disputed islands. At the border, the seiner walks gloomily. The history of the discovery of the Kuril Islands

TASS-DOSIER. On December 15, 2016, the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Japan begins. It is assumed that one of the topics during his talks with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be the question of ownership of the Kuril Islands.

Japan is currently making territorial claims to Russian islands Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a group of small islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge ( Japanese name Habomai).

The TASS-DOSIER editors have prepared material on the history of this problem and attempts to solve it.

background

The Kuril archipelago is a chain of islands between Kamchatka and the Japanese island of Hokkaido. It is formed by two ridges. The largest of the islands of the Great Kuril ridge are Iturup, Paramushir, Kunashir. Most big Island Small Kuril Ridge - Shikotan.

Initially, the islands were inhabited by the Ainu tribes. The first information about the Kuril Islands was received by the Japanese during the expedition of 1635-1637. In 1643 they were surveyed by the Dutch (led by Martin de Vries). The first Russian expedition (led by V.V. Atlasov) reached the northern part of the Kuriles in 1697. In 1786, by decree of Catherine II, the Kuril archipelago was included in the Russian Empire.

On February 7, 1855, Japan and Russia signed the Shimodsky Treaty, according to which Iturup, Kunashir and the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge were transferred to Japan, and the rest of the Kuriles were recognized as Russian. Sakhalin was declared a joint possession - an "undivided" territory. However, some unsettled questions about the status of Sakhalin led to conflicts between Russian and Japanese merchants and sailors. The contradictions of the parties were resolved in 1875 with the signing of the St. Petersburg Treaty on the exchange of territories. In accordance with it, Russia transferred all the Kuril Islands to Japan, and Japan renounced claims to Sakhalin.

On September 5, 1905, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed, according to which part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel passed into the possession of Japan.

return of the islands

At the final stage of the Second World War, during the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the USSR named the return of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands among the conditions for the start of hostilities against Japan. This decision was enshrined in the Yalta Agreement between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain of February 11, 1945 ("Crimean Agreement of the Three Great Powers on the Far East"). On August 9, 1945, the USSR entered the war against Japan. From August 18 to September 1, 1945, Soviet troops carried out the Kuril landing operation, which led to the surrender of the Japanese garrisons in the archipelago.

On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. According to the document, Japanese sovereignty was limited to the islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, as well as less large islands Japanese archipelago.

On January 29, 1946, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Japan, American General Douglas MacArthur, notified the Japanese government of the exclusion of the Kuril Islands from the territory of the country. On February 2, 1946, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Kuril Islands were included in the USSR.

According to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, concluded between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan, Tokyo renounced all rights, titles and claims to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. However, the Soviet delegation did not sign this document, since it did not stipulate the question of the withdrawal of the occupying troops from the territory of Japan. In addition, the treaty did not specify which islands Kuril archipelago there was a speech and in whose favor Japan refuses them.

This was the main reason for the existing territorial problem, which is still the main obstacle to the conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan.

The essence of the disagreement

The principal position of the USSR and Russia was and is that "belonging to the southern Kuril Islands (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai) Russian Federation is based on the universally recognized results of the Second World War and the unshakable post-war international legal basis, including the UN Charter. Thus, Russian sovereignty over them has a corresponding international legal form and is beyond doubt" (statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry dated February 7, 2015).

Japan, referring to the Shimodsky Treaty of 1855, claims that Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a number of small islands never belonged to the Russian Empire and considers their inclusion in the USSR illegal. In addition, according to Japanese side, these islands are not part of the Kuril Archipelago and therefore they do not fall under the term "Kuril Islands", which was used in the San Francisco Treaty of 1951. Currently, in Japanese political terminology, the disputed islands are called "northern territories".

Declaration of 1956

In 1956, the USSR and Japan signed a Joint Declaration that formally declared the end of the war and restored bilateral diplomatic relations. In it, the USSR agreed to transfer the island of Shikotan to Japan and uninhabited islands(reserving Iturup and Kunashir) after the conclusion of a full-fledged peace treaty. The declaration was ratified by the parliaments of the two states.

However, in 1960, the Japanese government agreed to sign a security treaty with the United States, which provided for the maintenance of the American military presence on Japanese territory. In response, the USSR annulled the obligations assumed in 1956. At the same time, the Soviet Union stipulated the transfer of the islands by the fulfillment by Japan of two conditions - the signing of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country's territory.

Until the early 1990s. Soviet side did not mention the 1956 declaration, although Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka tried to return to its discussion during a visit to Moscow in 1973 (the first Soviet-Japanese summit).

