Islands that are the subject of territorial disputes. The disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea: reference

On the night of June 9, a Chinese Navy frigate approached within 24 nautical miles (38 km) of the coast of the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name for Diaoyu), whose ownership is disputed by Tokyo and Beijing. Previously in the same area, but without violating the territorial waters of Japan,

Japanese Cabinet Secretary General Yoshihide Suga during a press conference, he said that these maneuvers are of serious concern to Tokyo. The government, according to Sugi, will conduct a thorough investigation into the incident to determine whether the actions of the Russian and Chinese ships were coordinated.

Recall that the dispute between China and Japan over the ownership of the islands has been going on since the early 1970s. In September 2012, the situation escalated after the Japanese government bought three of the five islands of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) archipelago from a private Japanese owner.

About what are the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea, says AiF.ru.

One of the Senkaku Islands. Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

Senkaku (尖閣諸島, senkaku-shōto:) or Diaoyudao (traditional Chinese 釣魚台群島 - "fishing islands") is an archipelago in the East China Sea, 170 km northeast of Taiwan.

Consists of eight islands: Uotsurishima (Diaoyu-dao), Taishoto (Chivei-yu), Kubashima (Huangwei-yu), Kitakojima (Bei Xiao-dao), Minamikojima (Nan Xiao-dao), Oki-no-Kitaiva (Da Bei Xiao-dao), Oki-no-Minamiiwa (Da Nan Xiao-dao), Tobise (Fei Chiao-yan).

• Largest Island: Wotsurishima
• Total area: 7 km²
• highest point: 383 m
• Minerals: oil and gas reserves have been discovered on the shelf, there are rich fish resources

Senkaku Islands. Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

Are the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands inhabited?

No, these rocky islands are uninhabited. Both Japan and China sometimes send their official delegations to them. Landed people usually raise their national flag over one of the islands, after which they leave back.

What is the importance of these islands for Japan and China?

These islands are of interest due to their strategic position, the possession of them expands the possibility of both civilian and military navigation. In addition, fishing is possible in the area. But the dispute over the islands between China and Japan arose for a different reason. In 1968, specialists from the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East discovered rich reserves of oil and natural gas on the shelf of the islands. According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry of Japan as of November 1975, offshore oil reserves amounted to about 700 million tons, and gas - 200 billion cubic meters.

Senkaku Islands. Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

Island dispute between Japan and China

The prerequisites for the emergence of disagreements about the ownership of practically uninhabited islands were established in 1895 when they first came under Japanese control following the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).

According to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which secured the victory of the Japanese over imperial China, Beijing ceded Senkaku and Taiwan. In 1932, the Japanese government sold four islands to private ownership, and left one - Taisho - for itself.

After the end of World War II, when the Japanese lost all the lands they had captured since the end of the 19th century, the archipelago came under the temporary jurisdiction of the United States, and in 1972 was transferred by the Americans to Japan, which considers it the extreme point of the island prefecture of Okinawa and native Japanese territory. The United States recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the territory and believes that the disputed issue falls under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Guarantees. In turn, China considers the Diaoyu archipelago to be primordially Chinese land.

Beijing and Tokyo cannot determine the course of the border between the exclusive economic zones in the area of ​​the islands. Japan insists on passing the dividing line in the middle body of water, PRC - on moving the line closer to the Japanese coast.

In 1978, after the signing of the Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, Japan and the PRC announced a freeze on the debate over the islands. In April 1992, during a visit to Tokyo by General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Jiang Zemin, territorial sports were put aside for future generations.

On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government nationalized three islands - Uotsuri, Kitako and Minamiko, signing a contract with a private owner to purchase these islands for $ 26 million. Prior to the nationalization of the islands, Japan rented them from the Kurihara family. Rent annually cost the state 314 thousand dollars.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry urged Japan to reconsider its decision to nationalize them, the Chinese Defense Ministry stressed that "China's armed forces reserve the right to retaliate in connection with Japan's purchase of the Diaoyu Islands."

On September 14, 2012, six PRC patrol ships entered the territorial waters that Japan considers its own. The demonstrative entry of Chinese guards became the largest in the history of the territorial conflict between Tokyo and Beijing around Senkaku and lasted about seven hours.

On September 17, 2012, amid the escalating dispute with Japan over the islands, China began air force exercises with the participation of its latest fighters and landing ships. On the same day, a flotilla of a thousand Chinese fishing boats advanced to the shores of the archipelago.

On September 25, 2012, Taiwan openly joined the conflict. About 50 Taiwanese ships tried to break through to Senkaku. The Japanese border guards were forced to use powerful water cannons and eventually pushed them into international waters.

On January 30, 2013, a Chinese frigate temporarily targeted a Japanese patrol vessel in the area of ​​the disputed islands. According to the conclusion of the Japanese side, it was a "firing guidance radar." In connection with this incident, the Japanese government decided to form a special detachment of the country's self-defense forces to protect the Senkaku Islands, consisting of 20 patrol ships and 13 aircraft.

On July 23, 2013, the Marine Police Department was established in the PRC, whose functions include, in particular, "protection of the country's sovereignty over territorial waters."

On July 24, 2013, ships of the Chinese maritime police entered the zone that Tokyo considers its territorial waters for the first time. The Japanese border guards did not take active steps, fearing the escalation of the conflict.

On July 29-30, 2013, during a visit to China by Japanese First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Akitaka Saiki, he held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on bilateral relations, including the conflict over the islands. An agreement was reached to continue negotiations on different levels.

In September 2013, due to the conflict over the islands, the Chinese authorities refused to hold a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg.

