part still weighs more than 30 kg.

Zhenya surfaced and pulled out a six-kilogram bronze ring fastening of the reverse gear from under the water. After some time, I found the remains of an optical device, small parts from the engine. Traces of the paratroopers themselves have not yet been caught. Light green algae, which, like a long-haired carpet, tightly covers the entire bottom near the coastal part, interfere with looking for more. Fry and transparent shrimps dart around. The water warmed up to 20-22 degrees. Then they found a few more items: a bronze valve with a broken copper pipe, small engine fragments.

Torpedo boat G-5

Our historians have a discussion on how exactly the G-5 torpedo boat approached the shore. Aleksey reads in the documents that during the withdrawal after the landing, the torpedo boat flew ashore, since the reverse clutch of the left engine was turned back, and the right engine forward. We are trying to understand exactly how it looked based on the crevice we saw, where the boat was drowned. Could he cling to a stone in the middle of a small bay in which Sasha and Zhenya swam with a mask. What was the wind like? Aleksey immediately reads that the north and the waves are 3 points, respectively, there were problems with the approach to the shore.

And why are the remains of this boat lying in another part of the island? We came to the conclusion that the Finns after the war dragged the remains of the boats to a more convenient place for pulling ashore and subsequent cutting for recycling.

The third day is Wednesday.

On Wednesday after breakfast, armed with Finnish military photographs, we set off to search for a mass grave.

For half a day we were engaged in tying to the terrain using Finnish military photography. They figured it out this way and that. Oriented by the configuration of the stones and the location of the Finnish pillars and a shed for boat accessories. Now, of course, they are not. Therefore, they looked for hollowed holes in the rocks for the installation of pillars. They presumably determined the place, with the help of a pickaxe and shovels, they began to gouge holes in the pebbles.From the plexiglass found on the third floor in the locator post, we make a special tablet, scratching the main contours of the photograph with the tip of a knife. What would be directly through the plexiglass to impose the contour of the photo on the terrain. Which is what we did after dinner. Aleksey Mukhin, by this time, had already hollowed out a hole about a meter deep in the stone scree from cobblestones. For the sake of digging a hole, he even refused to go to lunch and was mercilessly burned in the sun. The outline on the plexiglass made it possible to more accurately determine the possible location of the mass grave.

Placed landmarks in the place where the boat shed stood

and telephone poles.

It was decided to dig another hole in the stones nearby, one and a half meters away.

They worked like this: one loosened the stones with a pick, after which large stones were thrown out with their hands, and a trifle was thrown out with a shovel.

Raking stones in a big way, there was such a ringing from a red-hot shovel that it was difficult to talk to each other. A group of war correspondents in the heat, drenched in sweat, filmed the process. Volodya and Igor took turns carrying a heavy camera on their shoulders and a tripod to it. Igor joined us with a pick, and then with a shovel in his hands he helped us as best he could. Hard labor continued until evening, and then Alexei came across a small bone-phalanx from a human finger. A rotten steel sleeve from a three-ruler was found nearby.

With tripled energy, they began to rip off the bridge between the pits, and two hours later the pits turned into a "trench for shooting from a standing horse." However, nothing else was found. It was clear that we were somewhere very close. But where? A mass grave cannot be small and it is difficult to lose it. More carefully examining the territory of the pebbly isthmus, littered by border guards, they found four rotten soldier mugs with the inscription LMZ (Lysevsky Metal Plant), the neck of a Soviet pre-war flask and several boots that were twisted and shriveled from time, suspiciously similar to naval boots from the war.

On the coastal part, under a pile of modern metal debris, pieces from a military boat were found.

Speed ​​screws made of steel. It looks like it was made during the war. Two powerful steering shafts. Wooden case.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time, we noticed that next to the pit we had torn apart, there was a pile of bricks. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

There was an assumption that perhaps our soldiers or border guards ennobled the burial with these bricks. With tripled energy, we expand and deepen the pit. Nothing. No signs. There is a stupor. It can’t be that the Finns would put an end to it and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. In a meter we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of control pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. There was an assumption that this is the desired place.

Perhaps the mass grave was moved, and ash and sawdust were poured into the pit so that they would not be blown away by the wind. And the bone from the finger remained on the surface and eventually fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that it is likely that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of the Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of the sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941-1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland were transferred here: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters. But this is to be checked in the military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater survey of the alleged place of death of the D-3 torpedo boat No. 22, which brought ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers. On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Right at the rocky shore, deep crevices 4-5 meters deep begin.

They managed to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, the remains of wooden sheathing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shells from a 45-mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a shell from 20 mm. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, shafts are bent.

Aleksey pulls one of the boat's propeller shafts ashore.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out from the crevices with an impromptu assembly tool. Storms and ice, even at depth, they are like a hammer hammered into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at a depth by huge boulders in several girths. These autumn and winter storms are a terrible force. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged away by storms to the depths.

