Disputed islands with Japan on the map. History of the Kuril Islands. The Kuril Islands in the history of Russian-Japanese relations

Recently, Shinzo Abe announced that he would annex the disputed islands of the South Kuril chain to Japan. “I will solve the problem of the northern territories and conclude a peace treaty. As a politician, as a prime minister, I want to achieve this at all costs,” he promised his compatriots.

According to Japanese tradition, Shinzo Abe will have to do hara-kiri if he doesn't keep his word. It is quite possible that Vladimir Putin will help the Japanese prime minister live to a ripe old age and die a natural death. Photo by Alexander Vilf (Getty Images).

In my opinion, everything goes to the fact that the long-standing conflict will be settled. The time to establish decent relations with Japan was chosen very well - for the empty hard-to-reach lands, which their former owners now and then look nostalgically, you can get a lot of material benefits from one of the most powerful economies in the world. And the lifting of sanctions as a condition for the transfer of the islands is far from the only and not the main concession that our Foreign Ministry is now seeking, I am sure.

So the quite expected surge of quasi-patriotism of our liberals, directed at the Russian president, should be prevented.

I have already had to analyze in detail the history of the islands of Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriysky on the Amur, the loss of which Moscow snobs cannot come to terms with. The post also discussed the dispute with Norway over maritime territories, which was also settled.

I also touched upon the secret negotiations between the human rights activist Lev Ponomarev and the Japanese diplomat about the "northern territories", filmed on video and posted online. Generally speaking, one of this video it is enough for our caring citizens to bashfully swallow the return of the islands to Japan, if it takes place. But since concerned citizens will definitely not keep silent, we must understand the essence of the problem.

background

February 7, 1855 Shimodsky treatise on trade and borders. The now disputed islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands have been ceded to Japan (therefore, February 7 is annually celebrated in Japan as Northern Territories Day). The question of the status of Sakhalin remained unresolved.

May 7, 1875 Petersburg treaty. Japan transferred the rights to all 18 Kuril Islands in exchange for the entire Sakhalin.

August 23, 1905- Treaty of Portsmouth resultsRusso-Japanese War.Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin.

February 11, 1945 — Yalta conference. THE USSR, US and UK reached a written agreement on the entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan, subject to the return of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to it after the end of the war.

February 2, 1946 on the basis of the Yalta agreements in the USSR Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk region was created - on the territory of the southern part of the island Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. January 2, 1947 she was merged with Sakhalin Oblast Khabarovsk Territory, which expanded to the borders of the modern Sakhalin Region.

Japan enters the Cold War

September 8, 1951 The Treaty of San Francisco was signed between the Allied Powers and Japan. Regarding the now disputed territories, it says the following: "Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Portsmouth Treaty of September 5, 1905."

The USSR sent a delegation to San Francisco headed by Deputy Foreign Minister A. Gromyko. But not in order to sign a document, but to voice their position. The said clause of the contract was formulated as follows:"Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the islands adjacent to it and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, titles and claims to these territories."

Of course, in our wording, the treaty is specific and more in line with the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements. However, the Anglo-American version was adopted. The USSR did not sign it, Japan did.

Today, some historians believe that The USSR had to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the form in which it was proposed by the Americans This would strengthen our negotiating position. “We should have signed a contract. I don’t know why we didn’t do this - perhaps because of vanity or pride, but above all, because Stalin overestimated his capabilities and the degree of his influence on the United States, ”N.S. wrote in his memoirs .Khrushchev. But soon, as we shall see later, he himself made a mistake.

From today's standpoint, the lack of a signature under the notorious treaty is sometimes considered almost a diplomatic failure. However, the international situation of that time was much more complicated and was not limited to the Far East. Perhaps, what seems to someone a loss, in those conditions became a necessary measure.

Japan and sanctions

It is sometimes erroneously believed that since we do not have a peace treaty with Japan, we are in a state of war. However, this is not at all the case.

December 12, 1956 The exchange of letters took place in Tokyo, marking the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. According to the document, the USSR agreed to "the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan."

The parties came to this wording after several rounds of lengthy negotiations. Japan's initial proposal was simple: a return to Potsdam - that is, the transfer of all the Kuriles and South Sakhalin to it. Of course, such a proposal by the losing side of the war looked somewhat frivolous.

The USSR was not going to cede an inch, but unexpectedly for the Japanese, Habomai and Shikotan suddenly offered. This was a reserve position, approved by the Politburo, but announced prematurely - the head of the Soviet delegation, Ya.A. On August 9, 1956, during a conversation with his counterpart in the garden of the Japanese embassy in London, the reserve position was announced. It was she who entered the text of the Joint Declaration.

It must be clarified that the influence of the United States on Japan at that time was enormous (however, as now). They closely monitored all her contacts with the USSR and, undoubtedly, were the third participant in the negotiations, although invisible.

At the end of August 1956, Washington threatened Tokyo that if, under a peace treaty with the USSR, Japan renounces its claims to Kunashir and Iturup, the United States will forever retain the occupied island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago. The note included a wording that clearly played on the national feelings of the Japanese: “The US government has come to the conclusion that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (along with the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which are part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan and should rightly be considered as belonging to Japan. ". That is, the Yalta agreements were publicly disavowed.

The affiliation of the "northern territories" of Hokkaido, of course, is a lie - on all military and pre-war Japanese maps, the islands have always been part of the Kuril ridge and have never been identified separately. However, the idea was well received. It was on this geographical absurdity that entire generations of politicians in the Land of the Rising Sun made their careers.

The peace treaty has not yet been signed - in our relations we are guided by the Joint Declaration of 1956.

Issue price

I think that even in the first term of his presidency, Vladimir Putin decided to settle all disputed territorial issues with his neighbors. Including with Japan. In any case, back in 2004, Sergey Lavrov formulated the position of the Russian leadership: “We have always fulfilled and will continue to fulfill our obligations, especially ratified documents, but, of course, to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements . So far, as we know, we have not been able to reach an understanding of these volumes as we see it and as we saw it in 1956.

“Until Japan's ownership of all four islands is clearly defined, a peace treaty will not be concluded,” responded then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The negotiation process has again reached an impasse.

However, this year we again remembered the peace treaty with Japan.

In May, at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin said that Russia was ready to negotiate with Japan on the disputed islands, and the solution should be a compromise. That is, none of the parties should feel like a loser. “Are you ready to negotiate? Yes, ready. But we were surprised to hear recently that Japan has joined some kind of sanctions - and here Japan, I don’t really understand - and is suspending the negotiation process on this topic. So we are ready, is Japan ready, I haven’t learned for myself, ”said the President of the Russian Federation.

It seems that the pain point is found correctly. And the negotiation process (I hope, this time in offices tightly closed from American ears) has been in full swing for at least six months. Otherwise, Shinzo Abe would not have made such promises.

If we fulfill the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration and return the two islands to Japan, 2,100 people will have to be resettled. All of them live on Shikotan, only a frontier post is located on Habomai. Most likely, the problem of the presence of our armed forces on the islands is being discussed. However, for complete control over the region, the troops deployed on Sakhalin, Kunashir and Iturup are quite enough.

Another question is what reciprocal concessions we expect from Japan. It is clear that the sanctions should be lifted - this is not even discussed. Perhaps access to credits and technologies, expansion of participation in joint projects? Not excluded.

Be that as it may, Shinzo Abe faces a difficult choice. The conclusion of the long-awaited peace treaty with Russia, spiced with "northern territories", would certainly have made him the politician of the century in his homeland. It will inevitably lead to tension in relations between Japan and the United States. I wonder what the Prime Minister would prefer.

And we will somehow survive the internal Russian tension that our liberals will inflate.

The Habomai group of islands is labeled "Other Islands" on this map. These are several white spots between Shikotan and Hokkaido.
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Image copyright RIA Image caption Before Putin and Abe, the issue of signing a peace treaty between Russia and Japan was discussed by all their predecessors - to no avail

During a two-day visit to Nagato and Tokyo, the Russian president will agree with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on investments. The main question - about the ownership of the Kuril Islands - as usual, will be postponed indefinitely, experts say.

Abe became the second G7 leader to host Putin after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The visit was supposed to take place two years ago, but was canceled due to sanctions against Russia, supported by Japan.

What is the essence of the dispute between Japan and Russia?

Abe is making progress in a long-standing territorial dispute in which Japan claims the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, as well as the Habomai archipelago (in Russia, this name does not exist, the archipelago, together with Shikotan, are united under the name of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The Japanese elite is well aware that Russia will never return two large islands, so they are ready to take a maximum of two small ones. But how to explain to society that they forever abandon the big islands? Alexander Gabuev, expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center

At the end of World War II, in which Japan fought on the side of Nazi Germany, the USSR expelled 17,000 Japanese from the islands; no peace treaty was signed between Moscow and Tokyo.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan established the sovereignty of the USSR over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but Tokyo and Moscow did not agree on what to understand by the Kuriles.

