Battle of Fidonisi Island. Before and after fidonisi. Further events and the meaning of the battle

Back in April 1788, before the arrival of the Turkish fleet in Liman, Suvorov proposed to Potemkin to storm Ochakov, then defended by only four thousand Turks, and undertook to carry out this task. His Serene Highness wrote to him in response: “I untie your hands for every benefit, but with regard to Ochakov, an attempt can be harmful; I will use everything to get it cheaply.

But already on May 20, a huge squadron of Gassan Pasha anchored at the walls of Ochakov. “The Busurman fleet appeared majestically in the amount of 52 ships,” Suvorov reported. Together with the ships already standing at Ochakov, the Turkish fleet consisted of 18 battleships, 22 frigates, and many rowing galleys; only 110 ships - with 20 thousand soldiers and 2 thousand guns. The superiority of the Turkish squadron over the Russian fleets in the Liman was so overwhelming that the caustic Suvorov started talking about the battle of the “bugs with elephants” and informed Voinovich about the situation through messengers. On the same day, Potemkin wrote about Voinovich to Mordvinov: “It is extremely necessary to bring him into a position to act against the enemy. Make haste to supply him with everything he needs."

On the morning of June 7, the ships of Paul Jones and the rowing ships of the Prince of Nassau-Siegen attacked the Turkish squadron and destroyed three enemy ships.

After this battle, Potemkin wrote to Voinovich: "Now it's your turn to glorify the Russian flag on the Black Sea."

On June 16, Admiral Gassan Pasha brought his ships into Liman. At 4 o'clock the next morning the battle began and lasted until dusk. The rowing flotilla under the command of Nassau-Siegen and Panaioti Alexiano, taking advantage of the fact that large Turkish ships often ran aground, destroyed two 64-gun enemy ships, including the captain-pashinsky, with decisive attacks. The Turkish admiral escaped on a boat. Retreating, the Turkish ships tried to go to sea and came under fire from a battery secretly set up by Suvorov at the tip of the Kinburn Spit. The shelling of the confused Turks continued all night long: a bombardment ship, two frigates, two shebeks, a galley and a transport ship were sunk. In the morning, the rowing flotilla arrived in time to complete the rout: five ships of the line were burned, one 54-gun went into the hands of the victors intact. In just two days, the Turkish fleet lost 15 ships: 5.5 thousand people and more than 570 guns. 1673 people were taken prisoner. Russian losses amounted to only one frigate, 18 people killed and 67 wounded.

The news of the victory had an extremely strong effect on Potemkin. In the most enthusiastic terms, he spoke about this event with Prince de Ligne and saw in it God's providence, special protection provided to him by Providence.

The battle in the Liman had not yet ended, when on June 18 a squadron of Rear Admiral Voinovich left Sevastopol in the direction of Ochakovo: the battleships Transfiguration of the Lord and St. Paul, 10 large frigates (two 50-gun ones: St. George the Victorious and "Apostol Andrey", and eight 40-44-gun: "Berislav", "Strela", "Kinburn", "Fanagoria", "Taganrog", "Light", "Perun" and "Victory"), one 18-gun frigate, 20 small Greek ships and three fireships.

The squadron was faced with the task of diverting Hassan Pasha's forces from Ochakov in order to prevent the Turkish fleet from assisting the besieged in the fortress. In turn, Gassan Pasha had long been waiting for Voinovich's squadron to enter the open sea - in the deep Akhtiar Bay with coastal batteries, it was inaccessible. Therefore, having received news of the movement of the Sevastopol squadron to meet him, the experienced Hassan decided to split his huge fleet: leaving a squadron of 12 frigates and 33 small ships at Ochakov, go with all available battleships to the sea for a decisive battle with the Sevastopol.

On June 28, Rear Admiral Paul Jones wrote to Potemkin from the St. Vladimir ":" I have the honor to inform you that at this moment, that is, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the Turkish fleet set sail; I even think that the enemy detachment, located west of Kinburn, wants to connect with their fleet. This maneuver may be in connection with the approach of the Sevastopol fleet, which is of great interest.

The movement of our squadron was greatly delayed due to the oncoming northern winds, and it approached the island of Tendra only on June 29th. A Turkish fleet was seen here - 47 pennants.

At dawn the next day, the Sevastopol squadron went to approach the enemy, who occupied a windward position, and, lining up in the battle line on the left tack (46) , prepared for battle. The Turkish squadron, approaching three miles, also entered the battle line. In the first hour of the day there was a calm, and the ships stopped. With the strengthening of the wind, the Russians again began to approach. Then the Turkish ships began to move away without accepting the battle. The Russians pursued them, while trying to take a windward position. By evening, the Turks slowed down; lowered our sails too. With the onset of darkness, the fleets again dispersed. For three days the squadron maneuvered into the sea, watching each other. Probably Hassan Pasha was puzzled: the Russians, led by only two battleships, were not going to leave under the cover of night. If they tried to withdraw during the day, losing in speed, they would have been defeated without difficulty - which Hassan initially counted on by arranging a demonstration of the attack. But day after day, a close-knit squadron of Sevastopol residents steadily followed him, imposing a battle.

Meanwhile, Hassan's fleet consisted of 15 battleships (of which five were 80-gun), 8 frigates, 3 bombardment ships and 21 small ships; the weight of a volley of 1110 ship guns was 410 pounds. The Russian squadron could fire a volley of 550 guns weighing only 160 pounds due to the large number of small-caliber guns - the ratio of the weight of the volley is 2.5 vs. contractions. The contours of the Russian ships were worse than the Turkish ones, which, moreover, were all sheathed with copper, while we did not have a single such ship. The sailing capacity of our ships was also less - due to the lower draft: the ships had to be built at the river shipyards for the time being. All this gave the Turks advantages in speed and maneuverability.

At the beginning of the year, due to the lack of ships, Potemkin ordered that 46-gun frigates be called ships or battle frigates in order to put them in battle against enemy ships of the line. It is difficult to say how much easier it became to fight because of these linguistic tricks. Voinovich had no choice but to put up his ten frigates against the battleships of the Turks (in subsequent battles they were no longer placed in the battle line).

In a letter to Ushakov, Marko Ivanovich noted that in the armada opposing them, three ships posed a special danger: Gassan Pasha himself, as well as vice and rear admirals, which differed both in size and weapons. With them, and should first of all try to start a fight.

It was not the first time for the Russian fleet to deal with superior enemy forces: this was the case both at Chesme and at Patras. But never before, much less after this confrontation, the balance of power was not so critical.

