States of the Visegrad Four. Combat brigade of the Vyshegrad group

Especially for the portal "Perspectives"

Lyubov Shishelina

Shishelina Lyubov Nikolaevna ‒ Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head. Research Department of the Central and of Eastern Europe Institute of Europe RAS

In January 2015, the regional association of the four countries of East-Central Europe - Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - will turn 24 years old. Emerging almost simultaneously with the European Union, the Visegrad Group has become an important part of the process of European regional restructuring. Modern realities allow us to speak about a more global role of the Visegrad region as a space of refraction and competition of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian projects.

In 2014, the countries of formerly Eastern Europe, now calling themselves Central Europe, celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first free parliamentary elections and the beginning of democratic transformation. Over a quarter of a century, tremendous changes have taken place: one system of economics and politics has replaced another, the boundaries of political regions and unions have changed, the system of international relations. At the same time, no one seemed to notice how the Central European landmarks that inspired everyone were replaced by transatlantic ones. And today this part of Europe is once again at the geopolitical crossroads, where not the idea of ​​continental solidarity from Reykjavik to Vladivostok, popular in the late 1980s, is being formed, but the border between two global projects: transatlantic and Eurasian.

The peculiarity of the transformation of the Eastern European region consisted not only in its transition to the Western integration and value system, but also in the division of the post-war sphere of influence of the USSR into two parts: Visegrad and the Balkans. What in the early 1990s was seen by many as an accident, today is beginning to take on the features of quite logical spatio-temporal phenomena. At first skeptically perceived not only by Moscow, but also by the participants themselves (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), the Visegrad Group - or, as this regional association is also called, the Visegrad Four - nevertheless begins to acquire the features of a subject not only European, but also, judging by by its role in the events in Ukraine, world politics.

The path of transformation of the Visegrad group from a reserve into a subject of European geopolitics was rather long and uneven. There were breakdowns, there were also upsurges, the impetus to which was given by pan-European events. We have been convincing ourselves for too long - as, indeed, in part, the Visegrad people themselves, and even more so Western Europeans- in the non-obviousness of the Visegrad interaction, which to some extent likened it to the CIS. However, the facts often showed otherwise.

Firstly, after the dissolution of the socialist structures that united the entire region of Eastern Europe from the Adriatic to the Baltic, it really split into two parts: South-Eastern (Balkan) Europe and East-Central (Visegrad). This trend was strengthened by the simultaneous admission of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, first to NATO, and soon to the European Union. Of course, the boundaries were thus not defined clearly and definitively. For example, Slovenia gravitates towards the Visegrad region, Western Ukraine… The formation of Visegrád Europe may not have been completed yet. The symptoms of this can be seen in the EU's Eastern Partnership program, which is closely linked to the Visegrad countries, as well as in the growing discussion about Austria and Slovenia joining the project and forming Visegrad-2.

Secondly, the region, having passed through centuries of difficult trials that approached it either from the West or from the East, really developed a unique originality, expressed, on the one hand, in the synthesis of civilizational characteristics, on the other hand, in a special relationship to its own identity. . The result has been a heightened critical attitude, turning into skepticism as soon as it comes to far-reaching European integration initiatives. These countries are united by the desire to follow advanced technologies and political trends and, at the same time, an unusually careful attitude towards their own centuries old traditions, language and culture… For centuries, the region has turned into the quintessence of “European Western” and “European Eastern”, realizing this in its connecting, bridge mission, which does not depend on opportunistic political trends.

Thirdly, this is the most dynamic region of Eastern Europe, which has been trying for decades to declare itself in a variety of, mostly reformist qualities, which is very reminiscent of the “third way” painfully sought by mankind in the 20th century, for some reason, in the case of Eastern Europe, dubbed by ill-wishers as "catch-up development". It was in the Visegrad countries that attempts were made to overthrow the existing system in 1956, 1968, 1980. And after the failures, new plans for the reorganization of society, economic and political relations were born here. Trying to break with one system that was inorganic for it, the region tried to break into another, as it turned out, just as little in line with its traditions. As a result, countries found themselves in constant struggle and movement, determined by these contradictions.

Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have been considered by the Western European states as the most promising partners among the countries of the "Eastern bloc" since the times of their socialist past. No wonder: together with the GDR, they were the most dynamically developing CMEA countries. From a political point of view, they were also considered more “advanced”: after all, it was in these countries that the most serious attempts to overthrow Soviet-type regimes took place in their time.

Today, it is precisely this region that is resisting Brussels' attempt to turn European development on the path of education States of Europe. Suffice it to mention that Poland and the Czech Republic were the last countries to sign the Lisbon Treaty, and Hungary, after the adoption of the document, was the first to try by adopting its own laws to challenge the supremacy of the Brussels legislation over the national one.

These states have much in common in history, long traditions of neighborhood, interpenetrating cultures and, until recently, largely complementary economies. All this indicates the presence of a certain common "Visegrad spirit". Romantic adherents of the idea even created the image of Homo visegrdicus, which in our time is replacing the interwar notion of the region as a “Central European cafeteria”. This unique spirit is based on the reality - the role of the region in culture, worldview, and economy that links the East and West of Europe. It is these "transitional qualities", which can be considered a reserve of geopolitics, that still allow the region to remain itself, without dissolving into the larger geopolitical schemes of its neighbors.