Stone featured in archival photographs.

In fact, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - it is necessary to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with the next small parts of the boat: some kind of copper tubes, steel corners, wires in lead insulation. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. It wasn't there. Damned algae and slight excitement interfere.

We take the finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing subtly, holds her elbow with her hand. He had already crashed twice on the rocks while he was coming out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of the three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

In total, 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one type MO, five torpedo boats of the G-5 type, one torpedo boat of the D-3 type and one type Sh-4) and 3 torpedo boats of the G-5 type in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out under water in a crevice.

And here is a mysterious object close up, similar to a receiver from Maxim, among fry and Baltic shrimp.

Separate parts of the torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, raised from under the water.

Remains of propeller shafts, with a bronze bushing.

Next to him were objects clearly associated with the landing: opened zinc from cartridges to a three-ruler with heavy bullets mod. 1930 (there was a yellow stripe on the lid), a zinc lid for RGD-33 grenades and an insert in a zinc box with Kaveshnikov fuses for F-1 lemon grenades. Found two telecoils without cable. It is unlikely that this was thrown by post-war border guards, since all the items found were pre-war production (except for one telephone reel of 1942). Stunned by the struggle with stones in the scorching sun, we wander "Home" to the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue in the morning to deepen and widen the pit.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time, we noticed that next to the pit we had torn apart, there was a pile of bricks. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

There was an assumption that perhaps our soldiers or border guards ennobled the burial with these bricks. With tripled energy, we expand and deepen the pit. Nothing. No signs. There is a stupor. It can’t be that the Finns would put an end to it and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. In a meter we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of control pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. There was an assumption that this is the desired place.

Perhaps the mass grave was moved, and ash and sawdust were poured into the pit so that they would not be blown away by the wind. And the bone from the finger remained on the surface and eventually fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that it is likely that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of the Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of the sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941-1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland were transferred here: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters. But this is to be checked in the military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater survey of the alleged place of death of the D-3 torpedo boat No. 22, which brought ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers. On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Right at the rocky shore, deep crevices 4-5 meters deep begin.

They managed to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, the remains of wooden sheathing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shells from a 45-mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a shell from 20 mm. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, shafts are bent.

Aleksey pulls one of the boat's propeller shafts ashore.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out from the crevices with an impromptu assembly tool. Storms and ice, even at depth, they are like a hammer hammered into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at a depth by huge boulders in several girths. These autumn and winter storms are a terrible force. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged away by storms to the depths.

Stone featured in archival photographs.

In fact, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - it is necessary to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with the next small parts of the boat: some kind of copper tubes, steel corners, wires in lead insulation. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. It wasn't there. Damned algae and slight excitement interfere.

We take the finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing subtly, holds her elbow with her hand. He had already crashed twice on the rocks while he was coming out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of the three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

In total, 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one type MO, five torpedo boats of the G-5 type, one torpedo boat of the D-3 type and one type Sh-4) and 3 torpedo boats of the G-5 type in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out under water in a crevice.

There were episodes in the history of the Great Patriotic War, information about which was stored for many years in the bowels of the archives, inaccessible to the general public. Often these were evidence of mistakes made by the command during the hostilities, which cost the lives of many fighters. One of these operations - the landing on Sommers Island, the photo of which can be seen at the beginning of the article - was only recently covered in the press.

Fire barrier at the exit to the Baltic

In 1942, Soviet submarines stepped up their activities in the Baltic Sea, causing significant damage to the Germans on their main communications. But the passage of submarines from the Gulf of Finland to the waters of hostilities made it difficult for the enemy garrison, the location of which was the small island of Sommers. How to get to the central part of the Baltic, bypassing this region fraught with mortal danger - that was the task that required an immediate solution.

A year before, a Soviet unit was based on the island, but, due to a short-sighted decision of the command, it was abandoned, which was immediately taken advantage of by the Finns who fought on the side of Hitler. They placed their garrison there, consisting of ninety-two well-armed fighters, delivered artillery pieces and built four strongholds of defense, thus turning the small island into

Demoted Admiral

The weather in the summer of 1942 turned out to be clear, which allowed the Finns to constantly maintain visual control over the surface of the bay and record the movements of Soviet submarines in time. The command of the Baltic Fleet decided to land troops on Sommers Island and take it. The development of the landing plan was entrusted to the captain of the first rank G. I. Levchenko, who had previously been demoted from the admirals for leaving Kerch.

For the rehabilitation of Levchenko, a military operation successfully carried out under his leadership was necessary, therefore it was very important for him to organize a military expedition to Sommers Island, and he set about executing the order with all haste. But his haste let him down. In preparing the capture of the island, many important factors were not taken into account, which subsequently played a fatal role.

