Islands of prestige: will Putin give the Kuriles to the Japanese side. Hello Japan and goodbye Kuriles. Putin hinted at a possible solution to a long-standing problem

The dispute between Russia and Japan over the ownership of the South Kuriles has been going on for several decades. Due to the unresolved issue, a peace treaty has not yet been signed between the two countries. Why are the negotiations so difficult and is there a chance to find an acceptable solution that would suit both parties, the website found out.

Political maneuver

“We have been negotiating for seventy years. Shinzo said, "Let's change our minds." Let's. So that's the idea that came to my mind: let's conclude a peace treaty - not now, but before the end of the year - without any preconditions.

This remark by Vladimir Putin at the Vladivostok Economic Forum caused a stir in the media. Japan's response, however, was predictable: Tokyo was not ready to make peace without resolving the territorial issue due to a host of circumstances. Any politician who fixes in an international treaty even a hint of renunciation of claims to the so-called northern territories runs the risk of losing the election and ending his political career.

Russian President Vladimir Putin takes part in the plenary session "The Far East: Expanding the Boundaries of Opportunities" of the 4th Eastern Economic Forum (EEF-2018). From left to right - TV presenter, Deputy Director of the State Television Channel Rossiya, President of the Bering-Bellingshausen Institute for the Study of the Americas Sergei Brilev, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chairman of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping, from right to left - Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea Lee Nak Yong and Mongolian President Khaltmaagiin Battulga

For decades, Japanese journalists, politicians and scientists have been explaining to the nation that the issue of the return of the South Kuriles for the Land of the Rising Sun is fundamental, and in the end they explained it. Now, with any political maneuver on the Russian front, the Japanese elites must take into account the notorious territorial problem.

Why Japan wants four southern islands Kuril ridge- It's clear. But why does Russia not want to give them away?

From merchants to military bases

About existence Kuril Islands the big world did not suspect until about the middle of the 17th century. The Ainu people who lived on them once inhabited all Japanese islands, but under the pressure of the invaders who arrived from the mainland - the ancestors of the future Japanese - was gradually destroyed or driven north - to Hokkaido, the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

In 1635-1637, a Japanese expedition explored the southernmost islands of the Kuril chain, in 1643 the Dutch explorer Martin de Vries explored Iturup and Urup and declared the latter the property of the Dutch East India Company. Five years later northern islands were opened by Russian merchants. In the 18th century, the Russian government took up the exploration of the Kuriles in earnest.

Russian expeditions reached the very south, mapped Shikotan and Habomai, and soon Catherine II issued a decree that all the Kuriles to Japan itself were Russian territory. The European powers took note of this. The opinion of the Japanese at that time did not bother anyone except themselves.

Three islands - the so-called Southern group: Urup, Iturup and Kunashir - as well as the Lesser Kuril Ridge - Shikotan and numerous uninhabited islets next to it, which the Japanese call Habomai, turned out to be in a gray zone. The Russians did not build fortifications or station garrisons there, and the Japanese were mainly occupied with the colonization of Hokkaido. Only on February 7, 1855, the first border treaty, the Shimoda Treaty, was signed between Russia and Japan.

According to its terms, the border between Japanese and Russian possessions passed through the Frieze Strait - ironically named after the same Dutch navigator who tried to declare the islands Dutch. Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai went to Japan, Urup and the islands further north to Russia. In 1875, the Japanese were given the entire ridge up to Kamchatka in exchange for southern part Sakhalin; 30 years later, Japan regained it as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, which Russia lost.

During World War II, Japan was one of the Axis states, but hostilities between the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan did not take place during most of the conflict, since the parties signed a non-aggression pact in 1941. However, on April 6, 1945, the USSR, fulfilling its allied obligations, warned Japan about the denunciation of the pact, and in August declared war on it. Soviet troops occupied all the Kuril Islands, on whose territory the Yuzhno-Sakhalin region was created.

But in the end, things did not come to a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR. The Cold War began, relations between the former allies heated up. Japan, occupied by American troops, automatically ended up on the side of the Western bloc in the new conflict. Under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, which the Union refused to sign for a number of reasons, Japan confirmed the return of all the Kuriles to the USSR - except for Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and Khabomai.

Five years later, there seemed to be the prospect of a lasting peace: the USSR and Japan adopted the Moscow Declaration, which ended the state of war. The Soviet leadership then expressed its readiness to give Japan Shikotan and Habomai, on the condition that it withdraw its claims to Iturup and Kunashir.

But in the end, everything fell apart. The United States threatened Japan that if they signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, they would not return the Ryukyu archipelago to it. In 1960, Tokyo and Washington entered into an agreement on mutual cooperation and security guarantees, which contained the provision that the United States had the right to station troops of any size in Japan and establish military bases - and after that Moscow categorically abandoned the idea of ​​​​a peace treaty.

If earlier the USSR had the illusion that by concession to Japan it was possible to normalize relations with it, transferring it to the category of at least relatively neutral countries, now the transfer of the islands meant that American military bases would soon appear on them. As a result, the peace treaty was never concluded - and has not yet been concluded.

