Torpedo boats island ezel august 1941. Book of memory and glory

The Moonsund Archipelago is a group of islands in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, separating it from the waters of the Gulf of Riga. In total, the archipelago includes over 500 islands, including 4 large ones: Saaremaa (Ezel), Khiuma (Dago), Muhu (Moon) and Vormsi. The geographical position of the Moonsund Islands, separated from the mainland by the rather narrow straits of Soela-Väin and Muhu-Väin, made them extremely important in terms of military control, both over the Gulf of Riga and, in general, over the eastern Baltic.

Until the First World War, the Moonsund Archipelago belonged to the Russian Empire. In September-October 1917, as a result of the Moonsund operation, Kaiser Germany was able to capture the archipelago. But German control of the archipelago was short-lived. According to the results of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920, the islands came under the jurisdiction of the newly independent Estonia.

In 1940, after the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR, the Moonsund archipelago again returned under the control of the Russian state represented by the Soviet Union.

The Second World War, which had begun by that time, again aggravated the importance of the archipelago in the military-geographical sense. In the same 1940, the formation of units of the coastal defensive Baltic region (BOBR) began. On the islands, the construction of coastal fortifications, equipping positions for coastal batteries, as well as equipping bases for the Baltic Fleet began. Unfortunately, our country did not have time to fully implement all the planned work by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. It was possible to equip a significant defense system only in the western and northwestern directions. From the side of the mainland, the islands were actually not protected. But even in its incomplete state, the defensive area on the Moonsund Archipelago had a significant impact on the course of events in the first months of the War.

The exceptional military significance of the archipelago was well understood by the German command. Attempts to destroy the infrastructure on the islands began from the very first days of the War. German aviation repeatedly tried to crush the defenses of the archipelago, but the Reich command did not dare to large-scale landing operations.

Starting in July 1941, all military units, including the fleet and aviation, were reassigned to the commandant of the archipelago, General Eliseev.

Also, the BOBR troops were entrusted with the following tasks:

1. Defend the Moonsund Islands.
2. Intermittent actions to disrupt enemy sea communications in the Gulf of Riga and the Irben Strait.
3. Provide minesweeping, anti-submarine defense and other types of defense in your area.
4. Ensure access to the Baltic Sea and the return of submarines, which could enter the Baltic Sea and return to their bases only through Moonsund and Soela Väin.

The first months of the War were extremely difficult for our country. A series of defeats and retreat on all fronts affected the morale of the army. Germany was already rejoicing in anticipation of an early victory. July 22, 1941 was the first massive raid on Moscow. The Goebbels department trumpeted the imminent victory of the Reich and the complete defeat of Soviet aviation.

The fallacy of such statements was soon refuted by Soviet pilots. By the end of July 1941, the only territory not captured by the Germans, from which our aircraft could attack Berlin, remained the Moonsund Archipelago. Then the Headquarters decided to deliver such a strike. The necessary material and technical means were secretly transferred to the islands, and the airfields of the archipelago were expanded for long-range aviation. On August 7, 1941, the 1st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet, based on Ezel Island, launched the first bombing strike on Berlin. In total, in August, the Baltic pilots made about 10 massive raids. The actions of our aviation dealt a serious blow to the reputation of the Goebbels department and infuriated Hitler, while dispelling the myth of the invincibility and invulnerability of the Reich.

Despite the fact that Riga was abandoned by the Soviet troops on July 1, 1941, the German command was able to start the operation to capture the Moonsund Islands only in September 1941. All this time, the aviation of the BOBR and the naval forces to a large extent fettered the actions of the German fleet in the eastern Baltic, thereby gaining invaluable time to prepare the defense of Leningrad.

The position of the defenders of the archipelago was seriously complicated when Tallinn fell. The Soviet command, under the threat of a complete blockage of the Baltic Fleet in the waters of the Gulf of Riga, was forced to withdraw ships based on the Moonsund Islands to Kronstadt and Leningrad. Thus, the garrison defending Moonsund was actually isolated from supplies from the mainland.

On September 14, 1941, enemy troops landed on the island of Muhu in two places - Kuyvaste and Kalaste. The garrison of the island, consisting of two battalions of the 79th Rifle Regiment and a couple of incomplete engineering and construction companies, put up stubborn resistance, almost completely destroying the landing at Calaste. At Kuivaste, the Germans entrenched themselves and, having transferred more than four battalions there in a day, went on the offensive.

On the morning of the same day, the enemy made another attempt to land on the southeastern coast of Saaremaa with more than 40 ships. Attacking from two directions, the Germans were rebuffed everywhere. Accurate fire from coastal batteries sank 12 boats and 2 trawlers, up to 20 other ships were damaged, and the survivors hurried to retreat.

At the same time, the Nazis twice made an airborne landing on the Kyubassar peninsula, but they were all destroyed by the personnel of the coastal battery No. 43. Later, when the enemy invaded the island of Saaremaa, the soldiers of the battery again showed examples of courage and heroism. Once in complete encirclement, they fought to the last shell, and then fought their way out of the encirclement..

It was a hero battery. Its commander, senior lieutenant V.G. Bukotkin, being wounded (he received eleven shrapnel wounds), continued to command the battery until he lost consciousness. After the battery soldiers retreated to the Syrve Peninsula, Bukotkin, still recovering from his wounds, continued to lead the actions of the coastal battery.

When repelling enemy landings, the Muhu garrison defended literally every inch of land. A detachment of volunteers came to his aid from the island of Saaremaa. The fighting on the island lasted for three days, the defending units suffered heavy losses and on September 17, by order of the command, they retreated to Saaremaa along the Orissar dam, after which they blew it up.