The garrison guarding the island

Based on erroneous intelligence, which they did not consider it necessary to double-check, the developers proceeded from the fact that the garrison consisted of only seventy people armed with two guns. As it turned out later, Sommers Island in the Gulf of Finland was defended by ninety-two people.

They had at their disposal twelve guns (two of which were larger than the cannons of Soviet boats), two large mortars, two anti-aircraft guns, as well as light and heavy machine guns. The Soviet landing on Sommers Island outnumbered the enemies - two hundred and fifty people armed with ten heavy machine guns participated in the landing, but they were significantly inferior to him in firepower.

Factors not taken into account when developing the plan

Intelligence did not cope with its task. The data she transmitted did not give a complete picture of how Sommers Island was defended. The internal structure of the protective structures erected on it was not presented when developing the plan for the landing of paratroopers. This greatly complicated the position of the paratroopers. In addition, they did not take into account the natural features that Sommers Island possessed.

Its internal geostructure is very complex. The broken coastline is a heap of rocks protruding from the water, the depth around which reaches five meters. Landing craft could not come close to land, and many fighters, under the weight of their equipment, drowned without reaching the shore. This led to a completely unjustified loss of human lives. Radio communication was not provided with the aviation supporting the landing force from the air.

Entering the sea landing ships

The operation began late in the evening on July 7, 1942. The ships with the Marines left Lavensaari and headed for Sommers Island. The Gulf of Finland on their way was continuously controlled by a group of aircraft, whose duty it was to warn the sailors in the event of the appearance of the enemy. At this time, Soviet bombers, accompanied by fighters, struck blow after blow on the island. They were replaced by attack aircraft, which carried out attacks from low altitudes. In response, the Finns opened powerful anti-aircraft fire.

In the shaky light of the white night, the boats approached the island, and the landing began. It turned out that it was impossible to land on the rocky shore, and the boats repeated the attempt several times under enemy fire. When unloading, they drowned the radio, thus remaining without radio communication. Even before they set foot on the island, the detachment suffered the first losses. Two boats were damaged by enemy fire.

Unsuccessful start of the operation

Landing on Sommers Island landed in several batches, as the ships approached. The white night, sung by poets, did the sailors a disservice. The surface of the bay was visible at a great distance, and each approaching boat was met by Finnish artillery fire. One of them, trying to get away from enemy shells, ran into stones. With great difficulty, it was possible to remove the crew and weapons from it.

Others had to, incurring losses, land fighters in places not provided for by the previously drawn up plan. The beginning of the operation did not portend its favorable outcome - out of two hundred and fifty-two participants in the operation, only one hundred and sixty-four landed on Sommers Island. The rest either died under enemy fire or drowned in the Baltic waves.

The Finnish command, having received a message about the attack by Soviet sailors, immediately sent significant reinforcements to help the island's garrison. Two and five patrol boats were sent to the combat zone. On the way to the island, they started a fight with Soviet torpedo boats, which, having received damage, did not manage to stop the enemy.

Capturing a stronghold of the Finns, and fighting in the air

By this time, the paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds with which the Finns fortified Sommers Island. The bunker was captured, and as a result of a fierce battle, out of twenty-six of its defenders, only three survived. The rest were killed. According to the plan, at this stage, the commander of the operation, Levchenko, was supposed to send them help, but, for unknown reasons, he did not, which put the attackers in a difficult position.

By the middle of the day, active hostilities were unfolding in the air. Soviet pilots delivered massive strikes on enemy positions and on his ships. Finnish aviation tried to attack boats approaching the island, some of which received significant damage. As a result of air raids, the ships of both sides received significant damage.

The second day of the assault on the island

By the morning of the next day, combat activity had somewhat decreased. This is due to the fact that the Soviet boats ran out of fuel, and the Finnish sailors by that time had shot all their ammunition. But at that time, the first of the German ships rushing to the aid of the Finns approached the island. It was minesweeper M 18.

By nine o'clock in the morning, events began to unfold in a direction unfavorable for the paratroopers. When approaching the island, he was hit and sank trying to deliver ammunition, which by that time were running out. The Finns, on the gunboat "Turunmaa" and additional boats, managed to transport a reinforcement company, consisting of one hundred and nine people, to Sommers Island. Their appearance immediately changed the balance of power, providing the enemy not only with firepower, but also with numerical superiority.

In the middle of the day, the landing of the reserve that had approached by that time began, but it was carried out, according to military historians, so unprofessionally and thoughtlessly that as a result of it there were only new unjustified victims. On the island itself, the battle continued with the same force. There was an urgent need to suppress the enemy mortar battery, but due to the lack of communication, the paratroopers could not contact either the aircraft or the crews of the boats located nearby.