On October 3, 2013, in Tokyo, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed that the Senkaku Islands are subject to Japanese administrative rights, and therefore the provisions of the bilateral security treaty apply to them. This means that Washington will come to the aid of Japan in the event of a clash with China near these islands.

On November 6, 2013, the Japan Self-Defense Forces deployed SSM-1 (SSM-1) anti-ship missiles for the first time on the islands of Miyako and Okinawa, targeting international straits leading from East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

On November 16, 2013, four boats of the PRC Marine Police entered the area where the islands are located, this call was the 70th since the nationalization of this territory by the Japanese government on September 11, 2012.

On November 23, 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced the creation of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, which, in particular, extends to the disputed islands. According to the order of the Ministry of Defense of the PRC, the Chinese armed forces will now apply defensive measures against any aircraft that do not respond to requests and do not obey orders while in this zone. As stated in the document, when passing through the identification zone, foreign aircraft must submit a flight plan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in advance, respond to identification requests, and have clear identification marks on board. Japan and South Korea protested to China in this regard, and the United States expressed serious concern to China and confirmed that it extends to the Senkaku Islands its obligations to defend Japan in accordance with the 1960 bilateral security treaty.

November 25, 2013 Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang stated that China does not exclude the possibility of establishing additional air defense identification zones in the future in other areas, in particular, in the South China Sea.

The airlines of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have already confirmed that they plan to notify the PRC authorities about flights via air space identification zone.

Tuesday, February 5th, 2013 |

Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu)

The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) is an archipelago in the East China Sea, 170 km northeast of Taiwan, the subject of a territorial dispute between Japan, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China.

Settlement history

According to official Tokyo, since 1885, the Japanese government has repeatedly studied the Senkaku Islands and received accurate confirmation that the islands were not only uninhabited, but there were no signs that they were under Chinese control. Based on this, on January 14, 1895, the government of the country officially included the Senkaku Islands in the territory of Japan in accordance with international law terra nullius - "no man's land".

The Senkaku Islands were neither part of the island of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores, which were ceded to Japan by Qing China in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was concluded in April 1895 following the First Sino-Japanese War. In the period 1900-1940. On the islands of Kubajima and Uotsurishima, there were 2 settlements of Japanese fishermen, with a total of 248 inhabitants. There was also a bonita processing plant on the island of Wotsurijima. Due to the crisis in the Japanese fishing industry, the factory closed and the settlements were abandoned by the beginning of 1941.

In 1945, Japan lost the war and lost all the territories it had acquired since the end of the 19th century. Senkaku, along with Okinawa, came under US jurisdiction. But in the early 1970s, the United States returned Okinawa to Japan, giving her Senkaku as well.

20 years later, the PRC stated that it did not agree with this decision and in 1992 declared this territory "originally Chinese." According to the Chinese side, the islands should be returned to China in accordance with the provisions of the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which deprived Japan of all its conquered territories. It must be said that interest in the archipelago from China began to arise after studies were carried out here under the auspices of the UN in 1968, on the basis of which it was concluded that there were oil and gas reserves in the East China Sea. This, in turn, prompted the Chinese Government and Taiwanese authorities since the 1970s to make their first claims to territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Curiously, up to this point, there had been no objection from any country or region to Japan's sovereignty over the islands. For example, there is a mention of "Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama County, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan" in a letter dated 1920, which was sent by the then Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki. In addition, the People's Daily article of January 8, 1953, and the Atlas of the World published in China in 1960, also considered the Senkaku Islands as part of Okinawa.

In 2003, the Chinese installed an offshore platform at maritime border With Japanese waters and started drilling. The Japanese side expressed concern that the PRC could start extracting gas from deposits extending under Japanese territory.

In the spring of 2004, in connection with the detention by Japan of Chinese citizens who landed on the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku), Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui of the People's Republic of China outlined the Chinese government's position on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands: he noted that the Diaoyu Islands and the islands adjacent to them are the original territory of the PRC, that China has an indisputable sovereign right over these islands, and that the determination and will of the Government and the people of China to uphold the country's territorial sovereignty remain unchanged.

In October 2004, the first round of consultations on the Senkaku gas field took place, during which the parties agreed to resolve all issues exclusively through negotiations, without resorting to the use of force. At the same time, China rejected the demands of the Japanese side to acquaint it with the PRC's plans for drilling and gas production at Senkaku.

Also, Tencent QQ, a service popular in China, launched filtering messages related to the controversial issue of the Senkaku Islands. In August 2004, QQ Games began filtering words such as "Senkaku Islands" and "Senkaku Defense Movement." This act sparked a lot of debate, and Tencent has since removed the filter.

In April 2005, the Japanese government decided to start considering applications from Japanese companies for issuing licenses for gas production on the shelf of the archipelago. The PRC Foreign Ministry described the decision as "one-sided and provocative", pointing out that Japanese firms cannot work in the territory that the PRC considers its own. Japan's decision was one of the reasons that led to massive anti-Japanese demonstrations and pogroms in China.

In June 2005, the second round of Sino-Japanese consultations took place. They didn't bring results. China refused to stop gas production from the shelf on the border between Chinese and Japanese waters and again rejected the request of the Japanese side to provide it with information about the work on the shelf. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said that China has a "sovereign right" to extract gas in "waters close to the coast of the PRC" and not "the subject of a dispute with Japan."

The parties agreed to continue negotiations. Japan agreed to consider a Chinese proposal to jointly develop the field. Until 2010, Japan and China were negotiating the details of the project, but they were suspended at the initiative of the PRC after Japan detained a Chinese trawler in the disputed Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands / and arrested its captain.