Dashing 1990s

Soviet leaders up to Gorbachev did not recognize the existence of a territorial problem in principle. In 1993, already under Yeltsin, the Tokyo Declaration was signed, in which Moscow and Tokyo indicated their intention to resolve the issue of ownership of the South Kuriles. In Russia, this was perceived with considerable concern, in Japan, on the contrary, with enthusiasm.

The northern neighbor was going through hard times, and the most insane projects can be found in the Japanese press of that time - up to the purchase of the islands for a large amount, since the then Russian leadership was ready to make endless concessions to Western partners. But in the end, both Russian fears and Japanese hopes turned out to be groundless: within a few years, Russia's foreign policy course was adjusted in favor of greater realism, and there was no longer any talk of transferring the Kuriles.

In 2004, the question suddenly surfaced again. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Moscow, as a state - the successor of the USSR, is ready to resume negotiations on the basis of the Moscow Declaration - that is, to sign a peace treaty and then, as a gesture of goodwill, give Shikotan and Habomai to Japan. The Japanese did not compromise, and already in 2014, Russia completely returned to Soviet rhetoric, declaring that it had no territorial dispute with Japan.

Moscow's position is completely transparent, understandable and explainable. This is the position of the strong: it is not Russia that is demanding something from Japan - quite the opposite, the Japanese are making claims that they cannot back up either militarily or politically. Accordingly, on the part of Russia, we can only talk about a gesture of good will - and nothing more. Economic relations with Japan are developing as usual, the islands do not affect them in any way, and the transfer of the islands will not speed them up or slow them down.

At the same time, the transfer of islands may entail a number of consequences, and their magnitude depends on which islands will be transferred.

The sea is closed, the sea is open

“This is a success that Russia has been moving towards for many years… In terms of the volume of reserves, these territories are a real Ali Baba’s cave, access to which opens up huge opportunities and prospects for the Russian economy… The inclusion of an enclave in the Russian shelf establishes Russia’s exclusive rights to subsoil and seabed resources enclave, including fishing for sessile species, i.e. crabs, shellfish, and so on, and also extends Russian jurisdiction over the territory of the enclave in terms of fishing, safety, environmental protection requirements.”

So the Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia Sergey Donskoy in 2013 commented on the news that the UN subcommittee decided to recognize Sea of ​​Okhotsk inland sea of ​​Russia.

Until that moment, in the very center of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, there was an enclave stretching from north to south with an area of ​​​​52 thousand square meters. km, for its characteristic shape called the "Peanut Hole" (Peanut Hole). The fact is that the 200-mile special economic zone of Russia did not reach the very center of the sea - thus, the waters there were considered international and ships of any states could fish in them and mine minerals. After the UN subcommission approved the Russian application, the sea became completely Russian.

This story had many heroes: scientists who proved that the seabed in the Peanut Hole area is the continental shelf, diplomats who managed to defend Russian claims, and others. Japan presented a surprise during the voting at the UN: Tokyo was one of the first to support the Russian application. This gave rise to a lot of rumors that Russia was ready to make concessions on the Kuriles in exchange, but they remained rumors.

What will happen to the status of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk if Russia gives Japan two islands - Shikotan and Habomai? Absolutely nothing. None of them is washed by its waters, therefore, no changes are expected. But if Moscow also gives up Kunashir and Iturup to Tokyo, the situation will not be so clear-cut.

The distance between Kunashir and Sakhalin is less than 400 nautical miles, that is, the special economic zone of Russia completely covers the south of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. But there are already 500 nautical miles from Sakhalin to Urup: a corridor leading to the Peanut Hole is being formed between the two parts of the economic zone. It is difficult to predict what consequences this will entail.

At the border, the seiner walks gloomily

A similar situation is developing in the military sphere. Kunashir is separated from Japanese Hokkaido by the Straits of Treason and Kunashir; between Kunashir and Iturup lies the Catherine Strait, between Iturup and Urup - the Friza Strait. Now the straits of Ekaterina and Friza are under full Russian control, Treason and Kunashirsky are under surveillance. Not a single enemy submarine or ship will be able to enter the Sea of ​​Okhotsk through the islands of the Kuril chain unnoticed, while Russian submarines and ships can safely exit through the deep-water straits of Ekaterina and Friz.

In the event that Japan transfers the two islands to Russian ships, it will be more difficult to use the Catherine Strait; in the event of the transfer of four, Russia will completely lose control over the straits of Treason, Kunashirsky and Ekaterina and will only be able to monitor the Friza strait. Thus, a hole is formed in the system of protection of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, which cannot be repaired.

The economy of the Kuril Islands is tied primarily to the extraction and processing of fish. There is no economy on Habomai due to the lack of population, on Shikotan, where about 3 thousand people live, there is a fish cannery. Of course, in the event of the transfer of these islands to Japan, it will be necessary to decide the fate of the people living on them and the enterprises, and this decision will not be easy.

