Depths of underwater tragedies. The ancestor of the formation of multi-purpose nuclear submarines Number and name of the boat

On May 26, 1958, in the United States, at the Electric Boat shipyard (General Dynamics) in Groton (Connecticut), the world's first specialized anti-submarine nuclear submarine SSN-597 “Tullibi” was laid down, optimized to combat Soviet missile submarines. On November 9, 1960, she entered service with the US Navy. In 1962-1967 The American fleet was replenished with 14 significantly more advanced and powerful “underwater hunters” of the Thresher type. These single-hull, single-shaft submarines with a displacement of 3,750/4,470 tons developed a full underwater speed of about 30 knots and could dive to a depth of up to 250 m. The distinctive features of the “killers” (as the anti-submarine nuclear submarines were nicknamed by American sailors) were relatively low noise, heavy-duty sonar equipment and relatively moderate ( However, the torpedo armament, consisting of four 533-mm torpedo tubes, located in the middle part of the hull at an angle to the centerline of the ship, is quite sufficient for solving anti-submarine missions.

If the first generation of domestic nuclear-powered torpedo ships (projects 627, 627A and 645) were created to combat enemy surface ships, then in the second half of the 50s it became obvious that the Soviet Union also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias” capable of combating missiles. Submarines of the “potential enemy” in positions where they are likely to use weapons, ensure the deployment of their own SSBNs (countering underwater and surface forces operating on anti-submarine lines), and also protect ships and transports from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines of combating enemy surface ships (primarily aircraft carriers), operating on communications, carrying out mine laying, etc. were not removed.

Work on studying the appearance of 2nd generation nuclear-powered ships began in the USSR in the late 50s. On August 28, 1958, in accordance with a government decree, the design of a unified steam generating plant began for new nuclear submarines. Around the same time, a competition for designs for 2nd generation boats was announced, in which the country's leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - SKB-143, TsKB-18 and SKB-112 "Sudoproject" - took part. The Leningrad SKB-143 had the greatest technical potential, which, based on its earlier (1956-58) proactive developments carried out under the leadership of A.B. Petrov, prepared technical proposals for torpedo (project 671) and missile (project 639) boats.

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, a single-shaft layout, the use of three-phase alternating current, as well as an increased diameter of the pressure hull, which ensured the transverse placement of two new, more compact nuclear reactors, unified for 2nd generation nuclear submarines .

As a result of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a nuclear torpedo submarine of the 671st project (code “Ruff”) with a normal displacement of 2000 tons and a working diving depth of at least 300 m. A distinctive feature of the new ship was to be powerful hydroacoustics (in conditions competition, for the first time the size of the GAS was specifically stipulated).

If the first generation nuclear submarines used a direct current electrical system (which was logical for diesel-electric submarines, where batteries were the main source of energy when moving underwater), then on the second generation nuclear submarines it was decided to switch to three-phase alternating current.

The tactical and technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered submarine were approved on November 3, 1959; preliminary designs were completed in March 1960, and technical designs were completed in December of the same year.

The creation of the Project 671 nuclear submarine was carried out under the leadership of chief designer G.N. Chernyshev (previously he participated in the design of boats pr. 617, 627, 639 and 645). Based on the fact that the new submarine was intended, first of all, to destroy American SSBNs in their combat patrol areas (i.e. in “clear water”, and not under the ice of the Arctic), the customer, under increased pressure from the developer, considered it possible abandon the requirement to ensure surface unsinkability when filling any of the boat’s compartments with water.

As on the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships, it was decided to use a two-reactor power plant on the new boat, which fully satisfies the reliability requirements. A compact steam generating plant was created with high specific performance, almost twice as high as the corresponding parameters of previous power plants.

“As an exception” Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov agreed to use one propeller shaft in Project 671, which made it possible to reduce displacement and noise. By switching to a single-shaft design, it was possible to achieve significantly higher underwater speeds than those of foreign analogues.

The implementation of a single-shaft design made it possible to place the main turbo-gear unit and both autonomous turbogenerators with all associated equipment in one compartment. This ensured a reduction in the relative length of the boat's hull. T.n. The Admiralty coefficient, which characterizes the efficiency of using the power of a ship’s power plant, exceeded the similar indicator of the Project 627 nuclear submarine by approximately two times and was actually equal to the coefficient of the American Skipjack-class nuclear submarines. In the design of the durable hull, it was decided to use new AK-29 steel, which made it possible to increase the immersion depth.

Unlike the 1st generation nuclear submarines, it was decided to equip the new ship with autonomous (rather than mounted on GTZ) turbogenerators, which increased the reliability of the electrical power system.

According to the initial design studies, it was planned to move the torpedo tubes to the center of the ship, as on the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, placing them at an angle to the centerline plane of the nuclear submarine. However, it later became clear that with such an arrangement, the speed of the submarine at the time of torpedo firing should not have exceeded 11 knots (which turned out to be unacceptable for tactical reasons: unlike the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, the Soviet submarine was intended to combat not only submarines , but also large enemy surface ships). In addition, with the “American” layout, torpedo loading operations were seriously complicated, and it became completely impossible to replenish ammunition at sea. As a result, it was decided to install the torpedo tubes on the Project 671 nuclear submarine in the bow of the ship, above the sonar antenna.

In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing the construction of a series of new nuclear-powered torpedo ships. Act on the acceptance into the USSR Navy of the lead boat of the 671st project - K-38 (serial number “600”) - Chairman of the Government Commission Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Shchedrin signed on November 5, 1967. Subsequently, another 14 nuclear submarines of this type were built in Leningrad. Three ships (K-314, K-454 and K-469) were completed according to the modified design. The difference was that, in addition to traditional torpedoes, they were equipped with the Vyuga missile-torpedo system, which was put into service on August 4, 1969. The missile-torpedo ensured the destruction of underwater, surface and coastal targets with a nuclear charge at ranges of ID-40 km. It was launched from standard 533-mm torpedo tubes from a depth of 50-60 m.

The double-hull submarine with a characteristic “limousine” fencing of retractable devices had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 steel, the thickness of the sheets of which reached 35 mm. Internal flat bulkheads were designed for a pressure of 10 kgf/cm2. The ship's hull was divided into seven waterproof compartments:

1st - torpedo, battery and residential;

2nd - central post, provision and auxiliary mechanisms;

3rd - reactor;

4th - turbine (it also houses autonomous turbine units);

5th - electrical and auxiliary mechanisms (it also contained a sanitary unit);

6th - residential and diesel generator;

7th - helmsman (the rowing electric motors and galley are also located here).

The structure of the light hull, the bow of the superstructure, and the vertical and horizontal tail were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, as well as the middle and aft parts of the superstructure, were made of aluminum alloy, and the large radome of the hydroacoustic complex antenna and rudders were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 boat (as well as its further modifications) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull.

The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on all previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design.

The ship received an air conditioning and air purification system, fluorescent lighting, as well as a more convenient (compared to 1st generation nuclear-powered ships) layout of cabins and cockpits, and modern sanitary equipment.

The main power plant of the nuclear submarine of the 671st project (which had a rated power of 31,000 hp) included two OK-300 overproduction units (a VM-4 water-water reactor with a thermal power of 72 MW and four PG-4T steam generators), autonomous for each side. The reactor core was to be recharged on a cycle of eight years.

Compared to the 1st generation reactors, the layout of the second generation nuclear power plants was significantly changed. The reactor has become more compact and “dense”. The “pipe in pipe” scheme was implemented, and the primary circuit pumps were “hung” on the steam generators. The number of large diameter pipelines connecting the main elements of the installation (1st circuit filter, volume compensators, etc.) has been reduced. Almost all primary circuit pipelines (small and large diameter) were placed in uninhabited premises and covered with biological protection. The systems of instrumentation and automation of nuclear power plants have changed significantly. The share of remotely controlled valves (valves, gate valves, dampers, etc.) has increased.

The steam turbine installation consisted of a main turbo-gear unit GTZA-615 and two autonomous OK-2 turbogenerators (the latter provided the generation of alternating current 380 V, 50 Hz and included a turbine and generator with a power of 2000 kW).

As a backup means of propulsion, two PG-137 DC electric motors (2 x 275 hp) were used, each of which drove its own two-bladed small-diameter propeller. There were two batteries, as well as two diesel generators (200 kW, 400 V, 50 Hz). All main mechanisms and devices had automated and remote control.

When creating the Project 671 nuclear submarine, some (albeit insufficient) attention was paid to noise reduction issues. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating of the light hull was used, and the number of scuppers was reduced. As a result, the acoustic visibility of the boat compared to the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships decreased approximately five times.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation system. There was a television system for monitoring general and ice conditions MT-70, capable, under favorable conditions, of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 m.

However, the main information device of the ship was the MGK-300 “Rubin” hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute under the leadership of chief designer N.N. Sviridov and having a maximum target detection range of about 50-60 km. It included a low-frequency nasal hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency mine-detecting sonar antenna MG-509 “Radian” in the front part of the fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, an underwater sound communication station, hydroacoustic alarm and a number of other elements. “Rubin” provided all-round visibility, independent automatic tracking and determination of target heading angles, ranging by echolocation, as well as detection of active enemy sonar systems.

After 1976, during modernization, on most boats of the 671st project, the Rubin SJSC was replaced with a more advanced Rubicon complex with an infrasonic emitter, which has a maximum detection range of more than 200 km. On a number of ships, the MG-509 was also replaced by the more modern MG-519.

Retractable devices included a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an Albatross radar complex, VAN-M or Anis and Iva radio communication antennas, a Curtain direction finder, as well as an RCP device (compressor operation under water). There were sockets for a number of removable antennas installed to solve specific problems.

A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, providing course guidance and dead reckoning.

The ship's armament consisted of six 533-mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at depths of up to 250 m.

The torpedo complex occupied the upper third of the first compartment. The torpedo tubes were located in two horizontal rows. In the center plane of the ship, above the first row of tubes, there was a torpedo-loading hatch. Everything was done remotely: torpedoes were pulled into the compartment, moved around it, loaded into devices and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives.

The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 control system.

The ammunition included 18 torpedoes and mines (SET-65, 53-65k, TEST-71, PMR-1, R-1). The loading option was chosen depending on the tasks being solved. Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Compared to the most modern American analogue - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 Sturgeon (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967), the Soviet submarine had a higher underwater speed (29 and 33.5 knots, respectively), and a slightly greater diving depth and commensurate ammunition. At the same time, the American nuclear submarine had less noise and more advanced hydroacoustic equipment, which provided it with better search capabilities. There was an opinion among Soviet submariners that “if an American boat has a detection range of 100 km, then ours has only 10 km.” This was probably an exaggeration, but the problems of secrecy and increasing the detection range of the enemy on Project 671 boats were never fully resolved.

The lead ship of the 671st project - K-38 - became part of the Northern Fleet. Its first commander was captain 2nd rank E.D. Chernov. During testing, the new nuclear-powered submarine developed a short-term maximum underwater speed of more than 34.5 knots, becoming (at this point in time) the fastest submarine in the world. Until 1974, the Northern Fleet was replenished with 11 more nuclear submarines of the same type, which were initially based in Zapadnaya Litsa Bay. In the period from 1981 to 1983 they were relocated to Gremikha. In the West, these ships received the code name Victor (in further- Victor1)

Elegant, very photogenic “Victors” had a bright, eventful biography. They could be found in virtually all seas and oceans where the Soviet fleet carried out combat service. At the same time, the nuclear submarines demonstrated fairly high search and combat capabilities. In particular, the “autonomy” in the Mediterranean Sea lasted almost 90 days instead of the required 60. There is a known case when the navigator of K-367 wrote in the log: “they determined the place of the ship by the release of the anchor on the aircraft carrier “Nee-Mitz” (which moored in the port of Naples). At the same time, the nuclear submarine did not enter Italian territorial waters, but was tracking the American ship.

In 1979, during another deterioration in Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships. The voyage took place in extremely difficult conditions (the water temperature at the surface reached 40°). According to the memoirs of campaign participant A.N. Shportko (commander K-481), in the power compartments of the boats the air heated up to 60-70°, and in living quarters - up to 40-50°. The air conditioners worked at full capacity, but the equipment (designed for use primarily in northern latitudes) could not cope: the refrigeration machines began to work normally only at a depth of 60 m, where the temperature of the sea water dropped to 10-15°.

The boats had two replaceable crews, located on the Berezina floating base, located in the Gulf of Aden or off the island of Socotra. The campaign lasted six months and was, on the whole, very successful. According to A.N. Shporko, Soviet nuclear submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very secretly: even if the US Navy detected them for a short time, they could not correctly classify them, much less organize prosecution. Subsequently, these conclusions were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking of American ships was carried out at the range of use of missile and missile-torpedo weapons: if the corresponding order had been received, they would have been sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%.

In September-October 1971, K-38 and K-323 made an autonomous under-ice expedition to the Arctic. In January 1974, a unique 107-day transition of two nuclear-powered ships of the 670th and 671st projects began under the command of captains 2nd rank V.D. Khaitarov and V.P. Gontarev from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet. The route passed along the Atlantic (to the Cape of Good Hope), the Indian and Pacific oceans. After passing the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, the boats moved in a tactical group (one ship was at a depth of 100 m, and the other - 150 m). In fact, this was the first experience of a nuclear submarine following such a long period as part of a tactical group.