Intensified dialogue in the 1990s

The situation began to change with the beginning of perestroika in the 1980s, the USSR recognized the existence of a territorial problem. Following the visit of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan in April 1991, the joint communiqué included a provision on the intention of the parties to continue negotiations on the normalization of relations and on a peaceful settlement, including territorial issues.

The presence of a territorial problem was also confirmed in the Tokyo Declaration, signed following negotiations between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in October 1993. The document recorded the desire of the parties to resolve the issue of territorial ownership of the disputed islands.

In the Moscow Declaration (November 1998), President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi "confirmed their determination to make every effort to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000." At that time, for the first time, the Russian side expressed the opinion that it was necessary to create conditions and a favorable atmosphere for "joint economic and other activities" in the South Kuriles without prejudice to the legal positions of both sides.

Modern stage

In 2008, Japanese politicians began to introduce the term "illegally occupied northern territories" in relation to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai. In June 2009, the Japanese Parliament passed amendments to the Law on Special Measures to Help Solve the "Problem northern territories", according to which the Japanese government bodies it is ordered to make every effort to return the "original lands of Japan" as soon as possible.

Visits to the islands by top Russian officials provoke a negative reaction in Tokyo (Dmitry Medvedev visited the islands in 2010 as president, in 2012 and 2015 as prime minister; the first two times he was in Kunashir, the last in Iturup). Japanese leaders periodically make "inspections of the northern territories" from an airplane or boat (the first such inspection was made by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in 1981).

The territorial issue is regularly discussed at Russian-Japanese talks. It was especially often raised by the administration of Shinzo Abe, who again took over as prime minister in 2012. However, it has not yet been possible to finally bring positions closer together.

In March 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that on the territorial issue it is necessary "to achieve an acceptable compromise or something like a hikiwake" ("draw", a term from judo). In May 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Japanese Minister Shinzo Abe agreed on the need to develop dialogue in a "constructive manner, without emotional outbursts, public controversy" and agreed on a "new approach" to solving bilateral problems, but the details of the agreements were not reported.

The Japanese authorities demand from Russia the fulfillment of the obligations assumed in 2001 on disputed islands Kuril ridge. The problem of the Kuriles again becomes relevant.

To the root of the problem:

One of the first documents regulating Russian-Japanese relations became the Treaty of Shimoda, signed on January 26, 1855. According to the second article of the treatise, the border was established between the islands of Urup and Iturup - that is, all four islands now claimed by Japan today were recognized as the possession of Japan. Since 1981, the date of the signing of the Shimoda Treaty has been celebrated in Japan as "Northern Territories Day". Another thing is that, relying on the Shimoda treatise as one of the fundamental documents, in Japan they forget about one important point. In 1904, Japan, having attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and unleashed the Russo-Japanese War, itself violated the terms of the treaty, which provided for friendship and good neighborly relations between states. The Shimoda treaty did not determine the ownership of Sakhalin, where both Russian and Japanese settlements were located, and by the mid-70s a solution to this issue was also ripe. The St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, which was ambiguously assessed by both parties. Under the terms of the treaty, all the Kuril Islands were now completely withdrawn to Japan, and Russia received full control over Sakhalin. Then, following the results of the Russo-Japanese War, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan ceded the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel. In 1925, the Soviet-Japanese Convention was signed in Beijing, generally confirming the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty. As is known, the late 1930s and early 1940s were extremely tense in Soviet-Japanese relations and were associated with a series of military conflicts of various scales. The situation began to change by 1945, when the Axis began to suffer heavy defeats and the prospect of losing the Second World War became more and more obvious. Against this background, the question arose about the post-war structure of the world.

So, according to the terms of the Yalta Conference, the USSR was obliged to enter the war against Japan, and South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands went to the Soviet Union. True, at the same time, the Japanese leadership was ready to voluntarily cede these territories in exchange for the neutrality of the USSR and the supply of Soviet oil. The USSR did not take such a very slippery step. The defeat of Japan by that time was a matter of maybe not a quick, but still time. And most importantly, refraining from decisive action, the Soviet Union would actually give the situation to Far East into the hands of the United States and its allies. By the way, this also applies to the events of the Soviet-Japanese War and the Kuril landing operation itself, which was not originally prepared. When it became known about the preparations for the landing of American troops on the Kuriles, the Kuril landing operation was urgently prepared in a day. Fierce fighting in August 1945 ended with the surrender of the Japanese garrisons in the Kuriles.

