The conflict between Britain and Argentina over the islands. The queen's fleet goes south

PROTYPE OF MODERN WARS

The armed conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1982 was one of the strangest in military history. For a tiny, almost uninhabited archipelago in the South Atlantic with a population of 1,800 people, which Great Britain owned for more than a century and a half, and which is a bone of contention between it and Argentina, fought on both sides about 60 thousand military personnel, over 180 ships, up to 350 combat aircraft and helicopters. 255 Britons and at least 712 Argentines were killed and hundreds were injured.

Light aircraft carrier Hermes.

And, nevertheless, that short (actually two-month) war allowed the British to gain significant experience in the rapid transfer and deployment of a fairly large grouping of armed forces far from their bases, interaction between the headquarters in London and the operational command in the theater, interaction between ground forces, air force and navy ; the use of the most modern weapons of that time in real combat conditions (many samples of weapons and military equipment are still in use).

Destroyer type Sheffield.

Recall that in early April 1982, the Argentine Armed Forces took possession of the disputed archipelago. On April 12, Great Britain declared a blockade of the Falklands, declaring a 200-mile zone forbidding Argentine ships. From April 18, scouts from the special forces of the British Navy and ground forces begin to land on the islands. From May 1, active fighting at sea and in the air. The Argentines are losing the General Belgrano cruiser, built in the USA in the late 1930s and hit by torpedoes from a British nuclear submarine on May 2, 1982, several more warships and vessels were destroyed by British naval aviation. In turn, the Argentine aircraft sank two British Sheffield-class destroyers, two Amazon-class frigates, a landing ship, a container ship, seriously damaged more than 10 ships, including both aircraft carriers that were part of the British squadron.

Amazon-class frigate.

More than 100 Argentine aircraft and helicopters were destroyed in air battles, anti-aircraft fire and on airfields. The greatest losses of the Argentine Air Force suffered from anti-aircraft missiles (45 aircraft). English pilots shot down 31 enemy aircraft. The British lost 34 aircraft and helicopters.

These figures testify to the intensity and bitterness of the confrontation.

Summing up the battles on land, one cannot help but pay attention to the fact that the British carried out active offensive operations only at night, after massive artillery and bomb attacks carried out on the guidance of spotter officers who were in the combat formations of the attacking units. As a rule, the tasks were completed in the first half of the day. Some 105 mm guns fired 500 rounds a day. Naval fire support also played a significant role in the battles for the Falklands: only 8 thousand shots were fired from 114-mm guns. However, in the course of hostilities, the British also used night attacks without prior aviation and artillery preparation, they landed helicopter landings at night, which sought to end the battle by morning.

Results of the airborne ground operation.

Why did the British prefer to fight under the cover of darkness? There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Argentine aviation, although it operated from remote mainland bases, still had a significant quantitative superiority over the British. Secondly, the contingent of the Argentine ground forces also outnumbered the English, but the best combat training of soldiers, sergeants, officers of the British ground forces, their ability to fight at any time of the day, sufficient provision of night vision devices made it possible to defeat a strong enemy, using darkness as an additional favorable factor.

Air and sea warfare over the Falkland archipelago.

Of particular interest is the fact that during the Falklands War, the AM39 Exoset (Exoset) Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASC) was used for the first time - length 5.21 m, diameter 350 mm, weight 735 kg, launch range 42 km, speed flight 1100 km/h. Guidance inertial, in the final phase of the flight on the active radar GOS Warhead mass: 165 kg. As well as the British Harrier VTOL aircraft - the maximum speed near the ground is 1185 km / h; cruising - 650-830 km / h; practical ceiling - 15200 m.
The fuel supply in the internal tanks is 2870 liters, in two outboard tanks of 455 liters or 1500 liters each. The aircraft is equipped with an in-flight refueling system. The combat radius of action when intercepting air targets is 750 km, when attacking ships and ground targets - 460 km. When patrolling in the zone for 1.5 hours - 185 km. Combat load - 2500 kg (with a run of 130-150 m).

Takeoff of the Super-Etandar fighter-bomber

At 05:07 hours on May 4, 1982, the SP-2H Neptune (callsign Mercury) took off from the naval base in Rio Grande, at 07:50 its first radar contact with a British warship followed. Two "Super-Etandara" carriers of the Exose anti-ship missile system launched from Rio Grande at 9:45. At 10:35 Prony (pilot of the Neptune) at last time climbed to a height of 1170 meters (3500 feet) and determined the coordinates of the corresponding targets (coordinates 52 33 "55" S, 57 40 "55" W). A few minutes later, he reported the data to the pilots of the Super Etandar, after which he set a course for the Rio Grande, where he finally arrived at 12:04.

The Super Etandar raid continued. Moving at very low altitude, at 10:50 they climbed to 160 m (500 ft) to check Prony's coordinates and found nothing. The pilots turned around and continued searching. After 45 km (25 miles) they rose again and after a few seconds of scanning, their radar screens showed the desired targets; the coordinates were loaded into the onboard weapon systems, the AM 39 descended and launched after the last check. (The exact time was 11:04).

What happened to the rockets? According to the British account, an officer on the destroyer Sheffield (Peter Walpole) was trying to visually identify a radar contact that had been reported to him by operations officer Nick Bato. By the time he identified the Exocet by a light plume of smoke, the missile was only 1 mile from the destroyer: the ship was hit four seconds later. The crew of one of the most modern ships of the Royal Navy received a "warning" about the attack only in the form of screams ... Some sources claim that the cause of the fire on the ship is not the warhead itself, but the fuel spilled from it, but according to other sources, including ., according to the captain of the affected ship (Samuel Salt), the reason was the explosion of a warhead that destroyed the control center and combat information Center. However, the cause of the fire, whatever it may be, cannot change the result of that fatal attack for the ship, which became the first test of an airborne anti-ship missile on the battlefield.

Destroyer Sheffield

After the events described, the following problem became particularly relevant: the “eyes” of the Super-Eandar were Neptune aircraft, the active use of which ceased on May 15. The reason for this was the lack of spare parts and the obsolescence of radar equipment. Instead, the Argentine Navy has proposed using the AN/TPS-43F 3D radar and the AN/TPS-44 Alert IIA tracking radar located in Puerto Argentino. These radars constantly tracked the movement of all British aircraft, fixing the places of "launches" of "Harriers" and "Sea Harriers". It soon became clear that the movements of the enemy were carried out according to a very specific pattern, so that now they were all quite expected and predictable. With this in mind, on May 23, two Super-Etandar sorties were carried out to strike at British aircraft carriers. No targets were found, the aircraft returned to base.

On May 25, 1982, radars located in Puerto Argentino located a possible target 176 kilometers (110 miles) to the northeast. At 14:28, both Super Etandars took off heading for KS-130N (256 km / 160 miles east of Puerto Deseado), after replenishing their fuel tanks, both aircraft headed for a target located at a distance of 480 km / 300 miles south of east of them. Halfway through, they lowered their flight altitude to 8-10 meters above the sea; the target was exactly where the stationary radars were in contact with it (58 "S, 56 W). The pilots, having downloaded all the necessary data, fired the missiles (at 16:31) and headed back. In Rio Grande they returned at 18.38 after the second refueling from the KC-130N. It was the longest raid by Super-Etandar aircraft: in 3 hours and 50 minutes they covered 2592 km / 1620 miles. According to British sources at 16.36, their missiles damaged the British ship "Atlantic Conveyor" (total tonnage 14946t.), which sank about a couple of hours after receiving damage.His death was the largest transport loss for OG 317, because at least ten helicopters were on board (three - “ Chinook "HC.1 of the 18th Squadron of the Royal Armed Forces, six "Wesex" HU.5 of the 848th Squadron of the British Navy and one "Lynx" HAS.2 of the 815th Naval Squadron).