In the ring of enemy ships

In the meantime, Sommers Island was surrounded by an increasingly dense ring of Finnish and German ships that had come up close. Their massive fire fell on both the marines fighting on the shore and on the ships supporting them. According to the data available to military historians, during the failed operation to capture this strategically important island, seven Soviet torpedo boats and one "small hunter" boat were sunk. In addition, the Kama gunboat, the base minesweeper, as well as many torpedo and other ships were seriously damaged. Four planes were shot down in the sky over the island.

The sad end of the operation

This incompetently prepared and planned landing ended tragically. The island remained in the hands of the Finns until 1944. The losses of our side, information about which was published only in recent years, amounted to three hundred and fifty-nine people killed and about a hundred wounded. The Finnish side lost one hundred and twenty-nine people in this battle.

Despite the fact that the operation to capture the island was completely failed, its direct participants cannot be blamed for this. They fulfilled their duty to the end. The blame lies with those who sent people to certain death, without providing them with the necessary means of combat, and without providing proper support for the large ships of the Baltic Fleet.

Today, this island, which has become a memorial to all those who died on its rocky shores, is visited by groups of tourists, whose trips are organized by Russian and Finnish travel companies.

On June 28, a Moscow-Beijing video bridge was held in the capital, dedicated to the results of joint Russian-Chinese research as part of the complex expedition of the Russian Geographical Society "Gogland". Participants of the environmental watch, which took place from 5 to 15 June 2017 on Sommers Island, spoke about the scientific results obtained and shared their impressions of the trip.

Since 2013, the Gogland expedition has been studying the Outer Islands of the Gulf of Finland, recognized as a real Terra Incognita of the North-West of Russia. Located within a radius of only 200 km from St. Petersburg, the islands at different times belonged to Sweden, Finland and Russia, but have never been the subject of systematic scientific research. This opened up unique perspectives for modern researchers in the field of geography, geology, flora and fauna, historical and cultural heritage.

In the press center of the Rossiya Segodnya MIA, the expedition was presented by the project coordinator, adviser to the editor-in-chief of the Rossiya Segodnya MIA Alexei Savitsky, head of the research group, geographer Anton Yurmanov, photographer, bild editor of the Russian Geographical Society Nikolai Razuvaev and correspondent of MIA Rossiya Segodnya today" Tatyana Zhirova. In Beijing, Zhang Guoyu, Secretary General of the Chinese Geographical Society, Zhang Xuanzi, Head of International Cooperation of the Secretariat of the Chinese Geographical Society, representatives of the Institute of Geography and Natural Resources of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Liu Xiaoqian and Zhu He, and an employee of Peking University Wu Xutong took part in the teleconference in Beijing.

– This year the expedition includes three islands: Bolshoy Tyuters, Gogland and Sommers. Now the shift is still going on at Bolshoy Tyuters and Gogland. Our part on Sommers ended on June 15th. This year we have chosen an island that has not previously been involved in the expedition. It is uninhabited, there is no permanent population, - the participants of the press conference say.

Sommers is a small island a little less than a kilometer long and 450 meters wide, which is part of the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland.

Head of the research team Anton Yurmanov noted that during the work of the expedition, a comprehensive environmental survey of Sommers Island was carried out.

“Despite the small territory, there are several types of natural complexes on the island: forest communities, swamps, fresh water bodies, meadows,” says Anton.

According to the geographer, scientists have recorded on Sommers about 150 species of higher plants, 25 species of birds, two species of mammals (northern leather seal and gray seal), two species of amphibians (common newt and gray toad), as well as a reptile - water snake. In addition, the island is located in the zone of the East Atlantic migration route, and accumulations of birds are possible on it during the migration period.

Thus, according to scientists, there is every reason to create a specially protected natural area on Sommers.

In addition to studying the ecological situation, the members of the expedition studied the military facilities of the Great Patriotic War that have been preserved here, and also cleared Sommers of garbage.

Concluding the teleconference, the representative of the Celestial Empire, Zhang Guoyu, noted that back in the 20th century, the Russian and Chinese Geographical Societies implemented joint projects. And in 2014, a cooperation agreement was signed between the organizations, within the framework of which expeditions and exhibitions are held. Chinese geographers are planning to invite colleagues from Russia to participate in joint expeditions, now on the territory of the Celestial Empire.

The expedition is carried out with the participation of the Expeditionary Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense, MIA "Rossiya Segodnya" and Leningrad State University named after A.S. Pushkin with the support of the Administration of the Leningrad Region, FGC "UES" and other organizations.

The longer you defend the rights, the more unpleasant the sediment.

The good combat activity of the Soviet army and navy in 1942 caused great damage to the transportation of strategic raw materials, troops and military supplies in Germany. The actions of Soviet submarines, torpedo boats and naval aviation in enemy communications created a great operational tension for all the forces and means of the German and Finnish navies in the Baltic. However, the path of our submarines and surface ships from the Gulf of Finland ran past Sommers, a small rocky island that occupies an important position, allowing the side that owns it to control the sea lanes between Leningrad and the central part of the Baltic Sea.