In March 2011, the Chinese oil and gas company CNOOC began developing the Shirakaba / Chunxiao / gas field. The Shirakaba / Chunxiao / field is located on the Chinese side of the line along which Japan separates the economic zones of the two countries, but Tokyo believes that it has access to a common gas reservoir in the East China Sea.

"The Diaoyu Archipelago and the islands adjacent to it have been Chinese territory, and China has undeniable sovereignty over these islands. Any measures taken Japanese side in the waters near the Diaoyu Islands are illegal and invalid, ”such is the official point of view of the PRC on the situation around the Diaoyu Islands.

On April 15, 2012, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced that the Japanese capital was going to buy these islands in the East China Sea, which are also claimed by China.

In the area of ​​the islands there are deposits of natural gas, which China intends to develop. Official Tokyo, on the other hand, claims that the sea border of the two states clearly delimits these territories, and the gas-rich areas belong to Japan. On this moment Tokyo authorities lease these islands from private owners, who are Japanese citizens.

On July 11, patrol ships of the Chinese Navy were maneuvering off the coast of Senkaku Island. In this regard, on July 15, 2012, the Japanese Ambassador to China was recalled for consultations.

On August 19, anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in China, in a number of places ending in pogroms of Japanese shops and Japanese-made cars. The reason for the speeches was the fact that a group of Japanese citizens landed on the disputed islands and hoisted the flag of Japan there.

On September 5, Japanese media reported that the Japanese government was able to negotiate with a private owner of 3 of the 5 Senkaku Islands to buy them for 2 billion 50 million yen, exceeding the offer of Tokyo Prefecture.

On September 11, China responded to Japan's decision by sending two warships to the disputed islands "to protect sovereignty." The Chinese Foreign Ministry explained that if Japan does not refuse to buy the Senkaku Islands, which the PRC considers historically belonging to it, then the incident could threaten with "serious consequences." Mass anti-Japanese pogroms began the same week, which led to the closure of factories owned by Japanese companies.

On September 16, relations between China and Japan escalated after mass protests began in China against Japan's "nationalization" of the islands, which the PRC considers its territory. Anti-Japanese demonstrations with the participation of several thousand people are engulfed in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Qingdao and Chengdu.

Later, 1,000 Chinese fishing boats head for the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China announced that Chinese government is ready to submit part of the documents regarding the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile maritime zone in the East China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, established on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Two of the 11 Chinese military patrol ships cruising near the Senkaku Islands entered Japanese territorial waters.

Eight small islands, the total area of ​​which barely exceeds 6 sq. km, have been the main stumbling blocks in relations between China and Japan for decades. Despite repeated attempts to normalize the situation, in 2018 the territorial dispute is ready to flare up with renewed vigor: since the beginning of January, Chinese ships approached the Senkaku Islands twice, which caused protests from Tokyo. TASS tells what are the positions of the parties, why the island conflict continues and what attempts have been made to resolve it.

Diaoyu or Senkaku?

The Senkaku archipelago, which the Chinese call the Diaoyu (釣魚岛, Chinese for "islands [for] fishing") and consider their territory, is located 410 km from the southern Japanese prefecture of Okinawa and 170 km northeast of Taiwan. Most major islands the ridges are Uotsuri, Kuba, Kitako, Minamiko and Taisho (the rest barely protrude from the water). The total area of ​​the disputed territory in the East China Sea is 6.3 sq. km. De facto, the islands are controlled by Japan, and not only mainland China claims them, but also the authorities of Taiwan.

The prerequisites for a dispute over the practically uninhabited islands appeared in 1895, when they first came under Japanese control following the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. According to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which sealed the victory of the Japanese over imperial China, Beijing ceded Senkaku along with Taiwan in favor of Tokyo. In 1932, the Japanese government sold four islands to private ownership, and left one - Taisho - for itself. After the end of World War II, when the Japanese lost all the lands they had captured since the end of the 19th century, the archipelago came under the temporary jurisdiction of the United States, and in 1972 was transferred by the Americans to Japan, which considers it the extreme point of the island prefecture of Okinawa and native Japanese territory. The United States recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the territory and believes that the disputed issue falls under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Guarantees.

In turn, China considers the Diaoyu archipelago to be primordially Chinese land. As evidence, the Chinese state media, for example, cite "ancient maps" on which the islands are designated as Beijing's possessions. Tokyo is using the same trick: in 2015, the Japanese Foreign Ministry discovered a Chinese map from 1969 with the islands named in Japanese.

The solution to the problem of disputed areas is complicated by the presence of rich fish resources and potential deposits of natural resources. In 1968, studies were carried out in the region of the islands under the auspices of the UN, on the basis of which it was concluded that there might be oil and gas reserves. However, no one knows the exact volumes of these reserves: according to the US Energy Information Administration, there are 28-57 billion cubic meters of hydrocarbons in the East China Sea, Chinese calculations exceed these figures hundreds of times.

The islands are also of strategic interest to Beijing and Tokyo: their possession expands the possibilities of both civilian and military shipping. Due to the territorial dispute, the parties cannot determine the course of the border between the exclusive economic zones in the area of ​​the Senkaku Islands. Japan insists on passing the dividing line in the middle of the water area, China - on moving the line closer to the Japanese coast.

Over the past half century, the dynamics of the conflict have changed, but never entered a "hot" phase. The PRC and Taiwan declared their claims to the islands in 1971 in connection with the forthcoming return of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction. In 1978, after the signing of the Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, Japan and China agreed to freeze the debate over the islands. In April 1992, during a visit to Tokyo by General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Jiang Zemin, the territorial dispute was put aside for future generations. At the same time, each of the parties still continued to consider these territories as their own. Turned around on both sides social movements for the return of the islands, which was accompanied by massive nationalist actions.