Auxiliary aircraft carrier (container ship) Atlantic Conveyor

Only one anti-ship missile remained at the disposal of the Argentines, while the need to destroy British aircraft carriers did not lose its relevance. On May 29, a shock operation was undertaken. The idea was that as soon as the Super-Etandar fired the remaining missile, the Skyhawks would follow it and drop 227 kg (500 lb) bombs on the aircraft carrier, and then they would have to take the brunt of the defense system of the attacked ship . At 12:30 on May 30, two "Super-Etandar" launched from the Rio Grande, the rocket was on the leader's plane, the follower's task was to support the command vehicle. Five minutes after launch, four A-4Cs followed. The group flew at an altitude of 7000 m after refueling, when the entire group was separated from the target by 304 km / 190 miles, they descended to the level of 30 meters / 100 feet. Around 14:32, the presenter reported that the missile was aimed at the target. The wingman confirmed this and the Exocet started. With the launch of the last missile, the participation of the 2nd Air Squadron in the conflict ended. Having carried out the launch, the Etendars turned around and, having refueled from the KS-130N, freely reached the Rio Grande.

Light aircraft carrier Invincible.

The Skyhawks continued to follow the Exocet after its launch and soon spotted a plume of thick smoke on the horizon. At a distance of 12 km / 7.5 miles, the first plane was shot down, a little closer to the target (at a distance of 2 km / 1.25 miles) the same thing happened with Castillo's plane (both pilots died). According to British data, the destroyer Exeter used the Sea Darts air defense system. In spite of everything, the surviving pilots managed to get to the target, drop bombs and shoot the entire ammunition load, after which, turning around and safely avoiding "meeting" with air defense systems, leave the danger zone without damage, refuel with KS-130N and return to Rio Grande 3 hours 47 minutes after departure. After the flight, the pilots described the ship they attacked as the Invincible aircraft carrier.

Note: The above does not correspond to the British version of the incident; the version given in the book “Falklands. Air War” is as follows: the ship successfully attacked by the Skyhawks was not the Invincible aircraft carrier, but the Avenger frigate. He used a white smoke screen as a cover and, in addition, the pilots mixed up the take-off decks of two completely different ships. None of the bombs dropped by the Skyhawks hit their target.

The problem with the British version is that the smoke seen by the pilots was not white, but black. It is also controversial that experienced pilots mistook the frigate's helipad for the flight deck of an aircraft carrier. It is also suspicious that the Invincible did not arrive at Port Stanley until almost two months later (in August), and upon its return to Portsmouth (September 17, 1982) it was obvious that its port side had undergone recent repairs.

The Argentine version says that the last Exocet anti-ship missile was aimed at the target ( big ship!) with absolute precision by the pilot of the Etendar, who, after launching it, turned the plane around and returned unhindered to Rio Grande. The 4th group, consisting of four Skyhawks, followed the course of the rocket and saw thick black smoke in the distance, most likely the cause of which was the hit of the Exocet. Then two of the four planes were shot down, but the surviving pilots claimed that they saw the steaming Invincible aircraft carrier, which they struck, without specifying its results.

In accordance with the British version, the rocket did not reach its intended target at all - the aircraft carrier, because. either sunk by a 114 mm shell from the Avenger frigate or neutralized by electronic warfare. In addition to the above, it is believed that it was not the Invincible that was attacked by the Skyhawks, but the nearby frigate, which, moreover, enveloped the aircraft carrier in white smoke in order to hide it from the attackers. Many experts claim that the Argentine pilots confused the take-off decks of the destroyer and the aircraft carrier and, in addition, mistook camouflage smoke for the trail of an Exocet hit.

No less revealing was the episode of the destruction of the destroyer "Coventry" by aircraft of the 5th Fighter Group of the Argentine Air Force.

Stormtrooper Skyhawk.

The main task of the 5th IG was to strike at two British ships (the destroyer Coventry and the frigate Broadsword), which were at that time to the north (Pebble Island) and were the vanguard of British ships in the San Carlos Strait. Both ships, especially the Coventry, accounted for a large number of events in the first days of the month: on May 3, a Lynx HAS.2 XZ242 helicopter based at the Coventry struck an Argentine patrol boat with two Sea Scua anti-submarine missiles. Alferez Sobral". Both missiles hit their target. The boat managed to stay afloat - even despite another Lynx attack from the destroyer Glasgow. On May 9, Sea Dart missiles fired from Coventry shot down a Puma helicopter (SA.330L Puma) of the 601st Argentine air battalion. The helicopter crew was killed. On the same day, three more Sea Darts were fired from the destroyer, this time directed against the Argentine Hercules aircraft, but they missed the target. From May 14, the ships Coventry and Broadsword carried out aerial reconnaissance. In addition, two Argentine Skyhawks were shot down from these ships. The crews of the downed aircraft were killed. The pilots of the Argentine Air Force (especially representatives of the 5th IG) could not remain indifferent to these events - the Coventry had to pay dearly for their actions.

The intention of the Argentinean command was to send two air units (three A-4B Skyhawks each) of the 5th IG to strike at Coventry and Broadsword around 14:00 local time. Given the proximity of the British ships to the Continent, it was decided to do without aerial refueling and, in addition, load each Skyho with three bombs weighing 454 kg / 1000 pounds each - a load practically impossible under normal circumstances. Due to technical problems two Skyhawks did not take part in the mission, and the lack of spare parts was a very serious problem.

Stormtrooper Skyhawk.

The flight took place at low altitude in the direction of the West Falklands. Soon, the Argentine aircraft were detected by the SI Wolfe system, which was equipped with the Broadsword frigate. The Sea Harriers were warned of the presence of Argentine aircraft, but they were ordered to leave the area, because. the Sea Wolf system that the Broadsword was equipped with could accidentally "hook" one of its aircraft. In addition, the Broadsword crew was aware of the Argentine aircraft through this same system. During the entry of the Argentines into the desired sector, they simultaneously entered the zone of action of the Sea Wolf missiles. However, the decision to fly in extreme proximity to each other played into the hands of the pilots: at that time, the distinguishing feature of the Sea Wolf missiles was to disrupt the attack if they could not locate the target. This is exactly what happened in this case: unsuccessfully trying to determine the target, the system stopped working, leaving the ship virtually incapable of defense. The Skyhawks attacked the destroyer and the frigate. After dropping their bombs and disengaging from the attack, they set back on their course.

The dropped bombs hit the frigate but did not explode. The destroyer Coventry was less fortunate. The Sea Dart system was unable to capture the Argentine aircraft attacking at a height of 10-15 m, and the missiles fired did not prevent the tragedy. The result of the attack (14.21 local time) by First Lieutenant Velasco (A-4B Skyhawk, serial number C-207), was that three bombs he dropped (weighing 454 kg / 1000 pounds each) hit the target at an angle of 45 degrees. The bombs passed through the deck and exploded inside the ship with great force: so the Argentine side took revenge by inflicting a fatal blow to the destroyer.

Destroyer Coventry.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the experience of the Falklands War was certainly used by the British and Americans in the anti-Iraq campaign. The same experience proves that professional soldiers are equally important for "high-tech" military branches and for modern infantry. Subdivisions and units of such fighters are capable of defeating any less trained, and therefore not so persistent, albeit numerous enemy. Difficult weather conditions, harsh climate and nature can also be used to achieve victory.

With more responsible planning of the Falklands operation, the Argentine command could have achieved impressive success. It should be noted that the equipment of the Argentine Air Force was worn out and not properly maintained. The "Super-Etandre" compound was not provided with a sufficient amount of anti-ship missiles. All this did not allow British ship groups to be attacked by anti-ship missiles from different courses at the same time and with the support of AWACS patrol aircraft. In addition, practical experience has shown that modern ships, in the design of which fire-dangerous light alloys are used, do not have sufficient survivability. The interception of anti-ship missiles flying at ultra-low altitude by air defense forces is extremely difficult. For effective detection of high-speed low-flying stealth targets, AWACS aviation systems are needed. Thus, it is assumed that the success of the Argentine side was quite possible. But the reality turned out to be different. Insufficiently secured operation, in fact, was a gamble that naturally led to the defeat and resignation of the ruling cabinet of Argentina. Some analogies with the present situation in Russia involuntarily suggest themselves.