And the same qualities make it possible to use Visegrad Europe as an object of European and world geopolitics, as it was formulated in the schemes of H. Mackinder, K. Haushofer, N. Spykman. After all, this region (especially Poland) played an important role in the strategy cold war in the postwar years. The US and the EEC started their “assistance program” for Eastern Europe precisely from Poland and Hungary. At one time, President Carter's adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski took a direct part in the conceptualization of regional cooperation - thinking of it, of course, primarily as "anti-WTS" and "anti-CMEA", that is, as a possibility of forming an anti-Soviet / anti-Russian island in this part of Europe. Subsequently, the cohesion of the region - of course, relative and, alas, changeable - occurred under the influence of the general scheme accession to the EU. Now a single spirit is manifested in the desire to stand out from the "leveling" of the EU, to preserve their own national identity. This is evidenced by last elections to the European Parliament, where most of the countries of the region were represented by representatives of national conservative movements.

We can say that the measure of the stability of regional formations or unions is their ability to repeatedly revive. It is this quality of theirs that does not allow them to disappear from the world map, to get lost in the projects of stronger world players. If you look at Visegrád Europe from this point of view, it is easy to see that as a phenomenon, as a resource of geopolitics, the region has fully developed.

The concept of "Visegrad Europe" (as "middle", "intermediate") can be geopolitically considered an expression of the aspirations of those who, being active politicians at the turn of the 1990s, tried to conceptualize the idea Central Europe‒ ideologically and economically different from European East and West. It is no coincidence that in the works of Eastern European historians of the late 1980s, this idea implied an arrangement that would be equally fair for all the peoples inhabiting the region, unattainable due to a number of geopolitical, cultural, economic and other factors. Czech Bogumił Doležal saw in the idea of ​​Central Europe a “cultural-historical melancholy” whose defining values ​​could at the same time be regarded as pan-European values. For the Hungarian Emil Niederhauser, Central Europe appears as “that part of of Eastern Europe who always dreamed of belonging to Western Europe , but in one form or another has always remained part of Eastern Europe.

In the spiritual sphere of modern Visegrad Europe, hostility is noticeable not only to the departed Soviet gigantism, but also to the new American mass culture. Under current conditions Central Europe can be identified as a cultural-territorial interpenetration with a kind of “bridge messianism” inherent in it, which should refract and reunite at the same time contacts between the East and West of Europe. Modern realities allow us to speak about a more global role of the Visegrad region as a space of refraction and competition of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian projects.

Creation of the Visegrad Group

At the turn of the 1990s, not only "cultural and historical melancholy" but also the notorious "human factor" played an important role in relations within the region and in its choice of international political orientation. In the eastern part of Central Europe, a kind of quasi-structure of anti-communist resistance and civilizational kinship with the West was to be created. Several options were tried at once: after all, there was a great chance of failure in that atmosphere of improvisation and unpredictability that had captured Eastern Europe by the end of the 1980s. To the south of the Center of Europe, the Central European Initiative was formed, and to the north, the Visegrad Initiative. Although at the first stage, among the countries of Eastern Europe, there was an idea of ​​the possibility of maintaining Eastern European integration without the participation of the USSR.

Until now, the history of the creation of the Visegrad group is surrounded by a halo of nebula and innuendo. Alertness to the idea arose immediately - precisely because of its revolutionary nature. Experts and politicians thought and spoke in terms of the Central European Initiative, which was reborn in the historical outlines of Austria-Hungary, considering it a natural continuation of Eastern European history, and suddenly - XIV century, Visegrad ...

It is officially stated that the idea originated in November 1990 in Paris, when, during a meeting of the CSCE, the Hungarian Prime Minister invited the leaders of Poland and Czechoslovakia to Visegrad, reminding them of the centuries-old event. On February 15, 1991, the Prime Minister of Hungary J. Antall, the President of Czechoslovakia V. Havel and the President of Poland L. Walesa, in the presence of the President of Hungary, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, signed in a restored Royal Palace Visegrad Declaration on cooperation of three states. As G. Yesensky writes, this was not done under the dictates of Moscow, Washington or Brussels. It was an independent decision of the three states to work together to restore cooperation with the West, in order to avoid a repetition of the tragic events of the past and for the sake of "an early transition from the Soviet to the Euro-Atlantic orbit."

The first agreements between countries in the conditions of the collapse of the USSR, Yugoslavia, the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA dealt with the problems of strengthening regional security and were signed in October 1991. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the East European “troika” was to assume the functions of a buffer zone that encloses the core “ developed Europe» from instability on the territory of the collapsed USSR.

The most successful result of the cooperation of the Visegrad Group in initial stage was the signing on December 20, 1992 of the Central European Free Trade Agreement. Thus, the countries of the group managed to create a common customs space even before joining the EU. This action demonstrated the ability of the Visegrad Group to develop constructive solutions and left hopes for a joint mobilization of efforts in defending their interests within the EU.

Unstable progress

Unfortunately, Visegrad cooperation did not become an obstacle to the collapse of the Czechoslovak state. Nor did it become a panacea for tensions in Hungarian-Slovak relations. By 1993, the Visegrad "troika" in the same external borders turned out to be a "four", and a dispute broke out between Hungary and Slovakia over the continuation of the construction of the Gabchikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric complex on the Danube, which encroached on the Hungarian-Slovak border.