On July 3, near the island of Fidonisi (now Snake), the Turks decided to take the fight. Rear Admiral Voinovich built a line of battle on the port tack, still having Hassan Pasha's fleet in the wind and on the opposite course.

After one in the afternoon, the Turks, remaining in the wind, began to approach in two wake columns. The first column of the Turks, led by Eski-Gassan himself, attacked the Russian vanguard under the command of Brigadier Fyodor Ushakov, the larger second column went to the corps de battalion and rearguard.

After a short skirmish with two of our ships and 50-gun frigates at a long distance, Hassan's ship was forced to leave the battle line, while he tried to cut off two frigates of our avant-garde, "Berislav" (captain of the 2nd rank Ya.N. Sablin) and “Arrow” (captain of the 2nd rank M.N. Neledinsky), but the ship “St. Paul” rushed to their aid. The ship of Kapudan Pasha was under fire from frigates from one side, and from the other by Ushakov's ship. The concentrated fire of our ships inflicted serious damage on the Turkish flagship, and Eski-Gassan, taking advantage of the advantage in speed, began to rapidly leave to extinguish the flames.

The flagship "Transfiguration of the Lord" of Rear Admiral Voinovich fought with two ships of the Turkish vice and rear admirals. And here the excellent training of our gunners affected, they quickly and accurately worked on targets. Soon, flames flashed on the decks of enemy ships and black smoke poured. Apparently, at first the Turks coped with the fires, but after repeated fires, they turned and went beyond the battle line. However, it was too early to relax: a multi-gun shebeka advanced in their place against the Transfiguration. And again, our arrows were accurate: the xebec soon stopped responding with fire and, having received many holes below the waterline, suddenly tilted and rapidly went under the water, leaving a large funnel on the surface of the sea. On the waves, among the wreckage, the heads of the few Turkish sailors who managed to throw themselves into the water in advance could be seen. Later they were all picked up by "Transfiguration".

The rest of the Russian frigates also fought with several enemy ships at once. Having lost their admirals, the Turks stopped their rapprochement with the Sevastopolites and fired at a distance. After fighting for a little more than an hour, their ships one by one began to turn and leave after their damaged flagships.

The Turks headed east, and Voinovich took the OSO course to cover the approaches to the Crimea. Before midnight on July 5, enemy ships were found heading towards Ak-Mechet Bay. Voinovich blocked their path, after which the enemy turned south, and then headed for the shores of Rumelia (47) and disappeared from sight on July 7.

These events are reflected in detail in the report of Rear Admiral Voinovich to Commander-in-Chief Potemkin:

“On the 3rd in the morning we were opposite the Danube in the sight of the Fidonisi Islands, the wind continued to the north, the enemy was in the wind in the same position; at eight o'clock in the morning, I ordered the fleet to turn over the over-tack, through the counter-march, and build a battle line on the left tack to the northeast, the enemy on the counter-tack; but the enemy had the windward side and all the advantages. As they began to unite, then the captain-pasha and his entire fleet, following, began to descend on us in two dense columns, since he had an excellent number in the ships; the first, under the command of the captain-pasha, having its ship in the lead, attacked my vanguard, the second column on the corps de battalion and rear guard, which made up a large number of ships with bombardment ships; at three o'clock and five minutes the battle began; his desire was greater for our two ships and two 50-gun frigates, there were five enemy ships against each of our ships, he had the benefit of the wind, he determined a large distance for himself, so that our 40-gun frigates with a 12-pounder cannon could operate on rare ships when he could harm them a lot with his big cannon; but the fire produced to him from ships and 50-gun frigates, Captain Pasha could only hold out for forty minutes with his ship in battle, he was forced to leave the line, he attempted to cut off two advanced frigates, but the ship "Pavel", which was in the forefront, adding sails, with great damage, made him turn away, when the same frigates "Berislav" and "Strela" very successfully fired their entire log at him, so that it was clear that large boards were flying from the stern of his ship; on the vice-admiral's and rear-admiral's, which stood opposite the ship "Transfiguration", twice thick smoke showed up and went out; the battle was very fierce up to four hours and 55 minutes, the enemy incessantly threw bombs from the bombardment ships, but with all his overwhelming force with a large gun he was forced to yield to courage alone, and with considerable damage, having raised all the sails, he moved away, gave way; above all, he lost one shebeke, which sank opposite the ship; people managed to save a little with it. With what fearlessness and courage my commanders acted, it is impossible to describe.

Damage on our part consists of: seven people wounded and killed, two 40-gun frigates "Berislav" and "Fanagoria" broke through in the underwater part, there was a big leak on the latter, but they soon captured it, also in two masts, and in rigging and topmasts; All of this was soon fixed...

On the 7th, the Turkish fleet disappeared from sight, went to the west, to the Rumelian shores, I remained at Cape Chersonese on the yards, and sent four damaged frigates to the Sevastopol harbor for an early repair of the underwater part, because a 100-pound stone core was found in the Berislav frigate , and others are pierced with 30- and 24-pounders.

I have the honor to present a map of the voyage and an action plan for what has been done.

The Sevastopol squadron was still at sea when Potemkin, on July 7, from near Ochakov, informed Catherine about the battles in Liman and attributed:

“I have news about Voinovich that he was in sight between Kozlov and Ak-Mechet for the 22nd of last month, therefore, the Turkish fleet passed him.”

Catherine answered Potemkin only on July 14: “Four battles on the Liman - we sang two prayers and thanked God for His great mercies. Voinovich worries me now. God grant that he successfully corrects his case ... "

On July 17, the empress still does not know anything about the victory at Fidonisi and writes to the prince: “... I am glad that Voinovich and the Sevastopol fleet are healthy. I think that the Pasha Captain was afraid that you would do some kind of undertaking behind him, and for this he went back. Adieu, mon cher Ami, portes Vous bien.

Finally, Potemkin wrote about the success of the Sevastopols, mentioning the victory over the Turks in Liman (July 1, Prince Nassau and Paul Jones utterly defeated the Turkish squadron remaining at Ochakov):

"July 18. Camp near Ochakovo

Dear Mother, Most Merciful Empress. From the attached report, please see the actions of the Sevastopol fleet. I only wished that we would not lose. With such an excellent number, the Captain Pasha acted very timidly. Proof that God has mercy on us.