Tokyo considers Iturup, Kunashir and Habomai to be its illegally occupied "northern territories". Moscow considers these islands part of the Kuril Islands and has repeatedly stated that their current status is not subject to revision.

In 2016, Shinzo Abe flew to Russia twice (to Sochi and Vladivostok), he and Putin also met at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima.

In early December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow and Tokyo had similar positions on the peace treaty. In an interview with Japanese journalists, Vladimir Putin called the absence of a peace treaty with Japan an anachronism that "should be eliminated."

He also said that the foreign ministries of the two countries need to resolve "purely technical issues" among themselves so that the Japanese can visit the southern Kuriles without visas.

However, Moscow is embarrassed that in the event of the return of the southern Kuriles, US military bases may appear there. The head of the National Security Council of Japan, Shotaro Yachi, did not rule out such a possibility in a conversation with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, the Japanese newspaper Asahi wrote on Wednesday.

Should we wait for the return of the Kuriles?

The short answer is no. "We should not expect any breakthrough agreements, and ordinary ones too, on the issue of ownership of the southern Kuriles," said former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze.

"The expectations of the Japanese side, as usual, are at odds with the intentions of Russia," Kunadze said in an interview with the BBC. "President Putin has repeatedly said in the last days before leaving for Japan that the problem of belonging to the Kuriles does not exist for Russia, that the Kuriles are , in fact, a war trophy following the results of the Second World War, and even the fact that Russia's rights to the Kuriles are secured by international treaties."

The latter, according to Kunadze, is a moot point and depends on the interpretation of these treaties.

“Putin is referring to the agreements reached in Yalta in February 1945. These agreements were political in nature and assumed the appropriate contractual and legal formalization. It took place in San Francisco in 1951. The Soviet Union did not sign a peace treaty with Japan then. , there is no other consolidation of Russia's rights in the territories that Japan renounced under the San Francisco Treaty," the diplomat sums up.

"The parties are trying as much as possible to blow off the ball of mutual expectations of the public and show that there will be no breakthrough," comments Alexander Gabuev, an expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

"The red line of Russia: Japan recognizes the results of World War II, renounces claims to the southern Kuriles. As a gesture of goodwill, we give Japan two small islands, and on Kunashir and Iturup we can make visa-free entry, a free zone for joint economic development - everything that anything," he believes. "Russia cannot give up two large islands, because it will be a loss, these islands are of economic importance, a lot of money has been invested there, there is a large population, the straits between these islands are used by Russian submarines when they go out to patrol the Pacific Ocean" .

Japan, according to Gabuev's observations, has softened its position on disputed territories in recent years.

“The Japanese elite is well aware that Russia will never return two large islands, so they are ready to take a maximum of two small ones. But how to explain to society that they are forever abandoning large islands? large. For Russia, this is unacceptable, we want to resolve the issue once and for all. These two red lines are not yet close enough to expect a breakthrough," the expert believes.

What else will be discussed?

The Kuriles are not the only topic discussed by Putin and Abe. Russia needs foreign investment in the Far East.

According to the Japanese edition of Yomiuri, due to sanctions, trade between the two countries has decreased. Thus, imports from Russia to Japan decreased by 27.3% - from 2.61 trillion yen ($23 billion) in 2014 to 1.9 trillion yen ($17 billion) in 2015. And exports to Russia by 36.4% - from 972 billion yen (8.8 billion dollars) in 2014 to 618 billion yen (5.6 billion dollars) in 2015.

The Japanese government intends to acquire a part of the gas fields of the Russian company Novatek, as well as a part of the shares of Rosneft through the state oil, gas and metals corporation JOGMEC.

It is expected that dozens of commercial agreements will be signed during the visit, and the working breakfast of the Russian president and the Japanese prime minister will be attended, in particular, by the head of Rosatom Alexei Likhachev, the head of Gazprom Alexei Miller, the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin, the head of the Russian Fund for Direct investments Kirill Dmitriev, entrepreneurs Oleg Deripaska and Leonid Mikhelson.

So far, Russia and Japan are only exchanging pleasantries. Whether at least part of the economic memorandums will come true, it will become clear whether they can also agree on something.

History of the Kuril Islands

Background

Briefly, the history of the "belonging" of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island is as follows.

1.In period 1639-1649. Russian Cossack detachments led by Moskovitinov, Kolobov, Popov explored and began to explore Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. At the same time, Russian pioneers repeatedly swim to the island of Hokkaido, where they are peacefully met by local natives of the Ainu people. The Japanese appeared on this island a century later, after which they exterminated and partially assimilated the Ainu.

2.B 1701 Cossack constable Vladimir Atlasov reported to Peter I about the "subordination" of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands to the Russian crown, leading to the "wonderful Nipon kingdom."

3.B 1786. By order of Catherine II, a register of Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean was produced, bringing the register to the attention of all European states as a declaration of Russia's rights to these possessions, including Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

4.B 1792. By decree of Catherine II, the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as Sakhalin Island officially incorporated into the Russian Empire.

5. As a result of the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War 1854-1855 gg. under pressure England and France Russia forced was concluded with Japan on February 7, 1855. Treaty of Shimoda, through which four southern islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to Japan: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Sakhalin remained undivided between Russia and Japan. At the same time, however, the right of Russian ships to enter Japanese ports was recognized, and "permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia" was proclaimed.

6.May 7, 1875 under the Petersburg Treaty, the tsarist government as a very strange act of "good will" makes incomprehensible further territorial concessions to Japan and transfers to it 18 more small islands of the archipelago. In return, Japan finally recognized Russia's right to the whole of Sakhalin. It is for this agreement referred most of all by the Japanese today, slyly silent that the first article of this treaty reads: "... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between Russia and Japan" ( the Japanese themselves violated this treaty in the 20th century repeatedly). Many Russian statesmen of those years sharply condemned this “exchange” treaty as short-sighted and harmful to the future of Russia, comparing it with the same short-sightedness as the sale of Alaska to the United States of America in 1867 for next to nothing (7 billion 200 million dollars). ), saying "now we're biting our own elbows".

7. After the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 gg. followed another stage of humiliation of Russia. By Portsmouth peace treaty concluded on September 5, 1905, Japan received the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, and also took away from Russia the right to lease the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dalniy. When Russian diplomats reminded the Japanese that all these provisions are contrary to the 1875 treaty g., those arrogantly and arrogantly answered : « War cancels all treaties. You have failed and let's proceed from the current situation ". Reader, remember this boastful declaration of the invader!

8. Next comes the time of punishment of the aggressor for his eternal greed and territorial expansion. Signed by Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference February 10, 1945 G. " Agreement on the Far East"It was envisaged:" ... 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan subject to the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, as well as the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny(these built and equipped hands of Russian workers, soldiers and sailors in the late XIX-early XX centuries. geographically very convenient naval bases were donated to "fraternal" China. But these bases were so necessary for our fleet in the 60-80s of the rampant "cold war" and intense combat service of the fleet in remote areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. I had to equip the forward base Cam Ranh in Vietnam for the fleet from scratch).

9.B July 1945 g. in accordance with Potsdam Declaration heads of the victorious countries the following verdict was passed regarding the future of Japan: "The sovereignty of Japan shall be limited to four islands: Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and such as WE SPECIFY". August 14, 1945 the Japanese government has publicly confirmed the acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and on September 2 Japan unconditionally surrendered. Article 6 of the Instrument of Surrender reads: "... the Japanese government and its successors will faithfully fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to give such orders and take such actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers shall require in order to carry out this declaration...”. January 29, 1946 Commander-in-Chief General MacArthur DEMANDED by Directive No. 677: "The Kuril Islands, including Habomai and Shikotan, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Japan." AND only after that of legal action, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 2, 1946 was issued, which stated: "All lands, bowels and waters of Sakhalin and the Kul Islands are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Thus, the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as about. Sakhalin, legally And were returned to Russia in accordance with international law . This could put an end to the "problem" of the Southern Kuriles and stop all further verbiage. But the story of the Kuriles continues.

10. After the end of World War II US occupied Japan and turned it into their military foothold in the Far East. In September 1951 USA, UK and a number of other states (total 49) signed San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, prepared in violation of the Potsdam agreements without the participation of the Soviet Union . Therefore, our government did not join the treaty. However, Art. 2, chapter II of this treaty, it is fixed in black and white: “ Japan renounces all legal grounds and claims ... to the Kuril Islands and that part of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. However, even after this, the story with the Kuriles does not end.

October 11.19 1956 d. the government of the Soviet Union, following the principles of friendship with neighboring states, signed with the Japanese government joint declaration, according to which the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended and peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations were restored between them. When signing the Declaration as a gesture of good will and no more promised to give Japan the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and Habomai, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries.