In April 1982, an armed conflict broke out between two independent UN member states, which was closely watched by the whole world. The "hot spot" was not Southeast Asia and the Middle East - in the center of events was a small archipelago in the southwestern part of the Atlantic. Great Britain, which calls the archipelago the Falkland Islands, entered into battle with Argentina, which calls it the Malvinas Islands.

To the continental coast of Argentina from Falkland Islands only 463 kilometers, and to the UK - 12,000 kilometers.

In the history of the Falkland Islands, quite a lot controversial issues since their discovery. Great Britain adheres to the version that the archipelago was discovered in 1592 by an English navigator John Davies. According to an alternative version, the honor of discovery belonged to the Spaniards.

The first settlement in the Falklands was founded only in 1764 by a French navigator Louis Antoine de Bougainville. The settlement on the island of East Falkland was named Port Saint-Louis - today it is the capital of the archipelago and its largest settlement Port Stanley.

Captain John Byron. Portrait of artist Joshua Reynolds Photo: Public Domain

In 1765 an English captain John Byron, not bothering to make sure whether people live on the archipelago, declared it the property of the English crown. A year later, the first English settlement was established on Saunders Island.

Both the French and the British were attracted by the main advantage of the Falkland Islands - they can act as an excellent staging post on the way from the Atlantic and to Pacific Ocean, as well as being a stronghold for control of the South Atlantic.

England dictates its own rules

In 1766 France ceded the islands to Spain. The Spaniards, not wanting to tolerate the presence of the British, tried to drive them out by force, but in the end an agreement was reached according to which both British and Spanish settlements remained on the archipelago. At the same time, both Spain and Great Britain did not give up their claims to full control over the islands.

In the last quarter of the 18th century, the British left the islands as the empire's resources were focused on waging war against the North American colonists. On the islands, the British left only a sign that recorded the rights of Great Britain to manage the Falklands. The Spaniards, in turn, also leaving the tablet, left the islands in 1811. With the independence of Argentina, it was this country that claimed its rights to the archipelago instead of the Spaniards.

In 1832, Argentina tried to strengthen its own "vertical of power" on the islands by appointing its own governor. The official, however, was killed during the rebellion of local residents, who quickly got used to the practical independent existence. In 1834, the British, once again appreciating the strategic importance disputed territory, put an end to the freemen of the Falkland Islands - January 10, 1834 Lieutenant of Her Majesty's Navy Henry Smith raised the flag of Great Britain over the city of Port Louis.

Argentine claims

The Argentines did not have the opportunity to interfere with the British, but the islands were not abandoned. In the 1940s, at the time of the signing of the UN Charter, the British representative was surprised to learn from an Argentine diplomat that the Falkland Islands should come under the control of Buenos Aires.

But during the century of English domination, the small population of the islands (less than 3,000 people) became English-speaking, and did not seek to join Argentina. The locals were engaged in sheep breeding, supplying wool to the UK, and did not want to change anything.

Sluggish negotiations between the two countries lasted almost 40 years, but did not lead to anything.

By the early 1980s, Argentina was ruled by a military junta, and in 1981 General Leopoldo Galtieri. The dictator received the support of the United States, but in the country itself the power of the military was losing credibility. And then the general decided to play on patriotic feelings by returning the Malvinas Islands to Argentina.

Operation Rosario

On March 19, 1982, several dozen Argentine workers landed on the uninhabited island of South Georgia, administered from the Falkland capital Port Stanley and located 800 miles from the archipelago, under the pretext that they needed to dismantle an old whaling station. They raised the Argentine flag on the island.

Representatives of Great Britain considered this an encroachment on their territory, and sent a small detachment of the military to expel the workers. General Galtieri responded by sending the Argentine military to protect the workers.

The reason for the invasion was found. On April 2, 1982, the Argentine army carried out Operation Rosario - special forces and marines landed on the Falklands, and after a short battle captured the capital of the islands, Port Stanley. The Argentines lost one man killed and three wounded. No British were killed, but 114, including 70 Marines, were taken prisoner.

Argentina announced the return of the Malvinas Islands. On April 3, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 502, which demanded the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands. The resolution received 10 votes in favor and 1 vote against (Panama), 4 countries abstained (including the USSR).

Argentine landing on the islands. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The Iron Lady goes to war

The world asked the question - is the UK able to respond to force with force? Skeptics were even on the Foggy Albion itself. However, the prime minister Margaret Thatcher did not hesitate, ordering the military to prepare for an operation to regain control of the islands.

On April 7, 1982, the British Minister of Defense announced the establishment of a blockade of the Falkland Islands from April 12, 1982 and the establishment of a 200-mile zone around the islands, while staying within which the ships of the Argentine Navy and merchant fleet would be sunk. In response, the Argentine government imposed a ban on making payments to British banks.

English submarines went on the hunt for Argentine ships. The British surface fleet set off on a campaign to the coast of Argentina, carrying ground forces with it.

On April 25, 1982, British soldiers landed on the island of South Georgia, from which the conflict began. The Argentines on the island surrendered without a fight.

Big victims of a small war

On May 2, 1982, the British submarine Conqueror torpedoed the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. The submarine commander received the sanction for the attack personally from Margaret Thatcher. Together with the cruiser, 323 Argentine soldiers were killed.

This blow forced the Argentine command to withdraw its fleet. It was decided to focus on air strikes from bases on the mainland. The calculation was that in this way it would be possible to inflict unacceptable damage on the British.

On May 4, the Super Etandar attack aircraft of the Argentine Air Force hit the newest British destroyer Sheffield with an Exocet anti-ship missile. A fire broke out on board, killing 20 sailors. The destroyer sank a week later.

There was a pause. The British were preparing for the landing and cleared the approaches to the islands. British "commandos" successfully carried out sabotage, and attempts by the Argentine Air Force to strike from the air turned into aircraft losses.

Negotiations on a cessation of hostilities mediated by the UN have yielded nothing. The British were confident of military success, the Argentines did not lose hope of fighting back.

The wreckage of an Argentine Air Force aircraft. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The triumph of the pilot Kurilovich and the shame of Lieutenant Colonel Piaggi

On the night of May 21, 1982, the British 3rd Marine Brigade began landings in San Carlos Bay. The operation began successfully, but in the morning the area was attacked by the Argentine Air Force. The British lost the frigate Ardent, and a number of ships were damaged.

However, the pilots make a mistake - the blows mainly fell on the covering ships, and not on the landing force, which allowed the British to develop the operation on land.

On May 25, 1982, the Argentines achieved one of the biggest gains of the conflict. Argentine pilot Roberto Kurilovich hit the Atlantic Conveyor container ship, which sank with helicopters and equipment to create an airfield in the captured bridgehead.

The English infantry lost their main means of transportation on the island, where there were practically no roads. We had to advance on Port Stanley on foot. However, the destruction of the container ship could not radically change the balance of forces.

On May 28, the British units won a land battle for the village of Goose Green. Having lost 47 men killed and almost 150 wounded, without receiving reinforcements, the Argentine Lieutenant Colonel Italo Piaggi ordered his subordinates to lay down their arms. For this decision, upon returning to Argentina, he was demoted and dismissed from the army in disgrace.

Argentine magazine cover featuring Margaret Thatcher as a pirate. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The defeat of Argentina turned into the collapse of the military junta

On June 8, the Argentine Air Force launched an airstrike on two British landing craft left without cover. About 50 British were killed, and the landing ship "Sir Galahad" subsequently had to be flooded due to the damage it received.

However, two days later, British units blocked the Argentines in Port Stanley.

During June 12-14, the British stormed all the dominant heights in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe main city of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine command on the islands, finding itself in a hopeless situation, capitulated.

On June 20, 1982, the British landed on the South Sandwich Islands, finally completing the operation.

During the conflict, Argentina lost 649 people killed and missing, 11,000 were registered as prisoners of war. About 100 planes and helicopters, a cruiser, a submarine, and 4 transport ships were lost.

Britain lost 258 people killed. Fleet losses amounted to 2 frigates, 2 destroyers, 1 landing ship, 1 container ship, 24 helicopters and 10 aircraft.

In the UK, the victory caused a national upsurge - the inhabitants of Foggy Albion again felt like citizens of the “mistress of the seas”.