Even blocking the Red Army units, the Germans failed to achieve a quick victory here. By the end of September, about 1,500 people remained in the ranks of the defenders of the archipelago with weak weapons and an insignificant supply of ammunition. There were no more equipped defense lines on the peninsula, so the command of the Baltic defensive region decided to leave the Syrve peninsula. Its defenders withdrew to Cape Tserel and from there they began to evacuate to the island of Hiiumaa on torpedo boats and motorboats. But most of the soldiers could not be transported. Due to the storm and the incessant shelling from the enemy, the boats sent to rescue them could not reach the Syrve peninsula. On October 4, the last telegram from the archipelago was received in Moscow, after which communication with the defenders of the island of Saaremaa was interrupted. The Moonsund defensive operation lasted more than a month and a half and was completed on October 22, 1941, when the remnants of the units defending the archipelago were evacuated to the Hanko Peninsula and Kronstadt.

And although it was not possible to hold the islands, their heroic defense seriously influenced the course of events in the Leningrad direction. The defenders of Moonsund managed to pin down the significant forces of Army Group North, as well as limit the actions of the German fleet in the Baltic. All this, in turn, made it possible to better prepare Leningrad for defense and maintain the combat capability of significant forces of the Baltic Fleet.

During the offensive of 1941, German troops advanced significantly eastward in the Leningrad direction and almost completely blocked the "northern capital", but they still failed to achieve their main goals. Leningrad survived, and the Baltic Fleet survived along with it. Although the Baltics suffered serious losses, the fleet remained a serious force capable of radically changing the balance of power in the Baltic Sea. By mid-1942, the front finally stabilized. The relative calm continued until the beginning of 1944.

Khiuma was defended by insignificant forces - only about 4,000 people. The garrison was commanded by Colonel A. S. Konstantinov, the military commissar was the regimental commissar M. S. Bilenko, and the chief of staff was Colonel P. V. Savelyev.
When the enemy began to land simultaneously in three directions, it was difficult for the commandant to decide where to throw his insignificant forces. The landing began at dawn on October 12, seven days after the end of the fighting on Sarem; it took the enemy a whole week to concentrate sufficient forces here. Large units of the 217th Infantry Division, concentrated on Sarema, Vormsi and on the coast of the mainland, were prepared for landing on Khium. The troops were supported by aircraft, destroyers and light cruisers. During the battles for Khiuma, a group of enemy ships "Westfallen" consisting of the cruiser "Cologne", destroyers "T-2", "T-5", "T-7", "T-8", seven base minesweepers was located at Cape Ristna . Another group, "Ostpreisen", as part of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, was located off the east coast of the island.
On the night of October 12, observers on the southern bank of Khium noticed an unusual animation and the light of many car headlights on Sarem. At dawn, almost in the dark, the enemy, hiding behind the hurricane fire of his artillery, began to force the bay. Six airborne detachments went to the area occupied by the 33rd engineer battalion and the 44th battery. The battery immediately, at the maximum rate of fire, opened fire. Precisely sent shells swept boats and boats from the water surface. Field guns, machine guns, and machine guns also entered the battle. Four landing units were defeated.
The enemy directed his efforts to the left flank of the Terkma sector, where there were no our troops and where the battery fire did not reach. Soon the Nazis landed on the right flank of the site, near the village of Nurste. The battalion commander A.P. Morozov threw his reserve into battle. At dawn, enemy planes appeared. Communication with the companies was broken; company and platoon commanders now acted independently. A detachment of Captain Goryunov, numbering 150 people, was advanced to the village of Valga. For two days the heroes fought on this line, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. Being wounded, Goryunov continued to command the detachment. A brave and courageous man, a communist, he died heroically in battle.
The fascists were prevented from developing success by the battery of Captain F.N. Volkov. The cruiser and destroyers of the enemy opened fire on it, at the same time they fired guns from Sarem, and aircraft bombed. Against Kataev's battery, directly into the area of ​​​​the firing position, the enemy threw part of the landing force. Machine gunners and projectorists protected the battery with rifle and machine gun fire and grenades, gunners fired at the infantry at point-blank range. The whole day the fighters held back the onslaught of the enemy. The enemy group captured the battery barracks; a few volleys - and the barracks, together with the Nazis, flew into the air. The same thing happened with the barn, where the Nazis broke into. Fierce fighting went on for about a day. Up to three hundred enemy soldiers were destroyed on the approaches to the battery.

“I am surrounded,” Kataev informed, “I am fighting. The enemy at the wire fence. I am under fire, aircraft bomb, I burn codes. Let's be open."

With the onset of darkness, the surviving gunners blew up the guns, cleared their way with bayonets and grenades in order to retreat north to the Tahkun battery.
In conditions of almost complete encirclement, the company of Captain M.I. Golovan from the 36th engineering and construction battalion made its way to the north. Colonel Konstantinov reported:

“For two days, the soldiers of Captain Golovan held back the onslaught of the enemy. On October 15, having destroyed over three hundred Nazis, several anti-tank guns and five tankettes, they went on the offensive. The next day, when the Germans sent a battalion to the rear of the detachment, Golovan was ordered to retreat to Tahkuna. On the night of October 17, the brave commander with 120 fighters and a 76-millimeter cannon broke through the enemy ring with a fight. In the battles for Kyaynu and Nymba, the enemy lost more than seven hundred people killed.