12. However The United States after 1956 imposed a number of military agreements on Japan, replaced in 1960 by a single "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security", according to which US troops remained on its territory, and thereby the Japanese islands turned into a base of aggression against the Soviet Union. In connection with this situation, the Soviet government announced to Japan that it was impossible to transfer the promised two islands to it.. And in the same statement it was emphasized that according to the declaration of October 19, 1956, "peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations" between the countries were established. Therefore, an additional peace treaty may not be required.
Thus, the problem of the Southern Kuriles does not exist. It's been decided a long time ago. AND de jure and de facto the islands belong to Russia . In this regard, it might be to remind the Japanese of their arrogant statement in 1905 g., and also indicate that Japan was defeated in World War II and therefore has no rights to any territory, even to her ancestral lands, except for those granted to her by the victors.
AND our foreign ministry just as harshly, or in a milder diplomatic form it would be necessary to declare this to the Japanese and put an end to this, FOREVER stopping all negotiations and even conversations on this non-existent and humiliating problem of the dignity and authority of Russia.
And again the "territorial question"

However, starting from 1991 , repeatedly held meetings of the President Yeltsin and members of the Russian government, diplomats with government circles in Japan, during which the Japanese side every time importunately raises the question of the "Northern Japanese Territories".
Thus, in the Tokyo Declaration 1993 signed by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan, was again acknowledged the "existence of the territorial issue", and both sides promised to "make efforts" to resolve it. The question arises - could our diplomats really know that such declarations should not be signed, because the recognition of the existence of a "territorial issue" is contrary to the national interests of Russia (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Treason") ??

As for the peace treaty with Japan, it is de facto and de jure in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956. not really needed. The Japanese do not want to conclude an additional official peace treaty, and there is no need. He Japan needs more, as the side that was defeated in the Second World War, rather than Russia.

A citizens of Russia should know the “problem” of the South Kuriles, sucked from the finger , her exaggeration, periodic media hype around her and the litigation of the Japanese - there is consequence illegal Japan's claims in violation of the obligations it has assumed, to strictly comply with the international obligations recognized and signed by it. And such a constant desire of Japan to reconsider the ownership of many territories in the Asia-Pacific region pervades Japanese politics throughout the 20th century.

Why the Japanese, one might say, have seized the South Kuriles with their teeth and are trying to seize them again illegally? But because the economic and military-strategic importance of this region is extremely great for Japan, and even more so for Russia. This an area of ​​colossal seafood riches(fish, living creatures, marine animals, vegetation, etc.), deposits of minerals, and rare earth minerals, energy sources, mineral raw materials.

For example, January 29 of this year. short information slipped through the Vesti (RTR) program: a a large deposit of the rare earth metal Rhenium(75th element in the periodic table, and the only one in the world ).
Scientists allegedly calculated that it would be enough to invest only 35 thousand dollars, but the profit from the extraction of this metal will allow to bring the whole of Russia out of the crisis in 3-4 years. Apparently, the Japanese know about this and that is why they are so persistently attacking the Russian government with a demand to give them the islands.

It must be said that for 50 years of ownership of the islands, the Japanese have not built or created anything capital on them, except for light temporary buildings. Our border guards had to rebuild barracks and other buildings at the outposts. The entire economic "development" of the islands, which the Japanese are shouting to the whole world today, consisted in the predatory robbery of the riches of the islands . During the Japanese "development" from the islands rookeries of fur seals, habitats of sea otters disappeared . Part of the population of these animals our Kuril residents have already restored .

Today, the economic situation of this entire island zone, like the whole of Russia, is difficult. Of course, significant measures are needed to support this region and take care of the Kuril people. According to the calculations of a group of deputies of the State Duma, it is possible to extract on the islands, as reported in the program "Parliamentary Hour" (RTR) on January 31 of this year, only fish products up to 2000 tons per year, with a net profit of about 3 billion dollars.
In military terms, the ridge of the Northern and Southern Kuriles with Sakhalin constitutes a complete closed infrastructure of the strategic defense of the Far East and the Pacific Fleet. They enclose the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and turn it into an inland one. This is the area deployment and combat positions of our strategic submarines.

Without the South Kuriles, we will get a "hole" in this defense. Control over the Kuriles ensures free access of the fleet to the ocean - after all, until 1945, our Pacific Fleet, starting from 1905, was practically locked in its bases in Primorye. The means of detection on the islands provide long-range detection of air and surface enemy, the organization of anti-submarine defense of the approaches to the passages between the islands.

In conclusion, one should note such a feature in the relationship of the Russia-Japan-US triangle. It is the United States that confirms the "legitimacy" of the ownership of the islands of Japan in spite of all international treaties they have signed .
If so, then our Foreign Ministry has every right, in response to the claims of the Japanese, to offer them to demand the return of Japan of its "southern territories" - the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands.
These archipelagos former colonies of Germany, captured by Japan in 1914. Japan's dominion over these islands was sanctioned by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After the defeat of Japan, all these archipelagos came under US control.. So Why shouldn't Japan demand that the United States return the islands to her? Or lack of spirit?
As you can see, there is explicit double standard in Japanese foreign policy.

And one more fact that clarifies the general picture of the return of our Far Eastern territories in September 1945 and the military significance of this region. The Kuril operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet (August 18 - September 1, 1945) provided for the liberation of all the Kuril Islands and the capture of the island of Hokkaido.

The accession of this island to Russia would be of great operational and strategic importance, since it would ensure the complete isolation of the "fencing" of the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk by our island territories: the Kuriles - Hokkaido - Sakhalin. But Stalin canceled this part of the operation, saying that with the liberation of the Kuriles and Sakhalin, we had resolved all our territorial issues in the Far East. A we don't need foreign land . In addition, the capture of Hokkaido will cost us a lot of blood, unnecessary losses of sailors and paratroopers in the very last days of the war.

Stalin here showed himself to be a real statesman, taking care of the country, its soldiers, and not an invader, who coveted foreign territories that were very accessible in that situation for the capture.
Source

Everyone knows about Japan's claims to the South Kuriles, but not everyone knows in detail the history of the Kuril Islands and their role in Russian-Japanese relations. This is what this article will be devoted to.

Everyone knows about Japan's claims to the South Kuriles, but not everyone knows in detail the history of the Kuril Islands and their role in Russian-Japanese relations. This is what this article will be devoted to.

Before turning to the history of the issue, it is worth explaining why the Southern Kuriles are so important for Russia *.
1. Strategic position. It is in the non-freezing deep-sea straits between the South Kuril Islands that submarines can enter the Pacific Ocean in a submerged position at any time of the year.
2. Iturup has the world's largest deposit of the rare metal rhenium, which is used in superalloys for space and aviation technology. World production of rhenium in 2006 amounted to 40 tons, while Kudryavy volcano emits 20 tons of rhenium every year. This is the only place in the world where rhenium is found in its pure form, and not in the form of impurities. 1 kg of rhenium, depending on the purity, costs from 1000 to 10 thousand dollars. There is no other rhenium deposit in Russia (in Soviet times, rhenium was mined in Kazakhstan).
3. The reserves of other mineral resources of the South Kuriles are: hydrocarbons - about 2 billion tons, gold and silver - 2 thousand tons, titanium - 40 million tons, iron - 270 million tons
4. The Southern Kuriles is one of 10 places in the world where, due to the turbulence of water due to the meeting of warm and cold sea currents, food for fish rises from the seabed. It attracts huge herds of fish. The cost of seafood produced here exceeds 4 billion dollars a year.

Let us briefly note the key dates of the 17th-18th centuries in Russian history associated with the Kuril Islands.

1654 or, according to other sources, 1667-1668- Sailing of a detachment led by Cossack Mikhail Stadukhin near the northern Kuril island of Alaid. In general, among the Europeans, the expedition of the Dutchman Martin Moritz de Vries was the first to visit the Kuriles in 1643, which mapped Iturup and Urup, but these islands were not assigned to Holland. Friz became so confused during his journey that he mistook Urup for the tip of the North American continent. The strait between Urup and Iturup now bears the name of de Vries.

1697 Siberian Cossack Vladimir Atlasov led an expedition to Kamchatka to conquer local tribes and tax them. The descriptions of the Kuril Islands he heard from the Kamchadals formed the basis of the earliest Russian map of the Kuriles, compiled by Semyon Remezov in 1700. 2

1710 the Yakut administration, guided by the instructions of Peter I “on finding the state of Japan and conducting trades with it,” instructs the Kamchatka clerks, “having done the courts, which are decent, for overflowing land and people on the sea with all sorts of measures, how it is possible to see through; and people will appear on that land, and those people of the great sovereign under the tsar’s highly autocratic hand again, as quickly as possible, by all means, according to local conditions, bring and collect yasak from them with great zeal, and make a special drawing for that land. 3

1711- A detachment led by ataman Danila Antsiferov and Yesaul Ivan Kozyrevsky examines the northern Kuril Islands - Shumshu and Kunashir 4 . The Ainu living on Shumshu tried to resist the Cossacks, but were defeated.