Voinovich did not know about the local successes, even though he knew, he could not use it if he was not in the wind. This matter is very important because of the smallness of ours against the enemy ... "

In the attached "most submissive report" Potemkin described in detail the battle at Fidonisi in accordance with Voinovich's report. It is very likely that on this occasion, His Serene Highness regretted that five months ago he had to rename the flagship of the squadron, this time justifying its first name "Glory to Catherine."

Order of Prince Potemkin

Rear Admiral Count Voinovich

I have received your message, sent with Lieutenant Commander Senyavin, and I see with pleasure from them how bravely you received and repulsed the enemy fleet near Fidonisi, despite the excessive superiority of its forces. To you, as the first participant in this famous case, declaring my gratitude, I entrust Mr. Brigadier and Cavalier to testify to this Ushakov, according to your report, who so distinguished himself and others who contributed to the defeat of the enemy, as well as to all the lower ranks. The courage and fearlessness inherent in Russian soldiers are quite noticeable here, and I did not fail to inform Her Imperial Majesty about this privileged advantage.

Admiral Grigory Andreevich Spiridov, who had been retired since 1774, on the day he received the news of the victory at Fidonisi, put on his ceremonial uniform - only once in all the years after leaving the fleet.

Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov also responded, on July 11 he wrote from Kinburn to Potemkin: “Count Voinovich laid his hand. I congratulate you most lowly…” (Subsequently, in honor of this naval victory, the name “Fidonisi” was given to the destroyer of the Black Sea Fleet, which entered service on June 7, 1917.)

“The action of the Sevastopol fleet made me very happy: it is almost unbelievable with what little power God helps to beat strong Turkish weapons! Tell me, how can I please Voinovich? Crosses of the third class have already been sent to you, will you not give him one, or a sword?

“The courage and courage that you showed, commanding the fleet on the Black Sea in the battle on July 3 of this 1788 with excellent enemy forces, led by the former Captain Pasha, was awarded Her Highest Imperial Majesty goodwill. As a sign of this, the Most Merciful has granted you the Order of St. George of the 3rd degree, which you have to assign and wear as established. I congratulate you on this mercy of the Monarchs, I expect with full assurance that you will not fail to distinguish yourself with new deeds.

On the same day, Marko Ivanovic received the award "In respect for the zeal for the service and the brave and courageous deeds shown to him in the battle on the Black Sea, on July 3, 788, against the superior forces of the enemy, led by the former Captain Pasha, commanding the fleet, conquering the battlefield."

However, after the victory, everything did not go smoothly: upon the arrival of the ships in Sevastopol, a fierce written battle began between Voinovich and Ushakov, with the involvement of Potemkin as an arbitrator. For the battle won, Voinovich presented all ship commanders (including Ushakov, of course) and, according to a long tradition, flag officer Dmitry Senyavin for awards. Fedor Ushakov, in his report, did not become modest and attributed all the merits in the battle exclusively to his vanguard: allegedly his ship and two frigates shot down not only the admiral's ship, but also the vice and rear admiral's ones, which were actually shot down by the "Transfiguration of the Lord" ! Moreover, Ushakov chalked up the shebeka, also sunk by Voinovich, and, in order to give more weight to his feat, called her a frigate!

“The ship“ St. Paul ”made an excellent and very real help to the aforementioned frigates, knocking down the captain-pashinsky ship with considerable damage. He especially, one after another, shot down from his places, first placed by the captain-pasha against his three ships, of which one is a large eightieth, then shot down one from the place that came to help them from the advanced ships, causing considerable damage to all of them, a frigate that descended from the wind , one sunk at last. He had a battle with vice-admiral and rear-admiral ships that approached him at a distance from the middle and rear of the fleet, which he also bravely repelled and forced to give way.

If we take this message for granted, it turns out that Ushakov's ship damaged 7 battleships of the Turks (that is, almost half of 15) and sank the frigate. What the rest of the ships of the Sevastopol squadron did at the same time is unclear.

At the end of his essay, Ushakov presented five of his subordinates to be awarded the Order of St. George IV degree (in this scenario, of course, it was assumed that Ushakov himself would receive St. George III degree). And he sent this report ... to the commander Voinovich himself !!! Until now, Voinovich has openly, warmly and friendly treated Ushakov, encouraging him for his excellent service and even affectionately calling him "my father", "heart friend", "darling". And suddenly a man, whom he did not doubt at all, writes him such a daring report, where he not only tells obvious fables without the slightest embarrassment, but also indicates to his commander which of the officers and which order should be awarded.

Rear Admiral Voinovich responded by sending a sharp letter to Ushakov: “Your act is very bad, and I regret that you inflict harmful damage in the team in such an upset to the service. This is unbearable for me to rule over such; decided, by making a precise description to His Lordship, to ask for dismissal. He said that he had sent this description to Commander-in-Chief Potemkin along with Ushakov's report.

Fyodor Ushakov, frightened to the extreme, decides to go for broke and writes on July 11 a lengthy report (5 pages of short text - not quite intelligible for today's reader) directly to Prince Potemkin, which was already a gross violation of subordination:

“I hoped to earn Your Grace's attention to the confirmation of a good opinion of myself; he alone I diligently seek and desire; but, Most Gracious Sovereign, the misfortune that is persecuted here through His Excellency Mark Ivanovich never leaves me, and through all sorts of excellent efforts of mine, I can’t find mercy and a just merit for me to find him for myself ... from my very childhood I got used to the respect and respect of commanders ... In one of all (chiefs. - P.V.) His Excellency Mark Ivanovich cannot find the desired success, who from the beginning of our acquaintance, when we were still colonels and both under the command of others, felt some excellent hatred for me, all the deeds for which I was sometimes commendable, I don’t know the reason why he was excellent they worry about what they cannot hide in all form and in deeds ... Although His Excellency, of necessity, sometimes shows some respect and favor, but for the most part his deeds and actions against me in a multitude are not at all consistent with my behavior and service.

Ushakov also attaches letters to him from Voinovich to the report: “In them I was always named as a kind friend, assistant and kind comrade ... His Excellency had an excellent power of attorney for me ... suddenly, by accident and I don’t know any reason why, I received this change ... "

And further: “Through this incident, I received such a strict letter and the wrath of His Excellency, from whom does he, what he heard about me, does not say, has a lot of spies around him and believes them in every lie and then takes revenge to infinity for every trifle ... "

However, these are all emotions, but the essential one - Ushakov admits to Potemkin that in his report on the battle he had enough of a surplus in listing the ships he had shot down:

“His Excellency Marko Ivanovich considers that it is not similar in my report that the Rear Admiral’s ship was shot down from its place by the Transfiguration ship during the battle, it really is (! – P.V.) ... and therefore the rear admiral's ship fought with the "Transfiguration"; being not very far from me and, I think, could not, retreating from the battle, pass my ship, and since he fought my ship least of all, I would gladly cut him off from my report and write whatever I wanted, but His Excellency sent my report without telling me about it before, and I learned about the sending of the report from his letter to me ...