The actions of the EU have not always contributed to the deepening of interaction between the Visegrad countries. Thus, the procedure for the adaptation of new members contributed more to the erosion of their unity than to strengthening. The Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), having contributed to the elimination of customs barriers, on the whole did not stimulate the activation of horizontal economic ties in the region. The benchmark for each of the countries continued to be subsidies from EU funds and Western investment. According to these articles, there was an open competitive struggle between the countries, which rather contributed to the verticalization of interstate relations and their closure on the integration core of the European Union. Throughout the 1990s, relations between the countries of the region were characterized more by a rather tough struggle for the right to be the first to be admitted to the EU than by mutual assistance. A priority for Budapest, Warsaw, Bratislava and Prague in the early years of the approval of the new political system were internal processes associated with the struggle for power and property, overcoming economic crisis.

In 1994‒1997 the Visegrad group never met. Contacts were carried out mainly on a bilateral basis. Newly elected Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Mecijar and Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn are busy with the disputed Danube Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric complex and the development of a friendship agreement that the EU has put forward as a condition for the admission of these countries to the EU. Against this background, the Hungarians managed to challenge the construction of a hydroelectric complex by the Slovak side in the territories inhabited by ethnic Hungarians in the European Court, but the case was decided not in favor of Hungary. Tensions in the relationship grew. As a result, the meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries planned for September 20, 1997 in Bratislava was cancelled.

A new impetus for Visegrad cooperation came from outside. On December 13, 1997, at the meeting of the Council of the EU in Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were officially invited to start negotiations on joining the European Union. This opened before the Visegrad countries the prospect of interaction and exchange of experience on specific issues of preparation for accession to the EU.

Significant changes have also taken place in the internal life of states. The intensification of interaction between the Quartet coincided with the arrival of new people to leadership positions. Although the alignment itself - socialists and liberals in three countries against the center-right in Hungary - did not portend an easy coordination of issues.

After a long pause, on October 21, 1998, on the eve of the entry of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland into NATO, in Budapest, the prime ministers of the three countries adopted a statement on the resumption of the Visegrad cooperation. Characteristically, the meeting did not adopt any statement about the aggravation of the situation in Yugoslavia, although the states of the region felt the approach of the Balkan war especially keenly. This circumstance confirms the assumption that at the initial stage the Visegrad Group was considered by the West rather as an instrument of its own geopolitics.

The Balkan war, joining NATO for some time brought together the countries of the Visegrad group. However, the very basis for rapprochement was not of any stable, long-term nature. The results of the war against Yugoslavia did not become a source of pride for Europe and an incentive for a new unity of efforts. On the contrary, the question arose of how an external power managed to drag Europe into an intracontinental war. One of the main problems for the Visegrad Group, as in the first stage of the existence of this organization, was the search for areas of cooperation. Besides new stage interaction was again overshadowed by the disagreements between the Hungarians and Slovaks around the construction of a hydroelectric complex on the Danube.

The preparations for the signing of agreements on associate membership, and then the agreement on the conditions for accession to the EU, were again carried out by the Visegrad countries in a separate and even competitive environment. Non-binding agreements on cultural cooperation, infrastructure development and protection environment, naturally, were not intended to raise Central European cooperation to a new level.

On May 14, 1999, at a meeting in Bratislava, in which the prime ministers of all four states of the Visegrad Group took part, issues of relations with individual states and international organizations. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, which became NATO members on March 12, supported the admission to the military-political alliance of Slovakia, which was struck off the list for the premiership of Vladimir Mechiar.

At an informal meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group in October 1999 in Slovak Javorina, after the military operation in Yugoslavia was over, the issues of strengthening the security of the region, fighting crime, and visa policy were discussed. On December 3, 1999, at a meeting in Slovak Gerlachev, Presidents Vaclav Havel, Arpad Gönc, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Rudolf Schuster adopted the "Tatra Declaration", in which they confirmed their determination to continue cooperation in order to "give a new face Central Europe» . The declaration emphasized the desire of the Visegrad states to join the European Union and repeated the appeal to NATO with a request to admit Slovakia to this organization.

On June 9, 2000, in Stirin, Czech Republic, the prime ministers of the Visegrad countries signed an agreement on the establishment of the Visegrad Foundation to support projects in the field of culture and science. Bratislava was chosen as the location of the fund.

The results of the December (2000) meeting of EU heads of government in Nice were awaited in the Visegrad capitals with great hope. Expectations were justified: the final date for the expansion of this structure was determined - 2004. The ten-year period of doubt and uncertainty of the EU, expressed in the constant postponement of admission, has ended.

On January 19, 2001, on the 10th anniversary, the presidents of the Visegrad Group in Polish Psztina adopted a declaration on achievements and successes on the path of integration into the European Union and NATO. And on May 31 in Krakow, the prime ministers proposed to countries that were not members of the Visegrad Group cooperation in the form of partnership. This status was immediately received by Austria and Slovenia. After a series of informal meetings, including at Krynitsky economic forum, On December 5, 2001, a meeting of the prime ministers of the Visegrad Group countries and the Benelux countries took place in Brussels. On the eve of joining the EU, the Visegrad countries began to improve the forms of their future cooperation in the European Union. The use of a joint platform provided them with more possibilities to be heard in Brussels.

