Extraordinary situation on board the aircraft. "There was a massive explosion on board." The pilots of Saratov Airlines are talking about a terrorist attack. "It was a terrorist attack"

The Battle of Stalingrad was an important event of the Second World War. The battle included the Wehrmacht's siege of Stalingrad (modern Volgograd), the confrontation in the city, and the Red Army's counteroffensive (Operation Uranus), as a result of which the Wehrmacht's VI Army and other German allied forces in and around the city were surrounded and partly destroyed, partly captured in captivity. According to rough estimates, the total losses of both sides in this battle exceed 2 million people. The Axis powers lost large numbers of men and weapons, and subsequently failed to fully recover from the defeat. I.V. Stalin wrote: “Stalingrad was the decline of the German fascist army. After the Battle of Stalingrad, as you know, the Germans could not recover.” For the Soviet Union, which also suffered heavy losses during the battle, the victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of the country's liberation, and the victorious march through Europe that led to the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.
On June 22, 1941, Germany and its allies invaded the territory of the Soviet Union, rapidly moving inland. Having suffered defeat during the battles in the summer and autumn of 1941, Soviet troops counterattacked during the Battle of Moscow in December 1941. Exhausted German troops, poorly equipped for combat operations in winter and with extended rears, were stopped on the outskirts of the capital and thrown back.
In the winter of 1941-1942. the German front eventually stabilized. Plans for a new attack on Moscow were rejected by Hitler, despite the fact that his generals insisted on this option. The attack on Moscow was too predictable - many thought so, especially Hitler.
For all these reasons, the German command considered plans for new offensives in the North and South. An attack on the south of the USSR would ensure control over the oil fields of the Caucasus (Grozny and Baku regions), as well as over the Volga River, the main transport artery connecting the European part of the country with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. A German victory in the south of the Soviet Union could seriously damage the Stalinist war machine and the Soviet economy.
The Stalinist leadership, encouraged by the successes near Moscow, tried to seize the strategic initiative, and in May 1942 threw large forces into the offensive near Kharkov. The offensive began from the Barvenkovsky ledge south of Kharkov, which was formed as a result of the winter offensive of the South-Western Front. A feature of this offensive was the use of a new Soviet mobile formation - a tank corps, which, in terms of the number of tanks and artillery, approximately corresponded to a German tank division, but was significantly inferior to it in terms of the number of motorized infantry. The Germans at that time were simultaneously planning an operation to cut off the Barvenkovsky ledge.
The offensive of the Red Army was so unexpected for the Wehrmacht that it almost ended in disaster for Army Group South. However, the Germans decided not to change their plans and, thanks to the concentration of troops on the flanks of the ledge, they broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and most of the Southwestern Front was surrounded. In the subsequent three-week battles, known as the "second battle for Kharkov", the advancing units of the Red Army suffered a heavy defeat. Only more than 200 thousand people were taken prisoner (according to German data, according to Soviet archival data - much less), a lot of heavy weapons were lost. After that, the front south of Voronezh was seriously weakened (See map May - July 1942). The key to the Caucasus, the city of Rostov-on-Don, which in November 1941 managed to defend with such difficulty, was surrendered without a fight. In the units of the Red Army in the southern direction, moods close to panic reigned. To maintain discipline in the divisions, penal companies and battalions were created (Order No. 227). In the rear of the Red Army, detachments of the NKVD were deployed.
Encouraged by the sudden success, Hitler decided to change his original plans and transferred the 4th Panzer Army from Group A to Army Group B. The first was heading to the Kuban and the North Caucasus, to the oil fields of Grozny and Baku, and the second - east to the Volga and Stalingrad.
The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was the main industrial city on the banks of the Volga (a vital transportation route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia). The capture of Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the capture of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin also had ideological and propaganda interests in defending the city that bore his name.
By the end of July, the Germans pushed back the Soviet troops beyond the Don. The defense line stretched for hundreds of kilometers from north to south along the Don. In order to organize a defense along the river, the Germans had to use, in addition to their 2nd Army, the armies of their Italian, Hungarian and Romanian allies. The 6th Army was only a few dozen kilometers from Stalingrad, and the 4th Panzer, south of it, turned north to help take the city. Further south, Army Group South (A) continued to deepen further into the Caucasus, but its advance slowed down. Army Group South A was too far south to support Army Group South B in the north.
Now the German intentions became completely clear to the Soviet command, so already in July it developed plans for the defense of Stalingrad. Soviet troops continued to move east until the Germans were ordered to attack Stalingrad. The Volga River was the eastern border of Stalingrad, and additional Soviet troops were deployed on the other side of the river. This connection of units was re-registered as the 62nd Army under the command of Vasily Chuikov. Her task was to protect Stalingrad at any cost.
Stalin forbade the townspeople to leave the city, referring to the fact that their presence would inspire the defenders of the city, and they would repel the enemy much stronger. All citizens, including women and children, worked to build trenches and defensive fortifications. A massive German bombardment on August 23 unleashed a firestorm, killing thousands of civilians and turning Stalingrad into a vast area littered with rocks and littered with burning ruins. Eighty percent of the living space in the city was destroyed.
The burden of the initial struggle for the city fell on the 1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment: a unit staffed mainly by young female volunteers with no experience in destroying ground targets. Despite this, and without the proper support available from other Soviet units, the anti-aircraft gunners remained in place and opened fire on the advancing enemy tanks. The 16th Panzer Division reportedly had to fight the 1077th's riflemen head to head until all 37 air defense batteries were destroyed or captured. By the end of August, Army Group South (B) had finally reached the Volga north of Stalingrad. Another advance to the river south of the city also followed.
At the initial stage, the Soviet defense relied heavily on the "People's Militia of Workers", recruited from workers not involved in military production. Tanks continued to be built and manned by voluntary crews, consisting of factory workers, including women. The equipment was immediately sent from the conveyors of factories to the front line, often even without painting and without sighting equipment installed.
By September 1, 1942, the Soviet command could provide its troops in Stalingrad only with risky crossings across the Volga. In the midst of the ruins of the already destroyed city, the Soviet 62nd Army built defensive positions with gun emplacements located in buildings and factories. The battle in the city was fierce and desperate. Stalin's order No. 227 of July 28, 1942 indicated that all those who retreated or surrendered positions to the enemy without an order from above would be shot without the slightest delay. "No step back!" - that was the call.
The Germans, moving deeper into Stalingrad, experienced heavy losses. Soviet reinforcements crossed the Volga from the east bank under constant bombardment by German artillery and aircraft. The average life expectancy of a newly arrived Soviet private in the city sometimes fell below twenty-four hours. German military doctrine was based on the interaction of the combat arms in general and the especially close interaction of infantry, sappers, artillery and dive bombers. To counter this, the Soviet command decided to take the simple step of constantly keeping the front lines as close to the enemy as physically possible (usually no more than 30 meters). Thus, the German infantry had to fight on its own, or be in danger of being killed by its own artillery and horizontal bombers, support was only possible from dive bombers.
A painful struggle went on for every street, every factory, every house, basement or stairway. The Germans, calling the new city war Rattenkrieg (German: Rat War), bitterly joked that the kitchen had already been captured, but they were still fighting for the bedroom.
The battle on Mamaev Kurgan, the blood-soaked height that dominates the city, was unusually merciless. Height changed hands several times. During one of the Soviet counterattacks on Mamaev Kurgan to intercept it, the Soviet troops lost an entire division of 10,000 men in one day. At the Grain Elevator, a huge grain processing complex, the fighting was so dense that Soviet and German soldiers could feel each other's breath. The fighting at the Grain Elevator continued for weeks, until the German army lost ground. In another part of the city, an apartment building defended by a Soviet platoon under the command of Yakov Pavlov was turned into an impregnable fortress. From this house, later called "Pavlov's House", one could observe the square in the city center. Soldiers surrounded the building with minefields and set up machine gun positions.
Seeing no end to this terrible struggle, the Germans began to bring heavy artillery to the city, including several giant 600 mm mortars. The Germans made no effort to send troops across the Volga, allowing Soviet troops to erect a huge number of artillery batteries on it. Soviet artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga continued to calculate German positions and work them with increased fire. The ruins that appeared due to this were used by the Soviet defenders as defensive positions. German tanks could not move among piles of cobblestones up to 8 meters high. Even if they could move forward, they came under heavy fire from Soviet anti-tank units located in the ruins of buildings.
Soviet snipers also successfully used the ruins as cover. They inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. The most successful sniper is known only as "Zikan", he had 224 men on his account by November 20, 1942. Vasily Grigoryevich Zaitsev killed 149 Germans during the battle.
For both Stalin and Hitler, the Battle of Stalingrad became a matter of prestige in addition to strategic importance. The Soviet command moved the reserves of the Red Army from Moscow to the Volga, and also transported air forces from almost the entire country to the Stalingrad region. The tension of both military commanders was immense: Paulus developed an uncontrollable nervous tic in his eye, and Chuikov experienced a sudden onset of eczema, which forced him to completely bandage his hands.
In November, after three months of carnage and a slow, costly advance, the Germans finally reached the banks of the river, capturing 90% of the ruined city and splitting the surviving Soviet troops in two, causing them to fall into two narrow pockets. In addition to all this, a crust of ice formed on the Volga, preventing the approach of boats and supplies for the Soviet troops in a difficult situation. In spite of everything, the struggle, especially on Mamaev Kurgan and in the factories in the northern part of the city, continued as furiously as ever. The battles for the Krasny Oktyabr plant, the Dzerzhinsky tractor plant and the Barrikada artillery plant became known to the whole world. While Soviet soldiers continued to defend their positions by firing at the Germans, plant and factory workers repaired damaged Soviet tanks and weapons in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield, and sometimes on the battlefield itself.
On November 19, 1942, the offensive of the Red Army began as part of Operation Uranus. On November 23, in the Kalach area, the encirclement around the 6th A of the Wehrmacht closed. It was not possible to complete the Uranus plan, since it was not possible to divide the 6th A into two parts from the very beginning (by a strike of the 24th A in the interfluve of the Volga and the Don). Attempts to eliminate the encircled outright in these conditions also failed, despite the significant superiority in forces - the superior tactical quality of the Germans affected. However, the 6th A was isolated and the stocks of fuel, ammunition and food were progressively reduced, despite the insufficient supply by air, undertaken by the 4th Luftflotte under the command of Wolfram von Richthofen.
Under these conditions, the newly formed Army Group "Don" under the command of Field Marshal Manstein attempted to unblock the encircled (Operation "Wintergewitter"). Initially, it was planned to start on December 10, but the offensive actions of the Red Army on the outer front of the encirclement forced the postponement of the start of the operation until December 12. By this date, the Germans managed to present only one full-fledged tank formation - the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht and (from infantry formations) the remnants of the defeated 4th Romanian Army. These units were under the control of the 4th Panzer Army under the command of G. Goth. During the offensive, it was reinforced by the very battered 11th and 17th Panzer Divisions and three airfield divisions.
By December 19, units of the 4th Tank Army, which had actually broken through the defensive orders of the Soviet troops, collided with the 2nd Guards Army under the command of R. Malinovsky, which had just been transferred from the Stavka reserve. The army consisted of two rifle and one mechanized corps. During the oncoming battles, by December 25, the Germans retreated to the positions in which they had been before the start of Operation Wintergewitter.
According to the plan of the Soviet command, after the defeat of the 6th A, the forces engaged in Operation Uranus turned to the west and advanced towards Rostov-on-Don as part of Operation Saturn. At the same time, the southern wing of the Voronezh Front was striking at the 8th Italian Army north of Stalingrad and advancing directly to the west (toward the Donets) with an auxiliary attack to the southwest (towards Rostov-on-Don), covering the northern flank of the South-Western front during a hypothetical offensive. However, due to the incomplete implementation of "Uranus", "Saturn" was replaced by "Small Saturn".
A breakthrough to Rostov (due to the lack of seven armies pinned down by the 6th A near Stalingrad) was no longer planned, the Voronezh Front, together with the South-Western and part of the forces of the Stalingrad Front, had the goal of pushing the enemy 100-150 km west of the encircled 6th th A and defeat the 8th Italian Army (Voronezh Front). The offensive was planned to begin on December 10, however, the problems associated with the delivery of new parts necessary for the operation (available on the spot, as we remember, were connected near Stalingrad) led to the fact that A. M. Vasilevsky authorized (with the knowledge of I. V. Stalin) postponement of the start of the operation to December 16. On December 16-17, the German front on Chir and on the positions of the 8th Italian Army was broken through, the Soviet tank corps rushed into the operational depth.
However, in the mid-20s of December, operational reserves began to approach Army Group Don (four German tank divisions, none of which were relatively well-equipped, originally intended to strike during Operation Wintergewitter. By December 25, these reserves had struck counterattacks, during which they cut off Badanov’s tank corps, which had just broken into the Tatsinskaya airfield (86 German aircraft were destroyed at the airfields). (and very low losses) to their own.
After that, the front line temporarily stabilized, since neither the Soviet nor the German troops had enough strength to break through the tactical defense zone of the enemy.
On December 27, N. N. Voronov sent the first version of the Koltso plan to the Supreme Command Headquarters. Headquarters in directive #170718 of December 28, 1942 (signed by Stalin and Zhukov) demanded changes to the plan so that it provided for the division of the 6th A into two parts before its destruction. Appropriate changes were made to the plan. On January 10, the offensive of the Soviet troops began, the main blow was delivered in the 65th A band of General Batov.
However, the German resistance was so serious that the offensive had to be temporarily stopped. From January 17 to 22, the offensive was suspended for regrouping, new strikes on January 22-26 led to the dismemberment of the 6th A into two groups (Soviet troops united in the Mamaev Kurgan area), by January 31 the southern group was liquidated (the command and headquarters of 6 th A, led by Paulus), by February 2, the northern group of the encircled capitulated. Shooting in the city went on until February 3 - the "Khivi" resisted even after the German surrender, since they were not threatened with captivity. About 90 thousand were taken prisoner at this, the last stage of operation C. 183. The liquidation of the 6th A was supposed to be completed in a week, according to the "Ring" plan, but in reality it lasted 23 days. Subsequently, a number of military leaders generally expressed the opinion that it was not necessary to liquidate the boiler by force, because. without food, the Germans in any case would have capitulated (or starved to death) in March 1943, and the Soviet troops during the operation "Ring" would not have suffered such losses (the 24th A after the "Ring" had to be withdrawn for reorganization).