Look, Gracious Sovereign, with a merciful eye on my most humble petition ... "

To complete his essay, Fyodor Ushakov asks to be dismissed from the service "with comfortable food."

Instead of punishing the brigadier who had a lot of self-importance, Potemkin favorably accepts his arguments: he himself is in the habit of working, as they say, “on a scandal” and being in hated relations with all his generals without exception, the prince was even pleased with the ensuing skirmish. In general, it seems that this whole farce was prepared: it is unlikely that Ushakov would have dared to do such an act, not counting in advance on support from above. Most likely, being well acquainted with both Voinovich and Potemkin, Ushakov accurately weighed the psychological situation and decided on a dangerous game. In the conditions of the war, due to the smallness of experienced officers, Potemkin did not take any measures before the time, besides, Voinovich himself openly praised the brigadier in his report, and he clearly sought to get the protection of the prince through letters, to become "his" person for him. Did Potemkin's hidden annoyance at Voinovich for last year's crash at Kaliakria have an effect here? Who knows…

However, for the battle at Fidonisi, brigadier Fyodor Ushakov received not George III degree, as he expected, but the Order of Vladimir III degree. A year later, perhaps to “warm up” the conflict, Potemkin gave Ushakov another George IV degree for Fidonisi (however, a strange thing: F.F. Ushakov is not listed as a holder of the Order of St. George IV degree).

About the battle at Fidonisi, Soviet historians write the same thing as a carbon copy: they say, here Ushakov (one) violated the traditional linear tactics, which predetermined the outcome of the battle. But the fact is that, in fact, linear tactics were violated by ... Kapudan Pasha Eski-Gassan! Showing off, Hassan moved to the vanguard on the flagship, leading the rest of the ships. If, according to the rules, he had been in the corps de battle, that is, in the middle of his huge squadron, the results of the battle would have been completely different: volleys of Russian guns would not have gotten him, and he could calmly lead the battle.

The victory at Fidonisi was important not only because it was possible to help the Yekaterinoslav army to divert the enemy from Ochakovo and prevent him from reaching the coast of Crimea. Perhaps no less important was the psychological factor: Russian sailors were convinced that even superior Turkish forces could be dealt with - and with success. This confidence gave them strength in further battles on the Black Sea.

July 14, 1788 - the first naval battle of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1792 between the fleets of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the baptism of fire of the Sevastopol squadron - the combat nucleus of the Black Sea Fleet. Despite the fact that the battle at Fidonisi did not significantly affect the course of the campaign, it was the first victory of the fleet, a victory over vastly superior enemy forces, which had great psychological significance.

background

On June 29, 1788, Russian troops besieged the Turkish fortress of Ochakov. On the same day, a Russian squadron under the command of Rear Admiral M. I. Voinovich left Sevastopol for Ochakov. The squadron included two 66-gun battleships, 2 50-gun frigates, eight 40-gun frigates, one 18-gun frigate, more than 20 small sailing ships and three firewalls. The main task of the Russian squadron was to prevent the Turkish squadron from assisting the Turkish troops besieged in Ochakovo and assisting the Russian ground forces, as well as to keep the enemy squadron from reaching the coast of Crimea.

The course of the battle

Due to headwinds, the Russian squadron approached Tendra Island only on July 10. The Turkish squadron discovered here consisted of 15 battleships (of which five were 80-gun), eight frigates, three bombardment ships and 21 small ships.

The Turkish squadron, avoiding battle, headed southwest, pursued by the Sevastopol squadron.

The fleets met on the morning of July 14 near the Danube Delta near the island of Fidonisi (Snake). The balance of forces of the parties was unfavorable for the Russian fleet. The Turkish squadron had 1110 guns against 550 for the Russian, salvo weight 2.5: 1 (due to the larger caliber guns of Turkish battleships). The ratio of the number of teams of 10,000 people of the Turkish squadron against 4,000 Russian crews made the possible outcome of the boarding battle unfavorable.

Occupying a windward position, the Turkish fleet lined up in 2 wake columns and began to descend to the Russian line. The first column of the Turks, led by Eski-Gassan himself, attacked the Russian vanguard under the command of Brigadier F.F. Ushakov, the larger second Turkish column went to the corps de battalion and rearguard. After a short skirmish with two of our ships and 50-gun frigates at a long distance, Gassan's ship was forced to leave the battle line, while he tried to cut off two frigates of the Russian avant-garde, but the St. Paul ship rushed to their aid. The ship of Kapudan Pasha found itself under fire from frigates on one side, and on the other - Ushakov's ship. The concentrated firing of the Russian ships caused serious damage to the Turkish flagship, and Eski-Gassan began to rapidly leave to extinguish the flames of the fire.

The flagship "Transfiguration of the Lord" of Rear Admiral Marko Ivanovich Voinovich fought with two ships of Turkish vice and rear admirals. The fire of the Sevastopol flagship caused fires on the ships of the Turks. At first they managed to put out the flames, but after repeated fires, they turned and went behind the battle line. After that, "Transfiguration" sank the Turkish shebeka.

At Sevastopol, 4 frigates were damaged.

Further events and the meaning of the battle

The Turkish fleet was forced to retreat. The task of the Russian fleet to support the ground forces near Ochakovo (which was taken only on December 17, 1788) was actually completed. The unconditional dominance of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea ended. On July 28, the Empress enthusiastically wrote to Potemkin: “The action of the Sevastopol fleet made me very happy: it is almost unbelievable with what little power God helps to beat strong Turkish weapons! Tell me, how can I please Voinovich? Crosses of the third class have already been sent to you, would you give him one, or a sword? Count Voinovich received the Order of St. George III degree. In honor of this naval victory, the destroyer of the Black Sea Fleet, which entered service on June 7, 1917, received the name Fidonisi.

The victory of the Russian squadron

The Turkish squadron, avoiding battle, headed southwest, pursued by the Sevastopol squadron.

Write a review on the article "The Battle of Fidonisi"

Notes

Links

An excerpt characterizing the Battle of Fidonisi

(1788 - 1789)

The battle of Fidonisi was the first victory of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and one of the first cases of the use of new, maneuverable, battle tactics, which replaced the linear one.