But if Russia gives up Iturup and Kunashir, the consequences will be much greater. Now about 15 thousand people live on these islands, infrastructure is being actively built, in 2014 it international Airport. But most importantly - Iturup is rich in minerals. There, in particular, is the only economically profitable deposit of rhenium - one of the rarest metals. Before the collapse of the USSR, Russian industry received it from the Kazakh Dzhezkazgan, and the deposit on the Kudryavy volcano is a chance to completely end dependence on rhenium imports.

Thus, if Russia gives Japan Habomai and Shikotan, it will lose part of its territory and suffer relatively small economic losses; if, in addition, it gives up Iturup and Kunashir, it will suffer much more both economically and strategically. But in any case, you can give only when the other side has something to offer in return. Tokyo has nothing to offer yet.

Russia wants peace - but with a strong, peaceful and friendly Japan pursuing an independent foreign policy. In the current conditions, when experts and politicians are talking louder and louder about a new cold war, the ruthless logic of confrontation comes into play again: giving Japan, which supports anti-Russian sanctions and retains American bases on its territory, Habomai and Shikotan, not to mention Kunashir and Iturup, Russia risks simply losing the islands without getting anything in return. It is unlikely that Moscow is ready to go for it.

On September 5, at a press conference following the results of the G20 in Hangzhou, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that a compromise on the Kuril problem could be reached. The starting point will be the agreement concluded by the USSR and Japan in 1956. It refers to the transfer of two southern islands Kuril ridge to the Japanese side. “However, the agreement did not specify a lot more. For example, under what conditions should the transfer be carried out, and whose sovereignty will be over these islands, ”Putin said. These questions are obviously the main stumbling blocks in the territorial problem that has been dragging Moscow and Tokyo since the Second World War.

Last week, at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Vladivostok, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stressed that the results of consultations on the problems of a peace treaty with Japan would be known in mid-December, when the Russian president pays a visit to Japan.

Abe himself, speaking at the WEF, called on Putin to regulate bilateral relations. “Let's put an end to this abnormal situation that has existed for 70 years, and together we will begin to build a new era Russian-Japanese relations, which will last for the next 70 years,” said the Japanese prime minister.

The Japanese leader addressed his Russian colleague as you to emphasize that trusting relations had developed between them.

Hours of talks between Russian and Japanese diplomats in 2016 mean that there is a desire to find a solution to the territorial problem on the part of both Tokyo and Russia. As Putin noted in his speech, this decision should ensure that "none of the parties will feel either defeated or lost."

Rights of winners

The problem of the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai - has existed since the end of World War II, in which Japan, an ally of Nazi Germany, was defeated by the forces of the USA and the USSR.

After the signing of Japan's surrender, four islands that belonged to Japan under the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1855 became part of the USSR. Japan jurisdiction Soviet side refused to acknowledge. A peace treaty between the two countries was never concluded.

The territorial dispute returned under the rule of Nikita Khrushchev, who wanted to improve relations with Japan.

In 1956, Moscow and Tokyo resumed diplomatic relations and stated in a joint declaration that a full-fledged peace treaty would be developed.

Its text read: "In meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Island (Shikotan. - Gazeta.Ru) to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. It was about this document that Putin spoke at the G20 summit.

Despite the fact that in 1956 both chambers of the Japanese parliament ratified the treaty, the Japanese side, as Putin recently emphasized, refused to implement it.

However, the first signal that the transfer of the islands to Japan could not be carried out was given precisely Soviet Union.

In a note to the government of Japan in January 1960, representatives of the USSR pointed out that Japan, by placing military bases on its territory, was violating the terms of the agreement on the transfer of the islands. The note said that, agreeing to the transfer of the islands, the USSR took into account the national interests of Japan and the peaceful intentions of the country. And these intentions were called into question by the American troops, who appeared in Japan on a permanent basis.

The Pravda newspaper explained the situation to the general public. An article appeared in it stating that Japan's military treaty with the United States was directed against the USSR, and if the islands were transferred, it would be quite possible to place new American bases on them. Pravda wrote that the islands would be handed over to Tokyo only after the withdrawal of US troops and the signing of a peace treaty with the USSR.

The Japanese government was already indignant at this, declaring that the international document should not be changed unilaterally. In an official note, Tokyo also noted that at the time of the conclusion of the declaration with the USSR, there were already foreign troops in Japan.

It was after this diplomatic scandal that the Japanese side announced that it would "relentlessly seek" not only the return of the previously promised Shikotan and Habomai, but also other "northern territories", as the Kuril ridge is called here. Since then, the dialogue has been interrupted.

All or nothing

Today, according to the Japanese expert, former Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze, it will be rather difficult to find a solution to the Kuril problem, since the parties are not ready to change their positions.

“I don't see anything new. The positions of the parties are initially mutually irreconcilable, relying on mass support in their countries. It is impossible to make concessions without catastrophic losses,” he told Gazeta.Ru.