Battle of Stalingrad

On November 19, 1942, Operation Uranus began - the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, which led to the encirclement and subsequent defeat of the Paulus army.

The front included the 62nd Army advanced from the reserve under the command of General Kolpakchi (from August 2 - General Lopatin, from September 5 - General Krylov, and from September 12, 1942 - Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov), 63rd, 64th armies, also the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined-arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. The Stalingrad Front received the task, defending in a strip 530 km wide, to stop the further advance of the enemy and prevent him from reaching the Volga. By July 17, the Stalingrad Front had 12 divisions (a total of 160 thousand people), 2200 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks and over 450 aircraft. In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and up to 60 fighters of the 102nd Air Defense Aviation Division (Colonel I. I. Krasnoyurchenko) operated in its lane. Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, the enemy had superiority over the Soviet troops in people by 1.7 times, in tanks and artillery - in 1.3 and in aircraft - more than 2 times.
On July 17, at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with the vanguards of the 6th German Army. Interacting with the aviation of the 8th Air Army (Major General of Aviation Khryukin), they put up stubborn resistance to the enemy, who had to deploy 5 divisions out of 13 and spend 5 days fighting our armies. In the end, the enemy drove the forward detachments from their positions and approached the main defense line of the troops of the Stalingrad Front. The resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Nazi command to reinforce the 6th Army. By July 22, it already had 18 divisions, numbering 250 thousand combat personnel, about 740 tanks, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. The troops of the 6th Army supported up to 1200 aircraft. As a result, the balance of forces increased even more in favor of the enemy. For example, in tanks, he now had a twofold superiority.
At dawn on July 23, the northern, and on July 25, the southern strike groupings of the enemy went on the offensive. Using superiority in forces and dominance of aviation in the air, the enemy broke through the defenses on the right flank of the 62nd Army and by the end of the day on July 24 reached the Don in the Golubinsky area. By the end of July, the Germans pushed back the Soviet troops beyond the Don.
In order to break through the defenses along the river, the Germans had to use, in addition to their 6th Army, the armies of their Italian, Hungarian and Romanian allies. The 6th Army was only a few dozen kilometers north of Stalingrad, and the 4th Panzer Army was advancing on Stalingrad from the south.
Under these conditions, on July 28, 1942, People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin issued No. 227, in which he demanded to strengthen resistance to the enemy and stop his offensive at all costs. The most severe measures were envisaged for those who would show cowardice and cowardice in battle. Practical measures were outlined to strengthen morale and fighting spirit and discipline in the troops. “It’s time to end the retreat,” the order noted. - No step back!" This slogan embodied the essence of Order No. 227. Commanders and political workers were tasked with bringing to the consciousness of every soldier the requirements of this order.
To strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, by decision of the front commander, the 57th Army was deployed on the southern face of the outer defensive bypass. The 51st Army (Major General T.K. Kolomiets, from October 7 - Major General N.I. Trufanov) was transferred to the Stalingrad Front. The situation in the zone of the 62nd Army was difficult. On August 7-9, the enemy pushed her troops across the Don River, and surrounded four divisions west of Kalach. Soviet soldiers fought in the encirclement until August 14, and then in small groups they began to break through from the encirclement. Three divisions of the 1st Guards Army (Major General K. S. Moskalenko, from September 28 - Major General I. M. Chistyakov) that approached the Reserve Headquarters launched a counterattack on the enemy troops and stopped their further advance.
On August 19, the Nazi troops resumed their offensive, striking in the general direction of Stalingrad. On August 22, the German 6th Army crossed the Don and captured on its eastern bank, in the Peskovatka area, a bridgehead 45 km wide, on which six divisions were concentrated. On August 23, the 14th tank corps of the enemy broke through to the Volga north of Stalingrad, in the area of ​​​​the village of Rynok, and cut off the 62nd Army from the rest of the forces of the Stalingrad Front. On the eve of the enemy aviation dealt a massive blow to Stalingrad from the air, making about 2 thousand sorties. Massive German bombardment on August 23 destroyed the city, killed more than 40,000 people, destroyed more than half of the housing stock of pre-war Stalingrad, thus turning the city into a vast area covered with burning ruins. In the early morning of August 23, General von Wittersheim's 14th Panzer Corps reached the northern outskirts of Stalingrad. Here, three anti-aircraft batteries manned by female personnel blocked his path. Two tanks and three tractors sheathed with armored steel came to the aid of the girls from the tractor factory. Behind them moved a battalion of workers armed with three-rulers. These few forces stopped the German advance that day. For the fact that Wittersheim, with his entire corps, could not cope with a handful of anti-aircraft gunners and a battalion of hard workers, he was removed from command. The corps suffered such losses that for the next three weeks the Germans could not resume the offensive.
In order to clear the way for infantry and tanks, the enemy began the massive use of aviation and heavy artillery - one after another, anti-aircraft batteries were out of order - scarce anti-aircraft shells came to an end, the delivery of which across the Volga was difficult due to the impact on German aviation crossings.
Under these conditions, on September 13, our troops retreated to the city in order to constantly keep the front lines as close to the enemy as physically possible. Thus, enemy aircraft and artillery could not effectively support infantry and tanks, being afraid to destroy their own. Street fighting began, in which the German infantry had to fight, relying on themselves, or in danger of being killed by their own artillery and aircraft.
The Soviet defenders used the emerging ruins as defensive positions. German tanks could not move among piles of rubble up to eight meters high. Even if they could move forward, they came under heavy fire from Soviet anti-tank rifles hidden in the ruins of buildings.

Degtyarev anti-tank rifle

Soviet snipers, using the ruins as cover, also inflicted heavy damage on the Germans. So, only one Soviet sniper Vasily Grigorievich Zaitsev during the battle destroyed 225 enemy soldiers and officers, including 11 snipers.
During the defense of Stalingrad at the end of September 1942, a reconnaissance group of four soldiers, led by Sergeant Pavlov, captured a four-story house in the city center and entrenched in it. On the third day, reinforcements arrived at the house, delivering machine guns, anti-tank rifles (later - company mortars) and ammunition, and the house became an important stronghold in the division's defense system. German assault groups captured the lower floor of the building, but could not capture it entirely. For the Germans, it was a mystery how the garrison on the upper floors was supplied.
By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general offensive of the German troops was stopped. On November 10, they went over to the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of sectors in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse.
The German command believed that after many months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not in a position to carry out a major offensive and therefore did not take care of covering the flanks. On the other hand, they had nothing to cover the flanks with. the losses suffered in previous battles forced the troops of the would-be allies to be used on the flanks.
Since September, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff have begun to develop a counteroffensive plan. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Headquarters under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin.
The Southwestern Front (commander N. F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of inflicting deep strikes from bridgeheads on the right bank Don from the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya (advance depth approx. 120 km.); The strike force of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. The shock groupings of both fronts were to meet in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and encircle the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. At the same time, part of the forces of these same fronts ensured the creation of an external encirclement front. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th air armies, delivered two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya region to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky region along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided for: to direct the main blows against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy's defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups to use terrain advantageous for the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough areas, by weakening the secondary areas, create a 2.8-3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy of the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy of the concentration of forces achieved, the strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.
The offensive of the troops of the South-Western and right wing of the Don Fronts began on the morning of November 19 after a powerful artillery preparation. Troops of the 5th tank armies broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army. The German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps introduced into the battle, the advanced units of which went into the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th Panzer Corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of ​​​​the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement ring of the Stalingrad enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. The 6th and main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total strength of 330 thousand people. By the same time, a large part of the outer front of the encirclement was created, the distance of which from the inner one was 40-100 km.
On November 24, the troops of the Southwestern Front, having defeated the Romanian units surrounded in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Raspopinskaya, took 30 thousand prisoners and a lot of equipment. On November 24 - 30, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, fighting fierce battles with the encircled enemy troops, halved the area occupied by them, squeezing it in the territory of 70-80 km from west to east and 30-40 km from north to south.
In the first half of December, the actions of these fronts to eliminate the encircled enemy developed slowly, since, due to the reduction of the front in the pocket, he condensed his battle formations and organized defenses in equipped positions occupied by the Red Army in the summer of 1942. A significant (more than threefold) underestimation of the number of encircled German troops played a significant role in slowing down the offensive.
On November 24, Hitler, having rejected the proposal of the commander of the 6th Army, Paulus, to break through in a southeast direction, ordered to hold Stalingrad in anticipation of outside help. At the end of November, the German troops operating against the outer front of the encirclement were united into the Don Army Group (commanded by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein), which also included the encircled group.
On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to surrender to the command of the encircled troops, but on Hitler's orders, it rejected it. On January 10, the liquidation of the Stalingrad cauldron began by the forces of the Don Front (Operation "Ring"). At this time, the number of encircled troops was still about 250 thousand, the number of troops of the Don Front was 212 thousand. The enemy stubbornly resisted, but the Soviet troops moved forward and on January 26 cut the group into two parts - the southern one in the city center and the northern one in the area of ​​​​the tractor plant and the factory "Barricades". On January 31, the southern group was liquidated, its remnants, led by Paulus, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group was finished. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad.

BATTLE OF KURSK

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, which included three major strategic operations of the Soviet troops: Kursk defensive (July 5-23); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. In terms of its scope, involved forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the largest battles of the Second World War. In a fierce clash that unfolded over a rather limited territory, both sides involved huge masses of troops and military equipment: more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, up to 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, over 11 thousand combat aircraft. The "Center" (commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge) hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of Army Group "South" (commander - Field Marshal E. Manstein) covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the warring parties consolidated on the achieved lines, learned lessons, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further actions. Considering the importance of the Kursk salient, the German command decided to spend the summer an operation to liquidate it and defeat the Soviet troops that occupied the defense here, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative, to achieve a change in the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, code-named "Citadel". The plan of the operation was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops located in the ledge with converging strikes from the north and south in the general direction of Kursk, and then, if successful, to carry out Operation Panther to defeat the troops of the Southwestern Front. Subsequently, it was planned to develop a strike deep in the rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow. To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, over 2,700 tanks and assault guns (including 360 obsolete tanks) and over 2,000 aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. On the Kursk ledge, which had a length of 550 km, the troops of the Central (commander - Army General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander - Army General N.F. Vatutin) fronts, which had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns, occupied the defense and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (including over 900 light tanks), 2.9 thousand aircraft (including 728 long-range aircraft and Po-2 night bombers). the Steppe Military District, which was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was renamed the Steppe Front on July 9 (commander - Colonel-General I.S. Konev), which had 573 thousand people, 8.0 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand people. tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, up to 400 combat aircraft. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having timely and correctly determined the enemy’s plan, decided: to switch to deliberate defense at pre-prepared lines, during which to bleed the strike groups ki German troops, and then go on the counteroffensive and complete their defeat. There was a rare case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for the offensive, chose the most optimal variant of its actions from several possible ones. During April-June, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 300 km were equipped in the Kursk salient. The first six lines were occupied by the Central and Voronezh fronts. The seventh line was prepared by the troops of the Steppe District, and the eighth, state line was equipped along the left bank of the river. Don.