Escalation of the conflict

Until the end of the 2000s, the situation developed in a positive way, and the parties even thought about joint development of fields in the East China Sea. This was advocated, in particular, by Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who said in 2009: "I want to turn a sea of ​​problems into a sea of ​​friendship." His Chinese colleague Hu Jintao spoke in a similar vein.

These plans were not destined to come true. On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government nationalized three islands - Uotsuri, Kitako and Minamiko, signing a contract with a private owner to purchase these islands for ¥2.05 billion (about $26 million). Prior to the nationalization of the islands, Japan rented them from the Kurihara family. Rent annually cost the state ¥24 million (about $314,000).

The nationalization of the islands was received with hostility by Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Ministry urged Japan to reconsider its decision, while the Chinese Defense Ministry stressed that "China's armed forces reserve the right to retaliate against Japan's purchase of the Diaoyu Islands."

In response to the nationalization of the islands by Japan, anti-Japanese demonstrations were held in more than 100 cities in the PRC, in which more than 500 thousand people took part - these are the largest demonstrations in China since the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972. The protesters smashed Japanese shops and businesses. More than 100 cars were burned near the representative offices of the Japanese automakers Toyota, Nissan and Honda across the country. Decreased by a few percentage points Japanese exports to China, as the Chinese began to massively refuse products from Japan.

On September 14, 2012, six PRC patrol ships entered the territorial waters that Japan considers its own. The demonstrative entry of Chinese guards became the largest in the history of the territorial conflict between Tokyo and Beijing around Senkaku and lasted about seven hours. Since then, Chinese patrol ships have been almost constantly near Senkaku and periodically make calls to coastal zone. On average, the Chinese visit the disputed waters between seven and 12 times a month (the maximum number of violations - 28 - was recorded in August 2013).

Chronology of rising tension around Senkaku

. September 17, 2012 Against the backdrop of an escalating dispute with Japan over the islands, China began air force exercises with the participation of its latest fighters and landing ships. On the same day, a flotilla of a thousand Chinese fishing boats advanced to the shores of the archipelago.

. September 25, 2012 Taiwan openly joined the conflict. About 50 Taiwanese ships tried to break through to Senkaku. The Japanese border guards were forced to use powerful water cannons and eventually pushed them into international waters.

. January 30, 2013 A Chinese frigate temporarily targeted a Japanese patrol vessel in the area of ​​the disputed Diaoyu Islands. According to the conclusion of the Japanese side, it was a "firing guidance radar." In connection with this incident, the Japanese government decided to form a special detachment of the country's self-defense forces to protect the Senkaku Islands, consisting of 20 patrol ships and 13 aircraft.

. July 23, 2013 China has set up a Maritime Police Administration whose functions include, in particular, "the protection of the country's sovereignty over territorial waters."

. July 24, 2013 China's maritime police ships for the first time entered the zone that Tokyo considers its territorial waters. The Japanese border guards did not take active steps, fearing the escalation of the conflict.

. July 29-30, 2013 During the visit to the PRC of Japanese First Deputy Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki, he held talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on bilateral relations, including the Senkaku conflict. An agreement was reached to continue negotiations at different levels.

. In September 2013 2019, due to the conflict over the islands, the Chinese authorities refused to hold a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg.

. October 3, 2013 In Tokyo, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed that the Senkaku Islands are subject to Japanese administrative rights and are therefore subject to the provisions of the bilateral security treaty. This means that Washington will come to the aid of Japan in the event of a clash with China near these islands.

. November 6, 2013 Japan Self-Defense Forces deployed SSM-1 anti-ship missiles for the first time on the islands of Miyako and Okinawa, targeting the international straits leading from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

. November 16, 2013 Four Chinese maritime police boats entered the area of ​​the Senkaku Islands, this was the 70th visit since the nationalization of this territory by the Japanese government on September 11, 2012.

Continuation

The situation escalated to the limit when on November 23, 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced the creation of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea, which, in particular, extends to the disputed Senkaku Islands. According to the order of the Ministry of Defense of the PRC, the Chinese armed forces will now apply defensive measures against any aircraft that do not respond to requests and do not obey orders while in this zone.

According to the document, when passing through the identification zone, foreign aircraft must send a flight plan to the Chinese Foreign Ministry in advance, respond to identification requests, and have clear identification marks on board. Japan and South Korea protested to China in this regard, and the United States expressed serious concern to China and confirmed that it extends to the Senkaku Islands its obligations to defend Japan in accordance with the 1960 bilateral security treaty.

At the same time, the airlines of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan confirmed that they plan to notify the PRC authorities about flights through the airspace of the identification zone. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang, China does not exclude the possibility of creating additional air defense identification zones in the future in other areas, in particular, in the South China Sea.

frozen spore

The situation was only normalized by November 2014, when Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe reached an agreement on four points, one of which was an agreement "through dialogue and consultations to prevent the deterioration of the situation around the Diaoyu Islands." The parties indicated that they hold different views on the situation, and thus actually froze further development conflict.

However, China and Japan are still far from completely overcoming the territorial dispute. There are both internal and external reasons for this. The first is the fact that the islands are of great symbolic importance for both sides. And even the slightest concessions to the neighbor will be fraught with discontent at home. Concerning external causes, then the conflict over eight pieces of land sticking out from under the water is just a particular manifestation of a larger game between China and Japan for influence in a region where neither side can give up.