Fortunately, the Japanese command did not know the real number of Soviet paratroopers and, without fully using their overwhelming numerical superiority, capitulated. At the same time, the South Sakhalin offensive operation was also carried out. So, at the cost of considerable losses, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands became part of the USSR.

San Francisco

The peace treaty between the victorious powers and Japan was signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. Japan, according to this document, renounced all rights to the Kuril Islands. However, the Soviet delegation did not sign this treaty. A number of researchers consider this a serious mistake of Soviet diplomacy, but there were very good reasons for this. Firstly, the document did not specify what the Kuril Islands were with their enumeration - the American side stated that only a special international court could establish this. Yes, and the head of the Japanese delegation, at the suggestion of the Americans, said that Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Khabomai are not included in the Kuril Islands.

What is also interesting is that Japan refused the rights to the islands, but it did not follow from the document to whom these islands were transferred .... in fact, the agreement did not confirm the right of the USSR to the Kuriles, but transferred the problem into an indefinite direction. "Favorite Japanese document" On October 19, 1956, the Soviet-Japanese declaration was signed, designed to prepare the basis for the preparation of a peace treaty. On this wave, the Soviet side, "meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests Japanese state, agrees to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan (Shikotan) to Japan, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the signing of the peace treaty. How many legal documents, the declaration, which Japanese politicians are so fond of recalling these days, has a number of subtleties. Firstly, if the USSR is ready to transfer, then such a document recognizes the very belonging of the islands to the Soviet Union. Secondly, the transfer must take place after the signing of the peace treaty. And thirdly, it was only about the two southern islands of Habomai and Shikotan. For 1956, both sides assessed such a declaration as a positive breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations, which alarmed the United States to no small extent. Under pressure from Washington, the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan was replaced, and the course was taken to sign the US-Japanese military treaty, which was finalized in 1960. Then for the first time from the Japanese side, not without the help of the United States, demands were voiced for the transfer of not two, but all four islands. The United States, however, pointed out that the Yalta agreements were declarative, but by no means binding. Since the treaty included clauses on the deployment of American bases in Japan, a memorandum from the USSR government to the government of Japan dated January 27, 1960 noted: “The new military treaty signed by the government of Japan is directed against Soviet Union, as well as against the Chinese People's Republic, cannot contribute to the expansion of the territory used by foreign troops by the transfer of the islands indicated to Japan. In view of this, the Soviet government considers it necessary to declare that only on the condition of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Japan and the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan, the islands of Habomai and Sikotan will be transferred to Japan, as provided for by the Joint Declaration. But, as you know, American troops are still stationed on the Japanese islands, and the Japanese government, constantly referring to the declaration, demands the transfer of not two, but four islands before the signing of peace.

From "perestroika" to our days

In the context of the weakening of the USSR, in the second half of the 1980s, the issue of the transfer of the Kuril Islands was again raised by Japan. Unfortunately, a number of steps taken by Soviet and young Russian diplomacy did not meet the interests of the state. One of the key points was the recognition of the problem of the islands and the conduct in a beneficial way for opposite side key. In fact, the topic of the Kuril Islands could become a bargaining chip in the politics of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who counted on decent material compensation in exchange for the islands. And if the former led an accelerated process, then Yeltsin allowed the transfer of the islands in the distant future (15-20 years). However, it was impossible not to take into account the colossal costs that would inevitably manifest themselves inside the country in the event of territorial concessions. Such a pendulum policy continued for almost the entire "Yeltsin era", Russian diplomacy moved away from a direct solution to the problem, which, under the conditions of the crisis, had a negative impact in all respects. On present stage there is no serious progress in the issue of the Kuril Islands due to the extremely uncompromising position of Japan, which puts as a preliminary condition the transfer of all four islands, and then the discussion of the signing of a peace treaty. What further conditions the Japanese Foreign Ministry can put forward can only be guessed at. In any case, the immediate solution of this issue is unlikely.
Especially given the persistent state foreign policy pursued by the country's leadership at the present time, aimed at strengthening the territorial integrity of Russia and strengthening its role in the geopolitical situation in the world.

To the root of the problem

One of the first documents regulating Russian-Japanese relations was the Shimoda Treaty, signed on January 26, 1855. According to the second article of the treatise, the border was established between the islands of Urup and Iturup - that is, all four islands now claimed by Japan today were recognized as the possession of Japan.