In Argentina, the defeat led to the fall of the regime of General Galtieri, who was arrested and put on trial.

British soldiers on the islands. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The war is over, the dispute remains

Immediately after the war, Great Britain took up the development of the infrastructure of the island - the construction of roads and a modern airfield. This was done primarily to meet military needs, so that new attempts to seize the archipelago by force were nipped in the bud.

In March 2013, the UK held a referendum in the Falkland Islands, but the question was: "Do you want the Falkland Islands to retain their political status as an overseas territory of the United Kingdom?"

1517 of the 1672 islanders with the right to vote participated in the will. In favor of maintaining the current situation, against - only three people.

However, Argentina did not give up its claims to the Malvinas Islands. The official Buenos Aires said that the referendum did not change the point of view of Argentina.

In 2012, on the eve of the Summer Olympics in London, Argentine athletes semi-underground filmed a commercial in the main city of the Falkland Islands, Port Stanley.

Such visual agitation caused delight in Argentina and anger in Great Britain.

The history of military confrontation manifests itself in the most unexpected way. So, at the 1986 FIFA World Cup in the Argentina-England match, the Argentinean Diego Maradona scored a goal with a handball. The judge did not notice this, Argentina won, and in the jubilant country, many regarded the victory as "revenge for the islands."

March of Argentine war veterans in 1982. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

In 2014, Argentine veterans of the 1982 war nearly lynched the crew of the popular British show Top Gear. Leading Jeremy Clarkson attached to his car license plates "H982 FKL", which the Argentines took as a mocking allusion to the war for the Falklands. And although the British assured that this was a pure coincidence, they had to urgently leave the country.

Since 2001, Argentina has celebrated the "Day of Veterans and Fallen in the Malvinas War" on April 2 every year. On this day, the Argentines remember the dead and pay tribute to the living participants in the battles. Argentina continues to believe that its flag will be flown over Port Stanley.

January 3rd, 2013

Read today's news: Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has sent an open letter to British Prime Minister David Cameron urging him to begin negotiations to return the Falkland Islands to Argentina, The Guardian reported on Thursday.

The letter is dedicated to the 180th anniversary of the annexation of the Falklands, located off the coast of Argentina. Kirchner uses the Spanish name for the islands and claims that "as a result of British colonial policy, the Malvinas Islands were taken by force from Argentina", which, in her opinion, dealt a blow to the country's territorial integrity. The President relies on the fact that in 1965 the UN General Assembly "unanimously, without a single vote against, adopted a resolution recognizing the annexation of the Malvinas Islands as the result of British colonialism and calling on countries to come to a settlement of the territorial dispute through negotiations."

The Argentine cruiser General Belgrano is wrecked after being hit by a torpedo from the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror on May 1, 1982. Argentine and Chilean courts managed to save 770 people while 323 were killed. (AP Photo)

In response to a letter, a copy of which was sent to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, David Cameron said that on this issue "the population of 3,000 in the Falklands mostly supports Britain." A referendum planned for March this year will decide whether the Falklands will remain a British Overseas Territory. Cameron assured that Britain would "respect and protect" the interests of the local population. Member of the Falkland Islands Legislative Assembly Barry Elsby backed the Prime Minister, saying that belonging to Britain is the choice of the Falklanders. Argentina also accuses Great Britain of expelling its citizens from the islands, the other side rejects such accusations.

The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, 14,000 kilometers away from Britain, are in fact the gateway to Antarctica, giving control over extremely resource-rich regions of the ocean. Disputes between Argentina and Great Britain about the ownership of the islands began at the beginning of the 19th century, when the first British settlers appeared on the islands. The fighting between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands began on April 2, 1982, lasted 74 days and ended in victory for the British crown. British oil companies in 2010 unilaterally began exploration for oil near the archipelago, which aggravated the conflict.

Argentine soldiers make military deliveries shortly after the invasion of the Falklands, April 13, 1982. (Daniel Garcia/AFP/Getty Images)

Militarily, the regime felt confident: the recently acquired French aircraft carrier as part of its air wing contained not only Skyhawks with bombs, but also the latest French Super-Etandars with Exocet anti-ship missiles, capable of, without entering the air defense zone of a detachment of warships, inflict a serious defeat on him. The success of aviation was ready to develop destroyers (EM) and guided missile frigates (FR URO). The Argentine military aviation grouping consisted of up to 200 units. The preparedness of the crews has traditionally had a high reputation. All this looked solid and could not but push the Argentine strategists to “tickle” old England.

At that time, the military-political leadership of Great Britain sought to improve the NSNF based on Trident missiles at the expense of the Navy. Because of this, the fleet barely makes ends meet; in 1982, both operating aircraft carriers, several ships of the main class, the most important elements of infrastructure, and a significant part of the personnel were reduced. Even without that, the positions of the "Mistress of the Seas" did not look convincing in comparison with France, and in a number of positions (in terms of the quality and quantity of surface ships of the main class) - and with Japan. In this regard, the leadership of the military department did not find it possible to either defend, let alone conquer the Falklands back. There is no doubt that these difficulties and moods in Great Britain were known to the Argentine side. Nevertheless, in April 1982, a solid contingent of British troops landed on the archipelago with light attack aircraft and helicopters. At the same time, the British also took South Georgia.

Gunsmiths prepare torpedoes on the British aircraft carrier HMS Hermes as Sea King helicopters watch for the possible arrival of Argentine submarines, May 26, 1982. (AFP/Getty Images)

The British ships had to overcome 6000-8000 miles to areas completely devoid of any signs of coastal basing. Approximately in the middle of the deployment route was the last piece of land used as a rear base - Ascension Island. Here the main forces of the 317th OS of the Royal Navy were assembled, after which Rear Admiral John Woodward reported to the commander of the Navy, Admiral J. Fieldhouse, who headed the specially created headquarters, the decision on the operation, later known as "Corporate". At the same time, planning was carried out, briefings on all types of databases, supplies, briefings, orientation, preliminary assignment of tasks to the forces, final acceptance of supplies in the parking lot on the roads. Further, all work took place in open ocean usually on the go.

A British soldier checks the area with binoculars, next to him is an anti-missile battery in case of an air attack, May 25, 1982. (AFP/Getty Images)

The basis of the OS Commander's decision was that all actions, including the capture of the Falkland Islands, should be completed no later than mid-June. Later, hydrometeorological conditions were incompatible not only with maintaining a database, but also simply with the presence of ships and aircraft in these waters, providing fire support and providing forces on the coast. By counting back, taking the minimum time necessary for landing operations on the coast, the maximum date for the start of the landing was determined on May 20-21.

In the same way, the timing of the arrival of the British OS in the theater (in the general exclusive zone) on May 1 was determined to gain dominance at sea and superiority in the air.
The first shots of this war were fired, and the account of losses opened on the island of South Georgia, where the Argentine submarine Santa Fe was disabled and captured by a specially allocated tactical group of ships and the British flag was raised.

The completion of the deployment is marked by a series of air strikes on the airfields of Port Stanley and Goose Green. First, on the night of May 1, a Vulcan strategic bomber from Ascension Island bombed Port Stanley from a high altitude. Success with the dawn was developed by the deck-based Sea Harriers. At that time, surface ships were shelling coastal targets and conducting a control search for enemy submarines. In the ensuing air battles, the Argentine aviation had an almost 10-fold superiority, but the British Sea Harriers were superior in efficiency to the Sidewinders in service with the Argentine Air Force. The main task of the first day was the covert landing of the task force of special forces to reconnoiter enemy positions and select the location of the future landing.

The struggle for supremacy at sea unfolded according to classical canons and with great severity. The Argentine fleet, having completed its combat deployment in advance, embraced with its battle order the arrived British OS from two sides - from the northeast and from the southwest. Massive use of coastal-based aviation was envisaged as distraction and support strikes.

English submarines were unable to detect enemy surface ships. When the submarine "Conqueror" finally detects the Argentine cruiser, overlays begin associated with the imperfection of the control of the submarine, as well as the difficulty of tracking surface ships in shallow water. Nevertheless, the Argentine cruiser was sunk as a result of a torpedo attack.