​

Despite the fact that in this battle you can already find all those features that distinguish Ushakov's manner of conducting naval combat, recently there has been a tendency that did not exist before - to attribute the entire victory to M. I. Voinovich. This view was not possible until, say, fifty years ago.

​

The fact is that Voinovich still has descendants. One of them, the son of a famous writer, wrote the book "The Warrior under the St. Andrew's Flag", which tells that Voinovich, a talented and invaluable boss, won the battle, but he was slandered by his own subordinate, who liked Potemkin better. Therefore, Voinovich was removed from command.

​

To prove this, Pavel Voinovich uses both documents (considering only a few reports of the ancestor and not noticing the existence of other papers that clearly refute his opinion) and gossip about Ushakov’s oddities, recorded by Pylyaev many years after the death of the admiral. To recognize this as a legitimate method of discussion, unfortunately, is not possible.

​

It is impossible to agree with the point of view of Pavel Voinovich, because enough documents have been preserved proving the opposite. Moreover, almost all of them are published. But the main evidence is that Voinovich, unlike Ushakov, neither before nor after won a single major naval battle. But back to business.

​

First of all, it is necessary to characterize Mark Ivanovich Voinovich himself, so that it is clear what kind of authorities Ushakov had to deal with.

​

According to the General Maritime List, Voinovich received the rank of midshipman in 1770 and was sent to the Mediterranean Sea to help the First Archipelago Expedition. He returned to Petersburg only in 1777.

​

In general, that year was marked for Voinovich by a great career success: “Commanding the frigate St. Mark", sailed with court yachts to the Berezovy Islands to meet the Swedish king". The year 1778 was marked for the count by only one achievement: "I was" on Her Majesty's boat "" .

​

After he went to the Astrakhan flotilla. But in the description of his actions, the "General Maritime List" admits some inaccuracy. Unsuccessful negotiations with local rulers simply mean captivity. Brockhaus and Efron are more correct here. In 1783, Count Voinovich was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet.

View of Sevastopol. End of the 18th century Engraving by Merlendi from a drawing by K. Geisler. Fragment. Central Naval Museum.

The worthlessness of Voinovich can be judged from the documents he wrote after the storm that almost destroyed the entire Sevastopol squadron in 1787. He is equally worried about the loss of two ships, and the loss of his beloved snuffbox. For a military man to write this is unthinkable. The authenticity of these papers could not be denied even by his descendants.

​

Academician Tarle in his work on Ushakov characterizes M. I. Voinovich "untalented and cowardly boss". You can judge further about the validity of this statement of the academician.

​

Let us proceed, in fact, to the presentation of events in the order in which they unfolded.

​

At the end of 1787, Ushakov was sent instead of the ill Panayoti Alexiano to command the Liman squadron. As we remember, the situation in Liman left much to be desired, including due to the inactivity of Mordvinov.

​

Ushakov was chosen for this place not by chance. The "History of the Russian Army and Navy" contains an indication that after the capture, Potemkin was opposed to Mordvinov and “decided to replace him with a more active and capable boss in the near future” .

​

Only Ushakov managed to disarm the ships for the winter and establish signals for monitoring the Turks, as Mordvinov returned him back to Sevastopol.

​

Prince Potemkin was very indignant at this and wrote to Mordvinov from Elisavetgrad: “Fleet, Mr. captain of the brigadier rank Ushakov was sent to the Liman squadron at my special command. And as it came to my attention that he went to Sevastopol, then I consider it necessary for Your Excellency to prescribe for accurate observation, so that people who are assigned to such authorities specifically from me should not be separated from me without an idea. .

​

From this message, it can be understood that Potemkin guessed what invaluable talents Ushakov had even before the battle of Fidonisi. But the prince did not return Ushakov to Liman.

Dnieper estuary. Contemporary photography.

The situation on the Black Sea in 1788 was as follows. The Russian fleet was still divided into two squadrons: Sevastopol and the one that was in Liman. Since the Turks were constantly trying to lock up and destroy the Liman part of the fleet, it was necessary to occupy their main fortification in Liman - Ochakov, in order to protect the ships from the constant risk of being destroyed. The task of the Sevastopol squadron was to divert the Turkish fleet from Liman and, if possible, destroy it.

​

In 1788, the first exit of the Sevastopol squadron to the sea took place on May 16. But Voinovich was again overtaken by storms, and no help was provided to Liman.

​

Eski-Gassan reached Ochakov without any interference. Fighting began in Liman. The Turkish fleet left Ochakov only when rumors reached Eski-Hassan about the appearance of the Voinovich squadron in the sea.

​

In order to understand what actually happened on July 3, 1788, we should study the correspondence between Ushakov and Voinovich. This will give us some idea of ​​who really won the battle of Fidonisi.

​

So, we read Voinovich's note addressed to Ushakov. According to Ushakov's instructions, it is dated July 3, 1788.

​

“Dear comrade, God has helped us today, otherwise we were in great danger.

​

If the wind had served him, as it was at first, he would have cut us off. We were very close, but as the wind became, and saw that we could already unite, then he turned away. I would need to talk to you. Please come, if you have leisure, 20 ships of the line have begun. I'm sorry, baby" .

​

From this illiterate and highly vague text, the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, Ushakov and Voinovich are getting along very well and are even friends. Secondly, Voinovich is very frightened by the possibility of an attack by the Turks and wants to consult with Ushakov about further actions in private ( "come if you have time").

"Transfiguration of the Lord" (formerly "Glory to Catherine") - Voinovich's flagship

From the next note it follows that Ushakov did not go anywhere, said he was sick and limited himself to a letter with recommendations. Voinovich came up with some other plan, which he does not give. However, he is still restless and hopes for Ushakov in everything: “I am very sorry that you are unwell, I am in the same circumstances, but what to do, force yourself, bachushka, as best you can, maybe God will have mercy on us” .

​

However, the fight was inevitable. And Ushakov not only "forced himself", but also won a brilliant victory.

​

Before describing the battle of Fidonisi, let's turn to Dotsenko's work to understand what Ushakov did (and in no way could Voinovich come up with).

​

"In the fleets of all countries of the world,- writes V. D. Dotsenko, - linear tactics then dominated. The work of J. Clerk "Movement of the Fleets" in Russia has not yet been read by anyone. The essence of the naval battle was the struggle for the wind, that is, the desire to take a more advantageous windward position in relation to the enemy. This gave undeniable advantages, since the windward fleet could dictate the distance of the battle and even leave it in the event of an unfavorable development of events. The ships picturesquely lined up against each other and in an artillery duel decided the outcome of the entire battle. It was extremely difficult to win, and even more so to utterly smash the enemy with such tactics.