On March 10-25, the boats called at the port of Berbera (Somalia), where their crews received a short rest. On March 29, while on combat duty, they had brief contact with American surface anti-submarine ships and broke away from them, going to greater depths. On April 13, after completing combat service in specified areas of the Indian Ocean, the boats on the surface, led by the support vessel Bashkiria, headed for the Strait of Malacca.

During the transition, the temperature of the sea water reached 28°. The air conditioning systems were unable to maintain the required microclimate: the relative humidity in the boat compartments was 90%, and the air temperature rose to 70°. The detachment of Soviet ships was monitored almost continuously by American base patrol aircraft Lockheed P-3 Orion based on Diego Garcia Atoll.

In the Strait of Malacca, where the ships entered on April 17, American “guardianship” became even tighter: numerous anti-submarine helicopters joined the Orions. On April 20, one of the Rubin GAS units caught fire on board the Project 671 nuclear submarine due to high humidity. However, through the efforts of the crew, the fire was quickly extinguished. On April 25, the ships passed through the strait zone and, breaking away from observation, went into the depths. May 6 nuclear submarine V.P. Gontareva entered Avacha Bay. On May 7, a second nuclear-powered icebreaker joined her.

In January 1976, the strategic missile submarine cruiser K-171, as well as the nuclear submarine K-469, which performed security functions, made another transition from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. The ships sailed across the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of only 18 cables from each other. We passed the Drake Passage at different depths, constantly maintaining contact via the ZPS. After crossing the equator, the boats separated and proceeded to Kamchatka (where they arrived in March), each along its own route. Over the course of 80 days, 21,754 miles were covered, and during the entire journey, K-469 surfaced to periscope depth only once (in the Antarctic region).

K-147, equipped with the latest, unparalleled system for tracking enemy nuclear submarines along the wake, May 29 - July 1, 1985, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank V.V. Nikitina took part in the exercises of the Northern Fleet submarine forces “Aport”, during which she performed six-day continuous tracking of the American SSBN “Simon Bolivar” (La Fayette type), using acoustic and non-acoustic means.

A very dramatic incident occurred with K-314 (commander Captain 1st Rank A.M. Evseenko) in March 1984. Carrying out, together with the Vladivostok BOD, tracking an American strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven escort ships, maneuvering in Japan sea, a Soviet boat on March 21, while surfacing to clarify the surface situation, pierced the bottom of an American aircraft carrier with its stern for almost 40 m. As a result, the US Navy maneuvers were curtailed and the Kitty Hawk, losing fuel oil through the hole, “crawled” into the Japanese dock , and the Soviet nuclear-powered ship, which had lost its propeller, proceeded in tow to Chazhma Bay, where it also began repairs.

This event caused a sharply negative resonance in the American press. Journalists specializing in naval topics noted the weakness of the AUG security, which allowed the boats of the “potential enemy” to surface directly under the keel of the aircraft carriers.

Time takes its toll. On March 14, 1989, the first boat of the 671st project, K-314, which was part of the Pacific Fleet, was decommissioned. In 1993-1996. The rest of the nuclear submarines of this type also left the fleet. However, the disposal of the honored ships was delayed. Currently, most of them are in the dumps, waiting for years for their fate.

The bodies of the four submariners were discovered after several hours of work by two shifts of Russian divers who penetrated the Kursk. It is possible that during the fire the submariners were able to move to the seventh compartment, where, according to Admiral Motsak, there could have been the most crew members. From the report of the Russian diver it follows that there are no individual breathing apparatus in the usual places. Most likely the sailors tried to use them. Does this mean that there was someone alive on the nuclear-powered ship?

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Kuroedov, states that the Kursk died after colliding with “another” boat. But there have been clashes before...

At first, the country waited with bated breath for an answer to the question: “Are they alive?” Then she angrily asked: “Why were they silent?” Now he peers in bewilderment at the muddy pictures from the bottom of the Barents Sea: “Will the bodies be raised?”

Huge amounts of money have been spent on the implementation of this “project of the century”. Russia pays a lot of money in foreign currency to the Norwegians. Despite all the security measures, the naval command still risks the lives of divers. The Kursk tragedy showed the complete failure of the search and rescue forces of the Russian Navy. No, this is probably not the fault of the current commander in chief, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov. At a time when everyone rushed, in accordance with the governing and directive directives, to enrich themselves at any cost, the fleet's PSS was simply sold off. For next to nothing. For metal.

In naval stories, the shoulder straps “SF” (Northern Fleet) were always deciphered as “Modern Fleet”. It is so indeed. It was to the North that the best ships, the best special equipment, and rescue apparatus were sent. Fortunately, not everything was looted. But what remained was not enough to save the Kursk.

In the Pacific Fleet, everything is much more complicated. The rescue submarine "Lenok", capable of conducting unique deep-sea operations, was cut up at Dalzavod, the ocean rescue tug "Fotiy Krylov" - a universal vessel, indispensable in providing assistance to surface ships in distress, earns foreign currency in freight in the Mediterranean, the fate of the rescue tug is also vague “MB-408”.

Yes, the rescue ship “Alagez” still remains in the Pacific Fleet. Yes, there is still his crew, consisting of top-class specialists. But this is clearly not enough. God forbid, if an emergency happens in the fleet at sea, there will be no one to save those in distress.

As experts say, the good news is that for the most part and most of the time, Pacific Fleet warships are at the wall. That is why there are now almost no emergencies at sea.

And it’s vain to think that it will always be like this. As practice shows, accidents are inseparable companions of combat service. For example, over the past 35 years of operation, the Pacific Fleet has recorded more than 70 accidents and incidents with nuclear submarines and boats carrying nuclear weapons. Among other things, at least nine cases of fires, seven technical and three missile accidents, eight contacts with the ground, and 20 collisions were recorded. According to unofficial data, at least 107 people died as a result of the incidents, and approximately 1,390 were exposed to radiation.

“Echo” of Chernobyl

It is believed that the most unlucky boats were Project 675 boats (according to the NATO classification Echo-2). Submarines of this class belong to the first generation boats. They were built on the stocks of the Sevmashpredpriyatie production association in Severodvinsk and at the Amur plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur according to the design of the Rubin joint design bureau of marine equipment. The first boats of this project came to the Pacific Fleet in the early 60s. In total, the Pacific Fleet included 18 submarines of this class.

During operation, at least 13 accidents and incidents with boats of this project were recorded in the Pacific Fleet. The most famous accident - “seaside Chernobyl” - occurred in Chazhma Bay in 1985. August 10 on a submarine standing at the pier

“K-431” under the command of captain 2nd rank Lukyan Fedchik, due to violation of reloading rules, the reactor lid exploded. The accident killed 10 people and exposed at least 913 to radiation.

Much less is known about other disasters. For example, few people know that in 1979 a similar tragedy occurred on a nuclear submarine with the tactical number “K-116”. On July 1, in the Pacific Ocean, during combat duty on a boat under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Shestak, the reactor cover also exploded. According to “B”, as a result of the accident, nine people died and more than 100 received quite serious doses of radioactive radiation.

28 people died as a result of a collision between the Echo-2 nuclear submarine K-56 and the civilian ship Akademik Berg. This happened on June 14, 1973 in Peter the Great Bay. The boat received a hole in the second compartment and the batteries were damaged. Most of the victims died as a result of poisoning from the poisonous gas contained in the batteries.

Another terrible tragedy with a boat of this type occurred on September 29, 1985. On the nuclear submarine “K-175” under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Kondakov in the area of ​​Dahlak Island off the coast of Ethiopia, calcium chloride was pumped into the cooling system instead of ammonia. As a result of the incident, 137 people were injured.

Unlucky “Stingrays”

The submarines of Project 670 A “Scat” (according to the NATO classification Charlie-1) also turned out to be unlucky. Since 1968, there have been at least 12 accidents and incidents involving boats of this class in the Pacific Fleet.

Submarines of the Skat project were considered second generation boats. They were built at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky according to the design of the Lazurit design bureau. A total of 11 nuclear-powered cruisers of this project were built, all of which were based in the Pacific Fleet.

It is curious that the very first accident with Project 670 A nuclear submarines occurred in December 1970. On the submarine “K-329”, which was being built on the stocks of “Krasny Sormovo”, an uncontrolled startup of the reactor occurred. The accident was accompanied by a fire and the release of radiation. The number of casualties as a result of this incident is unknown, but it is reported that at least 100 people received significant doses of radiation.

The next incident with the Project 670A nuclear submarine was registered on October 18, 1976. Off the coast of Kamchatka, the submarine managed to get caught in the net of a Japanese trawler.

But the 80s turned out to be the most unlucky for boats of this class.

The worst tragedy in the history of “Scats” occurred in 1983. A boat with the tactical number “K-429” under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Suvorov perished in Saranaya Bay. Due to an error by the crew, the submarine, having taken approximately 400 tons of sea water into its interior, lay on the ground at a depth of 38 meters. 14 people died in the flooded third compartment. Two more people died during an emergency exit from the boat. “V” spoke in detail about this tragedy in the issue of October 13. By the way, the same boat sank a second time in Krasheninnikov Bay in 1985. Fortunately, in this case there were no casualties.

Two incidents involving Skat-class nuclear submarines occurred in 1985. On January 25, a technical accident occurred on a boat with the tactical number “K-121” during combat service at sea. Diesel fuel from auxiliary engines entered the high pressure air system through a leaking valve. And just a few days later, on February 4, a fire broke out in the Pacific Ocean on another boat, the K-25. Fortunately, both of these accidents resulted in no casualties.

By the way, the aforementioned submarine “K-121” distinguished itself twice in the sad list of incidents - on March 1, 1987, this submarine under the command of captain 2nd rank Myakishev suffered an accident in Avacha Bay in Kamchatka. The boat touched the ground, damaging the stern and vertical rudder.

When the guardian angel sleeps

Nevertheless, in the sad list of accidents and incidents, “K-121” is by no means the leader. The submarine “K-122” of Project 659 “Echo-1” can rightfully be considered the record holder for the number of emergency incidents. Boats, like people, can be happy and not so happy. Apparently, when this submarine was laid down, the guardian angel was fast asleep. Over the 13 years of its existence, the submarine experienced four emergency situations.

The series of incidents with the K-121 began with a series of accidents during the 1970 military campaign. On May 7, in the Sokar Strait, while pursuing an enemy submarine, a boat under the command of the captain

1st Rank Kopyeva collided with an underwater rock. And five days later, a fire and smoke appeared in the compartments on the same boat. Some of the crew suffered carbon monoxide poisoning, but the exact number of victims is still unknown. Three years later, a fire occurred on the same boat, which was submerged in the Sea of ​​Japan. Due to carelessness in the galley, a fire occurred in the 8th compartment of the submarine. Fortunately, there were no injuries in this accident.

The boat was withdrawn from service in the Pacific Fleet in 1980 after a terrible tragedy - on August 21, a fire occurred in the power plant compartments on the K-122, located 85 miles east of Okinawa. As a result of the incident on the submarine under the command of Captain 1st Rank Sizov, 14 people were killed. The boat lost speed and required towing. To help those in distress

Rescue ships of the Pacific Fleet set off “K-122”. The submarine could only be towed through Japanese territorial waters, but the authorities of that country prohibited passage without guarantees of nuclear safety. The USSR gave such guarantees. But, as it turned out later, the Japanese conditions were not met. After studies carried out along the route of the damaged nuclear submarine, radioactive contamination of water and air was revealed.

A not very happy fate was in store for the Project 667 A nuclear-powered icebreaker K-451 (Yankee-1). This boat appears on the list of accidents and incidents three times.

On September 2, 1978, the turbogenerators caught fire on the K-451 located in the Pacific Ocean. In September 1984, the same boat, while crossing the Diana Strait in an underwater position, hit the ground at a depth of 68 meters, and three years later in the Arctic at periscope depth it encountered ice. Fortunately, all incidents were without far-reaching consequences.

In total, seven incidents involving boats of this project were registered in the Pacific Fleet.

How to collide in the ocean

Nuclear submarines of the Pacific Fleet have repeatedly collided with foreign submarines. Thus, the Project 675 nuclear submarine “K-108” under the command of Captain 1st Rank Bagdasaryan became a participant in such an emergency. In the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, the K-108, while diving, collided with the American submarine Totog (tactical number SSN-639). Both boats were seriously damaged, but fortunately there were no casualties. The incident occurred on June 20, 1970. A year later, on May 1, 1974, a submarine under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Antonovsky collided head-on with the American nuclear submarine Pintado (tactical number SSN-672). As a result of the incident, the bow hydroacoustic station on the American submarine was damaged, the torpedo tubes jammed, and some of the bow mechanisms received moderate damage.

12 years later, another nuclear submarine, the K-10, collided at a depth of 54 meters with a Chinese Han-class submarine. It happened in the Philippine Sea. After the collision, both boats surfaced. The damage was minor. After identification, “K-10” continued to carry out combat missions.

Khvatov's mistake

According to experts, 55 percent of all accidents occur due to the fault of personnel. The incident that happened in August 1968 with the K-108 submarine is further confirmation of this. Then the Echo-2 nuclear submarine hit the base of the Japanese island of Okinawa. The accident occurred due to a navigator's error - when determining the coordinates, the navigator and commander were mistaken by no less than 60 miles. Either the navigator’s lag was reset, or someone was careless with the map, but, be that as it may, the fact remains a fact.