It is generally accepted that it was the loss of the cruiser that forced the Argentine command to return the fleet to the bases. In fact, the Argentine sailors were burning with a thirst for revenge, but the weather prevented the fatal blow to the English OS. The Argentine fleet returned to bases and did not leave territorial waters anymore.

Thick smoke rises from the British frigate HMS Antelope in Ajax Bay on May 24, 1982. Four Argentine A-4B Skyhawks attacked a British frigate the day before. During the attack, a bomb was dropped on the ship, which British technicians unsuccessfully tried to neutralize. It exploded, starting a fire and killing 2 crew members. (AP Photo/Tom Smith)

Judging by the losses, the greatest intensity of the database is reached with the beginning of the landing, because it was far from gaining air superiority and the problem was solved by simply “grinding” Argentine aircraft, rushing to the landing area and the anchorage of landing ships and transports.

An Argentine soldier walks past the wreckage of a downed British military aircraft in Darwin. (Reuters/Eduardo Farre)

The landing itself on May 21 went smoothly and without losses, but by May 25 total number sunk British ships reaches four units, almost all other ships have multiple combat damage. The price is quite high, although it was possible to save all the landing and transport ships, especially with the landing, as well as aircraft carriers. The losses were also due to the inefficiency of the Rapira air defense system. The losses of the British in the ship composition here could have been incomparably more severe if the Argentine air command had shown more skill and enterprise in commanding forces.

At the same time, this air offensive in the antiamphibious direction, as well as previous airborne strikes, cost the Argentine Air Force and Navy at least a third of all combat-ready aviation and the loss of the most experienced pilots. It was at this moment that the command of the Argentine Air Force recognized its aviation forces as undermined, and a similar price for the Falklands was unacceptable. Leaving, the Argentine aviation, as they say, loudly slammed the door.

We are talking about the defeat of the Atlantic Conveyor container ship converted into air transport. In a well-planned raid by the Argentinean Super Etandars, timed to coincide with the national holiday of Argentina, a container ship with radar visibility similar to the Hermes took on the blow of two Exocets. One missile immediately aimed at him, the second, being taken away from the Hermes, also aimed at the container ship and finished it off. The ship was packed to capacity with the most valuable cargo for the expeditionary forces: three heavy Chinook helicopters, five Wessex helicopters, a solid supply of cluster bombs for the Harriers, equipment for quickly creating a runway in Carlos Bay, a huge amount of spare parts for helicopters, supplies and equipment. In addition, the container ship, being specially converted according to the mobilization plan, served as the third flight deck in the OS.

However, the bridgehead was already captured, the troops and equipment were on the shore, and as for the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, it was an unpleasant, but not a defining moment. The aircraft carriers were saved - and this is the main thing. Despite the delays, the actions of the British troops on the coast developed successfully, and by mid-June the enemy capitulated.

Argentine soldiers take up positions in Port Howard. (Reuters/Eduardo Farre)

Even two decades later, there is no complete clarity on the issue of the losses of Great Britain and Argentina. We are not talking about absolute accuracy - it would be nice to determine at least the order of losses.

A frigate sprays water on the damaged HMS Sheffield, 28 May 1982. The Sea King helicopter is hovering in the air at this time, providing safety. Two Argentine Super Etendard attack aircraft attacked a missile ship, starting a fire that lasted several days until HMS Sheffield sank completely, killing 20 people. (AP Photo/Press Association/Martin Cleaver)

On May 27, the UK Department of Defense reported that 109 people had died by that date. The Argentines acknowledged the loss of only 92, although three times as many died on one Belgrano. At the end of the war, the British announced the following figures: about 200 British were killed and about 300 wounded. The Argentine armed forces lost about 1,300 people killed. In the future, the losses of the British "grew", the Argentines, respectively, "decreased".

There was a figure of 230-236 British dead, incl. 120 in the ground forces, the number of dead Argentines is estimated at 750 people and this number has been "fixed" in all Western sources. Then the "final" number of British dead was called the figure of 250 people, more precisely 255-256 people, including: the Royal Navy lost eighty-seven people, the Royal Marines - twenty-six, the Merchant Navy - nine and the Royal Auxiliary Fleet - seven.

15-20 years after the war, 258 people were declared dead by the UK, incl. 3 inhabitants of the islands. The maximum number of British casualties that I have come across was 286 men.

Argentine POWs walk past a burning building at Port Stanley during the last days of the Argentine occupation of the southern islands. (AP Photo/J. Leonard)

Argentine losses are sometimes estimated at both 712 and 700 killed, there were figures of 690 killed and 176 wounded, but the official Argentine figure is 655 dead.

Full statistics on losses in manpower and equipment

The Falklands War was literally a gift for Prime Minister Thatcher. Or rather, not the war itself, but its result. In the early 1980s, the British economy was in a fever and the victory in the war greatly strengthened Thatcher's popularity and allowed her to stay in power until 1990. The war was no less a gift for the military: defense spending increased sharply. There was a decisive rejection of the old military doctrine, thanks to it, if Argentina had attacked in 1983, Great Britain would have lost the war. The carriers would have been sold, the massive drawdowns that had already begun in November 1981 and would have peaked in the spring of 1982 would have rendered the Royal Navy incapable of winning the battle for the Falklands. At least the way it actually happened.

Immediately after the war, the government declined responsibility for the war that had begun so timely. On July 6, 1982, Lord Franks was appointed chairman of a special committee of the Privy Council to investigate the causes of the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands. On January 18, 1983, the Franks Report was published, exonerating Margaret Thatcher's government of responsibility for the Argentine military junta's decision to invade the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982.

Another echo of the war in the South Atlantic was the process of disclosure of documents shedding light on the events of May 2, 1982. February 11, 1985 Former British Ministry of Defense official Clive Ponting is acquitted in a case involving disclosure of documents relating to the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands War.

Argentine POWs at Port Stanley, June 17, 1982. By the end of the conflict, over 11,000 Argentines had been taken prisoner.

Unable to stop the political and economic crisis in the country, the general began to prepare the departure of the military and destroy all evidence of repression, as well as demand amnesty from the democratic forces for all war crimes.

Raul Alfonsin became the first democratic president of Argentina in many years. He began trials of the military, almost all the highest ranks received a term. But the army was not going to give up: the first uprising against President Alfonsin was raised by Colonel Aldo Rico, a participant in the Falklands War, on April 15, 1985, at a military base in Campo Mayo. Although the instigators of the rebellion were arrested, the military managed to achieve a law according to which all persons involved in repressions below the rank of colonel were declared "executing orders." Concessions provoked the military to new performances. Only Aldo Rico was under house arrest, he immediately raised a new rebellion in mid-January 1988. On January 17, Rico surrendered, but they treated him rather mildly: a term with the ability to communicate by phone and good conditions of detention. The uprising in December 1988 ended with an increase in military salaries and no one was even arrested.

Finally, the new president of Argentina, Carlos Menem, will sign an amnesty order on October 5, 1989, and many generals will be free. The uprising on December 3, 1990 was crushed, but Menema signed a general amnesty on December 29, 1990.

On July 11, 1982, Argentina, and the next day Great Britain, would de facto declare the end of the war. About 5 thousand British soldiers were left on the islands. On June 27, 1983, the British Secretary of Defense announces £215 million for the construction of an airport in the Falkland Islands.

In October 1989, consular relations were restored between Great Britain and Argentina, and since February 1990 diplomatic relations have been fully restored.

Mass grave of 30 Argentine soldiers after the Battle of Darwin. On June 14, 1982, Argentine troops left the island, having been defeated by the British. (AP Photo/Martin Cleaver)

September 27, 1995 Great Britain and Argentina enter into an agreement to develop oil and gas fields in the South Atlantic southwest of the Falkland Islands. Mining supervision is entrusted to a joint commission.

The conflict broke out with new force when huge mineral deposits were discovered in the contested area. Oil reserves are estimated at 60 billion barrels of oil, and natural gas reserves at 9 trillion cubic meters. In February 2010, British oil companies began exploration and production of oil from the floating drilling platform Ocean Guardian, located 100 km north of the islands. This caused a wave of protest in Argentina and economic retaliatory measures on its part.