Until October 20, there were fierce, bloody battles. General Kabanov was ordered to begin evacuation from Khium. The chief of staff of the Hanko naval base, Captain 1st Rank P. G. Maksimov, who flew in to draw up a preliminary evacuation plan together with the commandant of the island, was also here. For three nights, starting from October 19, boats and motorized boats approached the island under shelling and bombing.
For three days, the Khankovites took out the defenders of Khium. In the last days of the fighting, they took people who stood chest-deep in water, but continued to fight with the Nazis. More than six hundred people were evacuated to Hanko and Osmussar.
The last battle at Tahkuna was fought by only a few sailors who managed to retreat along the rocky ridge to the sea. They fought to the death. The last survivor climbed the forty-meter lighthouse. In front of the eyes of the Nazis, he rushed down from the lighthouse platform. The name of the hero is still unknown.

On Search Movement Forum Anna Akhmedovna Zeil calls the name of this sailor - Nikolay Chizh.

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Current page: 11 (total book has 17 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 12 pages]

Following the scouts, Hauptmann Pankov, who temporarily commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Infantry Division, ordered his battalion to cross the dam on the morning of September 16 and seize a bridgehead on the eastern coast of the island of Saaremaa. Due to the fact that the bridgehead on the eastern coast of Saaremaa was captured, the operation to force the Veike Vein Strait was canceled, and the German units took turns crossing the dam to Saaremaa. Until 8 p.m., four German battalions were already operating on this island.

On this day, the story of the missing fifth boat of the German special forces was continued. The pilots who attacked the battery on Kubassar reported that they saw two people in German uniforms who gave them signs. A message was sent to them, and they confirmed by the signs specified in it that there were no Soviet units in this place. For their evacuation, two He-59 seaplanes from the 9th Marine Squadron of the Search and Rescue Service were involved. The operation to rescue his soldiers was led by Hauptmann Benes. After splashing down on these aircraft, rifle and machine-gun fire was opened. One plane burned down, and the second flew away. Pilot Oberfeldwebel P. Todte and observer pilot Lieutenant H. Sepke were wounded 273
Strelbitsky K. B. Losses of the German air force during the struggle for the Moonsund Islands September 9 - October 21, 1941. Forum Tsushima. http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=1041&p=6

Hauptmann Benesh found two of his soldiers in the reeds and took them and two wounded pilots out to sea in two inflatable boats, where they were picked up by a naval aircraft. Both survivors said that while descending to the boat they were seized and shot in the back, pretending to be dead, they then hid in the reeds.

The Kriegsmarine, despite a significant wave, systematically carried out the movement of ships between Virtsu and Kuivastu along the corridor created by German minesweepers. The German command concentrated the main efforts of the minesweepers on creating a corridor safe from mines in order to lead the landing flotilla to the north, for the future landing operation on Hiiumaa. At the same time, the commander of the German minesweeping forces in the Gulf of Riga repeated diversion operations as part of Operation Svedwind. These operations were now carried out without the tug caravans and coasters of the Ostsee IO, as they were already participating in the shuttle service to Mukha.

During the day, Air Command "B" concentrated its main efforts on ensuring the crossing of its infantry through the dam and seizing a bridgehead on the eastern coast of Saaremaa. In addition, anti-aircraft batteries were suppressed on the western edge of Triigi Bay and on Hiiumaa near Heltermaa. Vessels in the bay of Triigi were bombed, as a result of which KTShch No. 1306, 1307, 1309, 1310, 1318 sank; the last boat MO-216, minesweeper No. 81, tugboat KP-11, transport "Volkhov" 274
TsVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 100. L. 13–14.

The Germans lost 1 Bf-109 and 1 He-59 naval aircraft that day.

Table 14

In the operational summary of the General Staff of the Red Army, the course of the fighting on the island of Muhu is reflected as follows: “No. 172 on 20.00 16.09. Moon, Kubusar peninsula (northern - eastern part of Ezel island), there are fierce battles in which both sides suffer heavy losses. The enemy tried to land troops in the bay of Lyu on the west coast of about. Ezel with 6 transports, 8 destroyers and 11 torpedo boats. The landing was repulsed, while 1 destroyer and 4 transports with enemy troops were destroyed, of which 3 transports with a displacement of 8000 tons and one 4000 tons.

No. 176 on 20.00 18.09.1941: “On September 15, the enemy, with the support of ships and aircraft, landed troops up to two regiments. Our units with heavy fighting retreated to the Orissar dam. Enemy attempts to land an amphibious assault on the Kubasar Peninsula (Ezel Island) were repulsed, while transport, 80 boats and boats were sunk, transport, a destroyer were damaged, and an enemy plane was shot down. Landed enemy airborne troops on 7 gliders were destroyed. During 16.9, up to 90 enemy aircraft bombarded ships and coastal defense units on about. Ezel. Losses are specified " 275
Information provided by K. B. Strelbitsky.

Ezel (September 17–23)

By the beginning of the fighting on Saaremaa, German troops, taking advantage of the confusion in the units of Soviet troops retreating from Muhu, crossed to the eastern coast of Saaremaa along the dam. All possible reserves were thrown against the Germans: the 1st local Estonian rifle battalion, a cavalry detachment, a chemical company and the 10th sapper company. But attempts to dislodge the Germans from the bridgehead did not lead to success. Scattered attacks of the Soviet troops were repulsed. German aviation took an active part in the battles.

After leaving the Orissarian positions, the Germans could not be stopped at the second line of defense either. Coastal Defense Commandant General Eliseev in his reports 276
The first report was made immediately upon arrival in Leningrad in October 1941 by the commandant of the BOBR, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service Eliseev, and the commissar of the BOBR, divisional commissar Zaitsev. The second report was made at the training camp of the command staff of the KBF in March 1942 by the commandant of the BOBR, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service Eliseev.

and report 277
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528.