Something else is curious about this situation. Perhaps, after this curious accident, no one, even in their worst dreams, could have imagined that years later the boat commander who made such a gross mistake would become the commander of the Pacific Fleet. Probably, if anyone had guessed who this was in 1968, the poor fellow would have been laughed at. But the ways of God are inscrutable - captain 2nd rank Gennady Khvatov, who rammed Okinawa, received his admiral’s star more than twenty years after the incident, and was then appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Alexander Konev also received admiral's stars. On September 10, 1983, his nuclear submarine K-45 collided with the fishing trawler Novokachalinsk. Alexander Vasilyevich Konev is now vice admiral and first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet.

“The calf butted with the oak tree”

Curiously, sometimes accidents on nuclear submarines can change geography. In the Philippine Sea there is the so-called Casper Bank. It got its name from Captain 1st Rank Kasper, commander of the nuclear submarine

“K-469”. On July 16, 1976, at 2:23 a.m., his boat collided with a coral reef at a depth of 263 meters. The collision, as it turned out later, was due to an error by the hydroacoustic, who mistook his own noise reflected from the reef for the noise of a foreign submarine. All those responsible were severely punished, and the Philippine Sea was enriched with a new geographical name.

And the next story received a sonorous name from the submariners: “The calf butted with an oak tree.” On March 21, 1984, the Project 671 (Victor-1) nuclear submarine K-314 collided with the American aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63). The submarine under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Evseenko, monitoring the enemy carrier strike group, was ahead of the Kitty Hawk. At 23:00 Khabarovsk time, the boat changed course, and three minutes later, an aircraft carrier with a displacement of 81 thousand tons hit the K-314 in the aft part of the starboard side. As a result of the glancing blow, the wheelhouse and light hull of the Soviet boat received minor damage, the right horizontal stabilizer was crushed, the right propeller shaft of the K-314 jammed and the propeller shaft mortar with the propeller was broken. “Kitty Hawk” received a small underwater hole in the area of ​​the aircraft’s starboard gas tank. Apparently, God protected our submariners. Usually, damage to the rudder group means certain death for the boat. Fortunately, in March 1984 there were no casualties. The boat was saved. And at Kitty Hawk, Russian submariners were remembered with dashing words for a long time. Although, to tell the truth, in this case the Americans would have to blame their acoustician, who failed to detect the enemy submarine.

Rich Americans cry too

It is wrong to think that high accident rates are a distinctive feature of the Russian and Soviet fleets exclusively. Americans face the same problems.

On May 30, 1958, the American submarine USS Stickleback (SS-415), towed after a collision with a destroyer, sank near the Hawaiian Islands. The entire crew was removed from the boat before it sank.

The largest disasters in the history of the American submarine fleet remain the sinking of the Thresher and Scorpion nuclear submarines. USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the first nuclear submarine of the new Permit class, equipped with an experimental nuclear power plant. The maximum diving depth reached 400 m. On April 10, 1963, after a 9-month repair, USS Thresher went to sea accompanied by another nuclear submarine USS Skylark (ASR-20) for deep test diving. In addition to 16 officers and 96 sailors, there were 17 civilian research technicians on board. 15 minutes after reaching the specified depth, a telephone message was received from “Thresher” to “Skylark” about “difficulties” that had arisen. Then on the Skylark they heard a sound “like air rushing into the tanks,” after which there was silence. The rescue ship later discovered various debris and debris above the crash site, including pieces of internal lining. The cause of the disaster was probably a water leak from a pipeline in the engine room, which prevented the boat from floating to the surface. All 129 crew members were killed. The boat lies at a depth of 2600 m, its durable hull was destroyed and fell into several large parts.

On May 22, 1968, the Skipjack-class nuclear submarine USS Scorpion (SSN-589) sank at a depth of 3,600 m, 400 miles southwest of the Azores. According to the current version, the cause of the disaster was an explosion on board the submarine. There were nine officers and 85 sailors on board. They all died. The submarine carried two Astor torpedoes with nuclear warheads.

In another case, in April 1988, the diesel submarine USS Bonefish (SS-582), with a crew of 92, was disabled by a fire that broke out in the battery compartment 160 miles off the coast of Florida. The boat was on a training voyage. The submarine surfaced and

the crew received an order to leave, but three sailors died while fighting the fire. The remaining 89 people were safely evacuated. The submarine itself was towed to the port after the fire and was later withdrawn from the fleet due to too much damage.

There are also more recent examples. On February 11, 1992, the Russian submarine “K-239” of Project 945 “Karp” (Sierra) in the Barents Sea, in Russian territorial waters, collided with the American attack nuclear submarine “Baton Rouge”. On the strongest titanium hull of the Russian boat there are still parts marked “Made in the USA”. If the blow had fallen slightly to the side, the Baton Rouge would have inevitably sunk. She returned with serious injuries anyway. The Russian submarine did not have them.

On February 11, 1998, a multipurpose nuclear submarine rammed a fishing vessel while surfacing. The incident occurred seven miles off the coast of South Korea. The civilian ship sank as a result of the collision; fortunately, its crew was rescued. That same year, on March 19, the Kentucky Ohio-class nuclear-powered missile submarine collided with the Los Angeles-class attack submarine San Juan off the coast of the United States.

There are no heroic deaths of simulator crews

Scuba diving is a special branch of naval service. It has no analogues. This is a specific world. And if a land soldier can be trained not in battle, but, as they say, on the fingers and, in general, without compromising the quality of military education, then with submariners everything is much more complicated.

Ships must go to sea. Several times a year. Everyone remembers the tragedy of the Komsomolets submarine, which was lost in 1989. Then the cause of the disaster was the crew’s ignorance of their own equipment. The material part must be used live. At least to make sure that at sea it works the same way as on land, on simulators. No simulator, no textbook can replace this.

On May 26, 1958 in the United States, at the Electric Boat shipyard (General Dynamics) in Groton (Connecticut), the world's first specialized anti-submarine nuclear submarine SSN-597 "Tullibi", optimized to combat Soviet missile submarines.

On November 9, 1960, she entered service with the US Navy. In 1962-1967 The American fleet was replenished with 14 significantly more advanced and powerful “underwater hunters” of the Thresher type. These single-hull, single-shaft submarines with a displacement of 3,750/4,470 tons developed a full underwater speed of about 30 knots and could dive to a depth of up to 250 m. The distinctive features of the “killers” (as the anti-submarine nuclear submarines were nicknamed by American sailors) were relatively low noise, heavy-duty sonar equipment and relatively moderate ( However, the torpedo armament, consisting of four 533-mm torpedo tubes, located in the middle part of the hull at an angle to the longitudinal axis, is quite sufficient for solving anti-submarine tasks.

If domestic first-generation nuclear-powered torpedo ships (projects 627, 627A and 645) were created to combat enemy surface ships, then in the second half of the 50s. it became obvious that the Soviet Union also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias”, capable of combating missile submarines of the “potential enemy” in positions where they are likely to use weapons, ensuring the deployment of their own SSBNs (countering underwater and surface forces operating on anti-submarine lines), and also protect ships and transports from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines of combating enemy surface ships (primarily aircraft carriers), operating on communications, carrying out mine laying, etc. were not removed.

Work on studying the appearance of second-generation nuclear-powered ships began in the USSR in the late 50s. On August 28, 1958, in accordance with a government decree, the design of a unified steam generating plant began for new nuclear submarines. Around the same time, a competition for designs for 2nd generation boats was announced, in which the country's leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - SKB-143, TsKB-18 and SKB-112 "Sudoproekt" - took part. The Leningrad SKB-143 had the greatest technical potential, which, based on its earlier (1956-1958) initiative work carried out under the leadership of A. B. Petrov, prepared technical proposals for torpedo (project 671) and missile (project 639) boats .

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, a single-shaft layout, the use of alternating three-phase current, as well as an increased diameter of the pressure vessel, which ensured the transverse placement of two new, more compact nuclear reactors unified for second-generation nuclear submarines.

As a result of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a nuclear torpedo submarine of the 671st project (code "Ruff") with a normal displacement of 2000 tons and an operating depth of at least 300 m. A distinctive feature of the new ship was to be powerful hydroacoustics (in conditions competition, for the first time the size of the GAS was specifically stipulated).

If the first generation nuclear submarines used a direct current electrical system (which was logical for diesel-electric submarines, where batteries were the main source of energy when moving underwater), then on the second generation nuclear submarines it was decided to switch to three-phase alternating current.

The tactical and technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered submarine were approved on November 3, 1959; preliminary designs were completed in March 1960, and technical designs were completed in December of the same year. The creation of the Project 671 nuclear submarine was carried out under the leadership of chief designer G.N. Chernyshev (he had previously participated in the design of boats of Projects 617, 627, 639 and 645). Based on the fact that the new submarine was intended primarily to destroy American SSBNs in their combat patrol areas (i.e., in “clear water” and not under the ice of the Arctic), the customer, under increased pressure from the developer, considered it possible to refuse requirements to ensure surface unsinkability when filling any of the boat’s compartments with water.

As on the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships, it was decided to use a two-reactor power plant on the new boat, which fully satisfies the reliability requirements. A compact steam generating plant was created with high specific performance, almost twice as high as the corresponding parameters of previous power plants.

“As an exception,” the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov agreed to use one propeller shaft in Project 671, which made it possible to reduce displacement and noise. By switching to a single-shaft design, an improvement in the ship's propulsion qualities by approximately 30% was achieved, and also (using more powerful domestic energy) ensured that underwater speeds were significantly higher than those of foreign analogues.

The implementation of a single-shaft design made it possible to place the main turbo-gear unit and both autonomous turbogenerators with all associated equipment in one compartment. This ensured a reduction in the relative length of the boat's hull. As a result, with a larger displacement, the wetted surfaces of the nuclear-powered submarines of projects 627 and 671 turned out to be approximately equal. The Admiralty coefficient, which characterizes the efficiency of using the power of a ship's power plant, exceeded the similar indicator of the Project 627 nuclear submarine by approximately two times and was actually equal to the coefficient of the American Skipjack-class nuclear submarines.

In the design of the durable hull, it was decided to use new AK-29 steel, which made it possible to increase the immersion depth.

Unlike the first generation nuclear submarines, it was decided to equip the new ship with autonomous (rather than mounted on GTZ) turbogenerators, which increased the reliability of the electrical power system.

When creating the Project 671 boat, great importance was attached to the development of underwater detection and target designation means, and the development of navigation equipment and weapons.

According to the initial design studies, it was planned to move the torpedo tubes to the center of the ship, as on the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, placing them at an angle near the centerline of the submarine. However, it later became clear that with such an arrangement, the speed of the submarine at the time of torpedo firing should not have exceeded 11 knots (which turned out to be unacceptable for tactical reasons: unlike the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, the Soviet submarine was intended to combat not only submarines , but also large enemy surface ships). In addition, with the “American” layout, torpedo loading operations were seriously complicated, and it became completely impossible to replenish ammunition at sea. As a result, it was decided to install the torpedo tubes on the Project 671 nuclear submarine in the bow of the ship, above the sonar antenna.

In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing the construction of a series of new nuclear-powered torpedo ships. The act of acceptance into the USSR Navy of the lead boat of the 671st project - K-30 (serial number "600") - was signed by the chairman of the government commission, Hero of the Soviet Union G. I. Shchedrin on November 5, 1967. Subsequently, 14 more were built in Leningrad Nuclear submarines of this type.

Three ships (K-314, K-454 and K-469), intended for the Pacific Fleet, were completed according to the modified project 671B. The difference was that, in addition to traditional torpedoes, they were equipped with the Vyuga missile-torpedo system, which was put into service on August 4, 1969. The missile-torpedo ensured the destruction of underwater, surface and coastal targets with a nuclear charge at ranges of 10 - 40 km. It was launched from standard 533-mm torpedo tubes from a depth of 50 - 60 m.

The double-hull submarine with a characteristic “limousine” fencing of retractable devices had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 steel, the thickness of the sheets of which reached 35 mm. Internal flat bulkheads were designed for a pressure of 10 kgf/cm.

- 1st torpedo, battery and residential;
- 2nd central post, provision and auxiliary mechanisms;
- 3rd reactor;
- 4th turbine (it also houses autonomous turbine units);
- 5th electrical and auxiliary mechanisms (it also contained a sanitary unit);
- 6th residential and diesel generator;
- 7th helmsman (the rowing electric motors and galley are also located here).

The structure of the light hull, the bow of the superstructure, and the vertical and horizontal tail were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, as well as the middle and aft parts of the superstructure, were made of aluminum alloy, and the large radome of the hydroacoustic complex antenna and rudders were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 boat (as well as its further modifications) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull. The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on all previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design.

The ship received an air conditioning and air purification system, fluorescent lighting, as well as a more convenient (compared to 1st generation nuclear-powered ships) layout of cabins and cockpits, and modern sanitary equipment.

The main power plant of the APL-671 project (which had a rated power of 31,000 hp) included two OK-300 steam generating units (a VM-4 water-cooled reactor with a thermal power of 72 mW and four PG-4T steam generators), autonomous for each sides. The reactor core was to be recharged on a cycle of eight years.

Compared to the first generation reactors, the layout of the second generation nuclear power plants was significantly changed. Although it remained a loop, the spatial distribution and volumes of the primary circuit were significantly reduced (i.e., the reactor became more compact and “dense”). The “pipe in pipe” scheme was implemented, and the primary circuit pumps were “hung” onto the steam generators.