Argentine Falklands War veteran José Luis Aparasio holds a picture of himself (right) and his comrade (left) after they were captured by British forces at the Battle of Mount Longdon on June 12, 1982. The photo above was taken in La Plata, Argentina on March 20, 2007. (Reuters/Enrique Marcarian)

Among the latter, one can name the December decision of the countries of the South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) to ban the entry into their ports of ships flying the flag of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

Shortly thereafter, on January 19, British Prime Minister David Cameron accused Argentina of colonializing the Falkland Islands, to which Buenos Aires indignantly stated that the words about "colonialism" from the lips of the British sounded especially offensive, since "history perfectly demonstrates their attitude to everything world” (today, about 50 of the approximately 200 countries of the world annually celebrate the day of independence from British rule). At the same time, Cameron approved an urgent plan to strengthen the country's military grouping.

sources
http://nvo.ng.ru
http://historiwars.narod.ru
http://m.ria.ru/world/20130103/917061244.html

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And I want to remind you how as a result of the war.

The Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina was one of the most notable events in British foreign policy XX century. This is the reign of Margaret Thatcher (1979 to 1990).

Below is information about the islands and the history of the conflict.

The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands are an archipelago in the southwestern Atlantic Ocean with a total area of ​​12.2 thousand square kilometers. Consists of two major islands- East Falkland (Soledad) and West Falkland (Gran Malvina) - and about 200 small islands and rocks.

The Falkland Islands are located 13,000 kilometers from Great Britain and 400 kilometers from Argentina.

The islands were discovered in 1591-1592 by the English navigator John Davis. Since 1765 belonged to Spain.

In 1820, after declaring independence from Spain, the United Provinces of La Plata (future Argentina) claimed their rights to the Falklands, which the Spaniards called the Malvinas Islands. In 1829, an Argentine military governor was landed on their territory with a small detachment of soldiers. In 1833, English ships arrived on the islands and declared the archipelago a British possession, and the Argentines who were on it were taken to their homeland.

Since the 1960s, Argentina has increased its diplomatic activity for the elimination of the colonial regime in the Falklands and the extension of its sovereignty to the islands. This problem was even considered at a UN meeting, and the majority spoke in favor of decolonization.

In 1972, Argentina built an airfield and installed telephone connection. Scientific cooperation began in 1976. But the government of England did not give the Falklanders equal rights with the inhabitants of Great Britain and even denied them the right to own property on the islands. Relations escalated when, in 1975, the British government sent a commission headed by Lord Shelkton to the Falklands to study

After the Conservatives led by Margaret Thatcher came to power in May 1979, Anglo-Argentine relations deteriorated, negotiations in New York in April-May 1980 came to a standstill.

The diplomatic solution of the territorial dispute seemed impossible to the military government of Argentina, headed by President General Leopoldo Galtieri, and it moved to decisive action.

On March 19, 1982, on the island of South Georgia, a desert island administered from the Falkland capital Port Stanley and located 800 miles from the archipelago, several dozen Argentine workers landed on the pretext that they needed to dismantle an old whaling station. They raised the Argentine flag on the island.

English soldiers tried to expel the Argentines, but troops came to the aid of the workers.

On April 2, 1982, Argentine troops also landed on the Falkland Islands. A company of 80 British Marines stationed at Port Stanley, on the orders of Governor Rex Hunt, capitulated without resistance. Galtieri appointed the commander of the Argentine Expeditionary Force, General Mario Menendoz, as the new governor. England on the same day broke off diplomatic relations with Argentina.

On April 3, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling on the parties to resolve the conflict over the Falklands through negotiations. England demanded the withdrawal of Argentine troops as a condition for the start of negotiations. Buenos Aires, agreeing to negotiations, refused to withdraw troops.

On April 5, a British squadron of 40 ships headed by the Hermes and Invisible aircraft carriers with a 10,000 expeditionary force on board sailed from Portsmouth (USA) to the South Atlantic.

On April 7, the British Secretary of Defense announced that starting from April 12, the British fleet would sink all Argentine ships that were within a radius of 200 miles (over 320 kilometers) and closer to the Falkland Islands. Argentina responded by calling in reservists and deploying additional troops to the islands. The airfield at Port Stanley began to be converted to receive military aircraft.

On April 25, the British squadron landed troops on the island of South Georgia, which captured the Argentine garrison without a fight.

On April 30, England imposed a complete military and naval blockade of the Falklands. British aviation from aircraft carriers attacked the positions of the Argentines on the islands, disabled both airfields and damaged several enemy combat aircraft and helicopters.

On May 2, a submarine sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, which was outside the 200-mile exclusion zone declared by the British. 386 crew members were killed. Argentine aircraft sank the British destroyer Sheffield on the same day, killing 30 people. The British government gave Argentina an ultimatum to withdraw Argentine troops from the Falklands within 48 hours. The ultimatum was not accepted, and on May 2 an English frigate sank an Argentine tanker.

In mid-May, British commandos raided Pebble Island and destroyed the enemy planes and weapons depots located there. On May 17 and 21, the British side demanded the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands within 14 days. Argentina again refused. On May 21, British troops landed in the Falklands. The operation involved 22,000 soldiers, two aircraft carriers, seven destroyers, seven landing ships, three nuclear submarines, 40 Harrier VTOL fighters and 35 helicopters. Two days later, the British captured the villages of Port Darwin and Goose Green on East Falkland Island.

On May 26, the Argentine government proposed to withdraw the troops of both sides to their bases within 30 days and transfer the islands to the United Nations for the period of negotiations. The British did not respond to the Argentine proposals.

On June 14, a ceasefire was reached, and on June 15, the 10,000-strong Argentine garrison, led by General Menendos, capitulated.

Shortly after the surrender, President Galtieri resigned. Power in Argentina passed to a civilian government. General Galtieri was sentenced to 12 years in prison for starting a war with England, of which he served seven.

As a result of the war over the Falklands, British sovereignty was restored.

The main vector of force in the post-war period at the geopolitical level shifted to the ocean areas - and not only because of the deployment of NSNF there. However, with all the scope and scale of weapons and the level of confrontation, none of the countries had a full-fledged combat experience in the use of the Navy until the Falklands conflict between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982, which bears signs of a real naval war.

For specialists, the Falklands crisis made it possible to verify with a high degree of certainty the correctness of the basic concepts and directions in the construction of fleets, the development of naval weapons, as well as techniques and methods of combat operations (BM) at sea.

POLITICAL AND OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC CONDITIONS OF THE CONFLICT

The origin of military conflicts has always been a confusing and ambiguous matter. Falkland is no exception. Falkland, or in the Argentine version - the Malvinas Islands, formally devoid of minerals and located in places with a harsh climate, remote from busy international sea ​​routes, barely fed a few thousand sheep and a bunch of extreme farmers.

The infrastructure of the archipelago corresponds to its abandonment. It has several runways that are not capable of serving modern jet aircraft, and weakly advanced system sea ​​based.

What really sparked the conflict? It will not be a big mistake to say that it owes its origin to the game of great political ambitions. In Argentina, another paramilitary regime came to power with election slogans and promises of a nationalist nature, among which the return of Malvin (disputed territory) also appeared.

Militarily, the regime felt confident: the recently acquired French aircraft carrier as part of its air wing contained not only Skyhawks with bombs, but also the latest French Super-Etandars with Exocet anti-ship missiles, capable of, without entering the air defense zone of a detachment of warships, inflict a serious defeat on him. The success of aviation was ready to develop destroyers (EM) and guided missile frigates (FR URO).

Argentine military aviation grouping consisted of up to 200 units. The preparedness of the crews has traditionally had a high reputation. All this looked solid and could not but push the Argentine strategists to “tickle” old England.

At that time, the military-political leadership of Great Britain sought to improve the NSNF based on Trident missiles at the expense of the Navy. Because of this, the fleet barely makes ends meet; in 1982, both operating aircraft carriers, several ships of the main class, the most important elements of infrastructure, and a significant part of the personnel were reduced. Even without that, the positions of the "Mistress of the Seas" did not look convincing compared to France, and in a number of positions (in terms of the quality and quantity of surface ships of the main class) - and with Japan.