1713 Ivan Kozyrevsky leads the second expedition to the Kuril Islands. On Paramushir, the Ainu gave the Cossacks three battles, but were defeated. For the first time in the history of the Kuriles, their inhabitants paid yasak and recognized the power of Russia 5 . After this campaign, Kozyrevsky made a "Drawing map of the Kamchadal nose and sea islands." This map depicts the Kuril Islands for the first time from Cape Lopatka in Kamchatka to the Japanese island of Hokkaido. A description of the islands and the Ainu, the people who inhabited the Kuriles, is also attached to it. Moreover, in the descriptions attached to the final "drawing", Kozyrevsky also reported a number of information about Japan. In addition, he found out that the Japanese were forbidden to sail north of Hokkaido. And that "Iturups and Uruptsy live autocratically and not in citizenship." Also independent were the inhabitants of another large island of the Kuril chain - Kunashir 6 .

1727 Catherine I approves the "Opinion of the Senate" on the Eastern Islands. It pointed out the need to "take possession of the islands lying near Kamchatka, since those lands belong to Russian possession and are not subject to anyone. The Eastern Sea is warm, not icy ... and may in the future follow commerce with Japan or China Korea " 7 .

1738-1739- The Kamchatka expedition of Martyn Shpanberg took place, during which the entire ridge of the Kuril Islands was passed. For the first time in Russian history, contact with the Japanese took place on their territory - at the anchorage near the island of Honshu, sailors purchased food from local residents 8 . After this expedition, a map of the Kuriles was published, which in 1745 became part of the Atlas of the Russian Empire 9, which was published in Russian, French and Dutch. In the 18th century, when not all territories on the globe had yet been explored by European countries, the prevailing "international law" (which, however, applied only to European countries), gave the priority right to own "new lands" if the country had priority in publishing maps of the respective territories 10 .

1761 The Senate Decree of August 24 allows the free fishing of sea animals in the Kuriles with the return to the treasury of the 10th part of the production (PSZ-XV, 11315). During the second half of the 18th century, the Russians explored the Kuril Islands and created settlements on them. They existed on the islands of Shumshu, Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup, Kunashir 11 . Yasak is regularly collected from local residents.

1786 December 22 On December 22, 1786, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire was to officially declare that the lands discovered in the Pacific Ocean belonged to the Russian crown. The reason for the decree was "an attempt on the part of the English merchant industrialists on the production of trade and animal trade on the East Sea" 12 . In pursuance of the decree, a note was drawn up in the highest name about "the announcement through Russian ministers at the courts of all European maritime powers that these open lands by Russia cannot otherwise be recognized as belonging to your empire." Among the territories included in the Russian Empire was also "the ridge of the Kuril Islands, touching Japan, discovered by Captain Spanberg and Walton" 13 .

In 1836, the jurist and historian of international law Henry Wheaton published the classic work Fundamentals of International Law, which, among other things, dealt with the ownership of new lands. Wheaton singled out the following conditions for the acquisition by the state of the right to a new territory 14:

1. Discovery
2. First development-first occupation
3. Long-term uninterrupted possession of the territory

As you can see, by 1786 Russia had fulfilled all these three conditions in relation to the Kuriles. Russia was the first to publish a map of the territory, including in foreign languages, the first to establish its own settlements there and began to collect yasak from local residents, and its possession of the Kuriles was not interrupted.

Above, only Russian actions in relation to the Kuriles in the 17-18th century were described. Let's see what Japan has done in this direction.
Today, Hokkaido is the northernmost island in Japan. However, it was not always Japanese. The first Japanese colonists appeared on the southern coast of Hokkaido in the 16th century, but their settlement received administrative registration only in 1604, when the administration of the principality of Matsumae was established here (in Russia it was then called Matmai). The main population of Hokkaido at that time was the Ainu, the island was considered as a non-Japanese territory, and the principality of Matsumae (which did not occupy the whole of Hokkaido, but only its southern part) was considered "independent" from the central government. The principality was very small in number - by 1788 its population was only 26.5 thousand people 15 . Hokkaido became fully part of Japan only in 1869.
If Russia had more actively developed the Kuriles, then Russian settlements could have appeared on Hokkaido itself - it is known from documents that at least in 1778-1779 Russians collected yasak from the inhabitants of the northern coast of Hokkaido 16 .

Japanese historians, in order to assert their priority in the discovery of the Kuriles, point to the “Map of the Shoho period” dated 1644, on which the group of Habomai islands, the islands of Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup are indicated. However, it is unlikely that this map was compiled by the Japanese based on the results of the expedition to Iturup. Indeed, by that time, the successors of the Tokugawa shogun continued his course of isolating the country, and in 1636 a law was issued according to which the Japanese were forbidden to leave the country, as well as to build ships suitable for long-distance voyages. As the Japanese scholar Anatoly Koshkin writes, the “Map of the Shoho period” “is not so much a map in the true sense of the word, but a plan-scheme similar to a drawing, most likely made by one of the Japanese without personal acquaintance with the islands, according to the stories of the Ainu” 17 .

At the same time, the first attempts of the principality of Matsumae to arrange a Japanese trading post on the island of Kunashir closest to Hokkaido date back only to 1754, and in 1786 an official of the Japanese government, Tokunai Mogami, examined Iturup and Urup. Anatoly Koshkin notes that “neither the principality of Matsumae nor the central Japanese government, having official relations with any of the states, could legally put forward claims to “exercise sovereignty” over these territories. In addition, as documents and confessions of Japanese scientists testify, the government of the bakufu (the headquarters of the shogun) considered the Kuriles "foreign land." Therefore, the above actions of Japanese officials in the southern Kuriles can be regarded as arbitrariness perpetrated in the interests of seizing new possessions. Russia, in the absence of official claims to the Kuril Islands from other states, according to the then laws and according to generally accepted practice, included the newly discovered lands in its state, notifying the rest of the world about this. 18

The colonization of the Kuril Islands was complicated by two factors - the difficulty of supply and the general shortage of people in the Russian Far East. By 1786, a small village on the southwestern coast of about. Iturup, where three Russians and several Ainu, who had moved from Urup, settled 19 . The Japanese, who began to show an increased interest in the Kuriles, could not help but take advantage of this. In 1798, on the southern tip of Iturup Island, the Japanese knocked over Russian signposts and set up posts with the inscription: "Etorofu - the possession of Great Japan." In 1801, the Japanese landed on Urup and arbitrarily set up an index pole, on which an inscription of nine hieroglyphs was carved: "The island has belonged to Great Japan since ancient times." 20
In January 1799, small Japanese military units were posted in fortified camps at two points on Iturup: in the area of ​​the modern Good Start (Naibo) Bay and in the area of ​​the modern city of Kurilsk (Syana) 21 . The Russian colony on Urup languished, and in May 1806 Japanese envoys did not find any Russians on the island - there were only a few Ainu 22 .

Russia was interested in establishing trade with Japan, and on October 8, 1804, on the ship "Nadezhda" (participating in the round-the-world expedition of I.F. Kruzenshtern), the Russian ambassador, State Councilor Nikolai Rezanov, arrived in Nagasaki. The Japanese government was playing for time, and only six months later, on March 23, 1805, Rezanov managed to meet with the inspector of secret surveillance K. Toyama Rezanov. In an insulting form, the Japanese refused to trade with Russia. Most likely, this was due to the fact that the Western Europeans who were in Japan set up the Japanese government anti-Russian. For his part, Rezanov made a sharp statement: “I, the undersigned of the most eminent sovereign Emperor Alexander 1, the real chamberlain and cavalier Nikolai Rezanov, declare to the Japanese government: ... So that the Japanese empire does not extend its possessions beyond the northern tip of the island of Matmay, since all the lands and waters to north belong to my sovereign" 23

As for the anti-Russian sentiments that were fueled by Western Europeans, there is a very revealing story of Count Moritz-August Beniovsky, who was exiled to Kamchatka for participating in hostilities on the side of the Polish confederates. There, in May 1771, together with the Confederates, he captured the St. Peter galliot and sailed for Japan. There he gave the Dutch several letters, which they in turn translated into Japanese and delivered to the Japanese authorities. One of them later became widely known as "Beniovsky's warning". Here it is:

“Highly respected and noble officers of the glorious Republic of the Netherlands!
The cruel fate that had carried me across the seas for a long time brought me a second time to Japanese waters. I went ashore in the hope that I might be able to meet Your Excellencies here and get your help. I am truly very sorry that I did not have the opportunity to talk with you personally, because I have important information that I wanted to tell you. The high respect that I have for your glorious state prompts me to inform you that this year two Russian galliots and one frigate, following a secret order, sailed around the coast of Japan and put their observations on the map, preparing for the attack on Matsuma and the islands adjacent to it, located at 41 ° 38' north latitude, to the offensive scheduled for the next year. For this purpose, on one of the Kuril Islands, which is closer than the others to Kamchatka, a fortress was built and shells, artillery and food depots were prepared.
If I could talk to you personally, I would tell more than what can be trusted to paper. Let Your Excellencies take such precautions as you deem necessary, but, as your fellow believer and zealous well-wisher of your glorious state, I would advise, if possible, to have a cruiser ready.
On this I will allow myself to introduce myself and remain, as follows below, your obedient servant.
Baron Aladar von Bengoro, army commander in captivity.
July 20, 1771, on the island of Usma.
P.S. I left a map of Kamchatka on the shore, which may be of use to you.”