Over the years, an absolute consensus has developed among the Japanese public about the belonging of the islands of the small Kuril ridge. Even the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ), an opposition political force independent of the USSR, adhered to it. The positions of the CPJ were even more radical. According to the Japanese communists, the USSR should have given Japan the news Kuril archipelago. During the years of the Cold War, this caused a sharp deterioration in relations between the CPSU and the CPJ.

It is worth noting that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who was often reproached by political opponents for surrendering Soviet positions, during his visit to Japan in 1991 did not include a mention of the 1956 declaration in his joint statement with the country's prime minister. Gorbachev's position was not to give Japan a single island.

“The chance was then missed. Since then, new realities have emerged,” the Soviet leader explained his position.

A new chance for a dialogue on the issue of the islands was already given by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Ryu Hashimoto, whom he called in his memoirs "Friend Ryu". In October 1993, in the Tokyo Declaration, Moscow and Tokyo agreed that "negotiations should be continued with a view to concluding a peace treaty as soon as possible by resolving this issue."

At the same time, in 1997, Yeltsin, at a meeting with Hashimoto, said that he was ready to solve the problem by returning to the treaty of 1855, that is, to return all four islands to Japan. As Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, a participant in the meeting from the Russian side, recalled, he had to literally beg Yeltsin not to take this step. Nemtsov said that this decision could be indignantly perceived by the public against the background of the general difficult situation in the country.

Allow compromise

This year the 1956 declaration will be 60 years old. The round date may be a good opportunity for a major shift in the issue of the Kurils.

There are certain possibilities for this. Both sides recognize this declaration and start from it as the main document, which, as Russian diplomats interlocutors of Gazeta.Ru have previously noted, is a valid legal document that has the character of an international treaty.

According to Pavel Gudev, a leading researcher at the IMEMO Center for North American Studies, a diplomatic breakthrough requires the Japanese side to move away from its intransigent position. “They say there should be no preconditions, but we think there should be,” he said.

If this shift occurs, then there may be several options for solving the problem, says Gudev. One plausible option is the so-called delayed sovereignty.

This means that the documents may indicate that part of the islands will come under the jurisdiction of Japan in 50 or even 100 years. It is also possible that only the islands themselves will be transferred to Japan, but the water area around them, as well as the resources, will remain the property of Russia, Gudev added.

Considering that at present the islands make the Sea of ​​Okhotsk an inland sea of ​​Russia, the parties can also agree that navigation in the water area would be available only for ships of Russia and Japan, added the interlocutor of Gazeta.Ru.

Russia should also demand from Japan that no military infrastructure has been created on the islands transferred to it, the expert believes.

Getting Japan to close the US military base on Okinawa is almost impossible, military analyst Grant Newsham noted in his column for Asia Times. Despite the fact that the behavior of the US military on Okinawa has often become a reason for protests in Japan itself, the US military presence is seen in Tokyo as an important factor in stability in the region.

Okinawa is "an excellent springboard from which to carry out various military operations to repel an aggressor," Newsham said. At the same time, if during the Cold War years this base served to counter the DPRK, today its main role is to contain China.

Regardless of the options, there is a possibility that the parties will announce a potential compromise over the Kuriles during Putin's state visit to Japan in December.

Putin himself mentioned in a recent interview with Bloomberg that a territorial compromise was reached with China over Tarabarov Island in 2004 after negotiations that lasted 40 years.

The President of Russia noted that "in the end, they found a compromise." “Part of the territory is finally assigned to Russia, part of the territory is finally assigned to the People’s Republic of China,” Putin said.

Giorgi Kunadze believes that no compromise on the disputed islands will be reached. The expert, who in the 1990s participated in negotiations with the Japanese side, argues that the Japanese do not need the islands themselves as such, but the "principle".

“To raise these islands to a decent level, you need to invest billions, and Japan today does not have such funds. But this is a matter of national prestige,” the diplomat added.

Image copyright RIA Image caption Before Putin and Abe, the issue of signing a peace treaty between Russia and Japan was discussed by all their predecessors - to no avail

During a two-day visit to Nagato and Tokyo, the Russian president will agree with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on investments. The main question - about the ownership of the Kuril Islands - as usual, will be postponed indefinitely, experts say.

Abe became the second G7 leader to host Putin after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The visit was supposed to take place two years ago, but was canceled due to sanctions against Russia, supported by Japan.

What is the essence of the dispute between Japan and Russia?

Abe is making progress in a multi-year territorial dispute, in which Japan claims the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, as well as the Habomai archipelago (in Russia, such a name does not exist, the archipelago, together with Shikotan, are united under the name of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The Japanese elite is well aware that Russia will never return two large islands, so they are ready to take a maximum of two small ones. But how to explain to society that they forever refuse big islands? Alexander Gabuev, expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center

At the end of World War II, in which Japan fought on the side of Nazi Germany, the USSR expelled 17,000 Japanese from the islands; no peace treaty was signed between Moscow and Tokyo.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan established the sovereignty of the USSR over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but Tokyo and Moscow did not agree on what to understand by the Kuriles.