The crushing defeat of the fascist German army and its allies at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43 shook the fascist bloc to its foundations. The funeral ringing of church bells, heard in Germany in the first days of February 1943, announced to the astonished world about the tragic finale of the Battle of Stalingrad for the Wehrmacht. The brilliant victory of the Red Army on the banks of the Volga and the Don made a huge impression on the world community. For the first time since the beginning of the Second World War, Nazi Germany, in all its inevitability, faced the formidable specter of inevitable defeat. Its military power, the morale of the army and the population were thoroughly undermined, and the prestige in the eyes of the allies was seriously shaken. In order to improve the internal political position of the Reich and prevent the collapse of the fascist coalition, the Nazi command decided in the summer of 1943 to conduct a major offensive operation on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. With this offensive, it hoped to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops located on the Kursk salient, seize the strategic initiative again and turn the course of the war in its favor. However, the Nazi clique again - for the umpteenth time! - cruelly miscalculated, overestimating her strength and underestimating the power of the Red Army.

By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. As a result of the selfless labor of the Soviet people, the organizational and inspiring activities of the Soviet leadership, the military-political position of the USSR by that time had become even stronger. The strike and fire power of the Red Army became much higher than in 1941-1942 and in the first half of 1943, while Nazi Germany failed to bring the total strength of its armed forces on the Eastern Front even to the level reached by the autumn of 1942. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in manpower and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people 1.1 times, in artillery - 1.7 times, in tanks - 1.4 times and in combat aircraft - 2 times. Based on the fact that the Red Army owned the strategic initiative and outnumbered the enemy in strength and especially in means, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to start the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 with broad offensive operations and deliver the main blow in the southwestern strategic direction. By the beginning of the decisive clash of the parties in the summer of 1943, the front line with a length of 2100 km passed from the Barents Sea west of Murmansk, then went to Karelia, 100-200 km east of the Soviet-Finnish border, further along the Svir River to Leningrad, then turned south to Lake Ilmen , Novgorod and Velikiye Luki, from where it turned again, but already to the southeast, to Kirov. After that, it formed the “Oryol balcony” advanced to the east and protruding far to the west, towards the enemy, the so-called Kursk Bulge. Further, the front line went southeast, north of Belgorod, east of Kharkov, from there south, along the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers, then along the eastern coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov to the Taman Peninsula, where the enemy held a large bridgehead. Throughout this space, stretching over 2,000 km from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, 12 Soviet fronts operated, which were opposed by 4 German army groups, a separate German army and Finnish troops. The political and military leadership of the Third Reich was persistently looking for an opportunity to successfully continue the struggle. His confidence was based on the fact that, despite the brutal defeat at Stalingrad, by the spring of 1943, the Nazi troops still managed to stabilize the situation on the Eastern Front. As a result of a successful counter-offensive in the Donbass and near Kharkov, carried out in February-March 1943, they stopped the offensive of the Soviet troops in the southwestern direction and, moreover, created important footholds in the central strategic direction. Since the end of March 1943, for the first time in the long months of the war, a relative calm has been established on the Soviet-German front. Both sides began active preparations for the decisive battles that were supposed to predetermine the final outcome of the war. Hitler and his entourage believed in the success of the upcoming offensive. The hope for success in them was inspired by the relatively calm situation in other theaters of the Second World War. The fascist German command was sure that in 1943 Germany was not threatened by the opening of a second front in Europe by the Western powers. Hitler managed for some time to prevent the collapse of the fascist bloc and to maintain the loyalty of his allies. And finally, much was expected from the new military equipment that was coming into service with the Wehrmacht in increasing quantities, primarily heavy tanks T-VI (“Tiger”), medium tanks T-V (“Panther”), assault guns (“Ferdinand”) and aircraft (the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter and the Henschel-129 attack aircraft). They were intended to play the role of the main strike force in the upcoming offensive. Nazi Germany began preparing for the next "general offensive" on the Eastern Front back in April 1943, having mobilized all its resources and capabilities for this. To make up for the huge human losses and restore the divisions defeated in the winter battles, the Nazi leadership resorted to total mobilization. At the same time, maximum possible efforts were made to increase the output of military products. All these factors, taken together, gave the military-political leadership of the Third Reich a certain chance of success. The Soviet high command was ready to launch a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. But it, given the sad experience of the spring of 1942, chose a different course of action. It was decided to prepare a defense in depth in advance and, relying on it, repel the enemy offensive, wear down and bleed his strike groups, and then go on the counteroffensive, complete the defeat of the enemy and finally tip the scales in favor of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces.
FORCES AND PLANS OF THE PARTIES
Both sides began to develop plans for the summer of 1943 even before the end of the winter campaign of 1942/43. Even before the end of the battles for Kharkov, on March 13, 1943, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 5, in which he determined the general goals of military operations on the Eastern Front for the spring and summer of 1943. and spring thaw, having created stocks of materiel and partially replenished their formations with people, they will resume the offensive. Therefore, our task is to, as far as possible, preempt them in their offensive in certain places with the aim of imposing their will, at least on one of the sectors of the front, as is currently the case on the front of Army Group South. In other areas, the task is reduced to bleeding the enemy offensive. Here we must create a solid defense in advance. Army Groups "Center" and "South" were tasked with delivering counter strikes to defeat the Soviet troops operating on the Kursk salient. The region of Orel, Kursk and Belgorod became the main focus of the Nazi command. The protrusion of the Soviet front, which penetrated deeply into the enemy's disposition here, caused him great anxiety. Using this ledge, Soviet troops could strike at the junction of Army Groups "Center" and "South" and make a deep breakthrough into the central regions of Ukraine, to the Dnieper. At the same time, the Nazi strategists could not resist the temptation to encircle and destroy the large grouping of Soviet troops located on it by delivering counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient. In the future, it was supposed to deploy an offensive to the northeast or south. Thus, Hitler's commanders intended to take revenge for Stalingrad. This operation was considered the main one at Hitler's headquarters. To carry it out, troops were withdrawn from other sectors of the Eastern Front (from near Rzhev, Demyansk, from the Taman Peninsula, etc.). In total, in this way it was supposed to strengthen the Kursk direction with 32 divisions, including 3 tank and 2 motorized. The fascist German command, after receiving Hitler's directive, intensified the development of a plan for an offensive operation in the Kursk region. Its plan was based on the proposals of Colonel-General V. Model (commander of the 9th Army). The essence of his proposals was to encircle and destroy the large forces of Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge by attacking 2 army groups from the north and south in the general direction of Kursk. On April 12, the plan of operation was presented to Hitler. After 3 days, the Fuhrer signed an order, according to which the Army Groups "Center" and "South" were to complete preparations for the offensive on Kursk by May 3. The developers of the plan for the offensive operation, which received the code name "Citadel", assumed that the attack tank groups of the Army Groups "South" and "Center" would reach the Kursk region in no more than 4 days. The creation of shock groups in army groups in accordance with Hitler's order began in March. In the Army Group "South" (Field Marshal E. von Manstein), the strike force consisted of the 4th Panzer Army (Colonel General G. Goth) and the Kempf task force. In Army Group Center, the 9th Army of General V. Model delivered the main blow. However, all the calculations of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command turned out to be very far from reality and immediately began to give big failures. So, the troops did not have time to carry out the necessary regroupings by the specified date. The actions of partisans on enemy communications and Soviet air strikes seriously hampered the work of transport, the transportation of troops, military equipment, ammunition and other materiel. In addition, the arrival of new tanks to the troops was very slow. In addition, their production has not yet been properly debugged. Due to a number of significant technical flaws, imperfections and shortcomings, the new tanks and assault guns, simply put, were not ready for combat use. Hitler was convinced that a miracle could only happen through the massive use of new types of tanks and assault guns. By the way, the imperfection of the new German armored vehicles manifested itself immediately with the transition of the Nazi troops to the offensive: already on the first day, out of 200 Panthers of the 4th Panzer Army, due to technical problems, 80% of the vehicles were out of order. As a result of a number of inconsistencies in the course of the preparation of the offensive operation and the miscalculations that emerged in the process, the timing of the transition to the offensive was repeatedly pushed back. Finally, on June 21, Hitler set the deadline for Operation Citadel to begin on July 5. The creation of two powerful strike groups on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which were based on tank and motorized formations, was completed by the beginning of July. The necessary adjustments were made to the original plan of the offensive operation. The main idea of ​​the revised plan was to create a significant superiority over the Soviet troops in the directions of the main attacks and, using massive tank formations, quickly break through the defenses before the approach of large Soviet reserves. The