Since 1981, the date of the signing of the Shimoda Treaty has been celebrated in Japan as "Northern Territories Day". Another thing is that, relying on the Shimoda treatise as one of the fundamental documents, in Japan they forget about one important point. In 1904, Japan, having attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and unleashed the Russo-Japanese War, itself violated the terms of the treaty, which provided for friendship and good neighborly relations between states.

The Shimoda treaty did not determine the ownership of Sakhalin, where both Russian and Japanese settlements were located, and by the mid-70s a solution to this issue was also ripe. The St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, which was ambiguously assessed by both parties. Under the terms of the treaty, all the Kuril Islands were now completely withdrawn to Japan, and Russia received full control over Sakhalin.

Then, following the results of the Russo-Japanese War, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan ceded the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel.

In 1925, the Soviet-Japanese Convention was signed in Beijing, generally confirming the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty. As is known, the late 1930s and early 1940s were extremely tense in Soviet-Japanese relations and were associated with a series of military conflicts of various scales.

The situation began to change by 1945, when the Axis began to suffer heavy defeats and the prospect of losing the Second World War became more and more obvious. Against this background, the question arose about the post-war structure of the world. So, according to the terms of the Yalta Conference, the USSR was obliged to enter the war against Japan, and South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands went to the Soviet Union.

True, at the same time, the Japanese leadership was ready to voluntarily cede these territories in exchange for the neutrality of the USSR and the supply of Soviet oil. The USSR did not take such a very slippery step. The defeat of Japan by that time was a matter of maybe not a quick, but still time. And most importantly, by refraining from decisive action, the Soviet Union would actually hand the situation in the Far East into the hands of the United States and its allies.

By the way, this also applies to the events of the Soviet-Japanese War and the Kuril landing operation itself, which was not originally prepared. When it became known about the preparations for the landing of American troops on the Kuriles, the Kuril landing operation was urgently prepared in a day. Fierce fighting in August 1945 ended with the surrender of the Japanese garrisons in the Kuriles.

Fortunately, the Japanese command did not know the real number of Soviet paratroopers and, without fully using their overwhelming numerical superiority, capitulated. At the same time, the South Sakhalin offensive operation was also carried out. So, at the cost of considerable losses, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands became part of the USSR.

Kurile Islands- a chain of islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the island of Hokkaido, separating the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from Pacific Ocean. The length is about 1200 km. total area- 15.6 thousand km. To the south of them is state border Russian Federation with Japan. The islands form two parallel ridges: the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril. Includes 56 islands. Have important military-strategic and economic importance.

Geographically, the Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin region of Russia. Southern islands of the archipelago - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, as well as the islands MalayaKurilridges.

On the islands and coastal zone industrial reserves of non-ferrous metal ores, mercury, natural gas, and oil have been explored. On the island of Iturup, in the area of ​​the Kudryavy volcano, there is the richest known mineral deposit in the world. rhenium(rare metal, the cost of 1 kg is 5000 US dollars). Thereby Russia ranks third in the world in terms of natural reserves of rhenium(after Chile and the USA). The total resources of gold in the Kuril Islands are estimated at 1867 tons, silver - 9284 tons, titanium - 39.7 million tons, iron - 273 million tons.

The territorial conflict between Russia and Japan has a long history:

After the defeat in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia handed over to Japan southern part Sakhalin;

In February 1945, the Soviet Union promised the US and Great Britain to start a war with Japan on the condition that Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands be returned to it;

February 2, 1946 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on education in the territory South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands South Sakhalin region as part of Khabarovsk Territory RSFSR;

In 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan adopted a Joint Treaty officially ending the war between the two states and transferring the islands of the Lesser Kuril Range to Japan. Signing the agreement, however, did not work out, because it came out that Japan was waiving the rights to Iturup and Kunashir, because of which the United States threatened not to give Japan the island of Okinawa.

Russia's position

The official position of the Russian military-political leadership in 2005 was expressed by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, stating that the ownership of the islands was determined by the results of the Second World War and that in this sense Russia was not going to discuss this issue with anyone. But in 2012, he made a very reassuring statement for the Japanese people, saying that the dispute should be resolved on the basis of a compromise that suits both sides. "Something like hikiwake. Hikiwake is a term from judo, when neither side managed to win," the President explained.

At the same time, the Government of the Russian Federation has repeatedly stated that sovereignty over the southern Kuriles is not subject to discussion, and Russia will strengthen its presence in them, making all the necessary efforts for this. In particular, the Federal target program"Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands", thanks to which the former Japanese "northern territories" are actively building infrastructure facilities, it is planned to build aquaculture facilities, kindergartens and hospitals.