​

All artillery was about the same. Everything depended on the training of the commanders. Under these conditions, new, unconventional ways of fighting were needed. In the Russian fleet, Ushakov became such an innovator, one of the first to abandon linear tactics, preferring maneuver, cutting through the formation of the enemy squadron, concentrating forces against the main forces of the enemy fleet and, most importantly, seeking first of all to destroy the flagship of the enemy fleet " .

​

All of these techniques we see in the battle of Fidonisi. Ushakov more than once - under Kerch, Tendra and Kaliakria - will prove the justification of his actions, which cannot be said about Voinovich.

​

So, July 3, 1788. The scene of the action is the northwestern region of the Black Sea, near the island of Fidonisi, which is now called Serpentine. The Russian squadron includes 2 battleships, 10 frigates and 24 small ships.

Of these forces, Ushakov commands only the vanguard, which is the battleship "St. Pavel", 50-gun frigate "Berislav", 40-gun frigates "Strela" and "Kinburn".

​

However, before that, Ushakov had some well-known agreement with Voinovich, which he mentions quite definitely: “For, having agreed on all the needs, his excellency verbally ordered, in necessary cases, the commanders of the ships deigned to follow the movement of the advanced squadron, which was done like that” .

​

Gassan Pasha's forces are much greater. He has 17 battleships, 8 frigates. Small vessels - 24, like our squadron.

Scheme of the battle near the island of Fidonisi

The whole battle is easily characterized by a phrase from Ushakov's addition to the battle report: “For my part, I felt great pleasure that it was similar to our common desire, for it is very beneficial for the practiced to fight in a regular way against non-art” .

​

At first, judging by Ushakov's description, the enemy was in an advantageous position. Hassan Pasha's squadron was in the wind. However, the Turkish naval commander needed to give the last orders. He traveled around his entire fleet in boats, giving orders to each ship. His actions did not escape the attentive eyes of Ushakov, who watched with interest as he in turn "establishes" the rear guard, corps de battalion and avant-garde. But when the rearguard of the enemy seemed to want to attack the Russian, it became completely clear that it was impossible to delay.

​

Ushakov ordered a maneuver to win the wind. The movement of the advanced ships was repeated by the entire fleet. Ushakov with his avant-garde was closest to the Turkish courts. "The entire fleet of the enemy,- the naval commander will note after the battle, - has already descended regularly to our entire line to such a distance that their guns could already reach our ships, but no one has started firing yet ” .

​

Gassan Pasha made an attempt to distract Ushakov and attack "like a lion" on the vanguard frigates, but nothing came of it.

​

Ushakov figured out the maneuver and prevented Gassan Pasha from boarding the frigates. He raised the signals for the rest and got even closer to the enemy. Seeing this, the Turkish ships left, leaving their flagship in front of them, which indignantly fired cannonballs at them.

​

“I hope that with great excitement he went down even closer and became a board directly against two frigates ... he fought with extreme fervor, but the Almighty helped us with this position and victory and I hope in his ship, apparently, there should be so many cannon holes that soon cannot be counted". There was nothing surprising in this - the ship of Kapudan Pasha was fired upon by several Russian ships.

​

During the battle, the foremast of one Turkish ship and the fore-mast of another were shot down, and a leak opened on the third. The damage received by the Ushakov ships was insignificant. There were no casualties on our side. The battle went on from 14:00 to 17:00 in the evening and ended with the flight of the Turkish fleet.

Serpent's Island (Fidonisi). Contemporary photography.

After the battle, Voinovich wrote a note to Ushakov with the following content:

​

“Congratulations, bachushka, Fedor Fedorovich. On this date he acted very bravely: you gave Captain Pasha a decent supper. I could see everything. What will God give us in the evening? This evening, when it gets dark, let's go to the Curonian OSO to our shores. This is very necessary. I'll tell you later, but our fleet deserved honor and withstood against such a force.

​

We will go to Kozlov, I need to report something to the prince. Sorry, dear friend. Be careful, honey. This night, so that we do not part, I will make a connection signal, then we will go down. .

​

From this letter (on which Ushakov wrote restrainedly "Received after the battle") we can draw the following conclusions.

​

Voinovich and Ushakov were on good terms even after the battle. It is very important that in this letter Voinovich acknowledges the undeniable merits of Ushakov and his passive role ( "I could see everything"). In addition, Voinovich does not consider it necessary to do anything to consolidate his success, but seeks to return to Russian territory as soon as possible.

​

Looking ahead, we note that Voinovich is unusually affectionately addressing the person whom he is going to deceive and deprive of the honor of victory. This document can serve as a monument to his cunning.

​

Ushakov was still needed by Voinovich. The commander of the Sevastopol squadron was afraid that the Turks might attack on the way. These fears were well founded. During the return, the squadron saw the enemy fleet. But instead of attacking, Voinovich did everything to avoid a meeting.

​

All hope of Voinovich was only on Ushakov. There are four notes by Voinovich, where he consults with Ushakov about further actions if the enemy attacks. It can be seen how confidence leaves the commander with each letter. We will only look at the third document.

​

“Dear friend, Feodor Feodorovich!

​

The enemy is coming. What to do? We must act heroically and as our duty dictates. If the matter is not to this day, and tomorrow God will allow us to take the wind from it, then I hope that we will destroy it altogether. Take care, old lady, gather your strength and give to the enemy according to his deeds. We will turn away from the coast as soon as possible through a counter-march and line up on the other tack, and there we will lie down in a drift in order to move a little away from the coast. Forgive me, friend, protect me, for God's sake, with your health and deed.

​

Your faithful servant Voinovich

​

Lead, bachushka, the line well and keep it close, but there is nothing to fear here on the shore. .

​

Everything is perfect here: both the question of the commander “What to do?”, And the answer about heroism that explains absolutely nothing. It is also interesting that Voinovich himself does not seek to show this heroism, but asks Ushakov to do it. Ushakov must both defeat the enemy and “encircle” the despondent Voinovich. What about Voinovich? Probably, he will again take a position from which everything is visible.

​

Avoiding purely journalistic discussions, we note that this letter can serve as another proof that Voinovich could not come up with new tactics. We do not see here a single principle of those listed by Dotsenko.

​

On the same day, Voinovich began to be overwhelmed with doubts whether his squadron would reach the harbor at all. He began to demand Ushakov's opinion whether they would get home at all.