enemy was well aware of the strength of our defense, but he believed that surprise and speed of action, multiplied by the high penetrating ability of tank divisions equipped with new equipment, would bring the desired success. But the confidence of the fascist German command was based on ephemeral calculations and was in flagrant contradiction to reality. He did not take into account in a timely manner many factors that could have the most direct, and, moreover, negative, influence on the course and outcome of the offensive operation. Among them, for example, is the gross miscalculation of German intelligence, which failed to detect as many as 10 Soviet armies, which then took part in the Battle of Kursk. Another such factor was the enemy's underestimation of the power of the Soviet defense and the overestimation of its own offensive capabilities. And this list can be continued for a long time. In accordance with the plan of Operation Citadel, Army Group South delivered two strikes: one by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, the other by the Army Group Kempf, which had a total of 19 divisions (including 9 tank divisions), 6 separate divisions of assault guns and 3 battalions of heavy tanks. In total, by the time they went on the offensive, they had 1,493 tanks, including 337 Panthers and Tigers, as well as 253 assault guns. The offensive of the ground troops was supported by the aviation of the 4th Air Fleet (1100 aircraft). The best formations of the Army Group South - 6 tank (motorized) and 4 infantry divisions - were part of the 4th tank army. Among them was the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, whose 4 motorized divisions received almost all the new tanks allocated to Army Group South. First of all, Field Marshal E. Manstein, who was considered the "best operational mind" of the German General Staff, counted on the strike power of this corps in the first place. The corps acted in the direction of the main attack of Army Group South. The strike force of Army Group Center (Field Marshal G. von Kluge) included 8 tank and 14 infantry divisions, 9 separate divisions of assault guns, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks and 3 separate companies of remotely controlled tanks, intended to undermine mines. fields. All of them were part of the 9th field army. It consisted of about 750 tanks, including 45 Tigers, and 280 assault guns. From the air, the army was supported by aviation of the 6th Air Fleet (up to 700 aircraft). The concept of Operation Citadel in the final version was to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending on the Kursk ledge, and then strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front . After that, it was planned to develop an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow. In order to distract the attention and reserves of the Soviet command, at the same time as striking at the Kursk Bulge, the Nazi command planned an attack on Leningrad. Thus, the leadership of the Wehrmacht developed a plan to defeat the entire southern wing of the strategic front of the Red Army. If this plan were successfully implemented, this would radically change the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front and open up new prospects for the enemy to continue the struggle. In contrast to the operations of the Wehrmacht in 1941-1942, the tasks of the enemy strike groups in Operation Citadel were much less in depth. The troops of the Army Group "Center" were to advance 75 km, and the Army Group "South" - 125 km. The fascist German command considered such tasks quite feasible. For the offensive in the Kursk region, it attracted about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized, more than 20% of infantry divisions operating on the Soviet-German front, as well as over 65% of aviation. These were the elite troops of the Wehrmacht, commanded by the most experienced generals. In total, for the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the enemy initially threw 50 of his most combat-ready divisions, including 17 tank divisions, as well as a large number of individual units of the RVGK. In addition, about 20 more divisions operated on the flanks of the strike groups. The ground troops were supported by aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets (more than 2 thousand aircraft in total). The fascist German command believed that it had done everything possible for the success of Operation Citadel. For no other operation during the entire period of the Second World War did it prepare so comprehensively, so carefully, as for the offensive near Kursk. “Today,” Hitler said in his address to the troops, which he read out on the night before the offensive, “you are starting a great offensive battle that can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole ... And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle” . This proclamation of the German Fuhrer very eloquently shows what hopes the enemy placed on his summer offensive near Kursk in 1943. After a victorious offensive in the winter of 1942/43, the Soviet command ordered the troops to temporarily go on the defensive, gain a foothold on the achieved lines and prepare for new offensive operations. However, having guessed the enemy's plan in time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to switch to deliberate defense. The development of the action plan of the Red Army for the summer of 1943 began as early as March 1943, and the final decision was made by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief only in June. The high command of the Red Army was in a resolute mood. In particular, such front commanders as N. F. Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovsky, R. Ya. Malinovsky and some others considered it necessary to continue the offensive. However, the Supreme Commander did not want to take risks, showed caution and did not fully share the belligerent views of his military leaders. He was not sure of the success of the offensive, which had previously failed during the summer period of the Red Army. The defeats in the spring and summer of 1942 (in the Crimea, near Lyuban, Demyansk, Bolkhov and Kharkov) left an imprint in his mind too deep to rely on chance. The Supreme Commander's vacillations intensified even more after the enemy's intentions to launch a major offensive in the Kursk region became known. On April 8, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov sent a report to Stalin from the Voronezh Front, in which he outlined his point of view on the current situation and expressed his proposals for future actions. “The transition of our troops to the offensive in the coming days,” he wrote, “in order to preempt the enemy, I consider it inappropriate. It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to the general offensive, we finally finish off the main enemy grouping. Having studied the opinions of the commanders of the fronts and the General Staff, I. V. Stalin held a meeting on April 12, which was attended by G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky and Lieutenant General A. I. Antonov (Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff). After a detailed discussion of the current situation, it was decided, while strengthening the defense, to concentrate the main efforts on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, where, according to all calculations, the main events should have unfolded. Here it was supposed to create strong groupings of troops, which, having repelled the powerful blows of the enemy, were to go on the counteroffensive, delivering the main blows to Kharkov, Poltava and Kyiv in order to liberate the Donbass and the entire Left-Bank Ukraine. From mid-April, the General Staff began to develop a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive, codenamed Operation Kutuzov. It was planned to involve the troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts in this operation. It was supposed to begin with the defeat of the enemy grouping on the Oryol ledge. The counteroffensive in the Kharkov direction, to which the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were involved, received the code name Operation Commander Rumyantsev. The fronts were supposed to carry out this operation in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front. The task of repulsing the enemy offensive from the Orel side to the northern part of the Kursk ledge was assigned to the troops of the Central Front, and from the Belgorod region to the southern part of the Kursk ledge - to the Voronezh Front. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Front was deployed, which was the strategic reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It consisted of 5 combined arms, tank and air armies, as well as 10 separate corps (6 tank and mechanized, 3 cavalry and 1 rifle). The front consisted of about 580 thousand people, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 470 aircraft. It was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough of the enemy both from the side of Orel and from Belgorod, and when the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts went on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths. The actions of the troops of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge were coordinated by the representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. Thus, the situation that had developed by the summer of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge was generally favorable for the Soviet troops. This gave certain chances for a successful outcome of the defensive battle. By the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command had completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Central Front (General of the Army K. K. Rokossovsky) had the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk salient, repelling the enemy’s offensive, and then, going on the counteroffensive, together with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, defeat his grouping in the Orel region. The Voronezh Front (General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) received the task of defending the southern part of the Kursk salient, exhausting and bleeding the enemy in defensive battles, after which, by switching to a counteroffensive, complete his defeat in the Belgorod and Kharkov regions. The troops of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western fronts were to assist the Central Front in disrupting the enemy offensive and be ready to go over to the counteroffensive. By the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Central Front had 5 combined arms (48th, 13th, 70th, 65th and 60th), 2nd tank and 16th air armies, as well as 2 separate tank corps (9th and 19th). In total, the front had 41 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, a fighter division, 5 rifle and 3 separate tank brigades, 3 fortified areas - a total of 738 thousand people, over 10.9 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.8 thousand people. tanks and self-propelled guns and 1.1 thousand aircraft. The front defended a strip 306 km wide. Organizing the defense, the commander of the troops of the Central Front proceeded from the fact that the enemy strike would most likely follow through Ponyri to Kursk, and therefore deployed his main forces on the right wing of the front in a strip of about 100 km - 3 armies (48, 13 and 70 ) - 58% of rifle divisions, about 90% of tanks and self-propelled guns, 70% of artillery. Particular attention was paid to the 30-kilometer strip along the Orel-Kursk railway. The rest of the front was defended by 2 armies (65th and 60th). Anticipating the fierce nature of the upcoming battle, General Rokossovsky created a strong second echelon and reserve. The 2nd Panzer Army was in the second echelon, and the 9th and 19th separate tank corps were in reserve. Both the second echelon and the reserve were located in the direction of the expected enemy strike. From the air, the troops of the front were supported by the 16th Air Army. The idea of ​​the defensive operation of the Central Front was to use a stubborn defense on the occupied lines to weaken the enemy strike force as much as possible, to stop its offensive, and in the morning of the 2-3rd day of the operation to launch a counterattack and restore the previously occupied position, or go on the counteroffensive. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Voronezh Front had 5 combined arms (38, 40, 69, 6th Guards and 7th Guards), 1st Tank and 2nd Air Armies, as well as 2 separate tank (2 th and 5th guards) and rifle (35th guards) corps. In total, the front had 35 rifle divisions, 4 tank and 1 mechanized corps and 6 separate tank brigades - a total of 535 thousand people, about 8.2 thousand guns and mortars, 1.7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 1.1 thousand aircraft. The front defended a strip about 250 km wide. The commander of the Voronezh Front believed that the enemy could strike simultaneously in three directions: from the Belgorod region to Oboyan, from the same region to Korocha, and from the region west of Volchansk to Novy Oskol. The first two directions were considered as the most probable, and therefore the main forces of the front were deployed in the center and on the left wing. Here, in a strip of 164 km, the 6th and 7th Guards armies defended. The rest of the sector was defended by 2 other armies of the first echelon of the front (38th and 40th). In the second echelon were the 1st tank and 69th armies, in reserve - 2 separate tank and rifle corps. The second echelon and the reserve, as well as on the Central Front, were located in the directions of the expected enemy strikes. From the air, the troops of the front were supported by the 2nd Air Army. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts outnumbered the enemy: in men - 1.4-1.5 times, artillery - 1.8-2, in tanks and self-propelled guns 1.1-1.5 times. However, on the axes of its main attacks, the fascist German command achieved a temporary superiority in forces and means. Only on the northern face did the Soviet troops retain some superiority in artillery. The concentration of superior forces in selected directions made it possible for the enemy to deliver powerful initial strikes against the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. In accordance with the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the transition to deliberate defense, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, by the beginning of the enemy offensive, basically completed their task of preparing a defense in depth. In total, 8 defensive lines and lines were equipped. The organization of defense was based on the idea of ​​deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions with a well-developed system of trenches, communications and other engineering structures. On the Central and Voronezh fronts there were 5-6 defensive lines and lines. The first two lanes constituted the tactical defense zone, and the third - the army defensive line. In addition, there were 2-3 more front lines. Along with this, a defensive line of the Steppe Front troops was created, and a state line of defense was prepared along the left bank of the Don. The total depth of the defense prepared by the Soviet troops near Kursk was 250-300 km. The most developed in terms of engineering was the tactical defense zone, the depth of which for the first time during the war years reached 15-20 km. Its first (main) strip consisted of 2-3 positions, each of which had 2-3 trenches of a full profile, interconnected by communication passages. The depth of the position was 1.5-2 km. The depth of defense of the armies was 30-50 km, fronts - 180-200 km. In the most important directions, the defensive lines were occupied by troops in the expectation that even if the enemy succeeded in breaking through the army defenses, then in the depths he would meet not an "operational space" where he could freely maneuver, but a new defense saturated with engineering structures and occupied by troops. The defense was built primarily as anti-tank. It was based on anti-tank strongholds (PTOP), built, as a rule, in battalion (company) defense areas, and anti-tank areas (ATR), created independently or within regimental defense areas. Anti-tank defense (ATD) was strengthened by maneuvering artillery and anti-tank reserves. The PTOP and PTR fire system was linked to the fire of artillery located in open and closed firing positions. A characteristic moment was that even cannon and howitzer artillery was being prepared for direct fire at tanks. Crews of tanks of the second echelons and reserves equipped firing lines for ambushes. It was supposed to use flamethrower units, tank destroyers and units of tank destroyer dogs to fight enemy tanks. More than 1 million anti-tank mines were installed in front of the front line and in the depths of the defense, many tens of kilometers of anti-tank barriers were erected: ditches, scarps, counter-scarps, gouges, forest blockages, etc. Mobile obstacle detachments (POZ) became an important element of anti-tank defense. For the first time in the war, the depth of anti-tank defense near Kursk reached 30-35 km. All weapons were supposed to be used massively, taking into account the probable directions of enemy strikes. Given that the enemy, as a rule, attacked with powerful air support, special attention was paid to the organization of air defense (air defense) of the troops. Anti-aircraft artillery (1026 guns) of the fronts, fighter aircraft and significant forces of the country's Air Defense Forces were involved in the performance of air defense tasks in addition to military forces and means. As a result, more than 60% of the combat formations of the troops were covered by two- or three-layer fire from anti-aircraft artillery and aviation. The population of the Orel, Voronezh, Kursk, Sumy and Kharkov regions, mobilized by the local authorities, rendered enormous assistance to the troops of the fronts. Hundreds of thousands of people were involved in the construction of defensive fortifications. For example, in April, more than 100 thousand people were involved in defensive work in the zones of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and in June almost 300 thousand. The balance of forces by the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge was as follows. For the offensive operation Citadel, the Nazi command employed over 900,000 personnel, about 10,000 guns and mortars, over 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. They were opposed by the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, numbering more than 1.3 million people. people, 19.1 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. Consequently, the Soviet troops (excluding the Steppe Front) outnumbered the enemy in people by 1.4 times, in artillery (excluding rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns) - in 1.9, in tanks and self-propelled guns - in 1.2 and in aircraft - 1.4 times. Based on an analysis of the current situation, the front commanders increasingly doubted the expediency of the decision taken by the high command to switch to deliberate defense. General Vatutin showed particular perseverance. He tried to convince Vasilevsky, and then Stalin, that in the current situation, deliberate defense was hardly expedient, as it would lead to the loss of precious time and, in the end, could lead to the disruption of the entire plan conceived for the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. He believed that a pre-emptive offensive was needed. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered that this option be carefully worked out and ordered Vatutin, Rokossovsky and Malinovsky (commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front) to submit their proposals to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky, firmly convinced of the need to meet the German offensive near Kursk, defended the previously developed plan. Thus, during the period of relative calm on the Soviet-German front, which lasted from late March to early July 1943, the opposing sides made great efforts to comprehensively prepare for the upcoming battles. In this competition, the Soviet state and its Armed Forces were ahead. It remained only to skillfully use the forces and means at the disposal of the command. Considering the unfavorable balance of forces for the enemy, we can conclude that Hitler's decision to attack at all costs was a gamble from a military point of view. But the Nazi leadership went for it, giving priority to political considerations. The German Fuhrer stated this directly in his speech in East Prussia on July 1. According to him, the Citadel operation will have not only military, but also political significance, will help Germany to keep its allies and frustrate the plans of the Western powers to open a second front, and will also have a beneficial effect on the internal situation in Germany. However, the position of the Nazi troops was further aggravated by the fact that surprise, due to which they managed to achieve success in the summer operations of 1941 and 1942, was lost. This was facilitated not least by the repeated postponements of the offensive near Kursk and the good work of Soviet intelligence. By the beginning of July, all decisions were made, tasks were set for the troops, the huge masses of the troops of the parties opposed on the Kursk Bulge froze in suspense ...
DEFENSIVE BATTLE ON THE KURSK DUT
(July 5 - 23, 1943)
July came, and on the entire vast Soviet-German front, the calm continued as before. Sovinformburo reports invariably read: "Nothing significant happened at the front." But it was a pre-stormy calm. Soviet intelligence closely monitored the actions of the enemy, especially the movement of his tank formations. Based on a thorough analysis of the situation and the latest intelligence data coming from various sources, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command came to the conclusion that the enemy offensive could begin on July 3-6, and promptly warned the front commanders about this. On the night of July 5, it was possible to establish the exact time for the transition of the Nazi troops to the offensive - 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5. Having assessed the current situation, the commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts decided to conduct a pre-planned artillery counter-preparation in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups. It was necessary to inflict maximum damage on the enemy with a powerful and sudden fire strike even before he went on the offensive, and thereby weaken the strength of his initial onslaught. “The question arose before us: to believe the testimony of the prisoners or not? It was necessary to immediately make a decision to carry out the artillery counter-preparation provided for by the plan, since there was no time to request a rate and receive a response. And it was accepted. The artillery commander of the front received an order to attack the enemy with all the power of fire weapons planned for this purpose. At 2 hours 20 minutes on July 5, pre-dawn silence
etc.................