During the second half of 1941, there was a Soviet garrison on it, but then at the end of December, during the evacuation of Soviet troops from the Hanko Peninsula, the island was abandoned by our units and soon the Finns settled there. However, they did not manage to sit on a rocky piece of land blown by all the winds for a long time, and Sommers moved into the category of "no man's land".
But this did not last long: when Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters were captured, the island was occupied by units of the Finnish 22nd Coastal Guard Company, they equipped an observation post and a coastal battery. The island became an important point of the Finnish-German anti-submarine defense system in the Gulf of Finland. Standing white nights allowed enemy posts to control the surface situation around the clock. The Finnish command realistically assessed the possibility of a Soviet landing, so they built fortifications on the island.

Under the general supervision of the commander of the Kronstadt naval base, Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko developed a plan to capture Sommers, approved by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

(Overview map of the battles for clarity of where the landing operation took place from July 8 to 11, 1942.)

Unfortunately, during the development of the operation plan, a number of miscalculations were made. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. In fact, the Finns had a garrison of 92 people on Sommers with twelve guns (of which two 75-mm, superior in power to the guns of Soviet boats, three 45-mm and seven 20-mm anti-aircraft guns), two 81-mm mortars, seven heavy and five light machine guns.

To capture the island, a detachment of 256 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in people, the landing force was noticeably inferior to him in firepower. The reconnaissance also failed to uncover the enemy's defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The peculiarities of the coast of the island were not taken into account, which led to a tragedy - when landing, well-armed and equipped fighters who left the boats often drowned under the weight of ammunition. Interaction with aviation was also not worked out, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and the connection of paratroopers and sailors with pilots was not provided at all.

July 5, 1942 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was headed by the captain of the 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. Accordingly, four groups were formed.
By the end of July 7, all the forces intended for the operation were fully prepared, and at 23:33, landing of troops, loading of ammunition and special equipment began on Lavensari.
At 0030 hours, the landing boats (four patrol boats, seven torpedo boats) moved towards Sommers. Their transition was provided by patrols, and from 0 hours 35 minutes - by four fighters. By one o'clock in the morning, the cover detachment reached the assigned area.

At the same time, from 0040 to 0059 on July 8, twelve DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under cover of fighters, bombed the island in two waves from a height of 2300-4000 meters. The bombing was not very accurate - out of 120 dropped 100-kg bombs, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by two raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, which attacked from low altitudes in groups of three aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by Oerlikon anti-aircraft fire.

At 01:20, the landing groups turned around and went to the landing sites. The sea was relatively calm (waves up to 3 points), and visibility was just excellent. At a considerable distance - 20-30 cables - the Finns discovered Soviet boats and opened fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 meters and began the landing, which ended within just five minutes. But at the same time, the TK-152 torpedo boat and the MO-110 sea hunter were damaged.
The second group also had a hard time. Approaching the coast under fire, the sailors and paratroopers made sure that due to the large number of stones, the boats could not come close to the coastal rocks, and the depth near the coast was up to 5-10 meters. Some boats had to repeat this several times, under fire trying to find suitable places for landing. When unloading the radio station, it got wet, and it could not work. The commander of the landing detachment refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 4:40 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade. Losses grew - the hull was damaged on the TK-62 torpedo boat, and superstructures were damaged on the MO-402, the commander died on it, and four crew members were injured.

The third group was met with particularly intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and on the TK-121 torpedo boat, the motors with the clutches switched on in forward gear stalled, and when the motors were started, he sat down on the stones from the move. An attempt to save him after the landing was unsuccessful and he remained on the rocks. Fortunately, we managed to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of MO-413 from this group showed indecision and landed the fighters later than the rest, and he needed an additional order from V.A. Salamatina.

But the fourth group was in the most difficult position. Her ships were unable to suppress the enemy's firing points, meeting a strong rebuff. The commander made a decision - to parachute the fighters at the point intended for the third group. But when the boats with the landing force began to bypass from the west, the damaged TK-71 torpedo boat lagged behind. He had to land paratroopers "anywhere." During the withdrawal, he was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and his crew, under incessant shelling, switched to the TK-152 torpedo boat. The TK-131 torpedo boat also got it - its commander was killed, three paratroopers were killed and four wounded.