Artur Gromov

Six months after the speech of the Kuomintang administration of Taiwan with a protest against the return of the Ryukyu and Senkaku islands to Japan, on December 30, 1971, Beijing also published an official statement on this matter. Formally, this statement was “tied” to the moment the Japanese Parliament approved the Japanese-American agreement of June 17, 1970.

In principle, Beijing's position on this issue completely coincides with the position of Taipei. Peking diplomacy solves the issue of arguing its position in a much simpler way than it was done in the statement of the Kuomintang administration of Taiwan. The document of the PRC Foreign Ministry uses exclusively historical argumentation - a widely tested method for territorial disputes imposed by China on its neighbors along the land border. The statement reads, in part: “The Diaoyu Island and other islands have always been Chinese territory. Even under the Ming Dynasty, these islands were already in the zone of China's maritime defense; they were islands belonging to the Chinese island of Taiwan, not belonging to the Ryukyu, which are now called Okinawa. The border of China with the Ryukyu in this area lies between the islands of Chiweyu and Kume; Chinese fishermen from Taiwan have long been engaged in economic activity on about. Diaoyu and other islands.

Note that the “question” of whether or not the Senkaku Islands are part of the Ryukyu archipelago, which Beijing focuses on, is an artificially far-fetched Chinese side. No one has ever - and the Japanese side agrees with this - included the Senkaku Islands in the Ryukyu archipelago.

In connection with the official announcement by the government of the People's Republic of China of its position regarding the ownership of the Senkaku Islands, one should obviously note an important moment in the development of the situation in this region. In 1970, preliminary sounding and probing of positions began, an active unofficial exchange of views between the PRC and the USA on the improvement and normalization of relations between the two countries. In July 1971, Henry Kissinger, then National Security Assistant to the President of the United States, visited Beijing. He held talks with Zhou Enlai and through whom the Chinese government officially invited United States President Richard Nixon to visit China. In October 1971, H. Kissinger again visited Beijing. All this testified to a significant easing of Sino-American relations. After the signing of the Japanese-American agreement on June 17, 1971, on the return of all rights to the Ryukyu archipelago to Japan, American military personnel began to gradually evacuate from the area. In the process of evacuation and the emerging normalization of relations with the United States, as if as a test of the readiness of the American administration to continue to pursue a policy of softening relations with China, a statement by the PRC Foreign Ministry dated December 30, 1971 was published in Beijing, which contained the PRC's official claims to the Senkaku Islands.

In this episode, the United States showed its loyalty to China by refusing to get involved in the current conflict, despite the fact that some political circles in Japan persistently tried to enlist their support in the dispute that arose.

Beijing's official statement provoked an immediate reaction from Tokyo: on January 6, 1972, the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a brief but very energetic statement warning that after the US withdrawal from the area, Japanese forces would be responsible for the defense of the Senkaku Islands. self defense.

On January 13, 1972, the Xinhua News Agency published a commentary in connection with this demarche of the Japanese government, in which it reaffirmed China's claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and protested "the greedy aspirations of the reactionary Sato government to annex Chinese territory."

Tensions in the East China Sea continued to escalate. In February, the Kuomintang administration of Taiwan took another step: the Taipei press published a report that a decision had been made to include the Senkaku Islands in Yilan County, Taiwan Province. In connection with this decision, the authorities of Yilan County stuck to their intention to send a special team to the islands in March to set up administrative institutions there.

With regard to this report, especially that part of it which deals with the establishment of "administrative institutions" on the Senkaku Islands, it is probably not out of place to recall once again that we are talking about islands on which there is no permanent population.

On February 17, the Japanese government protested against the decision of the Taiwanese authorities to include the islands in the administrative unit of Taiwan Province. Reports of this, which appeared in the pages of Japanese newspapers, gave impetus to an intensified public campaign in defense of Japan's rights to the Senkaku Islands. The Kyodo Tsushin Agency reported on March 3 from Naha, administrative center Okinawa what's local legislative assembly approved a resolution calling on the Japanese government to try to convince China to give up its claim to the islands.

In March 1972, the question of the islands was discussed at a session of the Japanese Parliament. Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Fukuda made a statement on this issue at a meeting of one of the committees of the parliament. According to a correspondent for the Kyodo Tsushin agency on March 8, T. Fukuda gave a historical overview of the events connected with the development of the Senkaku Islands by Japan since 1885 in his statement. In conclusion, the minister stressed that the islands undoubtedly belong to Japan and the claims of other countries to them are "unfair and deplorable."

The answer to this statement by T. Fukuda was a new commentary by the Xinhua News Agency, published in the Chinese press on March 31. Xinhua again categorically stated that “ Chinese people will certainly return the Diaoyu and the other islands.”

It is easy to see that before the beginning of 1972 the steps taken by Beijing and Taipei seemed to complement each other. In fact, Beijing immediately came out in support of any initiative by the Taiwanese Kuomintang administration aimed at asserting China's rights to the Senkaku Islands. However, the inclusion of the islands in Yilan County was one of the last steps taken by the Kuomintang administration in this regard. Its international position deteriorated sharply after the restoration of China's UN rights in late 1971, so it took a more cautious stance.

At the same time, some nuances appeared in Chinese propaganda around the issue of ownership of the Senkaku Islands. By this time, serious changes were taking shape on the domestic political scene in Japan (E. Sato was resigning), and the Chinese side obviously considered it untimely to take any steps that could in advance restore against it the future political leadership of Japan. This concerns not only the issue of China's territorial claims against Japan - Chinese propaganda has sharply muffled all anti-Japanese speeches, except for those that were directed personally against E. Sato. Therefore, the Chinese press did not react in any way to the entry into force of the Japanese-American agreement on the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, under which the Senkaku Islands also fell.