Tokyo considers Iturup, Kunashir and Habomai to be its illegally occupied "northern territories". Moscow considers these islands part of the Kuril Islands and has repeatedly stated that their current status is not subject to revision.

In 2016, Shinzo Abe flew to Russia twice (to Sochi and Vladivostok), he and Putin also met at the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation in Lima.

In early December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow and Tokyo had similar positions on the peace treaty. In an interview with Japanese journalists, Vladimir Putin called the absence of a peace treaty with Japan an anachronism that "should be eliminated."

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption In Japan, immigrants from the "northern territories" still live, as well as their descendants, who do not mind returning to their historical homeland.

He also said that the foreign ministries of the two countries need to decide between themselves "purely technical questions so that the Japanese could visit the southern Kuriles without visas.

However, Moscow is embarrassed that in the event of the return of the southern Kuriles, US military bases may appear there. The head of the National Security Council of Japan, Shotaro Yachi, did not rule out such a possibility in a conversation with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, the Japanese newspaper Asahi wrote on Wednesday.

Should we wait for the return of the Kuriles?

The short answer is no. "We should not expect any breakthrough agreements, and ordinary ones too, on the issue of ownership of the southern Kuriles," said former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze.

"The expectations of the Japanese side, as usual, are at odds with the intentions of Russia," Kunadze said in an interview with the BBC. "President Putin has repeatedly said in the last days before leaving for Japan that the problem of belonging to the Kuriles does not exist for Russia, that the Kuriles are , in fact, a war trophy following the results of the Second World War, and even the fact that Russia's rights to the Kuriles are secured by international treaties."

The latter, according to Kunadze, is a moot point and depends on the interpretation of these treaties.

“Putin is referring to the agreements reached in Yalta in February 1945. These agreements were political in nature and assumed the appropriate contractual and legal formalization. It took place in San Francisco in 1951. The Soviet Union did not sign a peace treaty with Japan then. , there is no other consolidation of Russia's rights in the territories that Japan renounced under the San Francisco Treaty," the diplomat sums up.

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption The Russians, like the Japanese, do not expect concessions from their authorities on the Kuriles

"The parties are trying as much as possible to blow off the ball of mutual expectations of the public and show that there will be no breakthrough," comments Alexander Gabuev, an expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

"The red line of Russia: Japan recognizes the results of the Second World War, renounces claims to the southern Kuriles. As a gesture of goodwill, we give Japan two small islands, and on Kunashir and Iturup we can do visa-free entry, free zone joint economic development Anything, he thinks. - Russia can't give up two large islands as it would be a loss, these islands have economic importance, a lot of money has been invested there, there large population, the straits between these islands are used by Russian submarines when they go out on patrol Pacific Ocean".

Japan, according to Gabuev, in last years softened its position on the disputed territories.

“The Japanese elite is well aware that Russia will never return two large islands, so they are ready to take a maximum of two small ones. But how to explain to society that they are forever abandoning large islands? large. For Russia, this is unacceptable, we want to resolve the issue once and for all. These two red lines are not yet close enough to expect a breakthrough," the expert believes.

What else will be discussed?

The Kuriles are not the only topic discussed by Putin and Abe. Russia needs foreign investment in the Far East.

According to the Japanese edition of Yomiuri, due to sanctions, trade between the two countries has decreased. Thus, imports from Russia to Japan decreased by 27.3% - from 2.61 trillion yen ($23 billion) in 2014 to 1.9 trillion yen ($17 billion) in 2015. And exports to Russia by 36.4% - from 972 billion yen (8.8 billion dollars) in 2014 to 618 billion yen (5.6 billion dollars) in 2015.

Image copyright RIA Image caption As head Russian state Putin last visited Japan 11 years ago

The Japanese government intends to acquire a part of the gas fields of the Russian company Novatek, as well as a part of the shares of Rosneft through the state oil, gas and metals corporation JOGMEC.

It is expected that during the visit dozens of commercial agreements will be signed, and the working breakfast of the Russian president and the Japanese prime minister will be attended, in particular, by the head of Rosatom Alexei Likhachev, the head of Gazprom Alexei Miller, the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin, the head of Russian fund direct investments Kirill Dmitriev, entrepreneurs Oleg Deripaska and Leonid Mikhelson.

So far, Russia and Japan are only exchanging pleasantries. Whether at least part of the economic memorandums will come true, it will become clear whether they can also agree on something.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for the second time this year will hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, at which he will again raise the issue of resolving the territorial dispute over the South Kuriles. This time, Abe will come with concrete economic aid projects for the Russian Far East. Is Moscow ready to respond to this with territorial concessions? What could be the compromise?