In total, out of 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers got on the island, 7 more were wounded on board the torpedo boat, and the MO-402 patrol boat did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned on landing. It was not possible to deliver a part of the machine guns to the shore.
The reaction of the Finns turned out to be very quick and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Sommers garrison, all available forces were thrown to his aid: the gunboats Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa, as well as five patrol boats. The Uusimaa was the first to arrive at the battlefield, which managed to repulse the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then came the Hämeenmaa and the patrol boats. During the battle with the Finnish gunboats, the TK-113 torpedo boat (commander - Senior Lieutenant A.I. Shumratov) was killed, which attacked the enemy together with the TK-73 boat. At about 3 hours 18 minutes, a prearranged signal was received from the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, which meant: "Fortified, please send a second echelon." However, in response to a request from Salamatin, Levchenko replied with a half-hour delay that the second echelon would be sent after the occupation of the island. And on Sommers there was a fierce battle.
The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Ityapyaya, all of whose guns were destroyed, and out of twenty-six defenders, only three managed to break through to their own. The rest were killed or wounded.
The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet aircraft delivered several strikes on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while the fighters repelled raids by Finnish aircraft that bombed the support forces. During one of them, the TK-33 torpedo boat from the cover detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat also suffered.
During the battles at Sommers, the messages that flowed to the headquarters of both sides contained, as a rule, greatly exaggerated information about the losses of the enemy, but for the Finns, who doubled their successes, this did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was sure that the enemy was being severely damaged and his ability to continue the fight was reduced. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats were damaged to varying degrees of severity, none of them were sunk.

Captain 1st rank Levchenko, realizing that the fighting turned out to be much more serious than planned, ordered the Kama gunboat to go to Sommers. Four torpedo boats and five patrol boats were sent from Lavensari to reinforce the fighting forces. The enemy also hastily sent additional forces - a detachment of German minesweepers.

In the morning hours of July 8, the activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats were running out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats, which had rendered great assistance to the garrison of the island, shot almost all the ammunition. But the first of the German ships that took part in it, the minesweeper M18, approached the battle site. At 8 hours 48 minutes, the Soviet fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers, a torpedo boat TK-22, which was trying to deliver ammunition to the paratroopers, caught fire and exploded from shells.
By 11:30 a.m., the Finns managed to transfer a company of 109 people on the gunboat "Turunmaa" and eight boats to help their garrison. The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation, the Soviet landing was in a difficult situation. Now on the side of the enemy was not only fire, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his gunboats supported their troops with the fire of medium-caliber guns, while the Soviet boats had only small-caliber guns.

The Kama, sent to Sommers, was escorted by minesweepers, the speed of which with the set trawls was very low. And although the Soviet coastal battery with Lavensari entered the battle in the afternoon, its fire was not corrected and was unlikely to be of particular benefit to the paratroopers. The approaching "Kama" had to direct almost all of its firepower against the Finnish ships.

At 2:30 p.m., the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin ordered to start landing a reserve in the amount of 57 submachine gunners, loading a radio station and food onto torpedo boats TK-11, TK-30 and TK-101. At about 4 p.m., they headed for Sommers and after about 45 minutes, under the fire of Finnish ships, they approached its eastern shore and began disembarking fighters and unloading ammunition. During the landing under enemy fire, 13 people were killed. True, 23 wounded were removed from the shore. From them it became known that a heavy battle was going on on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy's mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other fighters on the shore. Already on the retreat from the Finnish coastal guns, the TK-31 torpedo boat was hit and exploded. It seems that the Soviet command was not preparing for serious battles on Sommers, and there were no units on Lavensari that could be sent to help the landed units without the threat of weakening the defenses of the base itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing force in a timely manner, and then it was too late - German and Finnish aircraft, ships, boats and guns of the island garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supplies, removal of the wounded, and then the evacuation of the surviving soldiers impossible.

By the evening of July 8, instead of the Kama gunboat, on which both main battery guns had failed, the Burya patrol ship and the base minesweepers T-205 Gafel and T-207 Spiel entered the battle. But their help was clearly too late. By this time, Sommers was approached by Finnish minelayers Riilahti and Routsinsalmi and German ships - the Ost floating battery, the Nettelbeck floating base and the M37 minesweeper, which replaced the M18, which suffered from Soviet air raids. Minesweeper M37 took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. From it, a shock detachment of ten people formed on the ship was sent ashore, as well as several boxes of hand grenades, which the garrison needed.

On the night of July 9, the Soviet command made a last attempt to rectify the situation. Torpedo boats launched by the Burya patrol ship together with the T-207 minesweeper were thrown into the attack on enemy ships. Three boats managed to fire one torpedo each, but they did not reach their targets, and two boats were hit. An attempt to deliver ammunition to the island on three patrol boats also ended in failure. From a shell hit, it exploded and died with everyone on board, including the commander of the landing detachment, captain of the 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, sea hunter MO-306. And although skirmishes between enemy ships continued all day, the position of the landing force on the island became hopeless.

On July 9, at 12:30 pm, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector reported by radiogram to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, and the commander of the main base, Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, about the situation in the area of ​​the Lavensari and Sommers islands. The report stated that there were no forces and means to continue the operation, and there had been no military operations on Sommers itself since 0000 on July 9. At 19:20 G.I. Levchenko received a new message, which, in particular, said: “... No movement was detected on the island. If a landing is detected, I will continue the operation to capture ".