At the same time, in connection with the entry into force of the Japan-US agreement, the Chinese side has taken certain steps through official channels. Thus, the Albanian newspaper Zeri i Popullit reported on May 24, 1972, that Huang Hua, Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the UN, in a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council protested against the inclusion of the Senkaku Islands in the Japanese-American agreement. The letter reiterated that the islands have long been ostensibly Chinese territory and that any US-Japan deal involving the islands is illegal and, in Beijing's opinion, has no effect. The Chinese press, however, kept silent about this demarche of the PRC representative to the UN.

On July 7, 1972, a cabinet headed by K. Tanaka came to power in Japan. The new government set as its goal, along with the strengthening of Japanese positions in relation to the United States, the normalization of relations with the PRC, which the Prime Minister announced in his very first speech.

At the end of September 1972, K. Tanaka visited China, culminating in an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries on a basis that, in principle, corresponded to the requirements put forward in this matter by the Chinese side. However, in terms of the settlement of territorial problems, this visit did not give anything to Japan. As the correspondent of the Kyodo Tsushin agency reported on K. Tanaka's press conference on October 1, 1972, when the Japanese Prime Minister tried to discuss the issue of ownership of the Senkaku Islands during Japanese-Chinese negotiations, Zhou Enlai walked away from this discussion, stating: “ But we will argue about it here. After all, these are just tiny dots that are even difficult to notice on maps. They only became a problem because oil was found around them.”

Indeed, the Senkaku Islands were difficult to find on Chinese maps published before 1970: these islands simply do not appear on them.

In general, the analysis of cartographic materials published in China gives very interesting results in connection with the Senkaku problem. It is well known that both Kuomintang and Maoist diplomacy, anticipating the official presentation of their territorial claims against neighboring countries, widely used the method of "cartographic aggression". This method consists in the fact that certain areas of neighboring countries, which were later officially claimed, were included on Chinese maps as part of its territory. So, from the very first years of existence in China people's republic the maps published in the PRC depicted by it certain regions of the Soviet Far East and the entire Pamir, vast regions of Mongolia and India, the entire "Afghan corridor", the north of the Kachin region and the entire left bank of the Salween in the Shan region of Burma. In the same way, all the islands were depicted on the maps as belonging to China. South China Sea. But not a single map even mentions the existence of the Senkaku Islands.

Of course, the islands are small. But Chinese cards scrupulously depicted all the reefs and atolls, including those covered with water during high tides, the shallows of Macclesfield Bank, where, from the point of view international law There are no islands as such. The image of the Senkaku Islands on Chinese maps appeared only after the question of their ownership arose, and they began to be depicted even on maps with such a scale as 1: 50,000,000!

No less curious is the fact that the Chinese maps of the Taiwan province published before 1970-1971 limit it, and, consequently, the “Taiwan region” of Fr. Pengjia, located about 60 km northeast of Taiwan. On some maps, in the place where the Senkaku Islands are located, a sidebar with a legend is placed.

And only after the problem arose, the "Taiwan area" on the maps was significantly expanded. An example of this is the map of the province of Taiwan from the Atlas of China, published in 1973.

It is also interesting that even on the new maps, the Senkaku Islands are depicted differently from all other islands. If all other islands, say, the South China Sea, even the smallest ones, have a name next to their image, then the Senkaku Islands are only mapped. Two of them - Uotsuri and Sekibi - are marked with numbers, and their Chinese names - Diaoyuidao and Chiweiyu - are given, as a rule, not even in the legend, but outside the map frame.

Cartographic materials published in Taiwan depicted the area lying to the northeast of Taiwan, as well as similar publications in the PRC. A vivid example of this is the five-volume "National Atlas of China", prepared by the Taiwanese military academy and published in 1962. Volume I of this edition is devoted entirely to Taiwan. General cards The provinces (for example, maps B1, B6, B8) include, to the northeast of the island, only the Nengjia and Mianhua Islands, which are 50-60 km away from Taiwan, in the tagake province. There is no name of the Senkaku Islands - neither Japanese, nor Chinese, nor English - and in the annex to that summary index of geographical names of the province.

In both Beijing and Taipei press, the area of ​​the Senkaku Islands was referred to as an area of ​​active fishing for fishermen from Taiwan. But here in volume V of the said edition there is a map A15 “Main fishing areas”. On this map, the Senkaku Islands do not appear as one of the "main fishing areas" of fishermen from Taiwan. At the same time, it is well known that Japanese fishermen are actively fishing in this area.

The analysis of documents, publications and cartographic materials of the Chinese side allows us to conclude that the question of ownership of the Senkaku Islands, raised at the initiative of the Kuomintang administration of Taiwan, arose unexpectedly for Beijing. Beijing was not ready for it. But he immediately supported the Kuomintang initiative, seeing in this an opportunity not only to try to take over the entire continental shelf of the East China Sea or most of it, but also to gain leverage over the Japanese government by toughening or softening its position on this issue. In addition, the Peking leadership, of course, could not allow the Kuomintang to turn out to be more "patriots" than they were, advocating the "restoration of rights" of China to the islands allegedly "lost" in the distant past.

As far as Japan is concerned, apart from prestige and other considerations, there is at least one extremely important factor influencing its position with respect to the Senkaku Islands. The Washington Post newspaper wrote about this as early as December 30, 1970: “The Senkaku Islands - the only islands the Ryukyu chains, located in the area of ​​the continental shelf, and therefore the only islands that will give Japan the right to claim some share in the development of the resources of the continental shelf.