There is not a word of truth in this document. “It is puzzling what purpose Beniovsky was pursuing by giving the Dutch such false information,” noted the American researcher Donald Keane. There can be no doubt about their unreliability. Far from having any aggressive intentions towards Japan, the Russians strained every effort to preserve their Pacific possessions... Beniovsky undoubtedly knew the real state of affairs, but the love of truth was never one of his virtues. Perhaps he hoped to curry favor with the Dutch by exposing to them the fictitious plot of the Russians.

However, let us return to Nikolai Rezanov. After unsuccessful negotiations in Japan, Rezanov went with an inspection to the Russian colonies on the northwestern coast of America and the Aleutian Islands.
From the Aleutian island of Unalashka, where one of the offices of the Russian-American Company was located, on July 18, 1805, he wrote letter 25 to Alexander I:

By strengthening the American institutions and building up the courts, we can also force the Japanese to open a market, which the people very much desire among them. I do not think that Your Majesty will be charged with a crime when I now have worthy employees, what Khvostov and Davydov are, and with the help of which, having built ships, I will set off next year to the Japanese shores to devastate their village on Matsmay, drive them out of Sakhalin and smash them along the shores fear, in order to take away fisheries, and deprive 200,000 people of food, the sooner to force them to open a bargain with us, to which they will be obliged. Meanwhile, I heard that they had already dared to establish a trading post on Urup. Your will, Most Merciful Sovereign, is with me, punish me as a criminal, that without waiting for a command, I get down to business; but my conscience will reproach me even more if I waste time and do not sacrifice Your glory, and especially when I see that I can contribute to the fulfillment of Your Imperial Majesty's great intentions.

So, Rezanov, in the interests of the state, under his own responsibility, made an important decision - to arrange a military operation against Japan. He instructed Lieutenant Nikolai Khvostov and midshipman Gavriil Davydov, who were in the service of the Russian-American Company, to lead it. For this, the Juno frigate and the Avos tender were transferred under their command. The task of the officers was to make a voyage to Sakhalin and the Kuriles and find out whether the Japanese, having penetrated these islands, were oppressing the Kurilians brought into Russian citizenship. If this information was confirmed, the officers were to "drive out" the Japanese. That is, it was about protecting the territories belonging to the Russian Empire from the illegal actions of the Japanese.

In South Sakhalin, which Khvostov and Davydov visited twice, they liquidated a Japanese settlement, burned two small ships, and captured several merchants from Matsumae. In addition, the local Ainu foreman Khvostov issued a letter of acceptance of the inhabitants of Sakhalin into Russian citizenship and under the protection of the Russian emperor. At the same time, Khvostov hoisted two Russian flags (RAC and state) on the shore of the bay and landed several sailors who founded a settlement that existed until 1847. In 1807, the Russian expedition liquidated the Japanese military settlement on Iturup. The captured Japanese were also released there, with the exception of two left as interpreters.
Through the released prisoners, Khvostov conveyed his demands to the Japanese authorities 27:

“Russia's neighborhood with Japan made us wish for friendly ties to the true well-being of this last empire, for which an embassy was sent to Nagasaki; but the rejection of it, insulting to Russia, and the spread of Japanese trade in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, as the possessions of the Russian Empire, forced this power to finally use other measures, which will show that the Russians can always harm Japanese trade until they are notified through the inhabitants of Urup or Sakhalin about the desire to trade with us. The Russians, having now caused so little harm to the Japanese empire, wanted to show them only through the fact that the northern countries of it can always be harmed by them, and that further stubbornness of the Japanese government can completely deprive it of these lands.

Characteristically, the Dutch, having translated Khvostov's ultimatum to the Japanese, added on their own behalf that the Russians were threatening to conquer Japan and send priests to convert the Japanese to Christianity.

Rezanov, who gave the order to Khvostov and Davydov, died in 1807, so he could not protect them from punishment for military actions that were not coordinated with the central government. In 1808, the Admiralty Board found Khvostov and Davydov guilty of unauthorized violation of government instructions on the purely peaceful development of relations with Japan and outrages against the Japanese. As a punishment, the awards to officers for the bravery and courage shown in the war with Sweden were annulled. It should be noted that the punishment is very lenient. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the Russian government understood the correctness of the actions of the officers who actually expelled the invaders from Russian territory, but could not but punish them because of the violation of instructions.
In 1811, Captain Vasily Golovnin, who landed on Kunashir to replenish water and food supplies, was captured by the Japanese along with a group of sailors. Golovnin was on a round-the-world voyage, on which he set off in 1807 from Kronstadt, and the purpose of the expedition, as he wrote in his memoirs, was “the discovery and inventory of the little-known lands of the eastern edge of the Russian Empire” 29 He was accused by the Japanese of violating the principles of self-isolation of the country and together with his comrades spent more than two years in captivity.
The government of the shogun also intended to use the incident with the capture of Golovnin to force the Russian authorities to formally apologize for Khvostov's and Davydov's raids on Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Instead of an apology, the governor of Irkutsk sent an explanation to the deputy of the shogun on Ezo Island that these officers had taken their actions without the consent of the Russian government. This was enough to free Golovnin and other prisoners.
The monopoly right to develop the Kuril Islands belonged to the Russian-American Company (RAC), established in 1799. Its main efforts were aimed at the colonization of Alaska, as a region much richer than the Kuriles. As a result, by the 1820s, the actual border in the Kuriles was established along the southern tip of Urup Island, on which there was a RAK 30 settlement.
This fact is confirmed by the decree of Alexander I of September 1, 1821 "On the limits of navigation and the order of coastal relations along the coasts of Eastern Siberia, North-West America and the Aleutian, Kuril Islands, etc." The first two paragraphs of this decree state (PSZ-XXVII, N28747):

1. The production of trade, whale and fishing, and any industry on the islands, in ports and bays, and in general throughout the entire Northwest coast of America, starting from the Bering Strait to 51 "North latitude, also along the Aleutian Islands and along the Eastern coast of Siberia; since along the Kuril Islands, that is, starting from the same Bering Strait to the Southern Cape of Urup Island, and precisely up to 45 "50" North latitude is provided for use by the only Russian citizen.

2. Accordingly, it is forbidden for any foreign ship not only to moor to the shores and islands subject to Russia, indicated in the previous article; but also to approach them at a distance of less than a hundred Italian miles. Anyone who violates this prohibition will be subject to confiscation with the entire cargo.

Nevertheless, as A.Yu. Plotnikov, Russia could still lay claim to, at least, Iturup Island, tk. Japanese settlements were only in the southern and central parts of the island, while the northern part remained uninhabited 31 .

Russia made the next attempt to establish trade with Japan in 1853. On July 25, 1853, the Russian ambassador Evfimy Putyatin arrived in the Land of the Rising Sun. As in the case with Rezanov, negotiations began only six months later, on January 3, 1854 (the Japanese wanted to get rid of Putyatin by starving him out). The question of trade with Japan was important for Russia, because the population of the Russian Far East was growing, and it was much cheaper to supply it from Japan than from Siberia. Naturally, during the negotiations, Putyatin also had to resolve the issue of territorial demarcation. On February 24, 1853, he received an "Additional Instruction" from the Russian Foreign Ministry. Here is an excerpt from it 32:

On this subject of boundaries, it is our desire to be as lenient as possible (without, however, betraying our interests), bearing in mind that the achievement of another goal - the benefits of trade - is of essential importance to us.

Of the Kuril Islands, the southernmost, belonging to Russia, is the island of Urup, to which we could confine ourselves, appointing it the last point of Russian possessions to the south, so that from our side the southern tip of this island was (as it is now in essence) the border with Japan, and that from the Japanese side the northern tip of Iturup Island was considered the border.