The number of large diameter pipelines connecting the main elements of the installation (1st circuit filter, volume compensators, etc.) has been reduced. Almost all primary circuit pipelines (small and large diameter) were placed in uninhabited premises and covered with biological protection. The systems of instrumentation and automation of nuclear power plants have changed significantly. The share of remotely controlled valves (valves, gate valves, dampers, etc.) has increased.

The steam turbine installation consisted of a main turbo-gear unit GTZA-615 and two autonomous OK-2 turbogenerators (the latter provided the generation of alternating current 380 V, 50 Hz and included a turbine and generator with a power of 2000 kW).

As a backup means of propulsion, two PG-137 DC electric motors (2 x 275 hp) were used, each of which drove its own two-bladed small-diameter propeller. There were two batteries (112 cells each with a capacity of 8000 A/h), as well as two diesel generators (200 kW, 400 V, 50 Hz). All main mechanisms and devices had automated and remote control.

When creating the Project 671 nuclear submarine, some (albeit insufficient) attention was paid to noise reduction issues. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating of the light hull was used, and the number of scuppers was reduced. As a result, the acoustic visibility of the boat compared to the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships decreased approximately five times.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation system. There was a television system for monitoring general and ice conditions MT-70, capable, under favorable conditions, of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 m.

However, the main information means of the ship was the MGK-300 Rubin hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute under the leadership of chief designer N. N. Sviridov and having a maximum target detection range of about 50 -60 km. It included a low-frequency nasal hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency mine-detecting sonar antenna MG-509 "Radian" in front of the fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, an underwater sound communication station, hydroacoustic alarm and a number of other elements. "Rubin" provided all-round visibility, independent automatic tracking and determination of target heading angles, ranging by echolocation, as well as detection of active enemy sonar systems.

After 1976, during modernization, on most boats of the 671st project of the Rubin State Joint Stock Company, a more advanced Rubicon complex with an infrasonic emitter was noticed, having a maximum detection range of more than 200 km. On a number of ships, the MG-509 was also replaced by the more modern MG-519.

Retractable devices included a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an Albatross radar complex, VAN-M or Anis and Iva radio communication antennas, a Zavesa direction finder, as well as an RDP device. There were sockets for a number of removable antennas installed to solve specific problems. A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, providing course guidance and dead reckoning.

The ship's armament consisted of six 533-mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at depths of up to 250 m.

The torpedo complex occupied the upper third of the first compartment. The torpedo tubes were located in two horizontal rows. In the center plane of the ship, above the first row of tubes, there was a horizontal torpedo-loading hatch. At the bow end in front of the hatch there was a horizontal tray covered with shields, into which a torpedo was lowered by crane and loaded into the submarine. This design made it possible to radically shorten and simplify the process of loading ammunition, without requiring special physical effort or complex and dangerous operations from the team. Everything was done remotely: torpedoes were pulled into the compartment, moved around it, loaded into devices and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives.

The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 control system.

The ammunition load included 18 torpedoes or up to 36 mines (12 of them in TA). Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Compared to the most modern American analogue - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 Sturgeon (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967), the Soviet submarine had a higher underwater speed (29 and 33.5 knots, respectively), and a slightly greater diving depth and commensurate ammunition.

At the same time, the American nuclear submarine had less noise and more advanced hydroacoustic equipment, which provided it with better search capabilities. There was an opinion among Soviet submariners that “if an American boat has a detection range of 100 km, then ours has only 10 km.” This was probably an exaggeration, but the problems of stealth and increasing the detection range of the enemy on Project 670 boats were never fully resolved.

The lead ship of the 671st project - K-38 - became part of the Northern Fleet. Its first commander was Captain 1st Rank E.D. Chernov. During testing, the new nuclear-powered submarine developed a short-term maximum underwater speed of more than 34.5 knots, becoming (at the moment) the fastest submarine in the world. Until 1974, the Northern Fleet was replenished with 11 more nuclear submarines of the same type, which were permanently based in Gremikha. In the West, these ships received the code name Victor (hereinafter referred to as Victor 1).

Elegant, highly photogenic "Victors" had a bright, eventful biography. They could be found in virtually all seas and oceans where the Soviet fleet carried out combat service. At the same time, the nuclear submarines demonstrated fairly high search and combat capabilities. In particular, the “autonomy” in the Mediterranean Sea continued for almost 90 days instead of the required 60. There is a known case when the navigator of the K-367 wrote in the log: “They determined the ship’s location by releasing the anchor on the aircraft carrier Nimitz (which moored in the port of Naples). At the same time, the nuclear submarine did not enter the territorial waters of Italy, but was tracking the American ship.

In 1979, during another aggravation of Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships. The voyage took place in extremely difficult conditions (the water temperature at the surface reached 40 degrees). According to the recollections of campaign participant A. N. Shportko (commander of K-481), in the power compartments of the boats the air heated up to 60 - 70 degrees, and in living quarters - up to 40 - 50 degrees. The air conditioners worked at full capacity, but the equipment (designed for use primarily in northern latitudes) could not cope: the refrigeration machines began to work normally only at a depth of 60 m, where the temperature of the sea water dropped to 10 -15 degrees.

The boats had two replaceable crews, located on the Berezina floating base, located in the Gulf of Aden or off the island of Socotra. The campaign lasted six months and was overall very successful. According to A. N. Shportko, Soviet nuclear submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very secretly: even if the US Navy detected them for a short time, they could not correctly classify them, much less organize prosecution. Subsequently, these conclusions were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking of American ships was carried out at the range of use of missile and missile-torpedo weapons: if the corresponding order had been received, they would have been sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%.

In September - October 1971, K-38 and K-323 made an autonomous under-ice expedition to the Arctic. In January 1974, a unique 107-day transition of two nuclear-powered ships of the 670th and 671st projects began under the command of captains 2nd rank V.D. Khaitarov and V.P. Gontarev from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet. The route passed along the Atlantic (to the Cape of Good Hope), the Indian and Pacific oceans.

After passing the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, the boats moved in a tactical group (one ship was at a depth of 100 m, and the other - 150 m). Periodically, they exchanged call signs via UZPS, being at a distance of stable sound-underwater communication from each other. In fact, this was the first experience of a nuclear submarine following such a long period as part of a tactical group.

On March 10 - 25, the boat called at the port of Berbera (Somalia), where their crews received a short rest. On March 29, while on combat duty, they had a short-term contract with American surface anti-submarine ships and broke away from them, going to greater depths. On April 13, after completing combat service in specified areas of the Indian Ocean, the boats on the surface, led by the support vessel Bashkiria, headed for the Strait of Malacca.

During the transition, the temperature of the sea water reached 28 degrees. The air conditioning systems were unable to maintain the required microclimate: the relative humidity in the boat compartments was 90%, and the air temperature rose to 70 degrees. The detachment of Soviet ships was monitored almost continuously by American base patrols by Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft based on Diego Garcia Atoll. In the Strait of Malacca, where the ships entered on April 17, American “guardianship” became even tighter: the Orions were joined by numerous anti-submarine helicopters. On April 20, one of the Rubin GAS units caught fire on board the Project 671 nuclear submarine due to high humidity. However, through the efforts of the crew, the fire was quickly extinguished. On April 25, the ships passed through the strait zone and, breaking away from observation, went into the depths. May 6 nuclear submarine V.P. Gontareva entered Avacha Bay. On May 7, a second nuclear-powered icebreaker joined her. In January 1976, the strategic missile submarine cruiser K-171, as well as the nuclear submarine K-469, which performed security functions, made another transition from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. The ships sailed across the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of only 18 cables from each other. We passed the Drake Passage at different depths, constantly maintaining communication via the UPS. After crossing the equator, the boats separated and proceeded to Kamchatka (where they arrived in March), each along its own route. Over the course of 80 days, 21,754 miles were covered, and during the entire journey, K-469 surfaced to periscope depth only once (in the Antarctic region).

K-147, equipped with the latest, unparalleled system for tracking enemy nuclear submarines along the wake, May 29 - July 1, 1985, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank V.V. Nikitin, took part in the exercises of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet "Aport", during which she performed six-day continuous tracking of the American SSBN Simon Bolivar (Lafayette class), using acoustic and non-acoustic means.

A very dramatic incident occurred with K-314 (commander - Captain 1st Rank A. M. Evseenko) in March 1984. Carrying out joint monitoring with the Vladivostok BOD, an American strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven escort ships, which was maneuvering in the Sea of ​​Japan, on March 21, a Soviet boat, while surfacing to clarify the surface situation, pierced the bottom of an American aircraft carrier with its stern for almost 40 m. As a result, the US Navy maneuvers were curtailed and the Kitty Hawk, losing fuel oil through the hole, “crawled” into Japanese dock, and the Soviet nuclear-powered ship, which had lost its propeller, proceeded in tow to Chazhma Bay, where it also began repairs.

This event caused a sharply negative resonance in the American press. Journalists specializing in naval topics noted the weakness of the AUG security, which allowed the boats of the “potential enemy” to surface directly under the keel of the aircraft carriers.

Time takes its toll. On March 14, 1989, the first boat of the 671st project, K-314, which was part of the Pacific Fleet, was decommissioned. In 1993-1996. The rest of the nuclear submarines of this type also left the fleet. However, the disposal of the honored ships was delayed. Currently, most of them are in the dumps, waiting for years for their fate.

The ancestor of the formation of multi-purpose nuclear submarines
Date of: 25/05/2011
Subject: Nuclear fleet

N.Ya.Shcherbina, retired captain 1st rank, candidate of technical sciences, associate professor; V.B.Lozinsky, retired captain 2nd rank, candidate of military sciences, VMII (branch of VUNTS)

The fleet has already died from various pieces of paper. No people, no ships, no heroic deeds - only papers fluttering over the masts... An unheard-of thing happened: the office was boarded against the fleet, and it defeated the fleet! (F. Simonov, 1736)

With the signing of the Government Decree on the creation of submarines with nuclear power plants on September 12, 1952, a new era of the Russian submarine fleet began.

On September 24, 1955, just three years after the decree was issued, the first K-3 nuclear submarine of Project 627 was laid down at the Severodvinsk Machine-Building Enterprise. And this was in the most difficult situation of the country’s restoration after the Great Patriotic War.
Two years later, the first Soviet nuclear submarine was launched, and on July 1, 1958, the Naval flag was raised on it. From that time on, the “golden period” of Soviet nuclear shipbuilding began.

In July 1961, the 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet was created in Zapadnaya Litsa, consisting of two divisions: the 3rd (multi-purpose nuclear submarines) and the 31st (missile nuclear submarines).

The 3rd Division had to endure difficult tests of new technology and the exploration of the World Ocean at all latitudes from the Arctic to the Antarctic. The division's submariners were the first to pass under the ice of the Arctic from North to East (nuclear submarine K-115, commander I.R. Dubyaga), the first to conquer the North Pole (nuclear submarine K-3 and K-181, commanders L.M. Zhiltsov and Yu.A. Sysoev), were the first to circumnavigate the world from the North through the Drake Passage to Kamchatka (nuclear submarine K-133, commander L.N. Stolyarov). The waters of the Indian and Pacific oceans were conquered by second-generation submarines (nuclear submarines K-314, K-469, commanders V.P. Gontarev and A.F. Urezchenko), and the nuclear submarine K-454 (commander V.Ya. Baranovsky) opened the trans-Arctic route for single-shaft nuclear submarines. This is only a small part of the long-distance voyages of nuclear submarines associated with geographical achievements.

The main work of the submariners of the 1st Flotilla and the 3rd Division of the Northern Fleet nuclear submarine was hundreds of combat duties at the base and combat services in almost all oceans of the globe. These services took shape during the years of underwater existence, thousands of thousands of miles traveled, intensive tracking of the ships of a potential enemy, and absorbed thousands of human destinies. Someone became a Hero of the Soviet Union, Socialist Labor, became an admiral. From its ranks, only the 3rd division nominated 5 fleet commanders: V.P. Maslova, V.N. Chernavina, A.P. Mikhailovsky, V.P. Ivanova. O.A. Erofeeva. The flotilla and division were a real source of naval personnel.

The first Red Banner nuclear submarine flotilla of the Northern Fleet. Ancestor

In the early 1950s. Simultaneously with the construction of nuclear-powered ships, work began to find a place to create a base for a nuclear submarine fleet. On April 30, 1957, a survey team led by chief engineer A.M. Aleksandrovich landed on the shore of Malaya Lopatkina Bay, and by the end of the year a master plan for the development of the base and the future submariners’ village was ready.

On August 9, 1957, the first domestic experimental nuclear submarine K-3 (Leninsky Komsomol) was launched from the slipway of workshop No. 42 of the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (SMP). July 1, 1958 at 10 a.m. 03 min. the submarine was powered by a nuclear power plant and went out to sea.

The scientific director of the project is Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, the chief designer of the first nuclear submarine is V.N. Peregudov. The first crew commander is captain 2nd rank L.G. Osipenko, who for the first time after the end of World War II in the Navy was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On November 5, 1958, at the site of the proposed deployment of the nuclear submarine, a coastal technical base was formed to service nuclear power plants under the leadership of Captain 2nd Rank V.P. Chizhikov.