The Battle of Stalingrad, one of the greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War, was a turning point in the course of World War II. Interest in Stalingrad is not weakening, and the disputes of researchers do not subside. Stalingrad is a city that has become a symbol of suffering and pain, a symbol of the greatest courage. Stalingrad will remain in the memory of mankind for centuries. The battle of Stalingrad is conditionally divided into two periods: defensive and offensive. The defensive period began on July 17, 1942 and ended on November 18, 1942. The offensive period began with the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops on November 19, 1942 and ended with victorious volleys on February 2, 1943. More than 2 million people participated in the battle at certain stages. (on the distant approaches from July 17 to August 10, 1942, on the near ones - from August 10 to September 13, 1942) By the middle of summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the banks of the Volga. In the plan of a large-scale offensive in the south of our country (Caucasus, Crimea), the command of fascist Germany also includes Stalingrad (Hitler's directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942). Purpose: to take over the industrial city, whose enterprises produced military products (factories "Red October", "Barrikada", Tractor); reach the Volga, along which in the shortest possible time it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil necessary for the front was extracted. Hitler plans to carry out this plan with the forces of one 6th Paulus field army in just a week - by July 25, 1942. On July 14, 1942, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Stalingrad region was declared under a state of siege. July 17, 1942 was the day of the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad. The Kletsky, Surovikinsky, Serafimovichsky, Chernyshkovsky districts of our region were the first to meet the enemy. Well-prepared, armed, numerically superior to ours, the Nazi army, at the cost of any losses, sought to get to Stalingrad, and the Soviet soldiers, at the cost of incredible efforts, had to hold back the onslaught of the enemy. The forces of the advancing enemy were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942. It included: 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms armies, as well as 8 I'm an air force.