New thinking with old claims

Moscow should feel its importance. Today they are bargaining with Russia for a lot: for the “correct position” on Bashar al-Assad in Syria - investments and influence in the Middle East from Saudi Arabia; for the appeasement of Donbass and the return of Crimea to Ukraine - the lifting of economic sanctions from the West; for, finally, the transfer of the Kuril Islands - economic and humanitarian assistance from Japan. And although Russia, according to President Putin, does not trade interests and territories, a compromise with Japan is still possible. Not least thanks to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Despite the shouts from Washington, he put national interests above the "club" - as a member of the "Big Eight", Japan supported not only international sanctions against Russia, but also the exclusion of the country from the club of developed democracies. But in the G7, Tokyo was the only one trying to develop relations with Moscow, while Berlin and Paris acted as mediators in resolving the Ukrainian crisis, and Washington was distracted by the Middle East, in particular Syria.

In May, Abe brought an "eight-point plan" to his Russian colleague. Details were not disclosed even by leaks in the media, but in in general terms they discussed cooperation in the energy sector, industry, agriculture, high technology, healthcare, humanitarian exchange, the urban environment, as well as cooperation between small and medium-sized businesses. But even in this form, the layout was clear: Russia opens the Japanese market for its traditional export - raw materials, while Japan provides technology, knowledge and investments for the Russian Far East. Moscow responded to the proposal and presented 49 projects to partners.

Several months passed, and Abe again wanted to meet with Putin - this time at the second Eastern Economic Forum, which is taking place in Vladivostok. Japanese media outlets such as The Japan Times, Mainichi Shinbum, and NHK have made it clear that Abe will come with a new way of thinking, dubbed the "new approach." What is it?

In the 1990s, Tokyo made economic ties with Russia contingent on resolving the territorial dispute over the South Kuriles. According to the well-known formula - chairs in the morning, money in the evening. Then there were attempts to exchange not all the chairs at once, but one at a time, but the furniture is still forward. Now the Japanese authorities have decided to take a risk: we give you money to build confidence, and in the evening we want to get chairs.

Apparently, Abe set out to do something that none of his predecessors could do. If Putin, whom he invited to visit his small homeland in Yamaguchi Prefecture, shares his desire, then Abe will go down in history as the prime minister who proclaims in the Russian style: "The Kuriles are ours!" He already contradicts Washington with his too frequent visits to Russia, so he has no will to take. But before the next talks, the Japanese prime minister once again showed how far he is ready to go: in the Japanese government, he established a special post of commissioner for the development of relations with Russia, which was occupied by Economy Minister Hiroshige Seko. Now Russia must accept the pass and respond by appointing a curator of joint projects on its part - it could be First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov or Economics Minister Alexei Ulyukaev.

However, the "new thinking" has not completely outlived the old attitudes. As soon as the influential publication Mainichi Shinbum reported that the inhabitants of the South Kuriles would be allowed to live on the islands, after the establishment of Japanese sovereignty over them, the General Secretary of the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers, Suga, immediately denied the concession in question. But apparently, whatever the point in a dispute that has been going on for more than 70 years, Abe will not be the only one to face a dissenting elite and public.

Compromise or "frostbite ears"?

Japan's flirting with Russia is explained by pragmatic goals: in addition to the islands, Tokyo needs to wedge itself into the alliance of Moscow and Beijing so that the notorious turn to the East of Russia does not turn into a turn exclusively to China. This is part of the regional, Asia-Pacific policy, which is aimed at weakening Chinese influence, finding balance and parity. Therefore, economic incentives for Russia, which needs markets, technologies and investments, are only a means to achieve its own goals: from the settlement of territorial disputes to balancing China and limiting Chinese expansion.

A dusty compromise would be acceptable for Moscow: according to the Soviet-Japanese declaration of ending the war in 1956, the USSR was ready to transfer the island of Shikotan and the Habomai ridge to Japan in exchange for a peace treaty. Under US pressure, Tokyo refused to make peace, laying claim to Kunashir and Iturup. The failed deal already contained a formula that suits the Russian leadership even today.

Choosing between "give all the islands" or "half", the Kremlin is disposed to a "half" decision. The ideal option assumes that "neither side will feel like a loser, neither side will feel defeated or lost," the Russian president explained his vision to Bloomberg.

However, even if the owner of the Kremlin and his Japanese colleague achieve a trusting relationship, then how to explain to the Russians the need to transfer the islands to another state?

no logic recent history does not suggest. The last two years have shown that in order to annex Crimea, Russians are ready to endure a radical deterioration in living standards and a rollback of all economic indicators ten years ago. So why should they give away the islands for a little economic help - a medical center in Vladivostok, the latest Japanese technology, LNG terminals and new production facilities? This does not fit into the Russian character, which can partly be explained by the saying: "to spite my grandmother, I will get frostbite on my ears."

According to a VTsIOM poll conducted in 2016, 53% of Russians are convinced that the South Kuriles will always belong to Russia. So the authorities will be able to justify themselves for a compromise only by referring to the "wise" decision of the USSR, where the country, according to many, has left all the best forever.

But here, too, a nuance needs to be identified: the peace treaty with Russia plus the two islands does not suit the Japanese authorities, they want to "squeeze" everything. However, what will Moscow get as a result of a possible compromise, apart from economic assistance?