In March 1959, the 150th division of experimental ships was transformed into the 206th separate nuclear submarine brigade under the command of Captain 1st Rank A.I. Sorokina with the deployment of the brigade in Zapadnaya Litsa Bay. In October 1959, the first detachment of nuclear submarines arrived at Malaya Lopatkina Bay, consisting of the lead nuclear submarine K-5 and serial K-8 and K-14 of Project 627 A.

The day before, in August 1959, the nuclear submarine K-3 made its first long voyage under the Arctic ice, marking the beginning of the exploration of the Arctic Ocean by nuclear submarines.
That same summer, at the main base of nuclear-powered ships, a Radiation Safety Service (RSS) was formed under the leadership of Major M.M. Furemsa. With the arrival of the nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles, Project 658, at the main base location, a missile and technical base is formed, headed by Captain 2nd Rank A.G. Dotsenko.

Table 1 Ship personnel of the 206th separate submarine brigade, July 1961.

The 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet was headed by Rear Admiral A.I. Petelin. Chief of Staff of the flotilla, Captain 1st Rank A.G. Kozin, member of the Military Council - captain 1st rank G.G. Antonov, deputy commander for the electromechanical unit, head of the electromechanical service of the flotilla - captain 1st rank M.M. Budaev.

First commander of the 1st flotilla of the nuclear submarine Northern Fleet Rear Admiral A.I. Petelin, Hero of the Soviet Union

For the successful implementation of the activities of the newly formed nuclear submarine association, a communications center (under the leadership of Captain 3rd Rank N.I. Popadyin) and a training center (led by Captain 2nd Rank V. Pogorelov) were created under the flotilla.

Formation of the first multi-purpose formation of the nuclear submarine SF

The 3rd Division of Nuclear Submarines included multi-purpose nuclear submarines Project 627 (K-3, commander L.M. Zhiltsov), Project 627A (K-5, K-8, K-14, K-52, commanders: V S. Salov, V. P. Shumakov, V. F. Pershin, who replaced B. K. Marin and V. P. Rykov, respectively), as well as the reserve crew of O. B. Komarova.

The voyage of these nuclear submarines by the time they were included in the division averaged thousands of hours (50-60 days), in miles traveled - about 6 thousand miles (K-5) and about 12 thousand miles (K-14). That is, from the point of view of mastering new complex military equipment, they had very little experience.

Table 2 nuclear submarines of the 1st generation, included in the 3rd division of the Northern Fleet nuclear submarine

For three years - from 1961 to 1964, the 3rd Division received another 8 submarines of Project 627A (K-21, K-11, K-133, K-181, K-115, K-159, K -42 and K-50, commanders: V.N. Chernavin, Yu.N. Kalashnikov, G.A. Slyusarev, Yu.A. Sysoev, I.R. Dubyaga, V.S. Sinev, I.I. Panov and G.G. Kostev, respectively).

Four submarines (K-115, K-14, K-133, K-42, commanders: I.R. Dubyaga, D.N. Golubev, L.N. Stolyarov, V.I. Zamorev) were transferred during 1963- 1968 to the Pacific Fleet.

First division command: commander captain 1st rank V.P. Maslov, Chief of Staff Captain 1st Rank N.F. Renzaev, flag mechanic captain 2nd rank V.A. Rudakov, deputy division commander captain 2nd rank V.P. Rykov, deputy for political affairs, captain 2nd rank Chernovolov.

The new division command was entrusted with the task of ensuring high-quality acceptance of first-generation nuclear submarines from industry and their introduction into the Navy's operational inventory as soon as possible. The outbreak of the Cold War required an adequate response to this historical challenge.

By the time the lead submarine of the second generation, Project 671 (K-38, commander E.D. Chernov) arrived at the 3rd DiPL in December 1967, the combat strength of the division was as follows: 10 submarines, Project 627 and 627A, 4 second crew , floating barracks, torpedoes. In total, they made up more than one and a half thousand strong team of professional sailors, trained to solve any problems in accordance with the mission of the division.

Since 1964, nuclear submarines of the 3rd DiPL have mastered the main type of combat activity - performing combat service tasks. In 1965, the intensity of combat services doubled, which contributed to an increase in the combat effectiveness of the division. The number of detections of foreign submarines by our submarines has increased 2.5 times compared to 1964. In the Norwegian Sea, in the North Atlantic, and in the Mediterranean Sea, submariners have repeatedly discovered, classified and monitored foreign nuclear submarines and aircraft carrier strike groups of a potential enemy.

Second stage of division formation

The second stage of the formation of the division occurred in 1967-1974. The division received 15 nuclear-powered ships of the second generation, project 671 (K-38 head, serial: K-69, K-147, K-53, K-306, K-323, K-370, K-438, K- 367, K-314, K-398, K-454, K-462, K-469 and K-481) and a number of second crews (289, 166, 173, 246, 91, 373 and 89).

At the end of 1967 and beginning of 1968, Captain 1st Rank A.P. took command of the division. Mikhailovsky, Hero of the Soviet Union. A graduate of the General Staff Academy, Captain 1st Rank F.S., was appointed chief of staff of the division. Volovik, who previously served as commander of a submarine brigade at the Pacific Fleet.

The main tasks of this stage were the development of new generation nuclear submarines, improvement of fire training, development of tactics for using new generation ships in combat training conditions and in the process of their intensive use in combat service.

The ships and crews of the first generation of nuclear submarines, as the second generation nuclear submarines entered its composition, were transferred to the 17th division stationed in Gremikha.

In Table 4. The first commanders of the nuclear submarines and warheads-5 of the second generation nuclear submarines that received ships from industry are listed.

Table 3 nuclear submarines of the 2nd generation, which were part of the 3rd division after 1967.

Along with the main crews, the division included second crews to fully replace the main crews when they accepted the submarine: 289th crew (A.M. Evdokimenko), 166th crew (V.V. Anokhin), 173rd crew (V. M. Khramtsov), 91st crew (D.I. Zaydullin), 343rd crew (Shalygin then A.N. Korzhev), 426th crew (E.A. Tomko, later Hero of the Soviet Union), 89 th crew

(A.I. Makarenko). The personnel of the second crews went out on combat duty on a par with the main crews and successfully solved them. The 289th and 166th crews were subsequently given the K-370 and K-323 nuclear submarines that had arrived as part of the division.

Of the 15 new generation nuclear powered ships, the 3rd DiPL prepared and delivered them in 1974-1976. to the Pacific Fleet 3 nuclear submarines (K-314, K-454 and K-469) and the 89th second crew.

For the country's nuclear missile fleet, which is growing at an unprecedented pace, the 3rd DiPL has trained thousands of submariners.

As a formation that has enormous experience in mastering new equipment and weapons, for the speedy entry into the operational composition of the Navy in the early 1980s, nuclear submarines of Project 671RT K-387, K-495 (commanders Yu.A. Pechenkin, A.V. Gorbunov). The modified nuclear submarines were less noisy, more reliable, equipped with new missile-torpedo, sonar and navigation systems, and had an automated control system - BIUS.

In 1971, the division briefly included the nuclear submarine Project 705 K-64 (commander A.S. Pushkin) with a nuclear power plant with liquid metal coolant. From 1961 to 1981, the 3rd DiPL was stationed in Western Litsa. For the next 20 years, until its disbandment, as part of the nuclear submarine pr. 671 in the 11th submarine flotilla of the Northern Fleet, it was stationed in Gremikha.

First generation nuclear submarine

The development of first-generation nuclear submarines took place in the process of accepting ships from industry, in the combat training ranges of the Northern Fleet when practicing course tasks, in competitive torpedo firing, during naval exercises, as well as during long-term navigation in different climatic zones of the World Ocean. This made it possible to improve the tactics of using single nuclear submarines, as well as their interaction as part of tactical groups, etc.

The nuclear submarine K-21 was one of the first to carry out ice reconnaissance under the Arctic cap. This was followed by voyages to the North Pole of nuclear submarines K-3, K-181, and the trans-Arctic voyage of the nuclear submarine K-115. The nuclear submarine K-14 was one of the first to test the waters of the Atlantic. The K-133 passed a severe test in equatorial waters, followed by other nuclear submarines of the division.

With the advent of nuclear submarines, regular large-scale exercises began in ocean and sea theaters. In 1960, the operational-strategic exercise of the Northern Fleet "Meteor" was held, in 1961 - the command post exercise "Polar Circle". Nuclear submarines of the then 206th separate brigade, which later became part of the 3rd DiPL, took part in it.

The Cuban missile crisis became a severe test for the nuclear submarine fleet in 1962. The condition of nuclear ships did not allow them to fully express themselves in these dramatic events for the world, and the entire brunt of the crisis fell on the diesel fleet submariners.

In the years following the crisis, the stress of combat training for nuclear submarines increased sharply. The intensity of combat services (CS) has increased manifold. The areas of BS coverage have expanded from the Arctic to equatorial latitudes. There were Soviet nuclear submarines almost constantly in the Mediterranean Sea and in other strategically important areas of the World Ocean. More than 120 ships, including 30 submarines, were constantly in combat service. Submariners studied the hydroacoustic characteristics of potential enemy ships and their tactics.

The exercises "North" (1968), "Ocean" (1970), "Ocean-2" (1975), to which the ships of the potential enemy showed increased attention, confirmed the high level of skill of our sailors.

Before the arrival of the second generation nuclear submarines to the division, the first generation submarines mastered trans-Arctic and transcontinental routes, tested equipment and weapons in harsh conditions under the ice of the Arctic, in equatorial latitudes. The strategy and tactics of using multi-purpose submarines were worked out, their advantages and disadvantages were identified. Not only ships, weapons, weapons, but also people were tested.

A number of significant shortcomings were revealed on the first generation nuclear submarines. First of all, the insufficient reliability of steam generators of steam-producing installations, which led to a number of serious accidents with radiation exposure of personnel on the nuclear submarines K-8, K-19, K-133, K-3 and a number of others.

The constructive means of ensuring survivability were not up to the mark. First of all, this concerns issues of explosion and fire safety. The fire on the nuclear submarine K-3 during combat service in September 1967, with the loss of 39 submariners, became a serious signal about the need to improve means of ensuring survivability on nuclear submarines.

This was also confirmed by the disaster of the K-8 nuclear submarine in the Bay of Biscay in April 1970, which claimed 52 lives. (K-8 was no longer part of the 3rd Division's combat personnel).

The mass graves of sailors in Zapadnaya Litsa and Gremikha are a reminder to submariners of all generations of the tragic moments associated with the development of submarines of the 3rd DiPL of the first generation.

Continuous combat service in important strategic directions and in areas patrolled by nuclear submarines of a potential enemy showed that, due to the increased noise, first-generation boats had insufficient stealth, a very important tactical property for submarines.

Hydroacoustic surveillance equipment also required significant improvement.

Thanks to the experience gained during the construction and operation of the first nuclear submarines, it became possible to create submarines with more advanced second-generation nuclear power plants. Hydroacoustic stations have replaced more advanced acoustic systems. It was possible to get rid of flammable liquid in the ship's extensive hydraulic systems. More effective fire extinguishing and personnel rescue equipment appeared on boats.

Even with a number of shortcomings, the first generation multi-purpose nuclear submarines succeeded. In the context of the Cold War confrontation, they made it possible to acquire very valuable experience in detecting and tracking nuclear submarines of a potential enemy, primarily missile carriers and aircraft carrier strike groups. Tactics of action were improved, proposals were developed on the fly to modernize equipment, weapons and weapons for more advanced new projects of multi-purpose nuclear submarines.

Commanders of first-generation nuclear-powered ships

Almost all the commanders of the first generation nuclear-powered submarines came from diesel submarines, having gone through a rigorous school of naval training on them. Many of them commanded submarines for a long time and were real professional submariners.

The commander of the first nuclear submarine, Leonid Gavrilovich Osipenko, went through the crucible of war, participating in submarine combat campaigns in the Black Sea Fleet, and for several years commanded diesel submarines under the leadership of Vice Admiral G. Shchedrin and G.M. Egorova.

Commanders of the following serial corps: V.S. Salov, V.P. Shumakov, B.K. Marin, V.P. Rykov, V.N. Chernavin, Yu.N. Kalashnikov, G.A. Slyusarev, Yu.A. Sysoev, I.R. Dubyaga, V.S. Sinev, I.I. Panov, G.G. Kostev, O.B. Komarov were already submariners of the post-war generations. Their share fell to the most important mission - the acceptance of the first nuclear-powered ships from industry and their introduction into the operational composition of the Navy.

The second generation of commanders of the first nuclear submarines (L.M. Zhiltsov, V. Zertsalov, D.N. Golubev, E.N. Grinchik, M.M. Chubich, A.I. Pavlov and many others) were also mainly from from diesel submarines appointed to the positions of first mates and assistant commanders of nuclear submarines. The experience of diesel fleet submariners brought to the nuclear fleet played an important role in the development of the country's nuclear submarine fleet.

For 40 years, the nuclear submarine K-3 "Leninsky Komsomol" was commanded by 11 commanders: L.G. Osipenko, L.M. Zhiltsov, G.S. Pervushin, Yu.F. Stepanov, A.Ya. Zhukov, A.N. .Bazko, A.A. Rastvorov, O.V. Burtsev, S.V. Murashov, L.V. Bondarenko, E.A. Fedotov. The first two of them became rear admirals and Heroes of the Soviet Union, A.Ya. Zhukov was chief of staff of the 3rd DiPL O.V. Burtsev became vice admiral, under his command in 2002 the history of the 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet ended.