All day on July 10, naval battles and air strikes on ships were going on in the area of ​​​​the island, TK-83 and TK-123 torpedo boats were killed on our side. Attempts to land reconnaissance groups on the island ended in vain. On the night of July 11, the operation was terminated, all Soviet ships were returned to base.

Lack of strength and lack of necessary experience prevented success. The landing party died. There were no rescued, except for 23 wounded, who were evacuated on the evening of July 8. During the operation, seven Soviet torpedo boats and the boat "small hunter" were sunk, the base minesweeper, ten torpedo boats, five patrol boats, and five other boats were damaged. The gunboat "Kama" was out of order due to technical malfunctions.
Sommers Island remained in enemy hands. Strong minefields were hastily erected around it by the Finns and Germans. The island remained in the hands of the Finns until the withdrawal of Finland from the war in September 1944, representing a serious obstacle to the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

In July 1942, the command of the Baltic Fleet made an attempt to capture Sommers Island. The lack of the necessary experience and lack of strength did not allow success then. For many years, the details of this landing were kept in the bowels of the archive ...

Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. the situation in the Baltic became aggravated again in the summer, when Soviet submarines began to operate on the enemy's communications. However, their path from the Gulf of Finland ran past Sommers - a small rocky island *.

During the second half of 1941, the Soviet garrison was on it, but then at the end of December the island was abandoned by our units and soon the Finns settled there. However, they did not succeed in sitting for a long time on a rocky piece of land blown by all the winds, and Sommers moved into the category of "no man's land". But this did not last long: when Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters were captured, the island was occupied by units of the Finnish 22nd coast guard company. Standing white nights allowed enemy posts to control the surface situation around the clock. And therefore, under the general supervision of the commander of the Main Base of the Fleet ** Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko, a plan was developed to capture it, approved by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko. By the beginning of the war, he had the rank of vice admiral and was deputy people's commissar of the Navy, participated in organizing the defense of Nikolaev and Odessa. October 22, 1941 by the decision of the Stavka G.I. Levchenko was appointed commander of the Crimean troops. But the battles that unfolded there were unsuccessful for the Soviet units, and on the night of November 16, the troops of the 51st Army left Kerch. On November 19, the post of commander of the Crimean troops was liquidated, and on December 1, Levchenko was arrested by the NKVD. On January 24, 1942, he was expelled from the CPSU (b), and on January 29 he was sentenced to 10 years with the deprivation of all awards. But unlike many commanders, whose fate was tragic, the admiral's petition for pardon on January 31 was granted. On February 2, he was reinstated in the party (albeit with a severe reprimand). And although the former deputy people's commissar was demoted in rank to captain 1st rank, deprived of all awards and decided to be used in a lower job, his criminal record was removed. In March 1942, he headed the Leningrad naval base. He was appointed commander of the Kronstadt naval base on June 25, 1942. So Gordey Ivanovich needed success, as they say, desperately ...

Unfortunately, during the development of the operation plan, a number of miscalculations were made. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. In fact, the Finns had a garrison of 92 people on Sommers with twelve guns (of which two 75-mm, superior in power to the cannons of Soviet boats, three 45-mm and seven 20-mm anti-aircraft guns), two 81-mm mortars, seven heavy and five light machine guns. To capture the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in people, the landing party was noticeably inferior to him in firepower.

The reconnaissance also failed to uncover the enemy's defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The features of the coast of the island were not taken into account, which led to a tragedy - when landing, well-armed and equipped fighters who left the boats often drowned under the weight of ammunition. Interaction with aviation was not worked out either, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and the connection of the paratroopers (as well as the sailors) with the pilots was not provided at all.

July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was headed by Captain 2nd Rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the diagram.

By the end of July 7, all the forces intended for the operation were completely ready, and at 23:33, landing, loading of ammunition and special equipment began on Lavensaari. At 00:11 on July 8, the landing on the boats was completed, after another two minutes the ships began to enter the raid. At 00:30, the landing parties moved towards Sommers. Their passage was provided by patrols, and from 00:35 - by four fighters. By one o'clock in the morning, the cover detachment reached the assigned area. At the same time, from 00:40 to 00:59, 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, attacked the island in two waves from a height of 2300-4000 m. The bombing was not very accurate - out of 120 dropped 100-kg bombs, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by 2 raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, which attacked from low altitudes in groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by fire from 20-mm Oerlikons.

Landing on Sommers Island

Group II also had a hard time. Approaching the shore under fire, the sailors and paratroopers made sure that the boats could not stick close to it. Some of them had to repeat this several times, under fire trying to find suitable places for landing. When unloading the radio station, it was either wet, or the batteries were drowned and it could not work. The commander of the landing detachment refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 04:04 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade. Losses grew - the hull was damaged on the torpedo boat No. 62, and the superstructures on the MO-402, the commander died on it, and 4 crew members were injured.