The main reason for this failure is the betrayal of the battalion, created from the mobilized Estonians. In the second report, he points out: “The Estonian reserve battalion located in Paide was thrown into battle under the Pumale semi-manor - a dam, at the first contact with the enemy, without a fight, completely in the amount of 1350 people went over to the side of the enemy, as a result of this, the enemy broke through the Orissar position and began to spread one a group to the south, to Kyubassar, the second to the north-west towards Triga " 278
TsVMA RF. F. 161 Op. 6. D. 26. L. 34.

However, this fact is not confirmed in German documents and memoirs.

The author has at his disposal combat logs XXXXII AK and 61st Infantry Division, books on the history of the 61st Infantry Division and 151st Infantry Division, written by direct participants in the battles, including the commander of the 151st Infantry Division Oberst Meltzer. None of the sources mentions the mass surrender of the Red Army from September 14 to October 4, 1941, and even more so about the transition to their side of the Soviet battalion in full force. The version about the transition of the Estonian battalion to the side of the Germans is not confirmed in Estonian sources either. The Estonian historian Maelis Maripuu describes these events as follows: “After the German troops quickly crossed the Väike-Väin Strait, the defenses of the Red Army collapsed, and a rapid retreat began. Local mobilized servicemen, when sent to battle, gradually, at the first opportunity, left the Soviet units and surrendered to the Germans. One part managed to get civilian clothes from local residents and quietly cross the front line. In the German rear, they began to move towards their native places. By this time, the patrols of the formed Omakaitse were already patrolling the roads. Their task was to detain those who came from the Red Army. It was especially difficult for those who lived on the island of Muhu to go home, because the dam across the Väike-Väin Strait was guarded by Omakaitse. They turned a blind eye to the fellow villagers who returned home and let them go in peace” 279
Maripuu M. Esimene nõukogude aasta Saaremaal // Saaremaa. 2. Ajalugu. Mayandus. culture. Tallinn, 2007 (translated from Estonian by E. Kubi).

Does not confirm the version of the transition in full force to the side of the Germans and the veteran of this battalion A. Klaas 280
Klaas A. In those days... / Kadakaste saarte kaitsel. - Tallinn, 1966 (Fortress at sea, collection). S. 37.

The death of the "Estonian" battalion, as well as other parts of the reserve, probably occurred from the bombing and assault strikes of German aircraft. The reasons for the death of the cavalry detachment are visible in the dialogue between Vasily Riis and the commandant of Kuressaare, Major Fedorov, cited in the memoirs of the former. He writes: “... I met the commandant of the city. “You know, our cavalry squad…” he began, but I could not listen to him until the end. His face and tone already said it all. "I know!" I interrupted. “Two planes and ten minutes were enough ... The times of the cavalry were over,” the commandant continued stubbornly. And with amazing clarity, the fresh faces of the horsemen stood before my eyes in the morning. 281
Rhys V. In the line of fire / Kadakaste saarte kaitsel. - Tallinn, 1966 (Fortress at sea, collection). S. 37.

The 161st reconnaissance battalion of the 61st infantry division, which launched an attack on Kihelkona, struck at the gap between the Soviet units.

During September 17, the Germans continued to expand the bridgehead on Saaremaa and reached the line east of Triigi-Kardya-Mustla, cutting off Soviet units on the Kubassar peninsula. On the same day, Muhu was finally captured. To clean it up and create Estonian self-defense (under German control), the 3rd battalion of the 311th division of the 217th division was transferred to the island from Virtsu. The personnel of the 85th local rifle company of the KBF, the 43rd coastal battery and a detachment from the rifle battalion of captain Ogorodnikov continued to defend themselves on the Kubassar peninsula, cut off from their troops.

On the night of September 17-18, the infantry regiments of the 61st Infantry Division repelled numerous Soviet counterattacks. In the north of the island, a column of Soviet units, defending the northeastern part of the island, broke through the positions of the 176th regiment. The basis of this grouping was the 1st Sat of the 46th Rifle Regiment and, probably, the sailors of the Okhr Kuivastu. The losses of the 176th regiment during the reflection of the attack amounted to 14 people. In the south, large units of Soviet troops, on trucks, with three tanks, attacked the positions of the 3rd battalion of the 162nd paragraph. The battle went on all night, the attack was repulsed. Probably, a cavalry detachment was operating, which included three flamethrower tanks. The losses of the 162nd regiment amounted to 53 people. Because of the night fighting, the Germans rested until dinner. Then they replenished stocks of ammunition, food and carried out deep reconnaissance. The units of the 151st Infantry Division and the 161st RB were advancing mainly. 282
NARA. T-315. R-1013. F-000332-34 (document provided by A. Perestoronin, translated from German by V. Lobanov).

On September 17, the Kriegsmarine continued diverting operations against the Soviet garrison of the islands - "Svedwind". Again, landings were demonstrated and the Soviet coast was shelled in the areas of the island of Abruk, the city of Kuressaare and the Keiguste peninsula. During one of them ("Stimmung") off the southern coast of the island of Saaremaa, a minesweeper of the 17th flotilla M-1707 was blown up on a minesweeper, it was under fire from our 3rd coastal battery and was abandoned by the crew, who lost only 14 people killed. A few hours later, he was discovered by a detachment of TKA captain-lieutenant Osipov, consisting of TKA No. 83, 154, 111 and 67. The personnel of the latter removed weapons (20-mm cannon and 5 rifles) and ammunition from the minesweeper and sank it with a torpedo 283
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 531. L. 209.