​

As Ushakov himself later clarified, Voinovich's letters could only serve as evidence of the injustice of his latest accusations.

Turkish battleship of the 18th century.

All this wonderful friendship collapsed on July 9 in Sevastopol, when Voinovich wrote a report to Potemkin, in which he attributed the entire victory to himself. True, Ushakov was the first on the list of those who distinguished themselves, but in fact it did little.

​

Ushakov was very indignant at this, discussing the situation with other officers. Together they decided that the whole situation was dishonoring them. Rumors about his disrespectful statements reached Voinovich, and he wrote an accusatory letter to Fedor Fedorovich.

​

In particular, it said: “The truth is never hidden by me, and I never dared to convey too much. He did a great deal of duty and honesty. And to you, let me tell you that your act is very bad, and I regret that you inflict harmful things in the team in such a disorder and service. .

​

But Ushakov decided not to leave this matter like that, and a day later he wrote about everything in detail to Potemkin.

​

He sent him Voinovich's notes and letters, some of which we analyzed in order to prove the injustice of the commander's report. Ushakov noted that Voinovich indicated a different number of enemy ships (15 instead of 17 of the line) and downplayed the damage inflicted on the enemy by the Black Sea. This circumstance especially angered Ushakov.

​

“His Excellency changed the number of ships that were in battle only to consider the various notes he received from Kinburn and from your lordship, so as not to show improbability. But our own eyes, being so close in battle, cannot be incredible. I also don’t know why the damage to the enemy ships described in my report seemed incredible (according to which it’s impossible for some ships to be here), but they are so fair that, in addition to my entire team of servants, many people from corsair ships saw the whole incident and this damage and it's been publicized everywhere. What a need for me to write on myself and take too much. I would have been pleased with half of what happened, but, writing a report, I did not want to take justice away from the team, I was afraid to discourage them by reducing the case visible to everyone. And I wanted to give justice to everyone according to their merit and dignity. .

​

Ushakov hoped that Potemkin would either help him or let him resign. But letters from Sevastopol take a long time to reach Ochakov. Potemkin received Voinovich's report much earlier and recounted his false report to Catherine in detail.

​

After reading Ushakov's letter, Potemkin apparently realized that he was a bit hasty. He wrote a message in response (which, however, did not reach). In addition, in addition to the Order of St. Vladimir of the third degree, received in August, Ushakov was.

Unknown artist. Portrait of G. A. Potemkin.

However, all this did little. Ushakov still remained under the command of Voinovich, and he did not miss the opportunity to take revenge on his stubborn subordinate.

​

In January 1789, Voinovich informed Ushakov that he was now the chief commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and therefore could no longer command the Sevastopol squadron and entrusted it to Ushakov. Voinovich was leaving for Kherson.

​

However, Ushakov soon realized that this new appointment did little to change his position. Voinovich limited his powers in every possible way. Ushakov was so connected that he could not even transfer a sailor from one ship to another.

​

There were other harassments as well. For example, although on April 14, 1789, Ushakov was promoted to rear admiral, he did not receive any of the usual “favors” for this rank instead of cabin and portion money, which he lost. However, this was not what worried the new Rear Admiral the most.

​

Voinovich surrounded Ushakov with his people. So, he imposed on him the post of flag-captain Ovtsyn, whom Ushakov could not stand. Later Ushakov remarks: “... This definition for me as an assistant to Mr. Ovtsyn worries me, I willingly wish to have an adviser similar to the laws, but it should be of my choice such that in case I could take my place and correct the position of the flagship, which is what all commanders would be sure" .

​

Another problem for Ushakov was the appointment of the shipmaster Katasonov to Sevastopol, who, distracting workers from the repair of ships, “I used all my attention on the now inconsistent military time, for the most part, the intricate splendor of carriages, furniture and a very long-term structure of saw stone in my own house, to which there is no end in sight” .

​

Nothing could be done about it: Katasonov was defended by Voinovich. Therefore, Ushakov himself repaired the ships with sailors. Only thanks to this, some ships of the Sevastopol squadron did not cross "into non-existence", as the new squadron commander himself put it.

​

But most of all, Ushakov was upset that all this directly harmed the Sevastopol squadron. He understood that patience alone would not achieve any sense, and wrote about everything to Vasily Stepanovich Popov, the closest collaborator of Prince Potemkin.

​

Popov was one of those people who could be created only by Catherine's time. A man of humble origin, with his dexterity and ability to conduct clerical and private affairs well, he became absolutely indispensable, first to Prince Dolgorukov-Krymsky, then to Potemkin himself. Suvorov characterized him as follows: “He was a nice, honest man, dexterous and experienced in business. Easily accessible, without any pride, willingly taking part in the unfortunate, he knew how to win general respect and love.. It was to this person that Ushakov turned for help.

Lampi Johann Baptiste the Elder. Portrait of V. S. Popov.

wikipedia.org

Judging by Fyodor Fedorovich's letter, Popov had previously been interested in Voinovich's former junior flagship, feeling that the future was with Ushakov. Ushakov also knew about Popov's benevolence and decided to take advantage of it. He briefly wrote about the harassment he suffered from Voinovich, without mentioning either Katasonov or Ovtsyn. This was included in the following letters to Popov and Potemkin.

​

In the meantime, Ushakov was preparing the fleet for going to sea. The campaign of 1789 did without fighting at sea. The Sevastopol squadron could not leave the harbor for a long time due to insufficient supplies (Ushakov could not even interrogate the ropes at the command). All Ushakov's actions this year were forced to be limited to the fact that he diverted the Turkish fleet from Liman.

​

Voinovich with his Liman squadron was completely inactive. Two squadrons were supposed to connect, but Voinovich only wrote letters to Potemkin with excuses. Finally, the prince could not stand it. “At the end, you explain that a case would be good now, and I will tell you that there were cases and there will be more, but everyone will be missed”, he wrote on October 1, 1789.

​

In mid-November, Potemkin summoned Ushakov to his place in Iasi. The Black Sea Fleet needed a new commander, and the prince was firmly convinced that he had finally found him.

Notes

Dotsenko V.D. History of naval art: In 4 vols. T. 4. Actions of the fleet against the fleet - St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 2006 - p. 211-214.

Voinovich P.V. Warrior under the Andreevsky flag [Electronic resource]. URL: (date of access: 9. 01. 2017).