Japan, by and large, as it was from the world of the "Big Seven", will remain economically and politically integrated into the Western world. Russia will not be able to make Tokyo its ally either globally or regionally. Moreover, the territorial dispute that has been smoldering for decades does not pose any significant problem for Moscow. We can safely assume that if the status quo continues for another seventy years, then Russia will not lose anything.

All the rhetoric on this issue is reminiscent of diplomatic overtures, which are needed only for one thing - balancing geopolitical interests in the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan is opposing the emergence of Chinese hegemony, and Russia is escaping from the paws of the tiger, which sees in it a raw material appendage and a junior partner. Moscow is not averse to playing on Washington's nerves, splitting the unity of the world's leading economies.

But if Moscow has nowhere to rush, then does Abe have enough time to carry out his plan? He has led the Japanese government since 2012. As long as he is in power in the country rising sun rarely held back. Perhaps in his fourth term, Putin will no longer meet with him at the Eastern Economic Forum, but before the end of 2016, the Russian president intends to pay an official visit to Tokyo and, presumably, not empty-handed.

The Japanese seem to have already decided everything. Sami. They have already handed over the Kuril Islands to themselves, and from the visit of the Russian president to Japan they are only waiting for a formal announcement about this. At least, the psychological picture in today's Japan is exactly this, many observers say. Then they ask themselves: but is Vladimir Putan ready to make such an announcement? And what will be the disappointment of the Japanese when the Russian president does not say anything about the transfer of the islands?

Or will he say? Maybe the Japanese know something that we Russians don't know?

What can the Japanese demand?

The main leitmotif in the Japanese press and Japanese discussions about the Kuriles is the readiness to exchange investments for the islands. They call this the "zero option": they say that the islands are ours anyway, but the bitterness of the loss of territories must be sweetened for the Russians. Their economic affairs are bad, so the multibillion-dollar Japanese investments will come in handy for the Russians. And the cherry on this cake will be the signing of a peace treaty, which, they say, will end the state of war between Japan and Russia.

And, in fact, what legal grounds do the Japanese have to dispute the ownership of the islands? What do they have besides a constant stubborn pressure?

“The Japanese made a claim to the islands immediately after the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty between the allies and Japan, but there is no need to talk about any legal grounds,” said German Gigolaev, scientific secretary of the Institute of World History (IVI) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in a conversation with Tsargrad. since the USSR did not sign this peace treaty with Japan then, in 1951, they made claims on this basis. Well, ears, probably, as always, stick out from the US State Department - they asked the Japanese to put forward claims, and they put forward."

That's all the reason: give it back, because we want it, and the owner ordered ...

True, there were voices that Tokyo might consider signing a peace treaty without transferring four (more precisely, three in bulk) islands from the Kuril chain. There were also voices that the Japanese government was ready to be satisfied with two of them. The authoritative Japanese newspaper "Kyodo" published a version of this, citing a source in the Cabinet of Ministers.

However, then these versions were refuted, and the picture remained the same: Japan should get everything! By the way, in the variant of a compromise with two islands, the strategy is aimed at all four. It's purely a matter of tactics. In the same article in "Kyodo" it is directly stated: the transfer of the two islands will be only the "first phase" of the settlement of the territorial issue. Similarly, the option of joint Russian-Japanese administration of the southern part of the Kuriles is no longer valid: the government resolutely refuted the corresponding report of the Nikkei newspaper back in October.

Thus, the position of Tokyo remains unchanged, and any compromise options turn out to be useless and meaningless: the winner, as they say, takes everything.
And the winner, of course, in any exchange of the islands for any financial "buns" will be - and will be announced - the Japanese. For money is nothing more than money, and territory is never less than territory. Let us recall what place Alaska occupies in the Russian national consciousness with the history of its sale. And it’s clear, it’s clear that in the middle of the 19th century it was unprofitable, inconvenient, practically uninhabited by Russian land, which the British or Americans would have taken away one way or another simply by the fact of its gradual settlement. And what kind of borders could have stopped them if gold had been discovered there earlier, when Alaska was still under Russian jurisdiction!

So it seems to be correct and inevitable - at least they received the money, and not just lost the land - Alaska should have been sold. But does anyone thank Tsar Alexander II for this today?

Kurile Islands. On the island of Kunashir. Fishing. Photo: Vyacheslav Kiselev/TASS

What can the Japanese give?

The only thing that can justify the transfer of the territory of the country to another state in the minds of the people is, perhaps, only an exchange for other territories. As, for example, they did this with the Chinese, correcting the status of individual islands on the Amur. Yes, they gave away some land, but they also received it, and even a little more. But what lands can the Japanese give us in exchange? Is it the island of Okinawa with American military bases? It is unlikely - it is unlikely that among Japanese politicians there will be at least one capable of arranging such a "movement" ...
So, Japan has no land for us. Is there money?