In this regard, the leadership of the military department did not find it possible to either defend, let alone conquer the Falklands back. There is no doubt that these difficulties and moods in Great Britain were known to the Argentine side. Nevertheless, in April 1982, a solid contingent of British troops landed on the archipelago with light attack aircraft and helicopters. At the same time, the British also took South Georgia.

The archipelago was located less than 400 miles from the mainland of Argentina, while it was 8,000 miles from the metropolis. The Antarctic winter was approaching, no more than two months remained before its onset. In a word, not the best time and place for hostilities and even ordinary navigation. But, despite unsuitable conditions, the first sea lord of Great Britain, Admiral Henry Leach, requested permission from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to begin the formation of a task force (OS) to be sent to the South Atlantic.

PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF COMBAT ACTIONS

At the stage of mobilization and deployment, the formation of the vanguard of the OS began from the position of the planned exercise "Springtrain" in Gibraltar at the expense of participating ships. They were 2,000 miles closer to the conflict. The deployment began under the flag of the commander of the 1st Surface Flotilla, Rear Admiral Woodward. The rest of the OS forces soon gathered.

The first in the general exclusive zone within which it was possible to conduct hostilities against Argentina were three nuclear submarines(PLA) of the Royal Navy. It was believed that this was more than enough to materially consolidate the declared blockade of the islands, which Argentina did not get tired of feeding with new contingents of forces.

In addition to the PLA grouping, the British Expeditionary Force included two more: a strike group (UG) with two light aircraft carriers in the core and an amphibious formation (AG). Subsequently, a grouping of floating rear services will also stand out in the area of ​​​​the database.

The British ships had to cover 6,000-8,000 miles to areas completely devoid of any signs of shore-based deployment. Approximately in the middle of the deployment route was the last piece of land used as a rear base - Ascension Island. Here the main forces of the 317th OS of the Royal Navy were assembled, after which Rear Admiral John Woodward reported to the commander of the Navy, Admiral J. Fieldhouse, who headed the specially created headquarters, the decision on the operation, later known as "Corporate".

At the same time, planning was carried out, briefings on all types of databases, supplies, briefings, orientation, preliminary assignment of tasks to the forces, final acceptance of supplies in the parking lot on the roads. Further, all work took place in the open ocean, as a rule, on the move.

On April 18, the fleet continued to deploy. Admiral Fieldhouse will fly to London to defend there, at the highest level, the plan of operation adopted near the "front line", defending every point of it, without which it is impossible to manage a war taking place 8,000 miles from the Admiralty.

The basis of the OS Commander's decision was that all actions, including the capture of the Falkland Islands, should be completed no later than mid-June. Later, hydrometeorological conditions were incompatible not only with maintaining a database, but also simply with the presence of ships and aircraft in these waters, providing fire support and providing forces on the coast.

By counting back, taking the minimum time necessary for landing operations on the coast, the maximum date for the beginning of the landing was determined on May 20–21. In the same way, the timing of the arrival of the British OS in the theater (in the general exclusive zone) on May 1 was determined to gain dominance at sea and superiority in the air.

The first shots of this war were fired, and the account of losses opened on the island of South Georgia, where the Argentine submarine Santa Fe was disabled and captured by a specially allocated tactical group of ships and the British flag was raised.

The completion of the deployment is marked by a series of air strikes on the airfields of Port Stanley and Goose Green. First, on the night of May 1, a Vulcan strategic bomber from Ascension Island bombed Port Stanley from a high altitude. Success with the dawn was developed by the deck-based Sea Harriers.

At that time, surface ships were shelling coastal targets and conducting a control search for enemy submarines. In the ensuing air battles, the Argentine aviation had an almost 10-fold superiority, but the British Sea Harriers were superior in efficiency to the Sidewinders in service with the Argentine Air Force. The main task of the first day was the covert landing of the task force of special forces to reconnoiter enemy positions and select the location of the future landing.

The struggle for supremacy at sea unfolded according to classical canons and with great severity. The Argentine fleet, having completed its combat deployment in advance, embraced with its battle order the arrived British OS from two sides - from the northeast and from the southwest. Massive use of coastal-based aviation was envisaged as distraction and support strikes.

English submarines could not detect enemy surface ships. When, finally, the submarine "Conqueror" detects the Argentine cruiser, overlays begin associated with the imperfection of the control of the submarine, as well as the difficulty of tracking surface ships in shallow water. Nevertheless, the Argentine cruiser was sunk as a result of a torpedo attack.

It is generally accepted that it was the loss of the cruiser that forced the Argentine command to return the fleet to the bases. In fact, the Argentine sailors were burning with a thirst for revenge, but the weather prevented the fatal blow to the English OS. The Argentine fleet returned to bases and did not leave territorial waters anymore.

Formally, the struggle for supremacy at sea could be considered over at this point, but the bitterness in the confrontation of forces does not subside. Attack Argentine aviation comes to the fore, and the English fleet begins to suffer significant losses. The destroyer Sheffield, can be considered, was lost due to the bungling of his command. Being in the air defense-missile defense patrol, the radars were turned off on it, readiness was reduced, the ship did not keep watch in the information exchange and warning networks in order to obtain good quality radio communications with London.

As a result, the Argentines shot him with cruise missiles from low-flying Etanders. After 10 days, the Glasgow of the same type, which survived in that attack and showed itself from the very best side, was seriously damaged. After that, the OS command had doubts about the effectiveness of their best Sea Dart and Sea Wolf air defense systems.

Judging by the losses, the greatest intensity of the database is reached with the beginning of the landing, because it was far from gaining air superiority and the problem was solved by simply “grinding” Argentine aircraft, rushing to the landing area and the anchorage of landing ships and transports.

The landing itself on May 21 went smoothly and without losses, but by May 25 the total number of British ships sunk reached four units, almost all other ships had multiple combat damage. The price is quite high, although it was possible to save all the landing and transport ships, especially with the landing, as well as aircraft carriers. The losses were also due to the inefficiency of the Rapira air defense system. The losses of the British in the ship composition here could have been incomparably more severe if the Argentine air command had shown more skill and enterprise in commanding forces.

At the same time, this air offensive in the antiamphibious direction, as well as previous airborne strikes, cost the Argentine Air Force and Navy at least a third of all combat-ready aviation and the loss of the most experienced pilots. It was at this moment that the command of the Argentine Air Force recognized its aviation forces as undermined, and a similar price for the Falklands was unacceptable. Leaving, the Argentine aviation, as they say, loudly slammed the door.

We are talking about the defeat of the Atlantic Conveyor container ship converted into air transport. In a well-planned raid by the Argentinean Super Etandars, timed to coincide with the national holiday of Argentina, a container ship with radar visibility similar to the Hermes took on the blow of two Exocets. One missile immediately aimed at him, the second, being taken away from the Hermes, also aimed at the container ship and finished it off.

The ship was packed to capacity with the most valuable cargo for the expeditionary forces: three heavy Chinook helicopters, five Wessex helicopters, a solid supply of cluster bombs for the Harriers, equipment for quickly creating a runway in Carlos Bay, a huge amount of spare parts for helicopters, supplies and equipment. In addition, the container ship, being specially converted according to the mobilization plan, served as the third flight deck in the OS.

However, the bridgehead was already captured, the troops and equipment were on the shore, as for the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, it was an unpleasant, but not a defining moment. The aircraft carriers were saved - and this is the main thing. Despite the delays, the actions of the British troops on the coast developed successfully, and by mid-June the enemy capitulated.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER AND MANAGEMENT IN OPERATION

The role of the commander in any campaign or operation is decisive or close to it. In such a complex and specific operation as this one, especially. Despite the fact that there was a conflict between the leading edge of the ocean theater of operations with the Admiralty.