It should also be noted such commanders of first-generation nuclear submarines as B.A. Ananiashvili, V.G. Morozova, V.D. Borisenko, V.A. Kashirsky, A.P. Androsova, N.V. Sokolova, V.S. Borisova. E.P. Duba, V.F. Zaitseva, V.B. Bessonova, A.S. Petukhova, Yu.I. Chernenko, E. Rostovtseva, Yu.I. Druzhinina, V.V. Smaragdov and many others.

Development of second generation boats

Multi-purpose nuclear submarines Project 671, which replaced the first generation boats Project 627 and 627A, differed in architecture, design, and weapons systems. It was a single-shaft nuclear submarine with a more highly maneuverable steam-producing plant, devoid of many of the disadvantages characteristic of the first-generation nuclear submarines. Project 671 boats were equipped with a more advanced navigation system, hydroacoustic system, and a rapid torpedo loading device. Many management processes have been carefully automated.

Project 671 nuclear submarine was a high-speed submarine that met all the requirements (at that time) for a multi-purpose nuclear submarine, with perhaps one exception. The noise level of the boat, despite a number of constructive, organizational and technical measures taken, was still not at the proper level.

The nuclear submarine K-38 - the lead boat of this project, built by the Admiralty Plant, like any complex example of new military equipment, was nursed for quite a long time. The delivery of the boat to the Navy was delayed by a year due to the re-testing of one of the steam generators of the main power plant during mooring tests at the plant and for a number of other reasons. During the process of commissioning the Navy on the nuclear submarine K-38, the circulation pumps of the primary circuit were disabled, the steam generator leaked, as well as a number of other failures and breakdowns of equipment and weapons. And, nevertheless, after eliminating the shortcomings, the lead and serial nuclear submarines of this project turned out to be a worthy replacement for first-generation nuclear submarines.

By that time, first-generation nuclear submarines had mastered almost all areas of the World Ocean. More than 10 submarine officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Even the astronauts at that time could not boast of such results. But the technical lag behind the potential enemy (the USA and NATO) did not allow the first generation submarines to fight at sea “on an equal footing”. The emergence of second-generation nuclear-powered ships was supposed to radically change the situation for the better.

For boats of the 671 project there was no time left for “swinging up”. Reception from industry, delivery of combat training course tasks, preparation for combat service, combat service. Most of these nuclear submarines have become cyclical boats. Their exploitation was very intense.

At the stage of development of the Project 671 nuclear submarine at sea (late 1960s - early 1970s), the most difficult task was solved - to prove the possibility of fighting on an equal footing with multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the NATO Navy. In 1969, the nuclear submarines K-69 and K-147 carried out combat service in the Atlantic Ocean. In 1971, the K-147 nuclear submarine, the first of the second-generation multi-purpose nuclear submarines, carried out long-term (more than 29 hours) tracking of a foreign nuclear submarine in the Mediterranean Sea.

When going to sea, including on combat duty, there were often incidents of a technical nature, as well as those related to the control of ship maneuvers and navigation problems. Thus, in 1969, the nuclear submarine K-69 (commander R.A. Ketov) in the Atlantic Ocean collided with a foreign submarine that was tracking it. In March 1970, the same boat with the crew of A.M. Evdokimenko on board, at the fleet combat training ground, collided with a foreign nuclear submarine. In 1974, the nuclear submarine K-306 (commander E.V. Guryev, senior on board E-B.V. Gashkevich) in the Atlantic Ocean, while taking a tracking position for a foreign nuclear submarine, collided with it. In 1980, the nuclear submarine K-398 with the 166th crew (commander V.N. Kiselev) collided with a foreign submarine during long-term tracking.

These were almost combat contacts. Detection and long-term tracking of foreign nuclear missile submarines was the main task of second-generation multi-purpose nuclear submarines. Tactical technique - tracking is extremely difficult to accomplish, because detection of a foreign submarine, taking a tracking position and carrying out direct tracking must be carried out covertly. Maintaining a tracking position in readiness to destroy the enemy is possible only by maneuvering your ship without using active means. The slightest mistake in the actions of the ship's combat crew and the submarine commander leads to a loss of control over the distance to the enemy boat, which can lead to a collision with it.

Despite a number of discovered deficiencies in technical means and weapons (failure of the central scientific and technological complex, leaks of steam generators, failure of the PPU fittings, cracks in the welded joints of the pressure hull, the state of insulation of radio antennas, insufficient capabilities of the main accelerator, increased noise, etc.), in general, the submarines of the second generations of Project 671 turned out to be quite reliable, which made it possible in many cases to avoid serious accidents similar to those that occurred on the first generation nuclear submarines with mass casualties of personnel and their radiation exposure.

The modified Project 671RT submarines, K-387 Gorky-built and K-495 Leningrad-built, accepted for a short time under the command of the 3rd Division, went through a good training in entering the line and performing combat service tasks. There were two incidents involving human factors on K-387 that resulted in loss of life.

Another 5 arrived nuclear submarines, Project 671RT, made it possible to form the 33rd division of multi-purpose nuclear submarines. The organization of service for them was largely laid down by the 3rd DiPL.

The lead nuclear submarine K-64, Project 705, built in Leningrad, became part of the division in December 1971. It had a titanium hull, a steam-producing plant with a liquid metal coolant, and an extremely high degree of control automation for that time. Due to the presence of significant design flaws in the power plant, shortcomings in the organizational structure and maintenance infrastructure, in August 1972 the K-64 was put out of action, the raft was frozen, and the boat was dismantled. Six months of experience in using this nuclear submarine as part of an active formation made it possible to evaluate the complexity of its operation. In addition, an urgent need was identified to improve both the equipment itself and the coastal infrastructure to ensure its normal operation.

Commanders of the 3rd division of the nuclear submarine

The training of crews and their commanders is successfully accomplished through the well-organized work of the division command, headquarters, electromechanical service, and political department on shore and at sea. This largely depends on the division commander.

The first commander of the 3rd division was Captain 1st Rank V.P. Maslov, whose share fell to the beginning of the formation of the division with the development of the organization of its service. That was the time of intensive supply of first-generation nuclear submarines. These three years for the division commander and commanders of nuclear-powered ships were full of training on shore and at sea. The first experience was gained, new governing documents were created, almost everything started from scratch. After graduating from the Academy of the General Staff V.P. Maslov briefly commanded the 11th Division, then was appointed first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet, and subsequently its commander.

During the 35 years of the division's existence, it was commanded by nine officers (Table 5). Division commander V.P. Maslov, N.K. Ignatov (since 1964), A.P. Mikhailovsky (since 1967) had the opportunity to prepare the first domestic submarines to fight a potential enemy at sea.

After a short command of the 3rd DiPL A.P. Mikhailovsky headed the headquarters of the 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet, was its commander, then commander of the Leningrad Naval Base and commander of the Northern Fleet.

In the period 1981-1985. The fleet was replenished with a significant number of third-generation nuclear submarines.

Table 4 Command staff of the 3rd Division from 1961 to 1995

The order to disband the 3rd division of the nuclear submarine - the first-born of the nuclear fleet of the Navy - had to be accepted by the division commander, Rear Admiral G.I. Polyukhovich, who served on it all the years after graduating from the VVMUPP named after. Lenin Komsomol.

In training submarine crews of the first and second generations, the division commanders were actively assisted by their deputies. Much of the work in preparing the ships was carried out by staff officers: flag navigators, flagship RTS and electronic warfare specialists, flagship chemists, doctors, and senior assistants of the NS. The division's electromechanical service officers carried a huge burden of maintaining equipment in service.

Second generation submarine commanders

The ship's commander is the leading position in the fleet. They are the ones responsible for preparing the ship for combat operations and come into direct combat contact with the enemy. The success of the entire ship depends on their ability to unite and prepare the crew.

Together with the new generation ships, the 3rd Division was replenished with a galaxy of excellent commanders, whose names were mentioned above. The 3rd Division sent many capable young officers as submarine commanders to other formations of multi-purpose nuclear submarines.

Given the shortage of personnel trained for the second generation of nuclear submarines, competent commanders of the first generation ships were recruited. At his own request, Captain 2nd Rank V.N. Shcherbakov, who had spent too much time working on the construction of his new 3rd generation ship, Project 705, came to the division. Before joining the 3rd Division, he managed to defend his Ph.D. thesis, and later became a rear admiral, head of the Department of Military Medical Academy, Doctor of Science, and professor. He also succeeded in political activities, becoming vice-mayor and then first vice-governor of St. Petersburg.

Hundreds of nuclear submarine commanders and submariners devotedly and faithfully served the Fatherland for all those 35 years during which the 3rd division of multi-purpose nuclear submarines existed.

Tactical training

The division command paid great attention to the tactical training of nuclear submarine commanders. The first division commanders who accepted nuclear submarines into combat formations had the difficult task of identifying their real tactical capabilities, their ability to withstand the fleet of a strong potential enemy.

Much time was allocated for practical training of commanders on shore and at sea. The so-called "commander's day" Every Tuesday, after turning the mechanisms on the ships, the boat commanders gathered at the division's Training Center. Debriefings were conducted of all submarines entering combat training grounds, the actions of their commanders at sea were discussed, the actions of boats returning from the base were discussed, training was conducted on launching a torpedo attack in turn by each crew, exercises on long-term tracking of nuclear submarines and AUGs, new tactical techniques were practiced . Each commander, regardless of age and experience, could make his proposals, and they were discussed by everyone. It was these command exercises that laid the basis for the actions of submarine commanders at sea.

Deputy link

The closest attention was paid to the preparation of the division's deputy level. We are talking about a deputy level along the command line and in specialized specialties (navigators, torpedo operators, acousticians, signalmen, mechanical engineers, etc.). The division commander monitored the progress of each candidate commander's training. The submarine commander was directly responsible for training his first mate.

Most submarine commanders had the opportunity to train several commanders. So, captain 1st rank V.V. Nikitin trained 4 people during his 7 years of submarine command. With such an attitude towards the training of submarine commanders in the division, the question of their shortage never arose. And in the relevant professions, each boss was obliged to prepare a replacement for himself. This school of training for deputy level has proven itself in practice.

Study outside the division

The training of nuclear submarine crews was placed on a centralized basis from the very beginning. Sailors and petty officers underwent primary training in training detachments and in petty officers' schools. The training of nuclear submarine crews was carried out at Navy Training Centers with a developed infrastructure of training equipment and combat models of equipment and weapons. In addition, training was practiced in servicing new types of equipment, weapons and weapons at industrial enterprises, research and design organizations. This made it possible to ensure high-quality acceptance of ships from industry and their further trouble-free operation.

In addition, commanders and specialized ship specialists were trained at the 6th VSOC of the Navy. This was the last stage of full-time education. Further preparation for combat activities and career advancement took place within the framework of commander training under the leadership of the division commander and at the full-time and part-time departments of the Military Medical Academy. The advantage of correspondence training at the Military Medical Academy was that after its completion, personnel “did not float away” from the division.

Later, graduates of the Military Academy held responsible positions in the structures of the Navy.

Combat activity of the division

The combat activities of the 3rd DiPL are mainly the combat services of second generation nuclear submarines. Project 671 ships performed more than 150 combat missions in various areas of the World Ocean. Over the more than 20-year period of their intensive operation, there was not a single failure to complete a combat mission, despite the difficult climatic conditions where they had to serve: under the ice of the Arctic Ocean, in the stormy waters of the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea, in the hot waters of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. Submarines K-314, K-454 in 1974 paved new routes: transoceanic from the Atlantic Ocean, through the Drake Passage to the Pacific Ocean (K-314), trans-Arctic through the Arctic and Pacific oceans (K-454). Single-shaft nuclear submarine K-454 with crew V.Ya. Baranovsky laid the foundation for such transitions for single-shaft submarines of other projects. The transoceanic passage of the submarine K-469 around Africa (Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans) in 1976 turned out to be no less difficult.

It was not without difficulties that second-generation boats mastered the ice navigation, given their advanced stern stabilizers and the presence of only one main shaft line with a propeller far behind the stern. If it was damaged on the ice, returning the submarine to base became problematic. But the crews under the command of V.V. Anokhin, Yu.G. Sergeichev, A.N. Shportko, V.N. Shcherbakov, E.K. Mazovka, V.P. Mamaikin, V.F. Ermak completed the tasks of ice navigation completely successfully. Such voyages were not always without flaws. In 1971, the nuclear submarine K-147 returned from a 35-day voyage under the ice of the Arctic with a damaged deckhouse fence. When surfacing for a communication session among separately floating ice floes on the nuclear submarine K-370, the periscope pipe was damaged. Damage limited the speed, diving depth, and negatively affected the level of underwater noise. But they did not lead to the early termination of the nuclear submarine’s combat service. Their experience allowed other boats to avoid this.

Military service in the Indian Ocean zone was very difficult. The units and devices installed on the boats were not intended to operate in conditions of high seawater temperature. High temperatures, high humidity in the compartments, and overheating of the mechanisms created a constant threat of fire, which, in conditions of autonomous navigation of the submarine, could end in disaster. The crews under the command of A.N. Shportko, O.A. Petrov, V.N. Kiselev, A.K. Uraev, E.K. Mazovka, Yu.K. Rusakov, even in these difficult conditions, did not allow any failures in the execution of the combat mission. Of course, they also had problems. Thus, the K-369 nuclear submarine (with 166 crew), while mooring to the Akhtuba tanker in the Madagascar region, fell under its stern valance and bent part of the retractable devices. They had to be replaced at a maneuverable base in the Indian Ocean.