From 1998 to 2002, within the framework of the Visegrad Forum, eight meetings were held on the problems of accession to the EU. The leaders of the Central European group were afraid of inequality in the EU and saw one of their main tasks in an attempt to overcome it. Polish Foreign Minister A. Olekhovsky wrote about this: “we are concerned that Poland, after it becomes a member of the EU, will not be treated the same as everyone else, and we will find ourselves in a subordinate position.” The objections of the countries of the Visegrad Group, primarily Poland and Hungary, were caused by Brussels' plans to open access to newcomers to EU agricultural programs only 10 years after their adoption. As a result, a compromise option was adopted in the EU.

In the early 2000s, uncertainty and internal contradictions had a great influence on cooperation. These are, for example, the obvious claims of the young, ambitious and successful conservative Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban for the role of leader in the Visegrad Group. During his premiership, Hungary demonstrated significant economic success. V. Orban tried to expand the scope of the group by establishing closer relations with Austria and Croatia, where the national conservative forces were also in power. But such a prospect did not suit Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Another long pause in cooperation was associated with V. Orban's statement about the responsibility of the Czechoslovak state in connection with the decrees of E. Beneš, according to which tens of thousands of Hungarians were resettled in the post-war period. On the eve of joining the EU, V. Orban demanded from the Czech Republic and Slovakia to compensate the victims of the policy of E. Beneš. As a result, on March 1, 2002, the prime ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia refused to come to Visegrad for the next working meeting of the group's heads of government.

In addition, the Hungarian prime minister - apparently, primarily concerned about the political image in the upcoming parliamentary elections - promised to block the admission of Slovakia to NATO until the situation with the Hungarian national minority improves and introduce customs restrictions for Polish goods.

So the revival of the Visegrad initiative ended in calm again after a month or two. Meetings resumed only after the next parliamentary elections in Hungary, when power returned to the social-liberal coalition. The new Prime Minister of Hungary, Péter Meddessy, took part in the regular meeting of the prime ministers of Visegrad and Benelux, held on May 24-25, 2002, in Trencin, Slovakia.

On May 12, 2004, the Prime Ministers Marek Belka, Mikulas Dzurinda, Peter Meddesi and Vladimir Špidla met in the Czech Kroměř to outline concrete cooperation programs already as members of the EU. At the meeting, it was emphasized that with the accession to the EU and NATO (where Slovakia was admitted on March 25, 2004), the main goals of the Visegrad Declaration on joining the common European integration space were achieved. Participants highlighted the assistance provided to them by the Benelux countries, as well as Northern Europe. As an immediate goal, the leaders of Visegrad have outlined the promotion of EU accession for Romania and Bulgaria.

The experience of the 1990s-2000s leaves many questions about the real effectiveness of the Visegrad regional cooperation. There is no doubt about its usefulness in maintaining a regional dialogue as a means of preventing serious conflicts in the central part of Europe.

Visegrad Region EU

When distributing seats in the structures of the enlarged EU, the Visegrad countries generally did not support the position of Poland, which demanded equal representation with Germany, France and Spain. But since the summer of 2004, they have acted as a united front against discriminatory provisions regarding distribution from EU funds.

The long-term joint efforts of the four, several meetings with the Prime Ministers of the Benelux, President of the European Commission J.M. Baroso and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who presided over the EU since the second half of 2005, brought results. The newly admitted countries received access to funds from the EU budget not only on equal terms, but in some cases on especially favorable conditions. This can be considered the first major victory for the Visegrad Four countries and their "baptism" as a capable EU region.

Gradually within European Union The countries of the Visegrad Group have learned to work together and appreciate the benefits of joint action, which, in particular, manifested itself in the most difficult moments of the economic crisis. The intra-regional Visegrad market has grown significantly over the years of EU membership, and the main trade turnover of the countries is carried out within the borders of the region and the states directly adjacent to it. This is an undoubted indicator of the Quartet's consolidation.

Nevertheless, political relations within the Visegrad Group remained very tense. The fact that all countries were in a transitional period and in search of a new ideology had an effect, and this often turned them to the history of the region, full of conflicts. Therefore, the political contradictions between Hungary and Slovakia on the issue of the Hungarian national minority and between Hungary and the Czech Republic on the issue of the Beneš decrees again appeared on the surface.

Poland and Hungary continued to compete for leadership. Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany managed to demonstrate personal disrespect for his neighbors in the region. At first, these were incorrect statements to the face of the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico at the summit of the Visegrad Group. In 2006, he did not receive Polish President L. Kaczynski, who was in his country on a visit. In 2009, the Slovak authorities did not allow Hungarian President Laszlo Soyom to attend the celebration on the occasion of the opening of a monument to the Hungarian King Stephen in the Hungarian-populated Slovak village of Komarno. With the coming to power in Hungary in 2010 of the FIDES party and the adoption of the law on dual citizenship the tension has only increased.

Contradictions between the countries of the group also manifested themselves in relation to the Kosovo issue and the fundamental agreement between Russia and the EU. Thus, Slovakia did not recognize the independence of Kosovo, while the other three countries did so rather quickly. Poland blocked the signing of a new treaty between Russia and the EU, and then, like the Czech Republic, approved plans to deploy American missile defense forces in their country - naturally, without consulting Hungary and Slovakia. And although these issues gradually ceased to be relevant, they left their mark on the Quartet's dossier.