At the beginning of negotiations on the clarification of the border possessions of ours and the Japanese, the question of the island of Sakhalin seems to be important.

This island is of particular importance to us because it lies opposite the very mouth of the Amur. The power that will own this island will own the key to the Amur. The Japanese Government, no doubt, will firmly stand up for its rights, if not for the entire island, which it will be difficult for it to support with sufficient arguments, then at least for the southern part of the island: in Aniva Bay, the Japanese have fisheries that provide food for many to the inhabitants of their other islands, and for this circumstance alone they cannot but cherish the aforesaid point.

If, in negotiations with you, their Government shows compliance with our other demands - the demands regarding trade - then you can be compliant on the subject of the southern tip of Sakhalin Island, but this compliant should be limited to this, i.e. we can in no way recognize their rights to other parts of Sakhalin Island.

When explaining all this, it will be useful for you to point out to the Japanese Government that in the situation in which this island is located, if the Japanese cannot maintain their rights to it - rights that are not recognized by anyone - the said island can become in the very shortest time the prey of some strong maritime power, whose neighborhood will hardly be as profitable and safe for the Japanese as the neighborhood of Russia, whose disinterestedness they have experienced for centuries.

In general, it is desirable that you arrange this question about Sakhalin in accordance with the existing interests of Russia. If, however, you encounter insurmountable obstacles on the part of the Japanese Government to the recognition of our rights to Sakhalin, then it is better in this case to leave this matter in its current state ( those. undelimited - statehistory).

In general, in giving you these additional instructions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by no means prescribes them for indispensable execution, knowing full well that nothing unconditional and indispensable can be prescribed at such a distant distance.

Your Excellency is therefore left with complete freedom of action.

So, we see, this document recognizes that the actual border between Russia and Japan runs along the southern tip of Urup. Putyatin's main task is to at least reject Japan's claims to the whole of Sakhalin, and as a maximum - to force the Japanese to recognize it as completely Russian, because. This island is of strategic importance.
Putyatin, however, decided to go further and in his message to the Supreme Council of Japan dated November 18, 1853, he proposed to draw a border between Iturup and Kunashir. As A. Koshkin notes, the Japanese government, which at that moment was under pressure from the United States and Western European countries that wanted to open Japan for trade, was afraid that Russia might join them, and therefore did not exclude the possibility of a demarcation, along which all the islands, including the most southern - Kunashir, were recognized as Russian. In 1854, Japan compiled a "Map of the most important maritime boundaries of great Japan", on which its northern border was drawn along the northern coast of Hokkaido. Those. under favorable circumstances, Putyatin could return Iturup and Kunashir to Russia 33 .

However, the negotiations reached an impasse, and in January 1854 Putyatin decided to break them off and return to Russia to learn about the course of the Crimean War. This was important, because Anglo-French squadron also operated off the Pacific coast of Russia.
March 31, 1854 Japan signed a trade treaty with the United States. Putyatin again went to Japan in order to achieve for Russia the establishment of relations with Japan at a level no lower than with the United States.
The negotiations dragged on again, and on December 11, 1854, they were complicated by the fact that, as a result of the tsunami, the Diana frigate, on which Putyatin arrived (during his second arrival in Japan, he specially sailed on only one ship, so that the Japanese would not get the impression that Russia wants to demonstrate strength), crashed, the team ended up on the shore and the Russian ambassador was completely dependent on the Japanese. The negotiations were held in the city of Shimoda.

As a result of the intransigence of the Japanese on the issue of Sakhalin, Putyatin, for the sake of signing an agreement with Japan, went to the maximum compromise. On February 7, 1855, the Shimodsky Treaty was signed, according to which Sakhalin was recognized as undivided, and Russia recognized Japan's rights to Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Thus, the situation with the South Kuriles, which had de facto existed for many years, was officially recognized. However, since legally, these 4 islands were part of the Russian Empire, which was officially announced back in 1786, many historians of the Russian ambassador are now reproached for the fact that the South Kuriles were given to Japan without any compensation and that he should have defended to the end at least the largest of them is the island of Iturup 34 . Under the agreement, three Japanese ports were opened for trade with Russia - Nagasaki, Shimoda and Hakodate. In strict accordance with the Japanese-American treaty, the Russians in these ports received the right of extraterritoriality, i.e. they could not be judged in Japan.
To justify Putyatin, it is worth noting that the negotiations were conducted at a time when there was no telegraph connection between Japan and St. Petersburg, and he could not promptly consult with the government. And the way, both by sea and by land, from Japan to St. Petersburg, only in one direction, took a little less than a year. Under such conditions, Putyatin had to take full responsibility upon himself. From the moment he arrived in Japan until the signing of the Shimoda Treaty, the negotiations lasted 1.5 years, so it is clear that Putyatin really did not want to leave with nothing. And since the instructions he received gave him the opportunity to make concessions on the South Kuriles, he made them, after first trying to bargain for Iturup.

The problem of using Sakhalin, caused by the absence of a Russian-Japanese border on it, required a solution. On March 18, 1867, the "Temporary Agreement on Sakhalin Island" was signed, drawn up on the basis of the "Proposals for a Temporary Agreement on Cohabitation" of the Russian side. Under this agreement, both parties could move freely throughout the island and build buildings on it. This was a step forward, because earlier, although the island was considered undivided, the Russians did not use the southern part of Sakhalin, which the Japanese considered theirs. After this agreement, by order of the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia M. Korsakov, the Muravyevsky military post was founded in the vicinity of Busse Bay, which turned into a center for Russian development of South Sakhalin. It was the southernmost post on Sakhalin and was located well south of the Japanese posts 35 .
The Japanese at that time did not have the opportunity to develop Sakhalin as actively, so this agreement was more beneficial for Russia than for Japan.

Russia sought to solve the problem of Sakhalin finally and completely get it into its possession. For this, the tsarist government was ready to cede part of the Kuril Islands.

The Russian Foreign Ministry authorized the military governor A.E. Crown and E.K. Byutsov, appointed Russian chargé d'affaires in China, to continue negotiations on Sakhalin. Instructions were prepared for them. Butsov was instructed to convince the Japanese Foreign Ministry to send their representatives to Nikolaevsk or Vladivostok to finally resolve the issue of Sakhalin on the basis of establishing a border along the La Perouse Strait, exchanging Sakhalin for Urup with adjacent islands, and preserving the rights of the Japanese to fisheries.
Negotiations began in July 1872. The Japanese government declared that the cession of Sakhalin would be perceived by the Japanese people and foreign states as Japan's weakness and that Urup with the adjacent islands would be insufficient compensation 35 .
The negotiations that began in Japan were difficult and intermittent. They resumed in the summer of 1874 already in St. Petersburg, when Enomoto Takeaki, one of the most educated people of Japan at that time, arrived in the Russian capital in the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

On March 4, 1875, Enomoto spoke for the first time about giving up Sakhalin in exchange for compensation in the form of all the Kuril Islands, from Japan to Kamchatka 36 . At that time, the situation in the Balkans was aggravated, the war with Turkey (which, like during the Crimean War, England and France could again support) became more and more real, and Russia was interested in solving the Far Eastern problems as soon as possible, incl. Sakhalin.

Unfortunately, the Russian government did not show due perseverance and did not appreciate the strategic importance of the Kuril Islands, which closed the exit to the Pacific Ocean from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, and agreed to the demands of the Japanese. On April 25 (May 7), 1875, in St. Petersburg, Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov on the part of Russia and Enomoto Takeaki on the part of Japan signed an agreement under which Japan renounced its rights to Sakhalin in exchange for the cession of all the Kuril Islands by Russia. Also, under this agreement, Russia allowed Japanese ships to visit the port of Korsakov in South Sakhalin, where the Japanese consulate was established, for 10 years without paying trade and customs duties. Japanese ships, merchants and fishermen were granted the most favored nation treatment in the ports and waters of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and Kamchatka 36 .

This agreement is often called an exchange agreement, but in fact we are not talking about the exchange of territories, because. Japan did not have a strong presence on Sakhalin and no real opportunities to keep it - the waiver of rights to Sakhalin became a mere formality. In fact, we can say that the 1875 treaty fixed the surrender of the Kuriles without any real compensation.

The next point in the history of the Kuril issue is the Russo-Japanese war. Russia lost this war and, under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905, ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin along the 50th parallel.

This treaty has such an important legal significance that it actually terminated the treaty of 1875. After all, the meaning of the "exchange" treaty was that Japan renounced the rights to Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuriles. At the same time, at the initiative of the Japanese side, a condition was included in the protocols of the Portsmouth Treaty that all previous Russian-Japanese agreements were annulled. Thus, Japan deprived itself of the legal right to own the Kuril Islands.