Voyages in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea, which were carried out constantly by the division's submarines, were more common. But? Given the saturation of these areas with NATO anti-submarine forces and intense commercial shipping, it was impossible to relax when performing tasks in these areas. The nuclear submarines K-69, K-306, K-398 (with a crew of 166) collided with the tracked objects while tracking foreign submarines. K-481 (with a crew of 166) touched the ground while crossing the Strait of Gibraltar, and the nuclear submarine K-53 in the Mediterranean Sea, while in a communication session at periscope depth, collided with our dry cargo ship “Brotherhood”.

All these unpleasant cases led to failure and lengthy repairs of the nuclear submarine. But at the same time, they forced the crews and commanders of boats to prepare more thoroughly for performing tasks at sea, and to improve their skills when practicing tasks on the shore and in combat training grounds.

Maintaining technical readiness

The rapid growth of the nuclear submarine fleet, the presence of significant design flaws in equipment and weapons, and the lack of proper maintenance and repair infrastructure at the initial stage made maintaining the technical readiness of the ships very problematic.

By the time the 3rd DiPL was founded, the 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines, consisting of about a dozen nuclear-powered ships on which failures of equipment and weapons repeatedly occurred, had a single PM-6 floating workshop with very limited ship repair capabilities. The Navy ship repair plants SRZ-10, SRZ-35 and the Sevmashpredpriyatie SME plant, which built the first generation nuclear submarines, were involved in the emergency work.

At the beginning of development, when the service life of a significant part of the equipment was very low, the entire burden of maintaining a high degree of technical readiness of the boats fell on the personnel of the ships, repair teams of shipbuilding and ship repair plants. Only a decade later, the floating ship repair plant PRZ-7 was formed on the flotilla, capable of professionally performing a significant amount of preventive work during inter-voyage (MPR), navigation repairs (NR), dock inspections and repairs (DO and DR). However, the timing and quality of the repair work was not always maintained.

Guarantee supervision groups (GSG) of shipyards played a certain role in ensuring technical readiness. Regarding the nuclear submarine pr. 671, the GGN of the Admiralty Plant more than once provided significant assistance to the submariners of many ships.

With the commissioning of the Nerpa shipyard, specially built for the repair of second-generation nuclear submarines, the situation with maintaining the technical readiness of the ships of the 3rd DiPL has improved. Beginning in 1974, submarines of Project 671 began to be placed for repairs at the Nerpa Shipyard on a planned basis, instead of the previously practiced extension of the time between repairs.

The years of redeployment of the 3rd DiPL from Zapadnaya Litsa to Gremikha turned out to be difficult for the division, when the ships were scattered for many months at different bases of the Northern Fleet. Even with the presence of the specified infrastructure, maintaining the technical readiness of ships in these conditions placed an unbearable burden on the crew personnel. Electromechanical combat units were especially hard hit, since during preventive maintenance they were required to carry out a large amount of labor-intensive work. Other combat units and services of the ship also suffered.

With such a system for maintaining technical readiness, there is no need to talk about high percentages of combat use of the division’s ships. But, nevertheless, nuclear submarines sailed a lot. The costs of the system were compensated by the backbreaking and intense work of the submariners.

3rd Division - personnel forge

Being the founder of a formation of multi-purpose nuclear submarines, the division accepted ships and crews, practicing and improving their combat skills. Over more than three decades, it has included more than thirty nuclear submarines of the first and second generations and about a dozen second crews. Four first-generation and three second-generation nuclear submarines were transferred as battleships to the Pacific Fleet. A number of submarines and second crews, after the 3rd DiPL was commissioned, created the basis for the newly formed 6th and 33rd DiPL multipurpose submarines, and then the 24th. Thousands of people went through the school of the first multi-purpose unit, gaining experience and its traditions.

The officers who served on ships and in the crews of the 3rd DiPL, having undergone good naval training, were in demand for service in the Navy. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Admiral of the Fleet became the commander of the nuclear submarine K-21 V.N. Chernavin. His colleague on the boat, mechanical engineer V.V., became the Deputy Chief of the Navy - Head of the GTU, and admiral. Zaitsev. A.V. became the deputy of the Navy Civil Code for combat training and admiral. Gorbunov, former chief mate of the nuclear submarine K-314. The fleet commanders and admirals were A.P. Mikhailovsky, O.A. Erofeev (Northern Fleet), V.P. Maslov (Pacific Fleet), V.P. Ivanov (Baltic Fleet). The chiefs of the fleet headquarters were O.M. Faleev (TOF), M.V. Motsak (SF). Commanded fleets of submarines A.P. Mikhailovsky, E.D. Chernov, V.M. Khramtsov, O.M. Faleev, A.I. Pavlov, V.K. Reshetov and a number of other submarine officers who served on the 3rd DiPL. This is just the tip of the iceberg. In addition to them, there were also deputy commanders of flotillas (V.M., Monastyrshin, L.I. Zhdanov), division commanders, deputy commanders of divisions and brigades, flag mechanics of divisions and flotillas, heads of research institutes and schools, heads of organizations and institutions of the Ministry of Defense. All of them multiplied the glorious traditions of the submariners of the 3rd DiPL, who professed the slogan “always be ahead”!

Achievements in combat training

The veil of secrecy that surrounded the work of nuclear submariners with a thick veil prevented the publication of any information about the achievements of the 3rd DiPL in open sources for many decades.

Over the 35 years of combat activity of the division, every year its ships and crews took part in prize torpedo firing, in exercises to search and track submarines and surface ships, overcome anti-submarine defense and in a number of other activities in accordance with the mission of the anti-submarine division. Many ships and crews of the 3rd DiPL became prize winners. These were wonderful pages in the history of several generations of romantic submariners who devoted themselves completely to service and the sea. With the disbandment in 1996 of the 3rd DiPL, the founder of multi-purpose nuclear submarine formations, we deprived ourselves and future generations of the grateful memory of the deeds of our submariners.

What remains “in the rumor mill” about achievements in combat training?

The lead submarine K-3 became named - "Leninsky Komsomol", known throughout the world, since the leader of the party and state himself, N.S. In the summer of 1962, Khrushchev met her from a trip to the North Pole and presented high awards of the Motherland to the crew of the nuclear-powered ship. For a long time, its first commander, L.G., was not known to the general public. Osipenko, who opened the list of Heroes of the Soviet Union after the Great Patriotic War in peacetime (1958).

The submarine K-181, which surfaced in 1963 at the geographical point “North Pole”, gave the country Heroes of the Soviet Union Yu. A. Sysoev and V.A. Kasatonov. She made an official visit to Alexandria, received a high award, and became Red Banner.
Second generation nuclear submarine K-323 with crew V.V. Anokhina became the name "50 years of the USSR". The crew received this boat, a personal title and more than fifty awards after a 35-day voyage under the ice of the Arctic on the nuclear submarine K-147.

Both other submarines and the crews of the division were awarded attention, but the affairs of most of them remain forgotten, unclaimed by their contemporaries.

With this article we tried to compensate for this injustice and pay tribute to the long-term feat of nuclear submariners of the 3rd Diplom.

In the United States of America, on May 26, 1958, at the Electric Boat shipyard (General Dynamics company) in Groton (Connecticut), the world's first specialized anti-submarine nuclear submarine SSN-597 "Tullibi", optimized to combat USSR missile submarines, was laid down. She entered service with the US Navy on November 9, 1960. In 1962-1967, 14 more powerful and advanced Thresher “underwater hunters” were accepted into the American fleet. These single-hull, single-shaft submarines, with a displacement of 3750/4470 tons, developed an underwater speed of about 30 knots, and a maximum diving depth of up to 250 meters. The distinctive features of the “killers” (as American sailors nicknamed anti-submarine nuclear submarines) were heavy-duty hydroacoustic equipment, relatively low noise and relatively moderate torpedo armament (but quite sufficient to solve anti-submarine tasks), consisting of 4 torpedo tubes of 533 caliber mm, placed in the middle part of the vessel at an angle to the centerline plane.

USS Tullibee (SSN-597) is a US Navy submarine, the smallest of the American nuclear submarines (length 83.2 m, displacement 2300 tons). Named after the tallibee, a freshwater salmonid fish native to central and northern North America. Initially, the boat's crew consisted of 7 officers and 60 sailors; by the time it was withdrawn from the fleet, it reached 13 officers and 100 sailors.

If the first generation domestic torpedo submarines (Project 627, 627A and 645) were built to destroy enemy surface ships, then in the 2nd half of the 1950s it became obvious that the USSR also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias” that could destroy missile missiles. submarines of the “potential enemy” in the position of probable use of weapons, ensure the deployment of their SSBNs (countering surface and underwater forces that operate on anti-submarine lines) and protect transports and ships from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines were not removed from destroying enemy surface ships (mainly aircraft carriers), carrying out mine laying, operating on communications, and the like.

Work to study the appearance of second-generation nuclear submarines in the USSR began in the late 1950s. In accordance with the Government Decree, on August 28, 1958, the development of a unified steam generating unit began for new nuclear-powered ships. Around the same time, a competition for designs for second-generation submarines was announced, in which leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - TsKB-18, SKB-112 Sudoproekt and SKB-143 - participated. The largest tech. the Leningrad SKB-143 had the groundwork, which, on the basis of its own earlier initiative studies (1956-1958), carried out under the leadership of Petrov, prepared technical equipment. proposal for missile (project 639) and torpedo (project 671) boats.

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, which was developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, the use of three-phase alternating current, a single-shaft layout and an increased diameter of the durable hull, ensuring the transverse placement of 2 new, compact nuclear reactors, which were unified for second-generation nuclear-powered ships .

Based on the results of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a Project 671 torpedo nuclear submarine (code “Ruff”) with a normal displacement of 2 thousand tons and a working diving depth of up to 300 meters. A distinctive feature of the new nuclear-powered ship was to be high-power hydroacoustics (for the first time, the parameters of the sonar were specifically specified in the terms of the competition).

If the first generation nuclear submarines used a direct current electrical system (this was quite logical for diesel-electric submarines, where batteries were the main source of energy while moving underwater), then on the second generation nuclear submarines they decided to switch to three-phase alternating current. On November 3, 1959, the technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered ship were approved; a preliminary design was completed in March 1960, and a technical design was completed in December.

The Project 671 nuclear submarine was created under the leadership of chief designer Chernyshev (he had previously taken part in the creation of Project 617, 627, 639 and 645 submarines). Based on the fact that the main purpose of the new submarine was the destruction of American SSBNs in the combat patrol areas of these vessels (that is, not under the ice of the Arctic, but in “clean water”), the customer, under pressure from the developer, abandoned the requirement to ensure surface unsinkability when filled any of the submarine's compartments.

On the new submarine, as on the first generation nuclear-powered ships, they decided to use a two-reactor power plant, which fully met the reliability requirements. We created a compact steam-producing installation with high specific indicators, which were almost twice as high as the corresponding parameters of previous power plants.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Gorshkov, “as an exception,” agreed to use one propeller shaft on the Project 671 submarine. This made it possible to reduce noise and displacement. The transition to a single-shaft design ensured higher underwater speeds compared to foreign analogues.

The use of a single-shaft design made it possible to place a turbo-gear unit, both autonomous turbogenerators and all related equipment in one compartment. This ensured a reduction in the relative length of the submarine's hull. The so-called Admiralty coefficient, which characterized the efficiency of using the power of the ship’s power plant, was approximately twice as high as that of the Project 627 nuclear-powered ship and was actually equal to that of the American Skipjack-class nuclear submarine. To create a durable body, it was decided to use AK-29 steel. This made it possible to increase the maximum diving depth.

Unlike the first generation nuclear submarines, it was decided to equip the new ship with autonomous turbogenerators (rather than mounted on the main turbo-gear unit), which increased the reliability of the electrical power system.

The torpedo tubes, according to the initial design studies, were planned to be shifted to the center of the vessel, as on American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, positioning them at an angle to the centerline of the nuclear-powered ship. However, it later became clear that with such an arrangement, the speed of the submarine at the time of torpedo fire should not exceed 11 knots (this was unacceptable for tactical reasons: unlike the American-made Thresher-class nuclear submarines, the Soviet submarine was intended to destroy not only submarines, but also large enemy surface ships). In addition, when using the “American” layout, the work of loading torpedoes was seriously complicated, and replenishing ammunition at sea became completely impossible. As a result, on the Project 671 nuclear submarine, torpedo tubes were installed above the sonar antenna in the bow of the ship.

In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing for the construction of a series of new torpedo nuclear submarines. The act of acceptance into the Navy of the Soviet Union of the lead boat of Project 671 - K-38 (the submarine received the serial number “600”) - was signed on November 5, 1967 by the chairman of the government commission, Hero of the Soviet Union Shchedrin. 14 nuclear-powered ships of this type were produced in Leningrad. Three submarines (K-314, -454 and -469) were completed according to the modified design. The main difference between these ships was that they were equipped not only with traditional torpedoes, but also with the Vyuga missile-torpedo system, which was put into service on August 4, 1969. The missile-torpedo ensured the destruction of coastal, surface and underwater targets at ranges from 10 to 40 thousand m with a nuclear charge. For launch, standard 533-mm torpedo tubes were used from a depth of up to 60 meters.