The case of Admiral Woodward is a special one, psychologically exacerbated by the fact that he was in a "suspended state" almost until the end of the operation - something like an interim commander. Cunning chiefs kept him "on tiptoe", at any moment ready to replace a more experienced and "worthy" "two-star" admiral. This did not prevent, however, the Admiralty from "reaping" juice from Woodward in full.

But in case of success - as it happened - the British Admiralty had a reason to modestly look down to notice that the case with Woodward only confirms that each of them, even the youngest admiral, suddenly “pulled out” from any place, is ready to lead the expeditionary force and win the war where anywhere, even on the other side of the world.

To the credit of Admiral Woodward, he adequately endured this difficult psychological test, demonstrating the features and qualities of a real admiral. What is the burden of responsibility of the commander? Even at the deployment stage, people are washed overboard by a storm, helicopters fall into the water, they almost shot down a regular liner, mistaking it for the daily annoying Argentine reconnaissance aircraft. The admiral certainly remembers this with a shudder to this day.

It is now customary to say about Woodward that he conducted the first ever computer war at sea. This can be understood in different ways. The author of these lines, at that time “flying” on his project 671RTM nuclear-powered ship between the Persian and Aden Gulfs, the Seychelles and the adjacent seas, is closer and more memorable to such a feature of computer weapons as its reliability.

Unreasonably complex and not yet reliable enough, these systems drove specialists and commanders into a stupor by themselves. And then there is the constant lack of cooling, the accompanying 100% humidity, sea salt, which instantly appears on the contacts and connectors. Meanwhile, the salvo of the main weapon and the salvo for self-defense must follow in time and inevitably, and not when the specialists are ready, restarting the system twice, four times.

Therefore, I will never forget my calculators and acousticians - specialists from God. Behind them there was never a delay and even a hitch. In the Falklands, such problems cost the lives of ships and people, it is enough to recall the circumstances of the defeat of the destroyer Coventry.

To what extent could the commander influence this problem? In any case, he did not remain indifferent, continuously improving the elements of battle formation, techniques and methods for solving air defense and missile defense problems. You should start by making a decision for the operation - with an absolute shortage of data, as they say, "a decision in the saddle." The quality of his decision, as well as the subsequent planning of the database, is evidenced by the fact that practically not a single point of it was challenged in the Admiralty. The implementation of this plan, which did not allow a retreat in terms of more than one day, reveals another character trait of the commander: firmness in the implementation of the war plan. Behind this firmness is scrupulousness in the implementation of the entire list of activities that allow timely transition to the next stage of action.

A lot in the nature and style of the admiral's command is evidenced by his attitude towards the direct or indirect culprits of the heavy losses of the fleet, such as the commander of the Sheffield destroyer - an example of frankly out-of-the-ordinary bungling - and the Coventry destroyer, whose uncoordinated maneuvering at the time of the Argentine attack blocked the air defense system firing director "Sea Wolf" from the "Diamond", which led to the breakthrough of the Argentine aircraft and the infliction of a fatal defeat on the "Coventry".

Woodward left behind them the right to the accumulated combat fatigue and its consequences. In addition, the actions of the Coventry, its commander and crew before that were beyond praise, impeccable and courageous. Woodward is characterized by his willingness to fight with the forces that he has, and the determination to defend his opinion "above".

The inflexibility and iron will of the commander in achieving the goal was especially evident in the conduct of mine reconnaissance of passages to the landing point by warships. He understood that the main events of the war would unfold after the landing. It is impossible not to note the endurance of the British commander when he kept the aircraft carriers outside the revealed reach of the Argentine Etanders, not succumbing to the excitement of battle.

Military losses amounted to:

Great Britain- 258 people, 2 frigates, 2 destroyers, 1 container ship, 1 landing ship, 1 landing boat.

Argentina- 649 people, 1 cruiser, 1 submarine, 1 patrol boat, 4 transport ships, 1 fishing trawler.

And in conclusion of this analysis of the role and place of the commander, it remains to recall once again the historical burden of his most complex and responsible mission. For the first time in 37 peaceful post-war years, it was Admiral Woodward who had to uphold the bar of the British Navy, the British sailor, the British admiral. And one more important conclusion. The training system for ship commanders, with their universal service, has fully justified itself.

LESSONS, CONCLUSIONS AND REVELATIONS

The abundance of factual material provided by the experience of this war for the purpose of improving the programs for building the fleet, its weapons, methods and methods of using the forces of the fleet, turned out to be in demand. maritime powers completely different. Oddly enough, to the maximum extent - the US Navy, to a much lesser extent - by us and the UK.

The Falklands confirmed the assumption that a high-intensity conflict, where at least one of the participants is a nuclear power, is likely to develop in a non-nuclear variant. The question arose about the sufficiency and level of armament of the tactical plan.

The cunning of post-war shipbuilding, believing that it solved the age-old weight problem through the use of light alloys for superstructures and other structures, when much larger volumes of weapons became available in a limited displacement, cost the English sailors dearly. In all cases of combat damage to ships, heavy fires occurred. The light metal of the superstructures burned and melted, making it extremely difficult to extinguish fires. Could not stand the fire and polymer finishing materials.

Nuclear submarines looked surprisingly pale against the background of other forces, especially their search and strike capabilities. The conclusions were drawn immediately: now anti-ship missiles are deployed even on diesel and non-nuclear submarines using torpedo tubes.

The conflict has clearly confirmed that the greatest danger is air attack weapons (AOS) capable of operating at low and ultra-low altitudes. A whole arsenal of naval air defense systems in the British fleet (at least four types) did not provide guaranteed protection against low-flying air defense systems. Without an early warning system, the fleet has nothing to do at sea today.

The Americans drew conclusions and created the Aegis system, which, through persistent improvement, turned into a missile defense weapon. At the heart of the very concept of a database, they have Avaks and Hawkeyes constantly hanging over land and sea.

The lessons of the crisis very frankly raise the question of the relevance and superiority of weapons systems over the most advanced unitary models as an approach to solving combat missions. Night flight equipment, a more advanced radar and American Sidewinder missiles provided the Sea Harrier with air superiority over the most modern Argentine aircraft, recently acquired in France, Sweden, and Israel. In the United States, soon after the conflict, highly effective reconnaissance and strike systems appeared everywhere.

The onset of a torpedo crisis could be distinguished even then, during the database on the Falklands. Due to the uncertainty about the reliability of the new Tigerfish torpedoes, the only target in the war sunk by underwater weapons had to be attacked with a World War II weapon - the MK-8 torpedo. Yes, and the Argentine submarine, armed with American MK-37 torpedoes, was pursued by failures.

The anti-submarine effectiveness of the OS turned out to be unexpectedly low. The Argentine submarine “jumped” among the English ships for quite a long time and allegedly even tried to attack them. But no one found her!

Why is this experience interesting for us, then and now? It should not be forgotten that the Navy and the Royal Navy were united by the fact that they solved the most important problem of aircraft in a similar way. Phenomenon combat aircraft with vertical and short takeoff and landing was achieved only by the UK and the USSR. Even the United States, with its unlimited aerospace potential, has failed in this field.

This promised unprecedented dividends in the field of naval armaments. There was no need to get involved in an exhausting, ruinous and, in general, hopeless race to build and arm giant aircraft carriers. The problem of acquiring a balanced fleet for a significant period of time received a chance to be implemented almost in a mobilization version.

Previously considered not quite a full-fledged combat aircraft with a short takeoff and vertical landing, when working in the system, it easily achieved superiority over the “full-fledged” modern enemy combat vehicles. Of course, the Harrier turned out to be noticeably better than our Yak-38, primarily due to the powerful single engine. But on the way, we already had not just the best, but fundamentally new machines of this type, including supersonic ones, which promised great prospects.

The monstrous inconsistency in the construction of the fleet, resulting from a perverted structure, did not allow the Navy to acquire carrier-based aviation as a branch of forces on an ongoing basis and finally achieve the coveted balance. Life shows that the world is returning to this idea.

The Royal Navy will be out of reach with the commissioning of the new aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth, destroyers of the 45 type (Daring) and new multi-purpose submarines with new weapons announced on them. After all, he is still armed with the most advanced naval thinking, which was convincingly confirmed by the results and results of the Falklands crisis.