In the second half of the 2000s, Polish President Lech Kaczynski clearly demonstrated his claims to the role of leader of the Visegrad Group. Poland has clearly advanced in all indicators since joining the EU economic development. In addition, she became the main developer and foreman of the European Neighborhood Policy, and then a co-author of Sweden on the Eastern Partnership program. Back in the mid-2000s, Poland, with the active support of the EU, tried to form regional associations and blocs with a predominantly anti-Russian orientation to its east. So, on December 3, 2005 in Kiev, with the participation of the Polish leadership, an attempt was made to create a "Community of Democratic Choice", which included Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine and Estonia. The initiative was presented as an "axis democratic countries who do not want to be in Russia's zone of influence". Note that Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic preferred to stay away from such activity. However, all the countries of the Visegrad Group demonstrated unity in supporting the pro-European processes in Ukraine, as well as Georgia's policy, which runs counter to Moscow's interests in the post-union space.

"Eastern Partnership" as an incentive for unity

In the second decade of the XXI century. The Eastern Partnership program becomes a test of the Visegrad Group for unity. The admission in May 2004 of the countries of Visegrad Europe and the Baltic States to the EU created a qualitatively new situation for them, turning them from an object into a subject of the European Union's policy. First, the development and practical implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), adopted in 2004, fell to their lot. Poland then became the undoubted leader in this vector. It is enough to look at the regional structures that were planned to be organized at the first stage: Latvia - Lithuania - Belarus, Poland - Ukraine - Belarus and Poland - Lithuania - Kaliningrad. Poland is present in two out of three. From the very beginning, the ENP looked like a continuation of the introduction into the strategic space of Russia - however, at a slower pace, associated with the greater complexity and larger size of the new “absorbed” objects (in this case, Ukraine and Belarus).

By May 2005, that is, on the anniversary of the adoption of the ENP, it became obvious that this policy was already responsible for the decision to block transit from Russia to the Kaliningrad region, direct involvement in the change of power in Ukraine and strengthening the positions of pro-Western forces in Moldova. The ENP strategy did not say anything about the fact that it should be built in such a way as not to conflict with the interests of Russia and the integration structures being formed around it. On the contrary, on the eve of the adoption of the ENP strategy, the EU showed no intention to take into account the political interests of Moscow. In particular, one of the documents stated that the ENP supports Ukraine's aspirations for integration into the EU, however, "the establishment of the Common Economic Space of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan may become a brake on the development of relations between Ukraine and the European Union" .

Joint participation in the development of a policy towards the eastern neighbors, of course, created a neutral and stable platform for rallying the countries of the Visegrad Group. The tasks put forward within the framework of this policy were truly striking in their spatial and political scale. However, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic at first did not share the leadership ambitions of Poland in relation to the former republics of the USSR directly adjacent to their borders. Instead, Hungary and Slovakia, for example, continued to pursue a policy of improving bilateral relations with these countries, which was solely in their national interests.

By the end of the 2000s, the EU again took up the problem of expanding and clarifying its borders. Thus, in the spring of 2008, Brussels decided to decide on the prospects for relations with Ukraine and Moldova. These relations were supposed to become a level below “membership”, but one level above “neighborhood”. Thus, a third, intermediate program called “reinforced partnership” was born, hastily called by some MEPs the idea of ​​an Eastern European Union.

A new stage of the EU's Eastern policy towards the five former Soviet republics, called the "Eastern Partnership", was proposed in May 2008 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Sweden - Radoslaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt. However, the Eastern Partnership program faced obstacles in the context of the crisis. Presented for parliamentary discussion, it was sharply criticized by MEPs. Some reproached the program for its lack of ambition, while others, on the contrary (like the deputy from Romania, Adrian Severin), saw it as an empty box in a beautiful package. The representative of Britain, Charles Tannock, found in the proposal of Poland and Sweden a discrepancy with reality: in particular, the countries considered as a region under this program do not actually consider themselves as such and wish to build exclusively bilateral relations with the European Union. MP from Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis noted that the program does not provide the main thing - the protection of the objects of the Eastern Partnership policy from Russian encroachments.

The new initiative of the EU - the summit held in Prague on May 7, 2009 called "Eastern Partnership" - was ignored by the leaders of not only the ten leading Western states (including the heads of France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg), but also two of the six invited countries - Belarus and Moldova. Nevertheless, the host of the summit, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, did his best to emphasize that given fact does not detract at all historical significance this event.

On the eve of the summit, serious differences were revealed between EU members regarding the strategy of the Eastern Partnership. Thus, the leaders of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Benelux countries considered it necessary to issue a warning that this formula of cooperation does not promise EU membership for the target countries, but can only be considered as a means of inspiring these countries to converge their positions with the EU. At the same time, the Visegrad countries - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary - considered this position to be wrong. The two groups also differed in terms of terminology. While the countries of "old Europe" continued to refer to the former Soviet republics as "eastern neighbors", the countries of Visegrad Europe and the Baltics preferred to refer to the newcomers invited to the summit as "European countries". To some extent, the dispute was resolved after a compromise proposal to use the term "Eastern Partners".

The significance of the pompously announced event was reduced to promises of gradual progress in liberalization visa regime for the "Eastern Partners" and a differentiated approach to signing enhanced partnership agreements similar to the existing agreement with Ukraine.