Construction of the K-314 submarine at LAO (order 610). The felling fence is located under the “tent”. 1972

Before launching, the Project 671 submarine is disguised as a surface ship

Under no circumstances should the enemy know that nuclear submarines are being built in Leningrad. And therefore - the most thorough disguise!

Production of the Project 671 nuclear submarine: K-38 was laid down on 04/12/63, launched on 07/28/66 and entered service on 11/05/67; K-369 was laid down on 01/31/64, launched on 12/22/67 and entered service on 11/06/68; K-147 was laid down on 09/16/64, launched on 06/17/68, and entered service on 12/25/68; K-53 was laid down on 12/16/64, launched on 03/15/69, and entered service on 09/30/69; K-306 was laid down on 03/20/68, launched on 06/04/69, and entered service on 12/04/69; K-323 “50 Years of the USSR” was laid down on 07/05/68, launched on 03/14/70, and entered service on 10/29/70; K-370 was laid down on 04/19/69, launched on 06/26/70, and entered service on 12/04/70; K-438 was laid down on 06/13/69, launched on 03/23/71, and entered service on 10/15/71; K-367 was laid down on 04/14/70, launched on 07/02/71, and entered service on 12/05/71; K-314 was laid down on 09/05/70, launched on 03/28/72, and entered service on 11/06/72; K-398 was laid down on 04/22/71, launched on 08/02/72, and entered service on 12/15/72; K-454 was laid down on 08/16/72, launched on 05/05/73, and entered service on 09/30/73; K-462 was laid down on 07/03/72, launched on 09/01/73, and entered service on 12/30/73; K-469 was laid down on 09/05/73, launched on 06/10/74, and entered service on 09/30/74; K-481 was laid down on 09.27.73, launched on 09.08.74, and entered service on 12.27.74.

The double-hull submarine, which had a characteristic “limousine” fencing for retractable devices, had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 sheet steel 35 millimeters thick. Internal flat bulkheads had to withstand pressure up to 10 kgf/cm2. The submarine's hull was divided into 7 waterproof compartments:
The first is battery, torpedo and residential;
The second is provision and auxiliary mechanisms, the central post;
The third is reactor;
The fourth is turbine (autonomous turbine units were located in it);
The fifth is electrical, used to house auxiliary mechanisms (the sanitary unit was located in it);
The sixth is a diesel generator, residential;
The seventh is the helmsman (the galley and rowing electric motors are located here).

The lightweight hull structure, horizontal and vertical tails, and the nose of the superstructure were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, the aft and middle parts of the superstructure were made of aluminum alloy, and the rudders and the large radome of the main landing gear antenna were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 submarine (as well as further modifications of the submarine) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull.

The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design.

The ship was equipped with an air purification and air conditioning system, fluorescent lighting, a more convenient (compared to first-generation nuclear submarines) layout of cockpits and cabins, and modern sanitary equipment.

PLA pr.671 in a flooded transport and lifting dock. Leningrad, 1970

Withdrawal of submarine project 671 from TPD-4 (project 1753) in the North

Head submarine pr.671 K-38 at sea

The main power plant of the nuclear submarine of the 671st project (rated power was 31 thousand hp) included two OK-300 steam generating units (the thermal power of the VM-4 water-water reactor was 72 mW and 4 PG-4T steam generators), for each side autonomous . The recharge cycle of the reactor core is eight years.

Compared to the first generation reactors, the layout of the second generation nuclear power plants has changed significantly. The reactor has become more “dense” and compact. We implemented a “pipe in pipe” scheme and “attached” the primary circuit pumps to the steam generators. The number of large diameter pipelines that connected the main elements of the installation (volume compensators, primary circuit filter, etc.) has been reduced. Almost all primary circuit pipelines (large and small diameter) were located in uninhabited premises and covered with biological protection. Instrumentation and automation systems for a nuclear power plant have changed significantly. The number of remotely controlled fittings (gates, valves, dampers, etc.) has increased.

The steam turbine installation included the main turbo-gear unit GTZA-615 and two autonomous OK-2 turbogenerators (the latter provided the generation of alternating current 50 Hz, 380 V, included a turbine and a generator whose power was 2 thousand kW).

The backup means of propulsion were two PG-137 DC electric motors (each with a power of 275 hp). Each electric motor drove a two-bladed propeller with a small diameter. There were two batteries and two diesel generators (400 V, 50 Hz, 200 kW). All main devices and mechanisms had remote and automated control.

When designing the Project 671 nuclear submarine, some attention was paid to reducing the noise of the vessel. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating was used for the lightweight hull, and the number of scuppers was reduced. The submarine's acoustic signature has decreased by about five times compared to first-generation ships.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation complex and the MT-70 television system for monitoring ice and general conditions, which, under favorable conditions, was capable of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 meters.

But the main information device of the vessel was the MGK-300 Rubin hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute (headed by chief designer N.N. Sviridov). The maximum target detection range is about 50-60 thousand meters. It consisted of a bow low-frequency hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency antenna of the MG-509 Radian hydroacoustic mine detection system, located in the front part of the fence of the retractable wheelhouse devices, hydroacoustic signaling, underwater communication station, as well as other elements. “Ruby” provided all-round visibility, range measuring by echolocation, independent automatic determination of target heading angles and its tracking, as well as detection of enemy hydroacoustic active weapons.

After 1976, during modernization, on most Project 671 submarines the GAK Rubin was replaced by the more advanced Rubicon complex, which has an infrasonic emitter with a maximum detection range of more than 200 thousand m. On some ships, the MG-509 was also replaced by a more modern MG -519.

Retractable devices - a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an "Albatross" radar complex, a "Zavesa" direction finder, "Iva" and "Anis" or VAN-M radio communication antennas, as well as an RKP. There were sockets for removable antennas, which were installed when solving specific problems.

A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, which provided dead reckoning and course guidance.

The ship is armed with six 533 mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at a depth of up to 250 meters.

The torpedo complex was located in the upper third of the first compartment. Torpedo tubes were placed horizontally in two rows. In the centerline of the submarine, above the first row of torpedo tubes, there was a torpedo-loading hatch. Everything happened remotely: the torpedoes were placed in the compartment, moved along it, loaded into devices, and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives.

The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 fire control system.

The ammunition load consisted of 18 mines and torpedoes (53-65k, SET-65, PMR-1, TEST-71, R-1). Loading options were selected depending on the problem being solved. Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Technical characteristics of the Project 671 nuclear submarine:
Maximum length – 92.5 m;
Maximum width – 10.6 m;
Normal displacement – ​​4250 m3;
Total displacement – ​​6085 m3;
Buoyancy reserve – 32.1%
Maximum diving depth – 400 m;
Working immersion depth – 320 m;
Maximum underwater speed – 33.5 knots;
Surface speed - 11.5 knots;
Autonomy – 60 days;
Crew – 76 people.

The Soviet submarine, in comparison with the most modern analogue of the United States - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 Sturgeon (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967) had a greater underwater speed (American - 29, Soviet - 33.5 knots), comparable ammunition load and greater immersion depth. At the same time, the American nuclear submarine was less noisy and had more advanced sonar equipment, providing better search capabilities. Soviet submariners believed that “if the detection range of an American boat is 100 km, then ours is only 10.” Probably, this statement was exaggerated, but the problems of secrecy, as well as increasing the detection range of enemy ships on Project 671 submarines, could not be fully resolved.

K-38, the lead ship of Project 671, was accepted into the Northern Fleet. The first commander of the submarine was captain of the second rank Chernov. During testing, the new nuclear submarine reached a maximum short-term underwater speed of 34.5 knots, thus becoming the fastest submarine in the world (for that time). Until 1974, the Northern Fleet received 11 more nuclear-powered ships of the same type, which were initially based in Zapadnaya Litsa Bay. From 1981 to 1983 they were relocated to Gremikha. In the West, these ships were codenamed Victor (later Victor-1).

Very photogenic, elegant “Victors” had a rather eventful biography. These submarines were found in almost all oceans and seas where the Soviet fleet carried out combat service. At the same time, nuclear submarines demonstrated fairly high combat and search capabilities. For example, in the Mediterranean Sea, “autonomy” lasted not 60 prescribed days, but almost 90. There is a known case when the navigator of a K-367 made the following entry in the log: “they determined the ship’s position by releasing the anchor on the aircraft carrier Nimitz, moored in the port of Naples . At the same time, the nuclear submarine did not enter Italian territorial waters, but was tracking the US Navy ship.”

In 1979, with another deterioration in American-Soviet relations, the nuclear submarines K-481 and K-38 carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, about 50 US Navy vessels were located there. The conditions for swimming were extremely difficult (at the surface the water temperature reached 40°). Campaign participant Shportko (commander K-481) wrote in his memoirs that in the power compartments of ships the air heated up to 70 degrees, and in residential ones - up to 50. Air conditioners had to work at full power, but the equipment (which was designed for use in northern latitudes) could not cope: refrigeration units began to function normally only at a depth of 60 meters, where the water temperature was about 15 degrees.

Each boat had two replaceable crews, who were located on the Berezina floating base, which stood near the island of Socotra or in the Gulf of Aden. The duration of the campaign was about six months and, overall, it was very successful. A.N. Shportko believed that Soviet nuclear submarines in the Persian Gulf operated quite secretly: if the American naval forces were able to briefly detect Soviet ships, they could not correctly classify them and organize pursuit. Subsequently, intelligence data confirmed these conclusions. At the same time, tracking of US Navy ships was carried out at the range of using missile, torpedo and missile weapons: if they received the appropriate order, they would be sent to the bottom with almost 100% probability.

Submarines K-38 and K-323 made an autonomous under-ice voyage to the Arctic in September-October 1971. In January 1974, a unique transition from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet began (lasting 107 days) of two nuclear-powered ships of projects 670 and 671 under the command of captains of the second rank Khaitarov and Gontarev. The route passed through the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. After the ships passed the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, they moved in a tactical group (one ship at a depth of 150 meters, the other - 100 meters). This was actually the first experience of such a long duration of nuclear submarines as part of a tactical group.

On March 10-25, the submarines called at the Somali port of Berbera, where the crews of the ships received a short rest. On March 29, while on combat duty, the nuclear submarine had short-term contact with surface anti-submarine ships of the US Navy. We managed to break away from them by going to a considerable depth. After completing combat service in a given area of ​​the Indian Ocean, on April 13, the submarines on the surface headed for the Strait of Malacca, led by the support ship Bashkiria.

The seawater temperature during the transition reached 28 degrees. Air conditioning systems could not cope with maintaining the required microclimate: in the compartments of the boats, the air temperature rose to 70 degrees with a relative humidity of 90%. The detachment of Soviet ships was almost continuously monitored by the Lockheed P-3 Orion base patrol aircraft of the American Navy, which were based on Diego Garcia Atoll.

American “guardianship” in the Strait of Malacca (the ships entered the strait on April 17) became denser: patrol aircraft were joined by a large number of anti-submarine helicopters. On April 20, one of the Rubin GAS units caught fire on board the Project 671 submarine. The cause was high humidity. But the fire was quickly extinguished by the efforts of the crew. On April 25, the ships passed through the strait zone and went into depth, breaking away from observation. On May 6, the nuclear-powered icebreaker Gontareva entered Avachinskaya Bay. The second nuclear-powered submarine joined her the next day.

In January 1976, the strategic missile submarine cruiser K-171, and the nuclear submarine K-469, which performed security functions, made the transition from the Northern to the Pacific fleet. The ships crossed the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of 18 cables. The Drake Passage was passed at various depths. Constant communication was maintained via ZPS. After crossing the equator, the ships separated and arrived in Kamchatka in March, each taking its own route. In 80 days, the submarines covered 21,754 miles, while K-469 only rose to periscope depth once during the entire journey (in the Antarctic region).

PLA K-147 pr.671

PLA K-147 pr.671, modernized in 1984 with the installation of a wake detection system (SOKS). In 1985, using this system, the boat guided an American SSBN for 6 days

SSN K-306 Project 671, which collided underwater with an American SSN. Polyarny, water area SRZ-10, 1975

The submarine K-147, equipped with the latest and unparalleled system for tracking nuclear submarines along the wake, from May 29 to July 1, 1985, under the command of captain of the second rank Nikitin, participated in the exercises of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet "Aport", during which carried out continuous six-day tracking of the US Navy's Simon Bolivar SSBN, using non-acoustic and acoustic means.

In March 1984, a very dramatic incident occurred with the K-314 submarine under the command of Captain First Rank Evseenko. Carrying out, together with the Vladivostok BOD, monitoring the US Navy strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and 7 escort ships that were maneuvering in the Sea of ​​Japan, on March 21, the Soviet submarine, when surfacing to clarify the surface situation, tore through the bottom of the aircraft carrier for 40 meters . As a result, the maneuvers of the American Navy were curtailed and the Kitty Hawk, losing fuel oil through a hole, went to the Japanese dock. At the same time, the Soviet nuclear-powered ship, which had lost its propeller, was towed to Chazhma Bay. It was renovated there.

This event caused a negative resonance in the American press. Journalists who specialized in naval topics noted the weakness of the AUG security. This is what allowed the submarines of the “potential enemy” to surface directly under the keel of the aircraft carrier. On March 14, 1989, the first boat of Project 671, K-314, which was part of the TF, was decommissioned. In 93-96, the remaining nuclear submarines of this type left the fleet. However, the dismantling of the ships was delayed. Today, most of the ships are laid up, awaiting their fate for years.