German aircraft bombed Keiguste Bay. Two TKAs No. 17 and 93 fell under the blow of the Germans. They were here after the damage received on September 9th. They could not be towed away, since the tug "Riga" exposed mine banks, and the remaining TKA were on alert. At 10:38, a torpedo exploded on the TKA-93 as a result of a fragment hit. Both boats were destroyed 284
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 531. L. 205.

Two German floating batteries were used to fight the coastal battery on Kuressaare. Sweeping continued on the minefield in Bolshoy Zunda to create a north-south fairway for subsequent escort of ships to the north of Saaremaa in order to carry out a landing operation on Hiiumaa. Through the Viirs-Kurk Strait under fire from the Soviet 43rd battery, the crossing of artillery and watercraft continued.

The breakthrough of German troops on Saaremaa forced the Kudryavtsev air group to relocate to the take-off site of the Syrve Peninsula. Fighters were destroyed at the Kogul airfield, which, due to malfunctions, could not take off: two I-153s and one Yak-1 and I-16 each. Aircraft of new designs could not take off from a small platform on Syrva and were sent to Leningrad on September 17th. Junior Lieutenant Naumov flew to the airfield Bull's field on a MiG-3. The plane was wrecked on landing, and the pilot was unharmed. Yak-1 landed at the Komendantsky airfield. Two Che-2s sent to Saaremaa near Nargen Island were met by German fighters and returned to Leningrad 285
TsVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 275, 276.

Early in the morning of that day, I./KG 77 and II./ZG 26 were again returned to the command of the I Air Corps and began their flight to Leningrad. The remaining aircraft attacked coastal batteries in Keigust and Kyubassaare, as well as anti-aircraft gun positions at the Kogula airfield. Ships in the bays of Keiguste, Triigi and the Gulf of Riga were also successfully attacked by the Germans. In the afternoon, General von Wülisch, due to the beginning of the assault on Leningrad, was recalled to the headquarters of the 1st VF and handed over command of the air units to the commander of the Ostsee air command Oberst von Wild.

In the operational summary of the General Staff of the spacecraft, the battles on that day are described as follows: “On 20.00 19.09.1941: “At 05.00 17.09, the enemy again tried to land troops in Keygust Bay (Ezel Island) from 5 minesweepers, 5 transports and torpedo boats. By the actions of our coastal batteries, the enemy's attempt was repulsed. Under the cover of a smokescreen, the enemy withdrew. 1 enemy transport sunk. The battle at the Orisar dam on about. Ezel continues."

During September 18, the Germans continued their offensive in three directions. In the north, along the coast, the 176th point was advancing. He had to take the most difficult battle on the shores of Triigi Bay. Here, the withdrawal of the 1st Sat of the 46th Rifle Regiment was covered by a detachment of communists and Komsomol members of the battalion and the sailors of the OVR. German 88-mm anti-aircraft guns from the 111 anti-aircraft regiment fired at the ships in the bay. The following ships were sunk: "Helga", "Triton" and the ferry "Kuivasto" 286
TsVMA RF. D. 670. L. 27.

The commander of the OVR, captain of the 3rd rank Yegorov, who remained in Triigi, and his team destroyed the faulty boats and blew up the remaining fuel and lubricants and a warehouse with aerial bombs. After that we went to Hiiumaa 287
The third separate rifle ... forgotten. Collection of memoirs of participants in the defense of the Moonsund Islands in 1941 / Compiled by M. L. Kondratova, V. N. Lukin. - St. Petersburg, 2010. S. 273.

In the center, on Kuressaare, the 151st point was advancing. The 161st RB advanced between them. In the south, along the coast, the 162nd paragraph was advancing. They were opposed by the remnants of the 85th local SR and the 43rd BB. In the forest north of the battery, there was an attempt to use aerial bombs suspended from trees with weakened fuses, like trip mines. But enemy aircraft destroyed this obstacle 288
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 152.

After a fierce battle, the Germans captured the guns of the 43rd battery on Kubassaare. They were blown up by the personnel of the battery. Now the crossing of the Germans Virtsu - Kuivast was not threatened by anything, except for the beginning of the storm. With the forces of the 777th airborne engineer company, the German command deployed a second ferry crossing from Virtsu to Kuivastu. German floating batteries began to fight the Soviet battery on Keigust. During the offensive on Kuressaare, German intelligence captured a Soviet howitzer battery of 122-mm guns on the march, about 100 people surrendered. To comb the southeastern part of Saaremaa through Mukha, in the afternoon, the 2nd battalion of the 311th regiment of the 217th infantry division is transferred to this area. German aviation continued to fight against Soviet coastal batteries, tried to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops and attacked Soviet ships in Triigi.

The operational report of the General Staff of the Spacecraft No. 183 at 08.00 21.09.1941 reported: “The garrison of Fr. Ezel, under pressure from the enemy, moved away from the Orisar dam and by 01.00 19.9 occupied the line of the peninsula Kahta-Lakht, Palo-Kurdla, Koigi-Jarv, Karedi Manor, Kuhiguste, Kaaba, Triigi. A repeated attempt by the enemy to land troops in the Keygust area was repulsed, with one enemy transport sunk and two damaged. The stationary battery on the Kyubossaar peninsula, after the execution of all ammunition, was blown up by personnel. The enemy forces on the island of Ezel - up to one and a half regiments with armored vehicles.

The next day, September 19, the Germans continued their advance to the west. On the southeast coast, the personnel of the 1st BB, the 515th Ozenbat and one of the companies of the detachment of sailors continued to resist the German troops in the area of ​​Keiguste Bay. As a result of aerial bombardment, the commander of the anti-aircraft battery, Lieutenant Danilkin, was seriously wounded, his further fate is unknown. The commander of the coastal battery, Lieutenant Budaev, was seriously wounded in the legs. Not wanting to surrender, he shot himself 289
Chernov Yu. Meridians of the Baltic Glory (Following the Defense of the Moonsund Archipelago). – M., 1968. S. 71–72.