In 2011, the first half of which was held in the EU under the presidency of Hungary, and the second - Poland, there was a breakthrough in the policy of the Eastern Partnership. However, events on the Mediterranean flank (the "Arab Spring") did not allow the EU to support the efforts of the Visegradites. First, the summit in Hungary was removed from the agenda, and for the summit in Warsaw, from the leaders Western countries only Angela Merkel arrived.

Nevertheless, at the meeting of prime ministers of the Visegrad Group countries held on June 16, 2011 in Bratislava, it was announced that the Eastern Partnership program would henceforth become a long-term foreign policy priority of the Quartet. The leaders declared their intention to do everything possible to promote deeper political association and economic integration with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was also decided to seek additional funds for the purposes of the B-4 / EaP (Visegrad Four + Eastern Partnership) program in the amount of 250,000 euros from each of the member countries and declared intentions to continue convergence with the objects of the Eastern Partnership policy in creating a common market and a single economic spaces.

At a new stage in the development of the Visegrad Group, working meetings with the leaders of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became more frequent, and the military-political component of the agreements began to intensify. In particular, the Prague Declaration following the meeting of the Visegrad Four foreign ministers with colleagues from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, along with the need to intensify cooperation through civil societies, educational programs, direct contacts, etc., also mentions the development of a dialogue with EaP target countries in terms of common foreign and security policy. The declaration “On a stronger NATO” (March 2012) expresses the determination to create by 2016 its own regional military formation under the command of Poland. At the same time, contacts between the Visegrad Four and Balkan countries, some of which (or parts of which) were included in the "Carpathian Europe" program. This program, where the role of the locomotive again belongs to Poland, corresponds to the geopolitical goals of the region and the leadership ambitions of the Visegrad elite.

Gradually, the Visegrad Group, with the approval of the founding countries, almost completely took control of the Eastern Partnership project and in every possible way contributed to the fact that during the Lithuanian presidency in 2013 (to the 10th anniversary of the ENP policy and the fifth Associate Membership Agreements were initialed by target countries. Ukraine, of course, was seen as the main trophy of the association's policy. However, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych did not sign the agreement. This event provoked the winter (2013/2014) events on the Kiev Maidan and resulted in civil war in this country. Poland has become one of the main international negotiators, and the Visegrad countries are trying together to shape their policy towards Ukraine and Russia. This is already a qualitatively new stage in the history of the countries of the Visegrad Group and the policy of the Eastern Partnership, which deserves separate reflection and analysis.

Notes:

70% of EU exports to Eastern Europe and 68% of imports from there were accounted for by three countries in the region - Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In terms of such indicators as the cost (complexity) of producing one ton of exports, Hungary was almost six times superior to Latvia. (

Brussels' interference in the process of adopting the country's constitution, the law on the press, regulations on judges, etc.

As the Polish historian Svetomir Galash writes, the "Visegrad summit" of 1335 was an important milestone in the establishment of new, peaceful diplomatic principles and in the limitation of military conflicts.

The term was first used by the Hungarian culturologist Robert Kiss-Zeman.

Niederhauser Emil. A kelet-európai egysege es különbsége. // Magyar Tudomány, 1988, No 9. P. 668-681.

Thus, Hungarian Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy proposed, while maintaining the basic structure of the CMEA, to create in it also a small integration capable of interacting on a more flexible and efficient basis. Nepszabadság, January 8, 1990.

Although formally everything was already ready for the proclamation on January 1, 1993 of the collapse of the Czech-Slovak state.

Bettcher Winfried. European impotence in the Balkans // International Dialogue. IE RAS, No. 1 2000.

15 Years of Visegrad. International Visegrad Fund. Bratislava, 2006. P. 47.

Olechowski Andrzej. Political System and Foreign Policy. European Union - Polish Project in progress. // The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest. 2001, Vol.1, No 1(1). P.74.

A. Drynochkin. Economic aspects of functioning of the Visegrad countries within the framework of the EU // Visegrad Europe. IE RAN, 2012.

Report on "Wider Europe - Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors." Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy. Rapporteur: Pasqualina Napoletano. European Parliament. November 5, 2003.

It was noted that with the improvement political situation Belarus could join the Eastern Partnership, as well as Kaliningrad region RF.

In addition, it was planned to open four platforms for multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Eastern Partnership program: democracy and good governance; economic integration and convergence based on EU sectoral policy; security of energy supplies; contacts between citizens.

http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/joint-statement-on-the

Joint Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Prague, March 5, 2012.

Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have long maintained close economic, cultural and political ties. In the early 1990s, they were the first among the former socialist countries to embark on the path of democratization and market reforms. In February 1991, in the Hungarian city of Visegrad near Budapest, the heads of the three states signed a declaration of cooperation, which marked the beginning of a new sub-regional association - the Visegrad Group. Its main goal was to promote the integration of member states into the European economic and political space. After the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states in 1993, the original trio became the four. In December 1991, the Visegrad countries signed the European agreements, which opened up the prospect of EU membership for them. In 1994, Hungary and Poland were the first to apply for EU membership.

In the process of the formation of the Visegrad Group, disagreements periodically arose between its participants. Some of them were connected with the political and ethnic conflicts of the Second World War, others - with the course of negotiations on accession to the EU and current bilateral relations. Ultimately, however, centripetal tendencies prevailed. The rapprochement of the four countries was facilitated by the presence of a common strategic goal - to join the EU - and the realization that it is precisely collective actions that will help to effectively defend their interests in negotiations with Brussels.