"Moshki" on patrol

But the fourth group was in the most difficult position. Her ships were unable to suppress the enemy's firing points, meeting a strong rebuff. The commander made a decision - to parachute the fighters at the point intended for the III group. But when the boats with the landing force began to bypass, from the west, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 lagged behind. He had to land the paratroopers "anywhere." During the withdrawal, he was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and his crew, under incessant shelling, switched to torpedo boat No. 152. Torpedo boat No. 131 also got it - its commander was killed, 3 were killed and 4 paratroopers were wounded.

In total, out of 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers got on the island, 7 more were injured on board the torpedo boat, and the MO-402 patrol boat did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned on landing. It was not possible to deliver a part of the machine guns to the shore (apparently, a large one, since it was simply unthinkable to sail with the Maxims).

Torpedo boat with landing

Finnish gunboat "Uusimaa" (of the same type "Hameenmaa")

At about 03.18, a prearranged signal was received from the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, which meant: "Fortified, please send a second echelon." However, in response to a request from Salamatin, Levchenko replied with a half-hour delay that the second echelon would be sent after the occupation of the island. And on Sommers there was a fierce battle. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Ityapyaya, all the guns of which were destroyed, and out of 26 defenders, only three managed to cling to their own. The rest were killed or wounded.

The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet aircraft made several attacks on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while the fighters repelled raids by Finnish aircraft that bombed the support forces. During one of them, torpedo boat No. 33 from the cover detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat were also damaged.

Boat KM №911 puts a smoke screen

In the morning hours of July 8, the activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats were running out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats, which had rendered great assistance to the garrison of the island, shot almost all the ammunition. But the first of the German ships that took part in it, the minesweeper "M 18", approached the battlefield.

German minesweeper type M. "M 18" and "M 37" belonged to this type

At 14.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, which was part of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin ordered to start landing a reserve in the amount of 57 machine gunners, loading a radio station and food onto torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101. At about 16.00 they headed for Sommers and about 45 minutes later, under fire from Finnish ships, approached its eastern shore and began disembarking fighters and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that it happened during the day, everything was organized very badly - again, like at night, they drowned the radio station, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, 23 wounded were removed from the shore. From them it became known that a heavy battle was going on on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy's mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other fighters on the shore. Already on the retreat, he received a hit and exploded torpedo boat No. 31.

Torpedo boat at the pier of Lavensaari island

By the evening of July 8, instead of the gunboat "Kama", on which both guns of the main caliber had failed, the patrol ship (according to Western classification - a destroyer) "Storm" and base minesweepers (ships of special construction, which had strong artillery weapons) entered the battle. -205 Gafel and T-207 Spiel. But their help was clearly too late. By this time, Sommers was approached by the Finnish minelayers "Riilahti" and "Routsinsalmi", and German ships - the floating battery "SAT 28" ("Ost"), the floating base (tender) "Nettelbeck" and the minesweeper "M 37", which replaced its colleague " M 18", which was badly damaged by Soviet air raids. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times, he approached the shore at 500 m. His crew decided to demonstrate to the Finns their "brotherhood in arms": a shock detachment of 10 people formed on the ship was sent to the shore, as well as several boxes of hand grenades, which the garrison needed.

Soviet base minesweepers

Soviet torpedo boats go on the attack

In these battles, seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were killed. The base minesweeper was damaged, and the gunboat "Kama" was practically out of order due to technical malfunctions - although one of the guns was put into operation, the steering failed and the boat was inactive for a long time and had to be towed. Only on the first day of the fighting, 10 torpedo, 5 patrol and 5 other types of boats were damaged.

But it seemed to the Finns that this was not enough, so they "enrolled in the list of their victories" 8 ships and boats sunk by coastal artillery, the fleet reported about 7 destroyed Soviet boats, and chalked up another gunboat (Volga) and 2 boats Finnish aviation. The Finns and the Germans acknowledged the damage to the minesweeper "M 18", the gunboats "Hämeenmaa" and "Turunmaa" and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army lost 15 killed and 45 wounded, while the navy lost 6 killed and 18 wounded. They estimated the Soviet losses in people as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and approximately 200 more people who drowned along with the lost ships. After the end of the fighting, the Finns covered Sommers with minefields and he remained under their control until Finland's withdrawal from the war in September 1944.

Although the operation to capture Sommers failed, it is unlikely that anyone today will turn their tongues to disrespect the direct participants in the fighting. Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the inadequacy of Soviet soldiers with special landing craft, the passivity of large ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ineffectiveness of fire from coastal batteries, the Swiss historian Y. Meister, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet Union, was forced to admit: the crews of the torpedo boats fought very bravely, but they failed to save the day in this mismanaged operation."

* The length of the island is about 950 m, the width is about 450 m.
** So from June 1942 the Kronstadt naval base became officially known