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Territorial dispute between Japan and China

The subject of the dispute. The Senkaku Seto Islands (Diaoyutai Qundao in Chinese cartography) include five uninhabited islands and three reefs. with total area about 6.32 sq. km, located in the southern part of the East China Sea, 175 km north of Ishigaki Island (Ryukyu archipelago, Japan). They are located in the area with coordinates 25°46 north latitude and 123°31 east longitude, i.e. 190 km northeast of Taiwan and 420 km east of mainland China. At the moment, the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands are under the jurisdiction of Japan, but China also claims its rights to them.

Question history. As in the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, the history of ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is so complicated that, from a legal point of view, one can argue endlessly about it. The problem of ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands became topical after the entry into force in 1994 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its severity increased significantly after rich reserves of natural gas, estimated at approximately 200 billion cubic meters, were discovered in 1999 on the shelf of the disputed islands. In May 1999, reports appeared in the Japanese press that Chinese ships were conducting geological exploration offshore the Senkaku Islands in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Tokyo offered Beijing to hold joint consultations on the issue of maritime law in its application to the wealth of the disputed islands, but Beijing refused, declaring that the region of the islands was not recognized as an economic zone of Japan. In 2003, the Chinese set up an offshore platform near the sea border with Japanese waters and began drilling. In Japan, they suspected the Chinese side of trying to extract gas from deposits extending under Japanese territory. In October 2004, the parties held the first round of consultations on the Senkaku gas field, during which they agreed to resolve all issues exclusively through negotiations, without resorting to the use of force. At the same time, however, China rejected the demands of the Japanese side to acquaint it with the PRC's plans for drilling and gas production at Senkaku. In April 2005, the Japanese government decided to start considering applications from Japanese firms for issuing licenses for gas production on the shelf of the archipelago, which caused objections from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which characterized this decision as one-sided and provocative, and became one of the reasons for mass anti-Japanese demonstrations and pogroms in China. In June 2005, the second round of Sino-Japanese consultations began, but they did not bring results, since China refused to stop gas production from the shelf on the border between Chinese and Japanese waters and again rejected the request of the Japanese side to provide it with information about the work on the shelf. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said that China has a "sovereign right" to extract gas in "waters close to the coast of the PRC" and not "the subject of a dispute with Japan." Indeed, while carrying out gas exploration work, China has never crossed the dividing line established by Japan, based on the de facto and legal ownership of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. Later, Beijing came up with its proposals for the joint development of the field, and Tokyo agreed to consider them. Difficult negotiations began on the details of the project. However, in September 2010, they were interrupted by the Chinese side after the Japanese coast guard on September 7 detained a Chinese trawler that had rammed a Japanese patrol ship off the coast of Senkaku. Not wanting to show weakness, Japan, having released the crew of the trawler on September 13, 2010, extended the detention of its captain. China demanded the immediate release of the captain and compensation for his detention, and then tightened customs procedures for Japanese companies trading with it and imposed an embargo on the export to Japan of rare earth metals, without which the Japanese electronics and automotive industries cannot work. On September 22, 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao warned Japan against further escalation of the conflict over the incident of the detention of the captain of the Chinese ship off the disputed islands, warning: “If Japan continues to make mistakes, the PRC will take further measures, and all responsibility (for the consequences) will lie on the Japanese side." Japan chose not to escalate the conflict and released the captain of the Chinese ship on September 24, which was seen as a serious victory for the PRC and within Japan itself, caused criticism of the government from the nationalists.

On November 13, 2010, on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Yokohama, a meeting was held between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan. Although both of them, according to members of the Japanese delegation, “spoke in favor of promoting strategically mutually beneficial relations, as well as developing exchanges at the private and government levels,” at the same time they confirmed the invariability of the positions of the PRC and Japan on the disputed islands, which each side considers its own. It is noteworthy that before meeting with Hu Jintao, Naoto Kan held talks with US President Barack Obama, which also touched upon the issue of relations between both countries and China. B. Obama said at the end of them that "the US obligations to defend Japan are unchanged", and N. Kan thanked the American president "for the consistent support of Japan's position during the period of deterioration of its relations with China and Russia" .

Thus, the personal meeting between the leaders of China and Japan did not contribute much to reducing the level of confrontation between the parties on the issue of the disputed islands, which became even clearer from subsequent events. On November 21, 2010, there were reports in the media that Japan intended to send troops to the neighboring islands of the Senkaku archipelago to monitor Chinese activity in the area. On December 19, the Chinese side announced its intention to send its warships to Senkaku / Diaoyu to monitor the situation.

In March 2011, the Chinese oil and gas company CNOOC began developing the Shirakaba (Chunxiao) gas field, which is located on the Chinese side of the line along which Japan separates the economic zones of the two countries. However, Tokyo believes that in this way CNOOC gains access to the common gas reservoir of the East China Sea.

Prospects for resolving the dispute. From the statements of the Japanese side quoted above, it follows that Japan does not intend to yield to China in the dispute over Senkaku. The threat of losing rare earth metals prompted Japan to look for new sources of this valuable raw material. Shortly after the incident with the detention of Chinese fishermen, there were reports that Japanese companies were establishing rare earth mining in Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Vietnam and India. And in 2011, Japanese geologists discovered the largest deposits of rare earth metals in pacific ocean. True, industrial production will require large investments, improved technologies and the conclusion of international agreements, since the areas of the ocean where deposits are found are located in international waters. Thus, in the foreseeable future, China will remain the monopoly supplier of rare earth materials to Japan. By the way, not wanting to spoil mutually beneficial economic relations, in 2011, after Japanese concessions, Beijing lifted an unspoken ban on the supply of rare earth materials to Japan.