In December 1992 in Polish city In Krakow, the Visegrad countries signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA, CEFTA), which entered into force on March 1, 1993. The document provided for the creation of a subregional FTA, including the liberalization of trade in goods and simplification of contracting procedures.

During 1993-1997. tariffs on goods subject to customs taxation were reduced by 60%. By 2001-2003 Tariffs were cut on "sensitive" industrial goods: steel, electronics and textiles. Tariffs on agricultural goods were gradually reduced, although quantitative restrictions remained. By the mid-1990s, a common market for industrial and some agricultural products had been formed. After in 1996-1999. Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria joined CEFTA, it began to unite 100 million consumers.

In 1999, the Agreement on the directions of Visegrad cooperation was signed in Bratislava. In it, the Quartet countries agreed to jointly solve the problems that arose in the course of their integration into the EU economic space. In addition, the Agreement regulated issues of cross-border, energy, environmental and cultural cooperation.

In March 1998, the Visegrad countries began, and in December 2002 completed negotiations on accession to the EU. On May 1, 2004, all of them became full members of the European Union and therefore ceased their membership in CEFTA, just like Slovenia, which joined the EU. For the same reason, Bulgaria and Romania withdrew from the FTA in 2007.

The creation of CEFTA was a successful example of sub-regional cooperation, useful not only for its members, but also for the EU as a whole. In 2003, Croatia joined CEFTA, in 2006 - Macedonia, and in 2007 - five more countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova. Thus, today the grouping consists of seven countries

South-Eastern Europe, claiming membership in the European Union or privileged cooperation with it. For them, participation in CEFTA is a form of preparation for further integration into the EU economic space.

Story

It was formed as a result of a meeting of the presidents and prime minister of three post-socialist countries - Lech Walesa (Poland), Vaclav Havel (Czechoslovakia) and Jozsef Antal (Hungary) on February 15, 1991 in the Hungarian city of Visegrad, in which a joint declaration was signed on the desire for integration to European structures.

This association is also sometimes called Visegrad troika or Visegrad triangle, since at the very beginning it included only three members - now this term is illegal, but still sometimes used, despite the fact that Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a single state back in 1993.

All members of the Visegrad Group became members of the European Union on May 1, 2004.

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An excerpt characterizing the Visegrad group

At three o'clock, no one had yet fallen asleep, when the sergeant-major appeared with the order to march to the town of Ostrovna.
All with the same accent and laughter, the officers hurriedly began to gather; again put the samovar on the dirty water. But Rostov, without waiting for tea, went to the squadron. It was already light; The rain stopped, the clouds dispersed. It was damp and cold, especially in a damp dress. Leaving the tavern, Rostov and Ilyin both at dusk looked into the doctor's leather kibitka, glossy from the rain, from under the apron of which the doctor's legs stuck out and in the middle of which the doctor's bonnet was visible on the pillow and sleepy breathing was heard.
"Really, she's very nice!" Rostov said to Ilyin, who was leaving with him.
- What a lovely woman! Ilyin replied with sixteen-year-old seriousness.

Relations between the "old" and "new" Europe are escalating before our eyes. Previously, the stumbling block was, which the Young Europeans from Eastern Europe flatly refused to accept. A new stage of confrontation has become a fronde within the EU by the Visegrad Group, which includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. These countries are fighting the "Brussels machine" and reject Angela Merkel's plans to reform the EU. Poland even refused to sign the final declaration of the last EU summit in protest against the "German diktat". In Brussels, now in "Putinism", now in "authoritarianism", they threaten with sanctions, and Luxembourg even offered to expel Hungary from the European Union. What are the underlying reasons, how far can the confrontation go, and what trump cards does the Visegrad Four have? After all, its participants receive through transfers from the EU budget average 15-20% of GDP.

Reasons for the split of "old" and "new" Europe

The European Union, which, according to Angela Merkel, is faced with an "existential crisis", is forced to decide where to move on in the face of the collapsed crises and. This search already in itself reveals various lines of division within the EU. As you know, major changes always lead to a clash of interests, as they create new "winners" and "losers".

Disagreements today are aggravated not only between the northern (“creditors”) and southern (“debtors”) countries of the European Union, but also between the “old” and “new” Europeans - who joined the EU in the new century.

There are a number of reasons for disagreements between the "old" and "new" Europe, among which the main ones are economic and security issues. IN Lately critically important for discussions about the further development of the EU have become the "factor of Russia" and. Despite heated debates about these "threats", in reality the European Union found itself divided along the lines of "old" and "new" Europe from the very beginning of enlargement in 2004, and this split has never been overcome.

Already since 2004, differences in attitudes towards security issues have been identified between the old and new EU members. Thus, many Western European countries did not seek unconditional support for US military enterprises, even as members of NATO. Here it is appropriate to recall the opposition of France, Germany and Russia to the US invasion of Iraq, after which many experts started talking about "the end of the united West." Or, for example, blocking next European countries, including France, the entry into NATO of Ukraine and Georgia.

At the same time, the Young Europeans, who joined the EU after 2004, associated the solution of security issues exclusively with, and gladly accepted the task of "containing Russia" by joining NATO and then the EU. Anti-Russian rhetoric justified their importance as a buffer zone containing Russia. In many ways, it was the rhetoric of the "new" Europeans that quietly but surely paved the way for anti-Russian sentiment in the EU.