On this day, the Germans captured the 1st coastal battery on the Keiguste peninsula. The guns were blown up by the personnel of the battery. The Kriegsmarine continued to create a passage 300 m wide from south to north into Triigi Bay, to concentrate the landing flotilla against Hiiumaa. The Germans made the main effort the next day to take Kuressaare. To do this, they concentrated the forces of the 151st and 162nd paragraphs against the Soviet grouping defending the city.

The greatest advance of the German troops occurred on 20 September. Soviet troops began to retreat to the Syrve Peninsula. From the report of General Eliseev, one can see that he chose from two options for withdrawal: to the island of Hiiumaa and the Syrve peninsula of the island of Saaremaa. Due to the operational situation prevailing at the time of the battle, the second option was adopted. General Eliseev wrote: “By this time, the main floating assets were destroyed by enemy aircraft, there were several small minesweepers on which no more than a battalion could be lifted without equipment, but even this was doubtful, because (as in the text. - Auth.) enemy aircraft destroyed boats and small boats all the time. To retreat, but only at night, it took at least ten nights ... They could not hold out for such a number of days, so it was decided to retreat with a fight to the Svorbe peninsula, for which to organize a number of lines ... After the decision was made, all ammunition, food, gasoline and warm uniforms transferred to Svorba, organizing all economic organizations there. An airfield for our aviation was also prepared and built there. ” 290
TsVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 6. D. 28. L. 39.

However, the logic of events does not allow us to agree that there was an option to retreat to Hiiumaa. It is unlikely that in the turmoil of the retreat it was possible to organizely withdraw all the material reserves on Syrva within three days, and even build an airfield on it. In addition, part of the forces of the Saaremaa garrison had not yet joined the battle and were located precisely on Syrva, these were the 69th brigade and the 34th brigade. Let's get acquainted with the opinion of General Kabanov: “The erroneousness of the decision is obvious. The Gulf of Riga and the entire coast are in the hands of the Germans. One battery of A. M. Stebel, although she fought heroically, and four torpedo boats of V. P. Gumanenko with a dozen torpedoes still cannot protect the Irben Strait. So isn't it better to save at least part of the garrison and go to Hiiumaa, three times smaller than Saaremaa, so that together and with the help of the Hanko garrison, stubbornly defend both the island itself and the mouth of the Gulf of Finland? So I thought and expressed it at the Hanko CP then. That's what I think now." 291
Kabanov S. I. On the far side. - M., 1971. S. 240.

After the decision was made to redeploy the main forces and supplies to Syrva and leave Kuressaare, local authorities also moved there. Their general headquarters was in the village of Yameyala, in the farm of the local teacher Eduard Punab 292
Puua, Endel. Punane terror Saaremaal 1941. aastal. (Saaremaa Muuseumi toimetised. 3.) Kuressaare, 2006. P.40 (translated from Estonian by E. Kubi).

On Syrva, from all over the island, soldiers of the 12th destruction battalion drove requisitioned cattle 293
There. S. 43.

Due to the rapid advance of the German 161st reconnaissance battalion, the Soviet command failed to make a systematic and organized withdrawal on Syrva. This resulted in a management crisis. General A. B. Eliseev casually mentions it in his report: “The maneuverable nature of modern ground operations requires the extensive development of radio communications between individual units up to and including the company, which was not done in 3-OSB, where control was based on electrolinear communications that were exposed to aviation and acts of sabotage" 294
TsVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 6. D. 28. L. 58.

In a political report sent by the head of the political department of the BOBR, regimental commissar L. E. Kopnov and intercepted by the Germans, this crisis is described more specifically: “Cases of cowardice and panic have been established. Among other things, a number of soldiers and commanders left their positions without orders. A significant part of the units, especially the commanders of the 3rd separate rifle brigade, were unable to fight in difficult conditions and lead subordinates. The enemy air force destroyed the telephone lines. At the same time, the commanders of different units did nothing to re-establish the interrupted connection. Intelligence was often very insufficient" 295

The consequence of this crisis was the dismissal of Colonel V. M. Pimenov, chief of staff of the 3rd brigade, and his transfer to the post of chief of staff of the 69th brigade True, according to veterans, he continued to remain at the headquarters of the brigade. Instead of V. M. Pimenov, the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Captain Ya. F. Yatsuk, was appointed to the post of chief of staff of the brigade. According to the recollections of veterans who went to Syrva without their subordinates, the commander and commissar of the 317th coastal battery was ordered by General Eliseev to return to the rear of the Germans for their personnel. Probably, senior lieutenant Osmanov and senior political instructor Lomonosov considered this order impossible. “They retreated into the forest and allegedly committed suicide there” 296
The third separate rifle ... forgotten. Collection of memoirs of participants in the defense of the Moonsund Islands in 1941 / Compiled by M. L. Kondratova, V. N. Lukin. - St. Petersburg, 2010.

The commander and military commissar of the OVR, because they left Triiga for Hiiumaa, and not for Syrve, the commandant of the BOBR ordered to be arrested 297
TsVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 111. L. 24.

The defense of the isthmus was personally organized by General Eliseev. According to the memoirs of veteran A.P. Uvarov: “During the passage of the isthmus of the Svorbe Peninsula, I personally saw General Eliseev, in a shabby leather raglan. He was pale, with red eyes from sleepless nights. It was in the evening. The general personally organized defense in this place, stopped trucks on the road and sent them back to the rear for shells if the trucks were empty. 298
There. S. 254.