And it depends what. Just recently, 10 billion dollars were received for a 19.5% stake in Rosneft. In total, the corporation promised "an overall effect, taking into account the capitalized synergies between PJSC NK Rosneft and PJSC ANK Bashneft, in the amount of more than 1.1 trillion rubles ($ 17.5 billion), cash receipts to the budget in the fourth quarter 2016 will amount to 1,040 billion rubles ($16.3 billion)."

Igor Sechin called this deal the largest in the history of the country. But these are just shares of just one state corporation, of which there are far more than one in Russia. Yes, as noted by a number of observers, sold at a fierce discount relative to the true value of the company.

Attention, the question is: how much money would Japan be willing to pay for our islands? Even if it's a tenfold higher amount - with $1.248 trillion in international reserves it can find it relatively painlessly - is it worth the candle? What economic effect will Japan get from the southern Kuril chain? It is clear that there will certainly be some effect - at least from the exploitation of marine resources in the adjacent water area. But the problem is that money is given - if given - by completely different people, far from the fishing industry.

Photo: Sergey Krasnoukhov / TASS

Until the first shout of the owner ...

However, it's not about money - even if they really were given to us. What can be purchased with them? The most valuable thing in today's world for Russia is technology and machine tools. Will the Japanese give them to us? You can be sure - no. Serious technologies are a closed subject for us for reasons of secrecy. A similar problem is with machine tools: yes, we need them after the total destruction of industry in the 90s, much more important is the technology for their production. At one time, the USSR had already made a mistake when, after the war, it brought German machine tools to its territory as requisition. Rather, it was a forced measure - there were actually no good machine tools in the USSR before the war, and even more so after. But only in this way the industry turned out to be tied to obsolete models, but Germany, forcedly "undressed" in this respect, forcedly, but extremely effectively, modernized its machine park.

But even if we assume that the Japanese will somehow bypass other people's restrictions in this matter - and these are primarily American restrictions dictated, among other things, by the interests and national security- how long can they portray "nobility"? Until the very first independent movement of Russia, which Washington would not like. For example, the final capture of Aleppo. Coalition Western countries has already threatened us with new sanctions for this and kept the old ones. Will the Japanese be able to disobey their main allies? Never!

Thus, everything turns out to be simple: even if Russia gives up the islands in exchange for money or technology, very soon it will not have either one or the other. And islands, of course.

What is Russia losing?

From a purely material point of view, the Kudryavy rhenium volcano alone on Iturup Island, which annually ejects $70 million worth of this valuable metal for defense needs, makes the loss of the islands a very mismanagement act. In Alaska, at least there was an excuse - the then Russian authorities did not know about either gold or oil in this distant land. According to the Kuriles, there is no such justification.
What happens if you give up the islands?

“Nothing good will happen,” the historian Gigolaev answers. “The zone of international waters in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, which are not subject to our national jurisdiction, will immediately increase. Plus, several straits are blocked for our warships to exit through them from the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk to the open ocean.”

Of course, the extraction of fish and seafood in the surrounding water area gives rather big incomes. At the same time, there is also the right to limit this production in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk for the same Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, because the possession of four islands makes this sea inland for Russia.
But these are still pleasant, but trifles against the background of what the loss of the islands in the geostrategic sense can turn into. As pointed out by German Gigolaev.

The thing is that since the Second World War, Japan has not been a sovereign power in the full sense of the word. It is under US military and political control. And if tomorrow the Japanese get at least one of the contested islands, the day after tomorrow an American military base. For example, with the missile defense system, which, as Tsargrad has already written more than once from the words of informed military experts, can be quickly and painlessly converted into an attack complex - just a canopy of Tomahawk cruise missiles. And no one can stop the Americans, and Tokyo in particular cannot.

By the way, they are not particularly eager to ban. Moreover, at the level of the prime minister, the government, and the Foreign Ministry, they have already officially denied any even attempts to make an exception from the security treaty with the United States in relation to the South Kuril Islands, if Russia agrees to give them up. According to Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, the security treaty with the United States "applies and will continue to apply to all territories and water areas that are under the administrative control of Japan."

Accordingly, if desired, access to the Pacific Ocean is blocked for the Russian military fleet, because there are straits that do not freeze in winter, which today are controlled by the Russian military, but will become American. So, as soon as the threatened period comes - and who guarantees that this will never happen? - Immediately the Pacific Fleet can be written off the balance sheet. Indeed, with the same success, a solid naval group led by an aircraft carrier could be based somewhere on Iturup.
Let's agree: the Japanese (or, more likely, their owners, the Americans) came up with a beautiful option. Insignificant for the area of ​​Russia, patches of land immediately deprive Russia of rhenium necessary in military production (in engine building, for example), and valuable resources of sea areas, and access to the ocean in a threatened period.

And this - in the complete absence of reasonable arguments for their rights to these islands! And if, under these conditions, Moscow decides to transfer the islands, then something more terrible will happen than the loss of fish, rhenium, and even access to the ocean. Because it will become clear to everyone: pieces can be pulled out of Russia even without any reasonable justification. That is, pieces can be pulled out of Russia! From Russia! Can!

She allowed...