At the same time, Beijing's position on the Diaoyu/Senkaku has not changed: “The Diaoyu archipelago and its adjacent islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times, and China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands. Any measures taken by the Japanese side in the waters near the Diaoyu are illegal and invalid.

The position of Japan does not change either. On August 10, 2011, Yu. Edano, Secretary General of the Cabinet of Ministers, during a discussion of the issue of Senkaku in one of the parliamentary committees, stressed that Japan is ready to defend the Senkaku Islands by military force. He stated: "If other countries invade these islands, we will use the right of self-defense and drive them out at any cost," adding that Japan "controls these islands legally."

At the end of the summer of 2011 in Japan, there was a change in the leadership of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan and, accordingly, the head of the country's cabinet of ministers. On August 30, 2011, the Chinese state news agency Xinhua responded to this event with the headline "Japan's new prime minister must respect China's key interests and development needs." In order to improve relations with the PRC, it recommends that the Japanese leadership, in addition to refusing to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, "show sufficient respect for China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially when it comes to issues related to the Diaoyu Islands, which are an integral part of China's territory..." . And further: “Beijing would also like to put aside these differences and jointly with Japan to develop resources in the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, provided that Tokyo recognizes the full sovereignty of China over this archipelago. In addition, Japan should recognize China's legitimate need for military modernization to protect its growing national interests."

This passage allows us to draw at least three conclusions regarding the position of the PRC on disputed territories Diaoyu/Senkaku for the near future:

1) In order to please the mood of the country's public, the Chinese leadership will continue to make statements about the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands by China, but at the same time, not wanting to complicate relations, it will not insist on holding specific negotiations on the fate of the islands - the dispute, in accordance with the call of Deng Xiaoping, will be postponed for indefinite time.

2) China, which is interested in the economic development of the territories in the Diaoyu/Senkaku area, will insistently invite Japan to do this jointly. The chances of getting Japan's consent to this proposal are negligible.

3) China intends to further build up its military, primarily naval, potential in order to get more significant trump cards in future negotiations on territorial issues, and not only with Japan. However, China is unlikely to seriously intend to use military force, or at least the threat of its use in a dispute over territories, since they understand that in this case the United States will be on the side of Japan.

On the whole, according to Japanese journalists and experts, Y. Noda's coming to power in Tokyo was perceived with caution in Seoul and Beijing. The reason for this lies not only in his statement on August 15, 2011, which did not go unnoticed in Asia, that the Class A war criminals whose ashes rest in Yasukuni Shrine, which some Japanese politicians so love to visit, “are not military men.” criminals." The fact is that Y. Noda has a reputation as a politician who is ready to firmly defend Japan's national interests. Here is what the Asahi Shimbun wrote on September 1, 2011: “If there is one issue that can cause a surge of emotions in the usually calm Prime Minister Yo. Noda, it is Japan's territorial disputes. Japan's new leader says his stance on national security and sovereignty is shaped by being raised by a father who served in an elite airborne self-defense regiment and saw Japanese paratroopers train. “I saw up close the fighters of the elite units who were undergoing hard training,” Y. Noda wrote in his book. “This experience helped shape my view of security.” About the position of Y. Noda on territorial dispute with China, the note says that they were clearly stated during the trip of the future prime minister to Beijing as part of a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians in December 2004. At that moment, relations between Japan and China were aggravated due to the incident with the entry of a Chinese nuclear submarine into Japanese territorial waters off the island of Ishigakijima in Okinawa Prefecture. At a dinner at the Beijing Diaoyutai Reception House, Yoh Noda raised the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, urging both sides to refrain from acts that incite nationalism. To this, the head of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Tang Jiaxuan, replied that the dividing line between the two countries "was drawn by Japan at its discretion", and China "never recognized this line." To this, Y. Noda replied that "from a historical point of view, the Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory."

There is no reason to believe that this position of Noda has changed since then. S. Maehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinets of Y. Hatoyama and N. Kan, also adhered to tough positions on territorial issues. And although he was forced to resign due to a scandal with illegal political donations, immediately after his coming to power, Y. Noda appointed S. Maehara as head of the DPJ Political Research Committee. This means that the nationalist S. Maehara gets the opportunity to play an important role in shaping Japanese politics, incl. and external. Thus, we can assume that the change in leadership of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan and, accordingly, the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan at the end of the summer of 2010 did not create any preconditions for facilitating the resolution of territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors.

Ending to be

William B. Hefin, Diayou/Senkaku islands dispute: Japan and China, Oceans apart. http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/articles/APLPJ_01.2_heflin.pdf

China's premier warns Japan against escalating conflict over disputed islands. http://www.ng.ru/world/2010-10-18/6_japan.html

Denisov I. “Japan will find justice for China at the bottom of the ocean”, Voice of Russia website, 07/5/2011, 16:42, http://rus.ruvnm/2011/07/05/52815657.html

Another press conference on July 5, 2022 with the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Hong Lei. http://ua.china-embassy.org/rus/fyrth/t837653.htm

Japan is ready to defend the Senkaku Islands if necessary. http://news.mail.ru/politics/6544033/

Japan "s new PM needs to respect China"s core interests, development demands, Xinhua, August 30, 2011.http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7583349.html

A familiar reaction: China, S. Korea wary of new PM, Asahi, 2011.08.31.