Despite the resistance of the vanguards of the Soviet troops, the Germans continued their offensive. The reconnaissance battalion of the 61st Infantry Division broke through to the area of ​​the Aste airfield and turned north. The main battle took place in the Mustyala area, after which a Soviet battery of 180-mm guns was captured. The guns were blown up. The reconnaissance battalion had difficulties in supplying the troops. This happened because the water level in the Suur-Väin Strait dropped by 0.5 m, the transports delivering cargo for the division had to be unloaded far from the coast. The command of the training detachment "Ostsee" described this situation as follows: "For many days the water level was so low that every time they tried to unload on Moon, the ships landed on stones and then they had to be pulled by tugboats" 299
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063400 (translated from German by I. Borisenko).

Therefore, the Kriegsmarine command decided to use heavy gliders to support the troops. They landed right at the location of the Soviet units and were destroyed. The last serviceable Soviet MBR-2 seaplanes left the Kihelkonna airfield on September 20, 1941, after which the ground personnel of the 15th squadron who remained here took part in the defense of Saaremaa on land. During the flight to Oranienbaum from September 16 to 18, three MBR-2s went missing. There were ten commanders and a cipher clerk on them. Their fate is unknown 300
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 122. L. 475.

Minesweepers No. 82 and 89 were sent for the ground personnel of the 15th UAE from Hiiumaa. However, they did not come to Kihelkona. Their search began on the morning of September 23, but was unsuccessful. Only some time later it became known that these minesweepers were interned in Swedish waters. And they didn't get there by accident. Probably because of the fear of dying, under the impression of losses in Triigi Bay, the acting commander of the 8th minesweeper division, captain-lieutenant I.P. Teplitsky, the commander of minesweeper No. 82, senior lieutenant G.V. , Lieutenant P. N. Krivolapov plotted to desert. To him, they attracted part of the personnel of the crews. Having left to carry out a combat mission in Kihelkona, they, having killed political officers Akulov and Yakovlev, headed for the coast of Sweden. In total, in Sweden from these ships it turned out: 13 medium commanders, 17 junior commanders and 30 sailors. Some of them will then refuse to return to their homeland. These were the first defenders of the Moonsund Islands interned in Sweden.

On the night of September 19-20, five MBR-2 44th aircraft were sent to Saaremaa. Of these, three seaplanes failed to land and flew back. Two sat down, one of them flew back that same night, one remained 301
TsVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 280.

The battle near Leningrad required more and more troops. Therefore, the 2nd Battalion of the 311th Infantry Division of the 217th Infantry Division and the 637th Heavy Motorized Artillery Battalion were withdrawn from the command of the commander of the 61st Infantry Division and sent to the east. On September 20, the command of the 61st Infantry Division began preparations for a landing operation against Soviet troops on the island of Hiiumaa. German intelligence assumed that the garrison of the island was approximately 3-5 thousand people, 8 artillery batteries (including 5-6 coastal ones), 10 anti-aircraft batteries, defensive lines, mainly in the south, northwest and north of the island. At the same time, the eastern and southeastern coast of Hiiumaa was considered to be less fortified. It was there that the main attack of the amphibious assault was planned by the forces of the 172nd Infantry Division 302
Melzer. Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln 1917-1941-1944. - 1960. S. 234 (translated from German - Central Scientific and Translation Bureau of the Navy, Leningrad, 1962). pp. 67–68.

By 12 hours on September 21, the 151st and 162nd regiments captured Kuressaare. The sweeping of the city has begun. Before leaving, the building of the BOBR headquarters was blown up. The pier Romassare, prepared for destruction, could not be blown up, as the infantry covering the pier retreated, and the demolitionists died 303

The German 2nd Battalion of the 162nd Infantry Division, passing through the city, captured the unexploded bridge over the Nasva River. Demolition charges on the bridge were neutralized. In the west, the 161st rb from the Mustyala region broke through to Kihelkon, where it captured two faulty MBR-2s, after which reconnaissance patrols were sent to the northwest to comb the Hundsort peninsula, to the south to capture Lumanda and to the east to capture the Kogul airfield. During the retreat, construction forces No. 05 destroyed all valuable property at airfields, warehouses and marinas: burned, blown up, flooded with water (cement). The iron remained undestroyed. The 3rd brigade organized the destruction of cement stored in the north (6000 tons) 304
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 153.

Soviet batteries on the Hundsort peninsula, buildings and an ammunition depot at the airfield were blown up. According to German intelligence and the testimony of prisoners, the main forces of the Soviet garrison retreated to the Syrve Peninsula. To verify these data, the commander of the 61st Infantry Division ordered the next day to attack in the direction of the peninsula with the forces of the 161st RB and the forward detachment of the 162nd Infantry Division. The remaining infantry regiments, the 176th and 151st, carried out combing in the northwest and in the central part of Saaremaa, respectively.

The commandant of the BOBR, following the results of the battles until September 22, reported: “The enemy is pushing our units to Ahrensburg in three columns. There is no strength to hold on to a broad front. I retreat to Tserel, preparing for the final battle. Many losses of personnel and equipment from enemy aircraft. The battles are maintained by the Red Navy, the 3rd brigade is holding on weakly. Estonian battalions went over to the side of the enemy. We will fight to the last" 305
TsVMA RF. F. 161. Op. 43. D. 111. L. 16.

On September 22, the Kudryavtsev air group was reinforced with three I-16s and three I-153s from the Hanko air group (13th ap) 306
TsVMA RF. F. 586. Op. 40. D. 35. L. 292.