The second clear difference between "old" and "new" Europe is that after the accession of new states to the EU, they began to receive most subsidies from structural funds, contributing less to the general budget. This causes rejection among the population of such states as the Netherlands, France or Germany, not to mention Britain preparing for an official divorce from the EU.

At the same time, the Young Europeans make claims to Brussels itself on various issues related to both the economy and security, which have become aggravated due to increased migration pressure on the European Union. And Brussels, in turn, condemns in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

Visegrad Fronde

Today, it is the Visegrad Group, which consists of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, that most loudly throws accusations against Brussels and demands that their opinion be taken into account.

Firstly, The Quartet positions itself as a single force jointly defending its positions in the face of the "old" Europe. Moreover, the countries of old Europe periodically express dissatisfaction with the preliminary meetings of the Visegrad Four countries before major EU meetings.

The prime ministers of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are Viktor Orban, Beata Szydlo and Robert Fico. Source: ibtimes.com

Secondly, some countries of the Visegrad Four, primarily Poland, seek to demonstrate their viability and democracy by being ready to democratize their neighbors in the western belt post-Soviet space included in the program.

Third, The Visegrad Group is dissatisfied with the direction of the latest changes in the EU, although in many ways they are due to the sharp and massive expansion of the EU to the East. Initially, the Visegrad Four rallied against the admission of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East under quotas determined by Brussels. However, as the “family drama” between the European Union and Britain plays out, more serious problems have come to the fore.

Europe of "two speeds" as a threat

The leader of the European Union, Germany, and the countries of the "old" Europe grouped around it, at the same time constituting the industrial core of the European Union, have begun preparations for the reforms of the European Union. This is driven by the fear that the UK's exit could trigger a "domino effect" and lead to the disintegration of the EU. Moreover, in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and even Germany, there is growing support for opposition parties advocating exit from the European Union.

Moreover, the "old" Europe of the Young Europeans is reluctant to discuss the upcoming reforms. This is not surprising, since restructuring in the European Union can significantly infringe on their interests. The essence of the upcoming reform is to divide Europe into at least two groups - the so-called "fast" and "slow" countries.

The Idea of ​​Europe different speeds” has long matured in the countries of the “core” of Europe. Back in 2015, German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel published an article in Bild magazine about a “two-speed” Europe, where leading countries can move faster on the integration path, and “others can catch up when they are ready.” In early February 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated: “History recent years showed that the EU will continue to exist various speeds that not everyone will certainly participate in certain integration steps.

In the light of the forthcoming reforms, the countries of the Visegrad Group fear, first of all, a possible reduction in funding from the EU budget [on average it reaches 15-20% of GDP in Eastern Europe - approx. "EE"]. They advocate the idea of ​​maintaining the full amount of payments from the general budget of the European Union and categorically oppose the idea of ​​a "two-speed" Europe.

The Visegrad Four play with a trembling hand

On March 1, 2017, the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, proposed five scenarios for the future development of the EU with the following conditional names: “leave everything as it is”; "keep only the single market"; "deeper integration for those who want and are ready"; “do less, but more efficiently”; "to do more together."

None of the scenarios proposed by Juncker for the future of the European Union, in fact, does not take into account the goals of the states of the Visegrad Group, since it assumes the division of the EU member states according to their abilities and opportunities, which will undoubtedly affect their financing.

Therefore, the Visegrad Four countries literally the next day, March 2, 2017, adopted their own declaration on the future of the EU, which rejects any division into different groups of countries within the European Union.

Nevertheless, the partners in the Visegrad Group do not have so many trump cards in their hands. And there are contradictions within the Visegrad Group itself. For example, the Czech Republic and Hungary are more Eurosceptic than Poland and Slovakia. Although even in Poland, those dissatisfied with the format of European integration and the proposed scenarios for its development for the first time began to agitate for the signing of a petition for Poland's withdrawal from the EU. Of course, Poland is clearly not ready to break off relations with the EU, just like Hungary, by the way.

However, the Hungarian prime minister insists that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should pursue their own policies and do not always have to reckon with Brussels. It is worth recalling that at the summit on September 16, 2016 in Bratislava, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg stated that Hungary should be excluded from the EU in general due to non-compliance with European values.

Do not forget that among all the countries of the Visegrad Group, it is Poland that receives the largest subsidies from the general EU budget, which cannot but raise questions from its comrades in the Fronde.

Apart from these contradictions, consultations between representatives of the four countries remain the only common working mechanism in the Visegrad Group. This is enough for joint statements, but not enough for a full-fledged bloc. Disagreements also arise on the issue of cooperation with Russia, as Hungary constantly speaks in favor of intensifying cooperation with Moscow and lifting sanctions.

These differences do not allow the countries of the Visegrad Four to work out their own scenario for the future development of the EU. To a greater extent, they talk about what they disagree with and do not offer their own vision of the future of European integration.

However, the EU does face a huge challenge to maintain effective integration, which implies both changes in the financing of countries and their division into integration readiness groups. different levels and speed. And the Visegrad rebel countries will either have to accept the scenario offered by the "old" Europe, or continue to play to strengthen the internal split, having no really serious trump cards in their hands, except for blackmail themselves.

Natalia Eremina, Doctor of Political Science, Associate Professor, Department of European Studies, St. Petersburg State University