General maritime list: At 13 h. Part 3. The reign of Catherine II. A - K - St. Petersburg: Type. V. Demakova, 1890 - p. 315 - 316.

General maritime list: At 13 h. Part 3. The reign of Catherine II. A - K - St. Petersburg: Type. V. Demakova, 1890 - p. 316 - 317; Encyclopedic Dictionary in 86 volumes. T. 6a / ed. K. K. Arseniev and prof. F. F. Petrushevsky - St. Petersburg: type-lithography of I. A. Efron, 1892 - p. 939.

Materials for the history of the Russian fleet. Part 15. - St. Petersburg: Type. Naval Ministry, 1894 - p. 58.

Ak. Tarle E. V. Admiral Ushakov on the Mediterranean Sea (1798-1800). / ac. Tarle E.V. Works in twelve volumes. T. 10. - M .: Publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1959 - p. 101.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 51; History of the Russian army and navy. T. 8. Collection. - M., 1912 - p. 89-92.

History of the Russian army and navy. T. 8. Collection. - M., 1912 - p. 92.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 51-55.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 55.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 56.

History of the Russian army and navy. T. 8. Collection. - M., 1912 - p. 92-98.

Skalovsky R.K. Life of Admiral Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov. - St. Petersburg: Russian Symphony, 2006 - p. 67-70.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 57.

Dotsenko V.D. History of naval art: In 4 vols. T. 4. Actions of the fleet against the fleet - St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 2006 - p. 212.

Skalovsky R.K. Life of Admiral Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov. - St. Petersburg: Russian Symphony, 2006 - p. 70.

History of the Russian army and navy. T. 8. Collection. - M., 1912 - p. 99.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 64.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 64 - 65.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 65.

Dotsenko V.D. History of naval art: In 4 vols. T. 4. Actions of the fleet against the fleet - St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 2006 - p. 213 (scheme).

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 61 - 63; History of the Russian army and navy. T. 8. Collection. - M., 1912 - p. 101.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 58.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 58 - 60.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 58-61.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 60.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 61.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 66-69

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 66, 72.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 66.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 67, 71-72.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 72.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 74-78.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 5-6, 87.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 79.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 83.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 80, 84.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 87.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 88.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 87-89.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 83-84.

Russian biographical dictionary: in 25 volumes. T. 14. / Ed. under the supervision of the chairman of the Imperial Russian Historical Society A. A. Polovtsev. - St. Petersburg: Type. I. N. Skorokhodova, 1905 - p. 538.

Russian biographical dictionary: in 25 volumes. T. 14. / Ed. under the supervision of the chairman of the Imperial Russian Historical Society A. A. Polovtsev. - St. Petersburg: Type. I. N. Skorokhodova, 1905 - p. 535–538.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 83 - 84, 86 - 89, 97 - 98.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 81 - 83, 84 - 86, 89 - 90, 95 - 97, 102 - 103, 105 - 110; History of the Russian army and navy. T. 8. Collection. - M., 1912 - p. 103-105.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 110.

Admiral Ushakov: In 3 vols. T. 1. / Ed. cand. military-marine sciences cap. 1st rank R.N. Mordvinova. - M .: Naval publishing house of the Naval Ministry of the USSR, 1951 - p. 111 - 112; ak. Tarle E. V. Admiral Ushakov on the Mediterranean Sea (1798-1800). / ac. Tarle E.V. Works in twelve volumes. T. 10. - M .: Publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1959 - p. 101.

The settlement located on Zmeinoy has the official status of a settlement (Beloye settlement). In the village there are: post office, museum, bank branch. In 2007, the construction of an Orthodox church on the island was discussed.

The status of Serpentine was important when considering the territorial dispute between Ukraine and Romania on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, rich in oil and gas reserves, at the UN International Court of Justice. On February 3, 2009, a decision was made according to which Serpentine was recognized as an island, and not a rock, which Romania tried to prove.

Geography

Snake Island is located about 35 kilometers east of the mainland coast at the latitude of the Danube Delta. It has a cruciform shape, the area is 20.5 hectares; the distance between the extreme points is 615 and 560 meters. The nearest settlement on the coast is the Romanian city of Sulina. The nearest settlement in Ukraine is the city of Vilkovo.

Relief and geological structure

Formed by strong rocks and has rocky steep banks, the height of the coast reaches 4-5 m in the north-eastern part and 25 m in the south-western. The maximum height is 41.3 m above sea level. The shores are mostly steep, but there are also 4 beaches: “Ladies”, “Dergach”, “Golden” and “Banditsky”. The island is the only tectonic uplift on the large (64,000 km²) northwestern shelf of the Black Sea, which is far from the coast. Consists of sedimentary rocks alternating with quartzite sandstones, quartz conglomerates and variegated deposits. The island has crevices and grottoes that go deep into the mainland rock. These are natural underground cavities that appeared as a result of exogenous geological processes.

Climate

The climate on the island is temperate, steppe, with frequent winds, weather changes and high humidity. The average temperature in winter ranges from 0 to 2°C, in summer - from 19 to 24°C. The absolute maximum temperature is +40°C, the absolute minimum is -30°C. The average annual precipitation is about 300 mm.

Flora

Steppe grasses grow on a relatively small layer of soil on the island. There is no tree vegetation on the island, although attempts are being made to plant trees.

Fauna

Protection of Nature

Decree of the President of Ukraine dated December 9, 1998 No. 1341/98 “On Territories and Objects of the Natural Reserve Fund of National Significance” created a general zoological reserve of national importance “Snake Island”, which includes an ecologically valuable part of the island with the adjacent water area of ​​the Black Sea. The total area of ​​the reserve is 232 hectares.

Story

She is not an example for us.
After all, Achilles succeeded in Ferah,
As surely as you know
With her to live outside our gray framework,
Out of time, in spite of fate!

Translation: Boris Pasternak

At the beginning of 2007, a residential complex located on the island received the official status of a village (Beloye settlement, Ukrainian Bile) as part of the Kiliysky district. This step provoked a protest from the Romanian side.

Shelf delimitation between Ukraine and Romania

Out of a total shelf area of ​​12,000 square kilometers, Romania received 9,700 square kilometers (79.34% of the territory).

Gallery

Notes

1. Snake // Dictionary of geographical names of the Ukrainian SSR: Volume I / Compiled by: M. K. Koroleva, G. P. Bondaruk, S. A. Tyurin. Editors: G. G. Kuzmina, A. S. Strizhak, D. A. Shelyagin. - M.: Publishing house "Nauka", 1976. - S. 242. - 1000 copies.