Japanese position

Every prime minister, every party that won the elections is determined to return the Kuriles. At the same time, there are parties in Japan that claim not only southern Kuriles, but also to all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin Island. Also in Japan, a political movement for the return of the "northern territories" is organized, which conducts regular propaganda activities.

At the same time, the Japanese pretend that there is no border with Russia in the Kuril region. Russian-owned the southern Kuril Islands on all maps and postcards are shown as the territory of Japan. Japanese mayors and police chiefs are appointed to these islands. Children in Japanese schools learn Russian in case the islands are returned to Japan. Moreover, they are taught to show on the map the "northern territories" and juvenile pupils of kindergartens. Thus, the idea that Japan does not end here is supported.

By decision of the Japanese government, starting from February 7, 1982, the country annually celebrates the "Day of the Northern Territories". It was on this day in 1855 that the Shimoda Treaty was concluded, the first Russian-Japanese treaty, according to which the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge went to Japan. On this day, a "nationwide rally for the return of the northern territories" is traditionally held, in which the prime minister and government ministers, parliament deputies from the ruling and opposition political parties, and former residents of the southern part of the Kuriles take part. While on the streets Japanese capital Dozens of far-right campaign buses with powerful loudspeakers, painted with slogans and under militaristic flags, leave, plying between the parliament and the Russian embassy.

The conflict over the Kuril Islands began long before World War II.

The dispute over the southernmost Kuril Islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Khabomai - has been a point of tension between Japan and Russia since they were taken over by the Soviet Union in 1945. Over 70 years later Russian-Japanese relations still cannot be called normal due to the ongoing territorial dispute. To a large extent, it was historical factors that prevented the solution of this issue. These include demographics, mentality, institutions, geography, and economics, all of which encourage tough policies rather than willingness to compromise. The first four factors contribute to the persistence of the stalemate, while the economy in the form of oil policy is associated with some hope of a resolution.

Russia's claims to the Kuriles date back to the 17th century, which occurred as a result of periodic contacts with Japan through Hokkaido. In 1821, a de facto border was established, according to which Iturup became Japanese territory, A Russian land started from the island of Urup. Subsequently, according to the Shimodsky Treaty (1855) and the St. Petersburg Treaty (1875), all four islands were recognized as the territory of Japan. IN last time The Kuriles changed their owner as a result of the Second World War - in 1945 in Yalta, the Allies, in fact, agreed to transfer these islands to Russia.

The dispute over the islands has become a part of politics cold war during negotiations to conclude the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 2c of which forced Japan to renounce all its claims to the Kuril Islands. However, the refusal of the Soviet Union to sign this agreement left these islands in a state of limbo. In 1956, a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration was signed, which de facto meant the end of the state of war, but failed to resolve territorial conflict. After the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, further negotiations were stopped, and this continued until the 1990s.

However, after the end of the Cold War in 1991, there appeared to be new opportunity to resolve this issue. Despite the tumultuous events in world affairs, the positions of Japan and Russia on the Kuriles have not changed much since 1956, and the reason for this situation was five historical factors that were outside the Cold War.

The first factor is demographic. Japan's population is already declining due to low birth rates and aging, while Russia's population has been declining since 1992 due to excessive drinking and other social ills. This shift, together with the weakening of international influence, has led to the emergence of retrospective tendencies, and both nations are now basically trying to resolve this issue by looking backwards rather than forwards. In the presence of such attitudes, it can be concluded that the aging populations of Japan and Russia are depriving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Vladimir Putin of the opportunity to negotiate because of firmly entrenched views on the issue of the Kuriles.

Context

Is Russia ready to return two islands?

Military construction in the Kuriles

Is it possible to agree on the Kuril Islands?

The perception of Japan in Russia was largely shaped by the issue of the Kuril Islands, and this continued until the end of the Cold War. Anti-Japanese propaganda became common after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and it was reinforced by the Japanese intervention during civil war in Russia (1918-1922). This led many Russians to believe that as a result, all previously concluded treaties were annulled. However, Russia's victory over Japan in World War II ended the previous humiliation and reinforced the symbolic meaning of the Kuril Islands, which came to represent (1) the irreversibility of the results of World War II and (2) Russia's status as a great power. From this point of view, the transfer of territory is seen as a revision of the outcome of the war. Therefore, control over the Kuriles retains an important psychological significance for the Russians.