The complexity of the situation also consisted in the fact that our troops experienced an acute shortage of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, in a number of formations there was not enough ammunition. Most of the divisions that arrived from the Headquarters Reserve did not yet have combat experience, other divisions were exhausted in previous battles. The open steppe nature of the terrain allowed enemy aircraft to strike at the Soviet troops and inflict great damage in people, weapons and military equipment. The battles for the main line of defense were preceded by the battles of the forward detachments. They also included cadet regiments. Having just left the walls of military schools, young officers went on their first attack as ordinary soldiers.

Battle of Kursk

The Battle of Kursk occupies a special place in the Great Patriotic War. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. This battle has no equal in its bitterness and stubbornness of the struggle.

The general plan of the German command was to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region. If successful, it was supposed to expand the front of the offensive and return the strategic initiative. To implement his plans, the enemy concentrated powerful strike groups, which numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. Great hopes were placed on the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighter planes, and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft.

The Soviet command decided to first bleed the enemy strike groups in defensive battles, and then go on the counteroffensive. The battle that began immediately took on a grandiose scope and was of an extremely tense character. Our troops did not flinch. They met the avalanche of enemy tanks and infantry with unprecedented stamina and courage. The offensive of the enemy strike groups was suspended. Only at the cost of huge losses did he manage to penetrate our defenses in some areas. On the Central Front - at 10-12 km, on the Voronezh - up to 35 km. Hitler's operation "Citadel" was finally buried by the largest oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka in the entire Second World War. It happened on July 12th. 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it from both sides. This battle was won by the Soviet soldiers. The Nazis, having lost up to 400 tanks during the day of the battle, were forced to abandon the offensive.

On July 12, the second stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. On August 5, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, in honor of this major success, a victorious salute was given in Moscow for the first time in two years of the war. Since that time, artillery salutes have constantly announced the glorious victories of Soviet weapons. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated. So the battle on the Kursk fiery arch ended victoriously. During it, 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. The fascist German troops lost about 500,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 3,700 aircraft. For courage and heroism, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers - participants in the Battle of the Fiery Arc, were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Kursk ended with a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War.

Belarusian operation (1944)

On June 22, 1944, the day before the start of the general offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out. At the front of 450 km, 45 reconnaissance units operated simultaneously. On the whole, reconnaissance in force, despite its failure in the zone of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies (the area of ​​the Minsk Highway to the north and south), achieved its goal - the front line of defense, the fire system, and the enemy grouping were clarified. In addition, the enemy, having taken the actions of the forward battalions as the beginning of a general offensive, used up a significant part of his divisional and even corps reserves.

During the first two days of the operation, formations of the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front and the northern strike group of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy's tactical defense zone to a depth of 25-30 km, inflicting significant losses on him. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front crossed the river. Western Dvina. Favorable conditions were created for the encirclement of the enemy in the Vitebsk region.

Five enemy divisions were surrounded and destroyed near Vitebsk, two divisions were defeated. The total losses of the enemy near Vitebsk amounted to over 20 thousand people killed and more than 10 thousand wounded.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive on June 24. On the first day of the operation, they broke through the main line of defense, and on the second day, the second line.

The front commander decided to deliver a concentrated strike on the Nazis with aviation. From 19:00 to 20:00 on June 27, 526 aircraft delivered a massive attack on the enemy, dropping 11,300 bombs and firing 572 rockets and 41,000 shells and cartridges. The enemy suffered huge losses and was dispersed. On June 29, ground troops that went on the offensive finished off the enemy.

As a result of the Bobruisk operation, the enemy lost 73,680 people killed and captured. The main forces of the 9th Army were defeated. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front deeply enveloped the 4th Nazi Army from the south.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, acting in the Mogilev direction, by the end of June 29, advanced to a depth of 90 km, crossed the Dnieper and liberated the city of Mogilev. This completed the first phase of the operation. For six days, the troops of the fronts crossed six rivers. including such a large water barrier as the Dnieper.

On July 3, troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts completed the encirclement of a 105,000-strong group of Nazi troops east of Minsk. Its liquidation lasted from 5 to 11 July. It was carried out by cutting the enemy with blows from several sides with simultaneous compression of the inner front of the encirclement. The partisans rendered great assistance in these battles to the regular troops, who from July 8 to July 11 bore the brunt of the fight against disparate enemy groups.

The defeat of the enemy army group "Center" was of great military-political and strategic importance. The most important result of this operation was the liberation of the Byelorussian SSR, a large part of the Lithuanian SSR and the eastern part of our allied Poland. The Soviet troops, having crossed the G. Neman, approached the borders of fascist Germany.

The enemy suffered huge losses. Of the 97 divisions and 13 brigades that participated in the battles at different times, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed. 50 divisions suffered losses from 60 to 70% of the entire composition.

1st Belorussian Front, aimed at Berlin

Zhukov leads the operation to take Berlin. Huge work was carried out in the rear to provide the army with ammunition and fuel, evacuate the wounded and feed millions of people.

In November 1944, the General Staff began planning military operations on the outskirts of Berlin. It was necessary to defeat the German army group "A" and complete the liberation of Poland.

The Soviet attack on Berlin was carefully prepared. A huge amount of ammunition and military equipment was transferred to the city. The troops of three fronts took part in the Berlin operation. The command was entrusted to marshals G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky and I.S. Konev. On both sides, 3.5 million people participated in the battle.

The assault began on April 16, 1945. At 3 am Berlin time, under the light of 140 searchlights, tanks and infantry attacked the positions of the Germans. After four days of fighting, the fronts commanded by Zhukov and Konev, with the support of two armies of the Polish Army, closed the ring around Berlin. 93 enemy divisions were defeated, about 490 thousand people were taken prisoner, a huge amount of captured military equipment and weapons. On this day, a meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe took place.

The Hitlerite command declared: "Berlin will remain German," and everything possible was done for this. Hitler refused to surrender and threw old people and children into street fighting. He hoped for strife among the allies. The prolongation of the war led to numerous casualties.