Senior Lieutenant G. D. Tsokolaev was the senior of the group. 307
Kabanov S. I. On the far side. - M., 1971. S. 242.

The appearance of this group caused an aggravation of the air struggle. Senior lieutenants Krainov, Semyonov, Tsokolaev and junior lieutenant Krainov shot down a German bomber over Cape Tserel. In turn, German fighters, Lieutenant V. Kretschmer and non-commissioned officer G. Normann, shot down two I-153 308
Prien J. Die Jagdflied erverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945. Teil 6/II. S. 294–295. P. 292 (translated from the German by V. Lobanov).

13th lieutenant K. L. Andreev (wounded) and junior lieutenant N. L. Shabanov (died). On the same day, an air battle took place between a German seaplane and Soviet fighters over the island of Abruka. The Germans describe it this way: “The Ostsee Air Command, Oberst von Wild, personally attacked Abruk’s battery that day with bombs and cannon-machine-gun fire and managed in two battles with 1 I-16 and 2 I-153 on his seaplane (He-114 ) get away from the enemy without significant damage to your car " 309
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063361 (translated from German by I. Borisenko).

One victory over a German seaplane on September 22 was credited to Major Leonovich, as well as a group victory to Lieutenant Khromov and Junior Lieutenant Shevtsov. On the same day, junior lieutenants Khromov and Shevtsov shot down a German Hs-126 short-range reconnaissance aircraft. Air battles continued the next day. Lieutenant Colonel Kudryavtsev recorded two victories over fighters 310
TsVMA. F. 226. Op. 27. D. 28656. L. 54.

However, these fighters do not appear in the lists of German losses. On September 23, the command of the KBF Air Force again tried to organize an air bridge on Saaremaa. Three MBR-2 44th AE at 22:45. flew to the island, but were forced to return due to bad weather conditions.

According to the preliminary data of the Germans, by the evening of September 23, 3305 people were captured on the islands. prisoners. In addition, weapons were captured until September 22 inclusive: “5 tanks, 37 guns, 11 anti-aircraft guns, 20 anti-tank guns, 2 infantry guns, 44 mortars, 98 machine guns, about 400 hand weapons” 311
NARA. T-311. R-51 (translated from German by I. Borisenko).

The Germans assessed the mood in the Soviet troops as follows: “In itself, the desire to fight is less than on the mainland, since the hopelessness of the situation is generally known. However, the commissars (there are now only 40 of them on the Svorbe peninsula) constantly forced the troops to resist. Means of influence: 1) Germans shoot the prisoners; 2) repression against family members of defectors and prisoners by the government (exile and confiscation of property). There are few defectors" 312
There.

The alleged intentions of the Soviet troops were assessed as follows: “The troops must continue to put up stubborn resistance on Svorba and Dago. The order to withdraw to Svorba was given on 20 September. The troops were told that they would be taken out by warships and merchant ships. 313
There.

From September 21, the commander of the Ostsee air command was subordinated to the 506th bomber group under the command of Oberstleutnant V. Schwartz, which had 9 Ju-88 A-4 and was based in Riga 314
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063359 (translated from German by I. Borisenko).

Number 9 includes only aircraft of the 1st and 3rd squadrons. In addition to the two headquarters aircraft, the 2nd squadron of the 906th air group (4 Ju-88 A-4) was subordinate to the commander of the 506th group.

On September 22, the German command tried to break through to the Syrve Peninsula on the move with the help of the 162nd regiment and the 161st reconnaissance battalion. However, all attempts to break through to the isthmus met with fierce resistance. In the combat log of the 61st Infantry Division, the situation was assessed as follows: “The fighting of the day confirmed that the enemy had withdrawn the main forces to Svorba and would defend the peninsula with all his might. The command of the division asked itself the question: why did the enemy leave the entire island in order to resist only on this peninsula, but a look at the map fully explains this. A thin isthmus at the entrance makes it possible to defend it with small forces, at the same time, the length of the peninsula does not make it possible to completely cover it with artillery fire. Finally, the armored battery on Tserela, already known since the First World War, blocks the Gulf of Riga at the southern tip of the peninsula. The strategic importance of Ezel lies precisely in the Svorbe peninsula. 315
NARA. T-315. R-1013. F-000344-47 (document provided by A. Perestoronin, translated from German by V. Lobanov).

The higher command continued the withdrawal from the subordination of the commander of the 61st infantry division of the reinforcement. According to the German higher command, the main task was completed, and on that day an order appeared to send the 254th construction battalion and a company of the 683rd construction battalion to Leningrad.

The BOBR command tried to create a powerful artillery group of coastal artillery on the Syrva. However, the time for this was also lost, and during the general retreat it was not possible to carry out the plan. During the evacuation of guns to the Syrve Peninsula from the Hundsort Peninsula, only one gun from the 24th battery was delivered, the gun from the 25th battery and the personnel accompanying it went missing. Perhaps this is what is mentioned in the report of the German Air Command "B". True, it mentions two tools: “At Laadyala (the foundation of the Hundsort peninsula. - Auth.) two heavy enemy guns moving along the road were attacked by bombs and cannon-machine-gun fire, and the servants of the guns hid for so long that the advanced German units were able to capture both guns " 316
NARA. T-311. R-51. P-2. F-063357 (translated from German by I. Borisenko).

An attempt was also made to transfer two guns from Pamman (167th BB) to Syrve; the guns were removed, taken away, but the road was cut off and both guns, apparently, were captured in disassembled form by the enemy 317
TsVMA RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 528. L. 153.