Japan is trying to define its place in the world as a "normal" state, located next to the growing great strength China. The question of the return of the Kuril Islands is directly linked to the national identity of Japan, and these territories themselves are perceived as the last symbol of defeat in World War II. The Russian offensive and the capture of Japan's "inalienable territory" helped reinforce the victim mentality that became the prevailing narrative after the end of the war.

This attitude is reinforced by the Japanese conservative media, which often supports the government's foreign policy. In addition, nationalists often use the media to viciously attack academics and politicians who hint at the possibility of reaching a compromise on this issue, leaving little room for manoeuvre.

This, in turn, has an impact on the political institutions of both Japan and Russia. In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin's position was so weak that he feared possible impeachment if the Kuril Islands were handed over to Japan. Simultaneously central Russian government was weakened as a result of the growing influence of regional politicians, including two governors of the Sakhalin region - Valentin Fedorov (1990 - 1993) and Igor Fakhrutdinov (1995 - 2003), who actively opposed the possible sale of the Kuriles to Japan. They relied on nationalist sentiments, and this was enough to prevent the completion of the treaty and its implementation in the 1990s.

Since President Putin came to power, Moscow has brought regional governments under its influence, but other institutional factors have also contributed to the stalemate. One example is the idea that the situation should mature, and then some issue or problem can be solved. During the initial period of his rule, President Putin was able, but not willing, to negotiate with Japan over the Kuriles. Instead, he decided to spend time and energy on resolving the Sino-Russian border conflict due to the question of the Kuril Islands.

Since returning to the presidency in 2013, Putin has become increasingly dependent on the support of nationalist forces, and it is unlikely that he will be ready to cede the Kuriles in any meaningful way. Recent events in Crimea and Ukraine clearly demonstrate how far Putin is willing to go to defend Russia's national status.

Japanese political institutions, while different from Russia's, also support a hard line of negotiation over the Kuriles. As a result of the reforms carried out after the end of World War II, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominates Japan. With the exception of the period from 1993 to 1995 and from 2009 to 2012, the LDP had and continues to have a majority in the national legislative assembly, and in fact her party platform regarding the return of four southern islands Kuril ridge since 1956 has been integral part national policy.

In addition, the real estate crash of 1990-1991 saw the Liberal Democratic Party nominate only two effective prime ministers, Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, both of whom rely on nationalist support to maintain their positions. Finally, regional politics in Japan plays an important role, and elected politicians in Hokkaido are pushing the central government to take a assertive stance in this dispute. Taken together, all these factors do not contribute to a compromise that would include the return of all four islands.

Sakhalin and Hokkaido emphasize the importance of geography and regional interests in this dispute. Geography influences how people see the world and how they observe policy making and implementation. The most important Russian interests are in Europe, followed by the Middle East and central Asia, and only after that Japan. Here is one example - Russia devotes a significant part of its time and efforts to the issue of NATO expansion to the east, in eastern part Europe, as well negative consequences related to the events in the Crimea and Ukraine. As far as Japan is concerned, the alliance with the United States, China, and the Korean Peninsula take precedence over relations with Moscow. The Japanese government must also take into account public pressure to resolve issues with North Korea regarding kidnapping and nuclear weapons, which Abe promised to do several times. As a result, the issue of the Kuriles is often relegated to the background.

Probably the only factor contributing to a possible resolution of the Kuril issue is economic interests. After 1991, both Japan and Russia entered a period of long economic crisis. The Russian economy hit its lowest point during its crisis national currency in 1997, and is currently facing serious difficulties due to the collapse in oil prices and economic sanctions. However, the development of oil and gas fields in Siberia, in the process of which Japanese capital and Russian capital are combined natural resources, promotes cooperation and possible resolution of the issue of the Kuriles. Despite the sanctions imposed, 8% of Japan's oil consumption in 2014 was imported from Russia, and the increase in oil and natural gas consumption is largely due to the consequences of the disaster at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima.

In their totality, historical factors largely determine the continued stagnation in resolving the issue of the Kuril Islands. The demographics, geography, political institutions, and attitudes of the citizens of Japan and Russia all contribute to a tough negotiating position. Oil policy provides some incentive for both nations to resolve disputes and normalize relations. However, so far this has not been enough to break the impasse. Despite the possible change of leaders around the world, the main factors that have driven this dispute to a standstill are likely to remain unchanged.

Michael Bacalu is a member of the Council on Asian Affairs. He received a master's degree in international relations at Seoul University, South Korea, as well as a bachelor's degree in history and political science Arcadia University. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author as an individual and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which he has ties.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.