On April 21, the first assault detachments reached the outskirts of the German capital and started street fighting. German soldiers offered fierce resistance, surrendering only in hopeless situations.

On May 1, at 3 o'clock, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, was delivered to the command post of the 8th Guards Army. He stated that Hitler had committed suicide on 30 April and offered to start negotiations for an armistice.

On the night of May 9, an act of unconditional surrender of Germany was signed. The war in Europe is over.

Battle of Stalingrad - 20th century Cannes

There are events in Russian history that burn with gold on the tablets of its military glory. And one of them - (July 17, 1942–February 2, 1943), which became Cannes of the 20th century.
The gigantic scale battle of the Second World War unfolded in the second half of 1942 on the banks of the Volga. At certain stages, more than 2 million people, about 30 thousand guns, more than 2 thousand aircraft and the same number of tanks took part in it from both sides.
During Battle of Stalingrad The Wehrmacht lost a quarter of its forces concentrated on the Eastern Front. His losses in killed, missing and wounded amounted to about one and a half million soldiers and officers.

Battle of Stalingrad on the map

Stages of the Battle of Stalingrad, its prerequisites

By the nature of the fighting Battle of Stalingrad briefly divided into two periods. These are defensive operations (July 17 - November 18, 1942) and offensive operations (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943).
After the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the defeat near Moscow, the Nazis were preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front. On April 5, Hitler issued a directive that spelled out the goal of the 1942 summer campaign. This is the mastery of the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and access to the Volga in the region of Stalingrad. On June 28, the Wehrmacht launched a decisive offensive, taking the Donbass, Rostov, Voronezh ...
Stalingrad was a major communications hub connecting the central regions of the country with the Caucasus and Central Asia. And the Volga is an important transport artery for the delivery of Caucasian oil. The capture of Stalingrad could have catastrophic consequences for the USSR. The 6th Army under the command of General F. Paulus was actively operating in this direction.

Photos of the Battle of Stalingrad

Battle of Stalingrad - fighting on the outskirts

To protect the city, the Soviet command formed the Stalingrad Front, headed by Marshal S. K. Timoshenko. began on July 17, when units of the 62nd Army entered the battle with the vanguard of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht in the bend of the Don. Defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad lasted 57 days and nights. On July 28, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin issued Order No. 227, better known as "Not a step back!"
By the beginning of the decisive offensive, the German command significantly strengthened Paulus's 6th Army. The superiority in tanks was twofold, in aircraft - almost fourfold. And at the end of July, the 4th Panzer Army was also transferred here from the Caucasian direction. And, nevertheless, the advance of the Nazis to the Volga could not be called fast. In a month, under the desperate blows of the Soviet troops, they managed to overcome only 60 kilometers. To strengthen the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad, the Southeastern Front was created under the command of General A.I. Eremenko. Meanwhile, the Nazis began active operations in the Caucasian direction. But thanks to the dedication of the Soviet soldiers, the German offensive deep into the Caucasus was stopped.

Photo: Battle of Stalingrad - fighting for every piece of Russian land!

Battle of Stalingrad: every house is a fortress

August 19 became black date of the Battle of Stalingrad- the tank grouping of the Paulus army broke through to the Volga. Moreover, cutting off the 62nd Army defending the city from the north from the main forces of the front. Attempts to destroy the 8-kilometer corridor formed by the enemy troops were unsuccessful. Although Soviet soldiers were examples of amazing heroism. 33 fighters of the 87th Infantry Division, defending the heights in the area of ​​​​Malye Rossoshki, became an insurmountable stronghold in the path of superior enemy forces. During the day, they desperately repulsed the attacks of 70 tanks and a Nazi battalion, leaving 150 dead soldiers and 27 wrecked vehicles on the battlefield.
On August 23, Stalingrad was subjected to the most severe bombardment by German aircraft. Several hundred aircraft struck industrial and residential areas, turning them into ruins. And the German command continued to build up forces in the Stalingrad direction. By the end of September, Army Group B had more than 80 divisions.
The 66th and 24th armies were sent to help Stalingrad from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On September 13, the assault on the central part of the city began with two powerful groups supported by 350 tanks. A struggle for the city, unparalleled in courage and intensity, began - the most terrible stage of the battle of Stalingrad.
For every building, for every inch of land, the fighters fought to the death, staining them with blood. General Rodimtsev called the battle in the building the most difficult battle. After all, there are no familiar concepts of flanks, rear, an enemy can lurk around every corner. The city was constantly subjected to shelling and bombing, the earth was burning, the Volga was burning. From oil tanks pierced by shells, oil rushed in fiery streams into dugouts and trenches. An example of the selfless valor of the Soviet soldiers was the almost two-month defense of Pavlov's house. Having knocked out the enemy from a four-story building on Penzenskaya Street, a group of scouts led by Sergeant Ya. F. Pavlov turned the house into an impregnable fortress.
The enemy sent another 200,000 trained reinforcements, 90 artillery battalions, 40 engineer battalions to storm the city ... Hitler hysterically demanded to take the Volga "citadel" at any cost.
The commander of the battalion of the Paulus army, G. Welz, later wrote that he recalls this as a nightmare. “In the morning, five German battalions go on the attack and almost no one returns. The next morning, everything repeats again ... "
The approaches to Stalingrad were indeed littered with the corpses of soldiers and the skeletons of burnt tanks. No wonder the Germans called the path to the city "the road of death."

Stalingrad battle. Photo of killed Germans (far right - killed by a Russian sniper)

Battle of Stalingrad - "Thunderstorm" and "Thunder" against "Uranus"

The Soviet command developed the Uranus plan for defeat of the Nazis at Stalingrad. It consisted in cutting off the enemy strike group from the main forces with powerful flank strikes and, having surrounded it, destroyed it. Army Group B, led by Field Marshal Bock, included 1011.5 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 10 thousand guns, 1200 aircraft, etc. The structure of the three Soviet fronts that defended the city included 1103 thousand personnel, 15501 guns, 1350 aircraft. That is, the advantage of the Soviet side was insignificant. Therefore, a decisive victory could only be achieved through the art of war.
On November 19, units of the South-Western and Don Fronts, and on November 20 of the Stalingrad Front, from two sides, brought down tons of fiery metal on Bock's locations. After breaking through the enemy defenses, the troops began to develop an offensive in the operational depth. The meeting of the Soviet fronts took place on the fifth day of the offensive, November 23, in the Kalach, Sovetsky area.
Unwilling to accept defeat Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazi command made an attempt to unblock the encircled army of Paulus. But the operations "Winter Thunderstorm" and "Thunderbolt" initiated by them in mid-December ended in failure. Now the conditions were created for the complete defeat of the encircled troops.
The operation to eliminate them received the code name "Ring". Of the 330 thousand who were surrounded by the Nazis, by January 1943 no more than 250 thousand remained. But the group was not going to capitulate. She was armed with more than 4,000 guns, 300 tanks, 100 aircraft. Paulus later wrote in his memoirs: “On the one hand, there were unconditional orders to hold on, promises of help, references to the general situation. On the other hand, there are internal humane motives - to stop the fight, caused by the plight of the soldiers.
On January 10, 1943, Soviet troops launched Operation Koltso. entered its final phase. Pressed against the Volga and cut into two parts, the enemy grouping was forced to surrender.

Battle of Stalingrad (column of captured Germans)

Stalingrad battle. Captured F. Paulus (he hoped that he would be exchanged, and only at the end of the war did he find out that they offered to exchange him for Stalin's son, Yakov Dzhugashvili). Stalin then said: “I don’t change a soldier for a field marshal!”

Battle of Stalingrad, photo of the captured F. Paulus

victory in Battle of Stalingrad was of great international and military-political importance for the USSR. She marked a turning point in the course of the Second World War. After Stalingrad, the period of expulsion of the German occupiers from the territory of the USSR began. Becoming a triumph of Soviet military art, strengthened the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition and caused discord in the countries of the fascist bloc.
Some Western historians, trying to belittle the significance of the battle of Stalingrad, put it on a par with the battle of Tunisia (1943), near El Alamein (1942), etc. But they were refuted by Hitler himself, who declared on February 1, 1943 in his headquarters: “The possibility of ending the war in the East by means of an offensive is no longer exists…"

Then, near Stalingrad, our fathers and grandfathers again "gave a light" Photo: captured Germans after the Battle of Stalingrad