The Treaty of 1875, which the Japanese side regularly refers to in disputes about the ownership of the Kuriles, after 1905 became just a historical monument, and not a legally binding document. It would not be superfluous to recall that by attacking Russia, Japan also violated paragraph 1 of the Shimodsky Treaty of 1855 - "From now on, let there be permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan."

The next key point is World War II. On April 13, 1941, the USSR signed a neutrality pact with Japan. It was concluded for 5 years from the date of ratification: from April 25, 1941 to April 25, 1946. According to this pact, it could be denounced a year before the expiration of the period.
The United States was interested in the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan in order to accelerate its defeat. Stalin, as a condition, put forward the demand that after the victory over Japan, the Kuriles and South Sakhalin would pass to the Soviet Union. Not everyone in the American leadership agreed with these demands, but Roosevelt agreed. The reason, apparently, was his sincere concern that after the end of World War II, the USSR and the USA would maintain good relations achieved in the course of military cooperation.
The transfer of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin was recorded in the Yalta Agreement of the Three Great Powers on the Far East on February 11, 1945. 37 It is worth noting that paragraph 3 of the agreement reads as follows:

The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - agreed that two or three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies, on the condition that:
…
3. Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Kuril Islands.

Those. we are talking about the transfer of all the Kuril Islands without exception, incl. Kunashir and Iturup, who were ceded to Japan under the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

On April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, and on August 8 declared war on Japan.

On September 2, the act of surrender of Japan was signed. South Sakhalin with the Kuriles went to the USSR. However, after the act of surrender, it was still necessary to conclude a peace treaty, in which new borders would be fixed.
Franklin Roosevelt, who was kind to the USSR, died on April 12, 1945, and was replaced by the anti-Soviet Truman. On October 26, 1950, American considerations on concluding a peace treaty with Japan were handed over to the Soviet representative in the UN in order to get acquainted. In addition to details unpleasant for the USSR, such as the retention of American troops on Japanese territory for an indefinite period, they revised the Yalta agreement, according to which South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands passed to the USSR 38 .
In fact, the United States decided to remove the USSR from the process of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan. In September 1951, a conference was to be held in San Francisco, at which a peace treaty between Japan and the allies was to be signed, but the United States did everything so that the USSR considered it impossible for itself to participate in the conference (in particular, they did not receive invitations to the conference PRC, North Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam, which the USSR insisted on and what was fundamental for it) - then a separate peace treaty would have been concluded with Japan in its American formulation without taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union.

However, these calculations of the Americans did not materialize. The USSR decided to use the San Francisco conference to expose the separate nature of the treaty.
Among the amendments to the draft peace treaty proposed by the Soviet delegation were the following 39:

Paragraph "c" shall be stated in the following wording:
"Japan recognizes the full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the southern part of Sakhalin Island with all the islands adjacent to it and the Kuril Islands and renounces all rights, titles and claims to these territories."
According to article 3.
Rewrite the article as follows:
"Japanese sovereignty will extend to the territory consisting of the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido, as well as Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Pares Vela, Marcus, Tsushima and other islands that were part of Japan before December 7, 1941, with the exception of those territories and islands referred to in Art. 2".

These amendments were rejected, but the US could not ignore the Yalta agreements at all. The text of the treaty included a provision stating that "Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905." 40. From a philistine point of view, it may seem that this is the same as the Soviet amendments. From a legal point of view, the situation is different - Japan renounces claims to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, but does not recognize the sovereignty of the USSR over these territories. With this wording, the agreement was signed on September 8, 1951 between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan. Representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland, who participated in the conference, refused to sign it.

Modern Japanese historians and politicians differ in their assessments of Japan's renunciation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands contained in the text of the peace treaty. Some demand the cancellation of this clause of the treaty and the return of all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka. Others are trying to prove that the South Kuril Islands (Kunashir, Iturup, Khabomai and Shikotan) are not included in the concept of the "Kuril Islands", which Japan refused in the San Francisco Treaty. The latter circumstance is refuted both by the established cartographic practice, when the entire group of islands - from Kunashir to Shumshu on maps is called the Kuril Islands, and by the texts of Russian-Japanese negotiations on this issue. Here, for example, is an excerpt from Putyatin's talks with Japanese representatives in January 1854. 41

« Putyatin: The Kuril Islands have belonged to us for a long time, and now Russian chiefs are on them. The Russian-American Company annually sends ships to Urup to buy furs, etc., and Russians had their settlement on Iturup even before, but since it is now occupied by the Japanese, we have to talk about it.

Japanese side: We considered all Kuril Islands have long belonged to Japan, but since most of of them passed one by one to you, then there is nothing to say about these islands. Iturup but it was always considered ours and we considered it a matter settled, as well as the island of Sakhalin or Krafto, although we do not know how far the latter extends to the north ... "

From this dialogue it can be seen that the Japanese in 1854 did not divide the Kuriles into "Northern" and "South" - and recognized Russia's right to most of the islands of the archipelago, with the exception of some of them, in particular, Iturup. Fun fact - the Japanese claimed that the whole of Sakhalin belonged to them, but they did not have its geographical map. By the way, using a similar argument, Russia could lay claim to Hokkaido on the grounds that in 1811 V.M. Golovnin in his "Remarks on the Kuril Islands" ranked Fr. Matsmai, i.e. Hokkaido, to the Kuriles. Moreover, as noted above, at least in 1778-1779, Russians collected yasak from the inhabitants of the northern coast of Hokkaido.

The unsettled relations with Japan hindered the establishment of trade, the resolution of issues in the field of fisheries, and also contributed to the involvement of this country in the anti-Soviet policy of the United States. At the beginning of 1955, the USSR representative in Japan turned to Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu with a proposal to start negotiations on the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. On June 3, 1955, Soviet-Japanese negotiations began in the building of the Soviet embassy in London. The Japanese delegation, as a condition for concluding a peace treaty, put forward obviously unacceptable demands - for "the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, the Chisima archipelago (Kuril Islands) and the southern part of Karafuto Island (Sakhalin)".

In fact, the Japanese understood the impossibility of these conditions. The secret instruction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry provided for three stages of putting forward territorial demands: “First, demand the transfer of all the Kuril Islands to Japan, with the expectation of further discussion; then, retreating somewhat, seek the cession of the southern Kuril Islands to Japan for "historical reasons", and, finally, insist on at least the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, making this demand an indispensable condition for the successful completion of negotiations.
The fact that Habomai and Shikotan were the ultimate goal of diplomatic bargaining was repeatedly said by the Japanese Prime Minister himself. So, during a conversation with a Soviet representative in January 1955, Hatoyama stated that "Japan will insist during negotiations on the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to her." There was no talk of any other territories 42 .

Such a "soft" position of Japan did not suit the United States. Thus, it was precisely for this reason that in March 1955 the American government refused to receive the Japanese Foreign Minister in Washington.

Khrushchev was ready to make concessions. On August 9, in London, during an informal conversation, the head of the Soviet delegation, A.Ya. Malik (during the war years he was the USSR ambassador to Japan, and then, in the rank of deputy foreign minister, the representative of the Soviet Union to the UN) suggested that the Japanese diplomat in the rank after Shun'ichi Matsumoto transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but only after the signing of a peace treaty.
Here is the assessment of this initiative by one of the members of the Soviet delegation at the London talks, later Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences S.L. Tikhvinsky43:

"I. A. Malik, acutely experiencing Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the negotiations and without consulting with the rest of the delegation members, prematurely expressed in this conversation with Matsumoto the spare position without exhausting the defense of the main position in the negotiations. His statement caused at first bewilderment, and then joy and further exorbitant demands on the part of the Japanese delegation ... N. S. Khrushchev's decision to renounce sovereignty over part of the Kuril Islands in favor of Japan was a rash, voluntaristic act ... The cession to Japan of part of the Soviet territory, which, without permission Khrushchev went to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet people, destroyed the international legal basis of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and contradicted the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which recorded the refusal of Japan from South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands ... "

As this quote makes clear, the Japanese perceived Malik's initiative as a weakness and put forward other territorial demands. The negotiations have ceased. This suited the US as well. In October 1955, J. Dulles, in a note to the Japanese government, warned that the expansion of economic ties and the normalization of relations with the USSR "may become an obstacle to the implementation of the US government's assistance program to Japan."

Inside Japan, fishermen were primarily interested in concluding a peace treaty, who needed to obtain licenses to fish in the Kuriles. This process was greatly hampered by the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which, in turn, was due to the absence of a peace treaty. Negotiations resumed. The United States exerted serious pressure on the Japanese government. So, on September 7, 1956, the State Department sent a memorandum to the Japanese government stating that the United States would not recognize any decision confirming the sovereignty of the USSR over the territories that Japan had renounced under the peace treaty.

As a result of difficult negotiations, on October 19, the Joint Declaration of the USSR and Japan was signed. It proclaimed the end of the state of war between the USSR and Japan, the restoration of diplomatic relations. Paragraph 9 of the declaration read 44:

9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.
At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan .

However, as we know, the signing of the peace treaty never took place. Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro, who signed the Declaration, resigned, and the new cabinet was headed by Kishi Nobusuke, an openly pro-American politician. Back in August 1956, the Americans openly proclaimed through Secretary of State Allen Dulles that if the Japanese government recognizes the Kuril Islands as Soviet, the United States will forever retain the island of Okinawa and the entire Ryukyu archipelago, which were then under American control.

On January 19, 1960, Japan signed the US-Japan Interoperability and Security Treaty with the United States, according to which the Japanese authorities allowed the Americans to use military bases on their territory for the next 10 years, to maintain ground, air and naval forces there. . On January 27, 1960, the USSR government announced that since this agreement was directed against the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet government refused to consider the transfer of the islands to Japan, since this would lead to an expansion of the territory used by American troops.

Now Japan claims not only Shikotan and Habomai, but also Iturup and Kunashir, referring to the bilateral Treatise on Trade and Borders of 1855 - therefore, signing a peace treaty based on the 1956 declaration is impossible. However, if Japan abandoned its claim to Iturup and Kunashir and signed a peace treaty, would Russia have to fulfill the terms of the Declaration and give up Shikotan and Khabomai? Let's consider this question in more detail.

On April 13, 1976, the United States unilaterally passed the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, according to which, effective March 1, 1977, they moved the border of their fishing zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles from the coast, establishing strict rules for access to it by foreign fishermen. Following the United States in 1976, by adopting relevant laws, the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Canada, Australia and a number of other countries, including developing ones, unilaterally established 200-mile fishing or economic zones.
In the same year, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of December 10 “On temporary measures for the conservation of living resources and the regulation of fisheries in the sea areas adjacent to the coast of the USSR”, the Soviet Union also established sovereign rights over fish and other biological resources in its 200-mile coastal zone 46 .
New realities were fixed in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. The concept of an "exclusive economic zone" was introduced, the width of which should not exceed 200 nautical miles. Article 55 of the convention provides that a coastal state in the exclusive economic zone has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration, exploitation and conservation of natural resources, both living and non-living, in the waters covering the seabed, on the seabed and in its subsoil, as well as in for the management of these resources, and in relation to other economic exploration and exploitation activities of the said zone, such as the production of energy through the use of water, currents and wind.” At the same time, it exercises jurisdiction in this zone in relation to “the creation and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; protection and conservation of the marine environment” 47 .

Earlier, in 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted.
Article 62 "Radical change of circumstances" of this convention reads (emphasis in bold is ours) 48:

1. A fundamental change that occurred in relation to the circumstances that existed at the conclusion of the contract, and which was not foreseen by the parties, cannot be referred to as a basis for terminating the contract or withdrawing from it, except when:
a) the existence of such circumstances constituted an essential basis for the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; And
b) the consequence of a change in circumstances fundamentally changes the scope of obligations still to be performed under the contract.
2. A fundamental change in circumstances cannot be invoked as grounds for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
A) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
b) if such a fundamental change, to which a party to the treaty refers, is the result of a violation by that party of either an obligation under the treaty or another international obligation assumed by it in relation to any other party to the treaty.
3. If, in accordance with the preceding paragraphs, the parties are entitled to invoke a fundamental change in circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, he may also invoke that change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

The introduction of the 200-mile economic zone is a circumstance that fundamentally changes the scope of commitments. It is one thing to transfer the islands when there was no talk of any 200-mile exclusive zone, and quite another thing when this zone appeared. However, can it be considered that the 1956 declaration falls under paragraph 2a, i.e. under the boundary? The declaration refers to sovereignty over land areas, while the border between maritime states runs along the sea. After the transfer of the islands to Japan, an additional agreement would be required to determine the maritime border.
Thus, it can be argued that the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed by both the USSR and Japan, is a fundamental change that falls under paragraph 1b of Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Those. Russia is not obliged to comply with the terms of the 1956 Declaration on the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, if suddenly Japan agreed to sign a peace treaty.

On November 14, 2004, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, on the air of the NTV channel, made a statement that Russia recognizes the 1956 Declaration "as existing."
The next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia is always ready to fulfill its obligations, especially with regard to ratified documents. But these obligations will be fulfilled "only to the extent that our partners are ready to fulfill the same agreements."
On May 24, 2005, deputies of the Sakhalin Regional Duma published an open appeal to Sergey Lavrov before his trip to Japan, where they pointed out that the 1956 Declaration was no longer binding:

“However, in 1956 there were no internationally recognized 200-mile economic zones, the starting point of which is, in this case, the coast of the Kuril Islands. Thus, now in the case of the transfer of territories, the object of transfer is not only and not only the islands, but also the adjacent economic zones that are inseparable from them, which only produce smuggled seafood worth up to 1 billion US dollars a year. Isn't the emergence of maritime economic zones in the world after 1956 a significant change in the situation?

Summarizing, we briefly note the main points.

1. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 annulls the 1875 treaty, so references to it as a legal document are not valid. The reference to the Shimodsky treatise of 1855 is irrelevant, because Japan violated this treaty by attacking Russia in 1904.
2. The transfer of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union is fixed in the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945. The return of these territories can be considered both as a restoration of historical justice and as a legitimate military trophy. This is a completely normal practice, which has a huge number of examples in history.
3. Japan may not recognize Russia's sovereignty over these territories, but it also has no legal rights to them - its refusal to claim South Sakhalin and the Kuriles is recorded in the peace treaty signed in San Francisco in 1951.
4. The Japanese indications that Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup are not part of the Kuril Islands (and, therefore, are not subject to the 1951 treaty) do not correspond to either geographical science or the history of previous Russian-Japanese negotiations.
5. After signing the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and legalizing the 200-mile exclusive zone in international law, following the 1956 Declaration becomes optional for Russia. Its possible implementation today, as Putin and Lavrov announced, is not an obligation, but a gesture of goodwill.
6. The Southern Kuriles are of great strategic and economic importance, so there can be no question that these are just pieces of land that you don’t feel sorry for.
7. The Kuril Islands - from Alaid to Kunashir and Habomai - Russian land.

* Anatoly Koshkin. Russia and Japan. Knots of contradictions. M.: Veche, 2010. S. 405-406.

To the root of the problem

One of the first documents regulating Russian-Japanese relations was the Shimoda Treaty, signed on January 26, 1855. According to the second article of the treatise, the border was established between the islands of Urup and Iturup - that is, all four islands now claimed by Japan today were recognized as the possession of Japan.

Since 1981, the date of the signing of the Shimoda Treaty has been celebrated in Japan as "Northern Territories Day". Another thing is that, relying on the Shimoda treatise as one of the fundamental documents, in Japan they forget about one important point. In 1904, Japan, having attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and unleashed the Russo-Japanese War, itself violated the terms of the treaty, which provided for friendship and good neighborly relations between states.

The Shimoda treaty did not determine the ownership of Sakhalin, where both Russian and Japanese settlements were located, and by the mid-70s a solution to this issue was also ripe. The St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, which was ambiguously assessed by both parties. Under the terms of the treaty, all the Kuril Islands were now completely withdrawn to Japan, and Russia received full control over Sakhalin.

Then, following the results of the Russo-Japanese War, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan ceded the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel.

In 1925, the Soviet-Japanese Convention was signed in Beijing, generally confirming the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty. As is known, the late 1930s and early 1940s were extremely tense in Soviet-Japanese relations and were associated with a series of military conflicts of various scales.

The situation began to change by 1945, when the Axis began to suffer heavy defeats and the prospect of losing the Second World War became more and more obvious. Against this background, the question arose about the post-war structure of the world. So, according to the terms of the Yalta Conference, the USSR was obliged to enter the war against Japan, and South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands went to the Soviet Union.

True, at the same time, the Japanese leadership was ready to voluntarily cede these territories in exchange for the neutrality of the USSR and the supply of Soviet oil. The USSR did not take such a very slippery step. The defeat of Japan by that time was a matter of maybe not a quick, but still time. And most importantly, by refraining from decisive action, the Soviet Union would actually hand the situation in the Far East into the hands of the United States and its allies.

By the way, this also applies to the events of the Soviet-Japanese War and the Kuril landing operation itself, which was not initially prepared. When it became known about the preparations for the landing of American troops on the Kuriles, the Kuril landing operation was urgently prepared in a day. Fierce fighting in August 1945 ended with the surrender of the Japanese garrisons in the Kuriles.

Fortunately, the Japanese command did not know the real number of Soviet paratroopers and, without fully using their overwhelming numerical superiority, capitulated. At the same time, the South Sakhalin offensive operation was also carried out. So, at the cost of considerable losses, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands became part of the USSR.